



**BERKELEY CITY COUNCIL PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE
SPECIAL MEETING**

**Tuesday, February 25, 2025
10:00 AM**

Cypress Room – 2180 Milvia Street, 1st Floor, Berkeley, CA 94704

Committee Members:

Councilmembers Rashi Kesarwani, Shoshana O’Keefe, and Brent Blackaby
Alternate: Mayor Adena Ishii

This meeting will be conducted in a hybrid model with both in-person attendance and virtual participation. All Committee meetings are recorded.

To access the meeting remotely use this URL - <https://cityofberkeley-info.zoomgov.com/j/1610923585>. To request to speak, use the “raise hand” function in Zoom. To join by phone: Dial **1-669-254-5252** or **1-833-568-8864 (Toll Free)** and Enter **Meeting ID: 161 092 3585**. To provide public comment, press *9 and wait to be recognized by the Chair. To submit a written communication for the Committee’s consideration and inclusion in the public record, email policycommittee@berkeleyca.gov.

This meeting will be conducted in accordance with the Brown Act, Government Code Section 54953. Any member of the public may attend this meeting, however, if you are feeling sick, please do not attend the meeting in person.

Pursuant to the City Council Rules of Procedure and State Law, the presiding officer may remove, or cause the removal of, an individual for disrupting the meeting. Prior to removing an individual, the presiding officer shall warn the individual that their behavior is disrupting the meeting and that their failure to cease their behavior may result in their removal. The presiding officer may then remove the individual if they do not promptly cease their disruptive behavior. “Disrupting” means engaging in behavior during a meeting of a legislative body that actually disrupts, disturbs, impedes, or renders infeasible the orderly conduct of the meeting and includes, but is not limited to, a failure to comply with reasonable and lawful regulations adopted by a legislative body, or engaging in behavior that constitutes use of force or a true threat of force.

California Government Code Section 84308 (Levine Act) Parties to a proceeding involving a license, permit, or other entitlement for use are required to disclose if they made contributions over \$500 within the prior 12 months to any City employee or officer. Parties and participants with a financial interest are prohibited from making more than \$500 in contributions to a decisionmaker for the 12 months after the final decision is rendered on the proceeding. The above contribution disclosures and restrictions do not apply when the proceeding is competitively bid, or involves a personnel or labor contract. For more information, see Government Code Section 84308.

AGENDA

Roll Call

Election of Chairperson

Minutes for Approval

Draft minutes for the Committee's consideration and approval

1. Minutes - November 18, 2024

Committee Action Items

The public may comment on each item listed on the agenda for action as the item is taken up. The Chair will determine the number of persons interested in speaking on each item. Up to ten (10) speakers may speak for two minutes. If there are more than ten persons interested in speaking, the Chair may limit the public comment for all speakers to one minute per speaker. Speakers are permitted to yield their time to one other speaker, however no one speaker shall have more than four minutes.

Following review and discussion of the items listed below, the Committee may continue an item to a future committee meeting, or refer the item to the City Council.

2. Resolution: Opposition to Police Brutality and Use of Force on Nonviolent Protesters

From: Councilmember Harrison (Author)

Referred: October 15, 2024

Due: March 24, 2025

Recommendation: Adopt a Resolution reaffirming the City of Berkeley's opposition to and condemning police brutality towards nonviolent protesters and discouraging use of "less-lethal" weapons for crowd control.

Financial Implications: See report

Contact: Kate Harrison, Councilmember, District 4, (510) 981-7140

Committee Action Items

3. **Berkeley Police Department Texting Offences: An Independent Investigation by the Police Accountability Board** *(Item contains supplemental material)*
From: Police Accountability Board
Referred: January 6, 2025
Due: June 9, 2025
Recommendation: The Police Accountability Board formally recommends to the City Council that it:
1. Pass an ordinance or otherwise affirm the Police Accountability Board's ability to access documents and records in furtherance of its central accountability function, consistent with Charter Amendment Section 125.
 2. Adopt a robust resolution ensuring full and meaningful accountability for sworn officers—whether on-duty or off-duty—who engage in misconduct of any kind, but especially actions or expressions of racial or other types of bias.
 3. Direct the City Manager to work with the Berkeley Police Department, Police Accountability Board, and the Office of the Director of Police Accountability to create a public repository to fulfill the vision of California Penal Code Section 832.7(b)(1), allowing for transparency in cases of sustained allegations of officer racism or other discriminatory conduct or expression.
 4. Call on California state legislators to extend the prohibition on arrest quotas, which are currently limited to the California Vehicle Code (Section 41600 – 41603).
- Financial Implications:** See report
Contact: Hansel Aguilar, Police Accountability Board, (510) 981-4950
4. **Police Accountability Board Report: Fair and Impartial Policing Implementation** *(Item contains supplemental material)*
From: Police Accountability Board
Referred: January 27, 2025
Due: June 16, 2025
Recommendation: Approve the following recommendations and instruct the Berkeley Police Department (BPD) and Police Accountability Board (PAB) to proceed with their implementation:
Recommendations to the Berkeley Police Department
1. Three-prong approach.
 - a. Definition of Low-Level Traffic Infractions: A definition consistent with SB 50 should be adopted.
 - b. Primary Collision Factors: This prong should specify the mode of the party at fault.
 - c. Community Reports: Under the category of "a variety of unsafe driving incidents," policies should be put in place that specify which calls for service will result in law enforcement action. That specification should be derived from an analysis of the 13% of calls from community members that resulted in a citation or arrest, as per the City Auditor's July 2021 report.
 - d. Community Caretaking: This prong needs more specificity, and its components should be based on Berkeley data rather than national statistics, as is done for Prong 1 (Primary Collision Factors). Specifically, the analysis should examine which other factors (non-PCFs) are highly associated with severe and fatal collisions in Berkeley.

Committee Action Items

The open-ended quality of this prong may contribute to more non-safety-related stops than is called for in the Council directive. If more specificity is not possible or feasible, this prong should be eliminated.

e. Reporting: Future BPD updates on FIP implementation should include statistical information enabling an analysis of the impact of the three-prong approach on reducing or eliminating stops for low-level offenses—a primary focus of the Council directive—in a manner that supports an overall assessment and an understanding of the approach’s impact on reducing racial disparities in traffic stops.

2. Evidence-based definition for stops of criminal suspects:

a. Establish an evidence-based definition for stops of criminal suspects.

b. Explain how precision-based policing, feedback loops, and accountability measures referenced in BPD FIP implementation updates relate to this recommendation and addresses the directive to establish an evidence-based definition for stopping criminal suspects.

3. Enhanced implicit bias training: Per the Council's directive, ensure that BPD personnel receive intensive annual training dedicated to implicit bias.

4. EIS: Pending the deployment of a new Early Intervention and Risk Management system, EIS audits should be focused on officers who are outliers on the variables stipulated in the Department’s EIS, with a particular focus on racial disparities in stops, arrests, and searches. A designated PAB Member should serve as an observer in this process, as has been informally agreed to. Future audit reports should include the scope of what was reviewed and a clear statement of findings within the confines of officer confidentiality.

5. Written consent searches: Future reporting to the council should include the number of consent searches conducted per reporting period and their effect on racial disparities in searches, compared to consent search numbers before implementation.

6. Warrantless searches of people on supervised release: Future FIP updates should identify the impact of the new BPD Policy 311.6 on the numbers of searches and arrests of people on probation and parole and the racial disparities in them.

7. Profiling by proxy: Future BPD updates should specify what instructions dispatchers are given on profiling by proxy, and any impact the instruction and corresponding Communications Manual amendments have had on racial disparities in departmental response to calls for service.

8. Business cards: Ensure that business cards are distributed as mandated by the Council directive.

9. Make resources on police-civilian encounters publicly available, such as through RAHEEM.org.

Recommendations to the Police Accountability Board

1. Scenario-based training: The 2021 Council specifically referred to the PAB oversight of the implementation of a scenario-based training component in the existing officer training required by the California Penal Code. This topic will be agendaized for discussion at a future PAB meeting, including the appropriateness of, and ability of the PAB to oversee departmental training.

2. Crisis Intervention Team (CIT): The 2021 Council item refers to the PAB accelerating CIT activity. This will be discussed in future PAB meetings.

Committee Action Items

Recommendations to the Berkeley City Council

1. Establish metrics to assess the success of implementing FIP directives. Currently, the BPD appears to be focused entirely on policy, and on tests of bias, as evidenced in its recently published Annual Report. The PAB has focused instead on outcomes, addressing the key question of whether racial disparities have decreased in any of the areas subject to FIP directives.

2. Eliminate reporting requirements for recommendations that the PAB ascertains have been fully implemented.

3. Require BPD to report biannually on:

a. Traffic stops by each prong of their 3-prong framework and by race within each prong.

b. Stop, search, and arrest data by probation/parole status and race.

c. Calls for service by the race of the reporter and reportee.

Financial Implications: See report

Contact: Hansel Aguilar, Police Accountability Board, (510) 981-4950

5. Discussion Item: Update on the Five-Year Infrastructure Plan and how it factors in with reduction of traffic violence

From: Councilmember Tregub

Contact: Igor Tregub, Councilmember, District 4, (510) 981-7140

6. Discussion Item: Domestic Violence Report

From: Councilmember Taplin

Contact: Terry Taplin, Councilmember, District 2, (510) 981-7120

Unscheduled Items

These items are not scheduled for discussion or action at this meeting. The Committee may schedule these items to the Action Calendar of a future Committee meeting.

Items for Future Agendas

- **Requests by Committee Members to add items to the next agenda**

Adjournment

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*Written communications addressed to the Public Safety Committee and submitted to the City Clerk Department will be distributed to the Committee in advance of the meeting and retained as part of the official record.*

*This meeting will be conducted in accordance with the Brown Act, Government Code Section 54953 and applicable Executive Orders as issued by the Governor that are currently in effect. Members of the City Council who are not members of the standing committee may attend a standing committee meeting even if it results in a quorum being present, provided that the non-members only act as observers and do not participate in the meeting. If only one member of the Council who is not a member of the committee is present for the meeting, the member may participate in the meeting because less than a quorum of the full Council is present. Any member of the public may attend this meeting. Questions regarding public participation may be addressed to the City Clerk Department (510) 981-6900.*



**COMMUNICATION ACCESS INFORMATION:**

This meeting is being held in a wheelchair accessible location. To request a disability-related accommodation(s) to participate in the meeting, including auxiliary aids or services, please contact the Disability Services specialist at [ada@berkeleyca.gov](mailto:ada@berkeleyca.gov), (510) 981-6418 (V), or (510) 981-6347 (TDD) at least three business days before the meeting date. Attendees at public meetings are reminded that other attendees may be sensitive to various scents, whether natural or manufactured, in products and materials. Please help the City respect these needs.

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I hereby certify that the agenda for this meeting of the Standing Committee of the Berkeley City Council was posted at the display case located near the walkway in front of the Maudelle Shirek Building, 2134 Martin Luther King Jr. Way, as well as on the City's website, on February 20, 2025.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Mark Numainville".

Mark Numainville, City Clerk

Communications

Communications submitted to City Council Policy Committees are on file in the City Clerk Department at 2180 Milvia Street, 1st Floor, Berkeley, CA, and are available upon request by contacting the City Clerk Department at (510) 981-6908 or policycommittee@berkeleyca.gov.



**BERKELEY CITY COUNCIL PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE
REGULAR MEETING MINUTES**

**Monday, November 18, 2024
10:30 AM**

2180 Milvia Street, 6th Floor, Berkeley, CA 94704 – Redwood Room

Committee Members:

Councilmembers Terry Taplin, Ben Bartlett, and Igor Tregub
Alternate: Councilmember Mark Humbert

This meeting will be conducted in a hybrid model with both in-person attendance and virtual participation. All Committee meetings are recorded.

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MINUTES

Roll Call 10:34 a.m.

Present: Taplin, Tregub

Absent: Bartlett

Public Comment on Non-Agenda Matters – 1 speaker.

Minutes for Approval

Draft minutes for the Committee's consideration and approval.

1. Minutes - July 15, 2024

Action: M/S/C (Tregub/Taplin) to approve the July 15, 2024 minutes.

Vote: Ayes – Taplin, Tregub; Noes – None; Abstain – None; Absent – Bartlett.

Committee Action Items

The public may comment on each item listed on the agenda for action as the item is taken up. The Chair will determine the number of persons interested in speaking on each item. Up to ten (10) speakers may speak for two minutes. If there are more than ten persons interested in speaking, the Chair may limit the public comment for all speakers to one minute per speaker. Speakers are permitted to yield their time to one other speaker, however no one speaker shall have more than four minutes.

Following review and discussion of the items listed below, the Committee may continue an item to a future committee meeting, or refer the item to the City Council.

2. Discussion Item: City's Progress on Reimagining Public Safety

From: Councilmember Taplin

Contact: Terry Taplin, Councilmember, District 2, (510) 981-7120

Action: 2 speakers. Presentation made and discussion held. The committee completed its consideration of this item.

3. Discussion Item: City's Approach to Traffic Enforcement

From: Councilmember Taplin

Contact: Terry Taplin, Councilmember, District 2, (510) 981-7120

Action: 2 speakers. Presentation made and discussion held. The committee completed its consideration of this item.

Committee Action Items

4. **Discussion Item: City's Progress on Vision Zero Action Plan**
From: Councilmember Taplin
Contact: Terry Taplin, Councilmember, District 2, (510) 981-7120
Action: 3 speakers. Presentation made and discussion held.

5. **Community Safety Plans for a Safe and Resilient Berkeley**
From: Councilmember Hahn (Author), Councilmember Tregub (Co-Sponsor)
Referred: October 15, 2024
Due: March 24, 2025
Recommendation: Refer to the City Manager to create four strategic, single-subject Community Safety Plans to effectively reduce Gun Violence, Sexual Assault, Retail Theft, and Traffic Violence. Return Plans to the City Council for review and approval.
Financial Implications: See report.
Contact: Sophie Hahn, Councilmember, District 5, (510) 981-7150
Action: 1 speaker. M/S/C (Tregub/Taplin) to send the item with a qualified positive recommendation to Council to direct staff to conduct a gap analysis of existing plans to ensure no duplication of efforts and identify areas where gaps may exist requiring a comprehensive plan; update the Vision Zero Action Plan in alignment with its recommendations, incorporating support for staff efforts in the update; identify and recommend any additional resources necessary to address the identified gaps, with a referral to the June budget process for funding if required; coordinate with external entities, including USC, UC Berkeley, and other cognizant entities, to support strategic plan development; and collaborate with county agencies and other relevant organizations to address related challenges effectively and return plans to the City Council for review and approval.
Vote: Ayes – Taplin, Tregub; Noes – None; Abstain – None; Absent – Bartlett.

Unscheduled Items

These items are not scheduled for discussion or action at this meeting. The Committee may schedule these items to the Action Calendar of a future Committee meeting.

6. **Resolution: Opposition to Police Brutality and Use of Force on Nonviolent Protesters**
From: Councilmember Harrison (Author)
Referred: October 15, 2024
Due: March 24, 2025
Recommendation: Adopt a Resolution reaffirming the City of Berkeley's opposition to and condemning police brutality towards nonviolent protesters and discouraging use of "less-lethal" weapons for crowd control.
Financial Implications: See report
Contact: Kate Harrison, Councilmember, District 4, (510) 981-7140

Items for Future Agendas

- Update on the Five-Year Infrastructure Plan and how it factors in with reduction of traffic violence
- Domestic Violence Report

Adjournment

Action: M/S/C (Taplin/Tregub) to adjourn the meeting

Vote: Ayes – Taplin, Tregub; Noes – None; Abstain – None; Absent – Bartlett

Adjourned at 11:58 a.m.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct record of the Public Safety Committee meeting held on November 18, 2024.

Wendy Sorensen, Assistant City Clerk

Communications

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Kate Harrison
Councilmember, District 4

ACTION CALENDAR
October 15, 2024

To: Honorable Members of the City Council

From: Councilmember Harrison

Subject: Resolution: Opposition to Police Brutality and Use of Force on Nonviolent Protesters

RECOMMENDATION

Adopt a Resolution reaffirming the City of Berkeley's opposition to and condemning police brutality towards nonviolent protesters and discouraging use of "less-lethal" weapons for crowd control.

POLICY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION

No final action was taken by the Public Safety Committee. Item is automatically returning to the Council agenda pursuant to the time limit for items referred to policy committees.

BACKGROUND

The City of Berkeley has a long and storied history of nonviolent protest and civil disobedience. Unfortunately, that history is coupled with one of police brutality directed at nonviolent protesters. The most infamous example of police brutality in Berkeley occurred on "Bloody Thursday" in 1969 when James Rector was murdered by the Alameda County Sheriff force and a National Guard helicopter sprayed CS (tear gas) on thousands of protesters shortly following the founding of People's Park and deputies shot birdshot and buckshot at demonstrators.

While CS gas and pepper spray are both banned in warfare by international law, police in the United States commonly use them for crowd control purposes. On June 9, 2020, the City Council unanimously passed a motion to prohibit the use of CS gas by the Berkeley Police Departments or by any agency called for mutual aid in Berkeley.¹ This motion also prohibited the use of pepper spray and smoke by the Berkeley Police Department and by any agency called for mutual aid response in Berkeley, during the

¹ <https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/city-council-meetings/06-09%20Annotated%20Agenda%204pm.pdf>

COVID-19 pandemic and until such time that the City Council removes this prohibition.² The City's recent suspension of the local COVID emergency does not mean that the COVID-19 pandemic is over, nor does it overturn the Council's 2020 pepper spray and smoke prohibition policy.

Other devices can also harm people. LRADs, or Long-Range Acoustic Devices, have dire consequences for the protesters and bystanders who are exposed to them. According to the Berkeley Police Department's 2022 Police Equipment and Community Safety Annual Report, BPD currently has two LRADs in its possession. Use of LRADs in crowd control situations can be dangerous according to Physicians for Human Rights, and the City of Berkeley regulates their use. LRADs are "capable of causing not only permanent hearing loss, but also migraine, vestibular, and other auditory symptoms" and emit decibels up to 162 dB SPL (sound pressure level), exponentially higher than jet engines at 130 dB SPL, as decibel levels increase exponentially.³

Batons are commonly used by police to brutalize protesters, and recent legislation strongly restricts their use by the Berkeley Police Department. Under international law, "batons must never be used as a means of punishment, to disperse peaceful protests, or against people who are already restrained."⁴ Yet batons were used by police forces across the United States to disperse peaceful protests during the Black Lives Matter protests of 2020, for example. During Berkeley Black Lives Matter protests in December of 2014, police forces used CS gas, blast rounds, and harmed protesters with batons to force crowds to disperse—which led to a successful civil rights lawsuit against the city.⁵

As a result, the City now is required to apply standards when less lethal weapons are used in a crowd using a standard closer to the lethal force standard. In addition, the policy requires BPD personnel to have a clear shot at an allegedly violent target to prevent injury to others, expansive use of force reporting, implementation of body worn cameras, cite and release provisions, crowd liaisons, and prohibitions on skirmish lines advancing rapidly into a crowd. Berkeley has to live up to its commitments, and other jurisdictions must adopt similar policies.

So-called less-lethal or "kinetic impact" projectiles, including rubber bullets, are used by police forces across the country against nonviolent protesters, and their use should be strongly restricted. According to Amnesty International, "there has been an alarming increase in eye injuries, including eyeball ruptures, retinal detachments and the

²<https://records.cityofberkeley.info/PublicAccess/api/Document/AfRL%C3%89LmUm28As5bQtd10Au1FOSJlk1QHHaoDvg0JDhYupGbecgfU%C3%89KphfxL4BQWn%C3%81GtBmi8Z0%C3%81w8NXdky5pxceo%3D/>

³ <https://www.asha.org/news/2020/long-range-acoustic-devices-for-crowd-control-can-cause-serious-hearing-loss-and-harm/>

⁴ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/06/global-20-rules-for-ending-widespread-misuse-of-police-batons/>

⁵ <https://www.berkeleyside.org/2015/06/11/police-report-mistakes-challenges-in-berkeley-protests>

complete loss of sight, as well as bone and skull fractures, brain injuries, the rupture of internal organs and hemorrhaging, punctured hearts and lungs from broken ribs, damage to genitalia, and psychological trauma” by less-lethal munitions.⁶ These weapons also include hard foam, rubberized buckshot, and CS gas. Amnesty International also states that “at least 53 people died from projectiles fired by security forces, according to a peer-reviewed study based on medical literature worldwide between 1990 and June 2017. It also concluded that 300 of the 1,984 people injured suffered permanent disability.” All less-lethal munitions can still be lethal, and should not be used for crowd control in Berkeley by UCPD or mutual aid agencies.

Finally, the practice of corralling, or “kettling,” can pose severe dangers to nonviolent and peaceful protesters. When police corral protesters in a confined space, there is nowhere to go if police begin to use force against protesters. As nonviolent and peaceful protesters are corralled into the same confined and potentially dangerous space, protesters may become victims of excessive police force more easily. Beyond the inability to escape police use of force, corralled protesters are put in a plainly frightening situation that may cause immense psychological distress. Importantly, even if police are focused on certain protesters, kettling places all protesters, including nonviolent and peaceful protesters, into the same confined and dangerous space. The City of Berkeley should strongly discourage any police departments responding to civil disobedience and protest in Berkeley from utilizing this strategy for crowd control.

“Less-lethal,” which is often erroneously described as “less-than-lethal,” is only relatively so. It can maim and even kill. It is known to have a disproportionate impact on persons with both physical disabilities and mental challenges. CS can be very detrimental to persons with asthma, COVID-19 or other respiratory diseases. Crowd control is a dynamic setting, and officers’ ability for precise shots is greatly impaired. The chances of hitting the intended individual with a projectile are low, and of hitting uninvolved protesters is high. Chemical munitions by their nature affect large numbers of people and even spread far beyond the immediate area. BPD Chief Meehan confirmed this in a *Berkeleyside* account from June 11, 2015:

“Chief Meehan noted that, even when an officer is focused on an individual, the projectile does not always find its mark due to the unpredictable movements of a crowd. A similar explanation was provided regarding baton strikes. Police said they are trained to avoid areas such as the head and neck, but that blows don’t always land in the right place because subjects move.”⁷

⁶ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/03/global-dozens-killed-and-thousands-maimed-by-police-misuse-of-rubber-bullets/#:~:text=There%20has%20been%20an%20alarming,damage%20to%20genitalia%2C%20and%20psychological>

⁷ <https://www.berkeleyside.org/2015/06/11/police-report-mistakes-challenges-in-berkeley-protests>

Use of less-lethal weapons in an indiscriminate manner against a demonstration that is non-violent, or even mixed, is a denial of First Amendment rights to free speech and assembly. In fact, it is tantamount to collective punishment, a denial of due process.

In September of 2021, Governor Gavin Newsom signed AB 48, which restricts police departments use of kinetic energy projectiles and chemical agents to disperse any assembly, protest, or demonstration, and AB 481, which requires law enforcement agencies to obtain approval of military equipment. While these laws restrict the use of “less-lethal” munitions California law enforcement agencies, they also do not preclude municipalities from adopting more stringent policies or reaffirming their opposition to their use on nonviolent protesters.

This subject is of particular concern because the University of California is currently awaiting a decision by the Supreme Court in *Make UC a Good Neighbor v. The Regents of University of California* that could allow the University to begin building housing there, with resulting protests a likely outcome. On September 19, 2023, the City of Berkeley adopted a resolution authorizing the City Attorney to submit an amicus brief in support of the University of California Regents, defending the University’s proposed development of People’s Park. It is important that the Berkeley City Council immediately adopt a resolution denouncing the use of “less-lethal” devices and any police brutality against nonviolent protesters in Berkeley from any agencies and police departments, whether or not our police department participates in enforcement actions.

FISCAL IMPACTS OF RECOMMENDATION

Following Berkeley’s policies on crowd control will reduce the need for resource-intensive and expensive paramedic and medical care for injured protestors.

ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY

There are no identifiable environmental effects or opportunities associated with adopting this recommendation.

ATTACHMENTS

1: Resolution

RESOLUTION NO. XXXX-N.S.

REAFFIRMING OPPOSITION TO AND CONDEMNING POLICE BRUTALITY
TOWARDS NONVIOLENT PROTESTERS AND DISCOURAGING USE OF “LESS-
LETHAL” WEAPONS FOR CROWD CONTROL

WHEREAS, Berkeley’s Southside neighborhood has historically been the site of violent police use of force and brutality towards protesting students and community members, most famously during “Bloody Thursday” in 1969 where the Alameda County Sheriff force murdered James Rector and a National Guard helicopter sprayed CS (tear gas) on thousands of protesters shortly following the founding of People’s Park; and

WHEREAS, the Chemical Weapons Convention and Geneva Convention prohibit CS gas and pepper spray in warfare; and

WHEREAS, the State of California recently enacted AB 481⁸ and AB 48,⁹ which demilitarize and regulate police departments’ acquisition and use of projectiles, chemical weapons, military equipment, and others, and protect protesters’ First and Fourth Amendment rights; and

WHEREAS, on April 27, 2021, the Berkeley City Council unanimously passed an ordinance to oversee and make transparent militarized police equipment used for crowd control and SWAT operations; and

WHEREAS, Berkeley Police Department’s 2022 Police Equipment and Community Safety Annual Report provided an inventory of reportable equipment, including 20 Less Lethal single 40MM launchers, 2 Less Lethal Milkor LTL 40 MM multi-launchers, 724 associated 40mm rounds, 8 Less Lethal FN 303 Launchers, 5,445 associated FN rounds, 190 Oleoresin capsicum (OC spray), 204 Chlorobenzylidene Malononitrile and Oleoresin capsicum, 2 Long Range Acoustic Devices, and 195 36’ batons; and

WHEREAS, on June 9, 2020,¹⁰ the Berkeley City Council unanimously voted to prohibit the use of CS gas by the Berkeley Police Department or any outside department or agency called to respond to mutual aid in Berkeley and of pepper spray or smoke for crowd control by the Berkeley Police Department, or any outside department or agency called to respond to mutual aid in Berkeley, during the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond; and

WHEREAS, the University of California’s University-wide Police Policies and Procedures¹¹ allow the University of California Police Department to apply intermediate force, including batons, tasers, pepper spray, chemical agents (such as CS gas), and

⁸ https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202120220AB481.

⁹ https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=202120220AB48.

¹⁰ <https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/city-council-meetings/06-09%20Annotated%20Agenda%204pm.pdf>.

¹¹ <https://ucnet.universityofcalifornia.edu/tools-and-services/administrators/policies/proposed/police-procedures-manual.pdf>.

rubber bullets, on nonviolent protesters displaying active resistance, which is defined as intentionally and unlawfully opposing the lawful order of a peace officer in a physical manner; and

WHEREAS, on August 3, 2022, UC Berkeley police forces in riot gear confronted protesters,¹² arrested students and community members participating in civil disobedience, and allegedly forcibly shoved nonviolent defenders of the park, resulting in severe injuries;¹³ and

WHEREAS, following the conflict on August 3, 2022, police forces retreated and UC Berkeley declared construction paused indefinitely; and

WHEREAS, on August 3, 2022, the Berkeley City Council called for a special meeting on August 4th, 2022 to discuss and consider the temporary suspension of the June 9, 2020 policy prohibiting the use of CS gas, smoke, and pepper spray for the duration of the City Council recess following pressure from the Alameda County Sheriff, and then canceled it on August 4, 2022 following public outrage; and

WHEREAS, in 2020, 84% of Berkeley voters¹⁴ approved amending the city charter to establish an independent police accountability board and director to provide oversight of local law enforcement, pointing to the public's desire for police reform; and

WHEREAS, violent, less-lethal forms of crowd control used by BPD, UCPD or mutual aid agencies, include but are not limited to Long Range Acoustic Devices, plastic and rubber bullets, hard foam, batons, corralling, launch projectiles, and Active Denial Systems; and¹⁵

WHEREAS, less-lethal weapons and tactics deployed in crowd control have disproportionate impacts on persons with both physical disabilities and mental challenges, can have detrimental impacts to persons with asthma, COVID-19 or other respiratory diseases; and

WHEREAS, less-lethal crowd control is a dynamic operation in which officers' ability for precise shots is greatly impaired and the chances of hitting the intended individual with a projectile are low, and of hitting uninvolved protesters is high; and

WHEREAS, chemical munitions by their nature affect large numbers of people and even spread far beyond the immediate area; and

¹² <https://www.berkeleyside.org/2022/08/03/uc-berkeley-fences-off-peoples-park-begins-construction-process>.

¹³ https://www.instagram.com/p/ChYn3ZYrU9j/?img_index=2.

¹⁴ [https://ballotpedia.org/Berkeley,_California,_Measure_II,_Police_Accountability_Charter_Amendment_\(November_2020\)](https://ballotpedia.org/Berkeley,_California,_Measure_II,_Police_Accountability_Charter_Amendment_(November_2020)).

¹⁵ <https://news.berkeley.edu/2020/06/05/are-crowd-control-weapons-dangerous-very-says-uc-berkeley-expert>.

WHEREAS, use of less-lethal weapons or tactics in an indiscriminate manner against a demonstration that is non-violent, or even mixed, is a denial of First Amendment rights to free speech and assembly, and is tantamount to collective punishment, and a denial of due process.

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Council of the City of Berkeley reaffirms its objection to and denounces any and all police brutality and use of force against nonviolent protesters, including those participating in nonviolent civil disobedience.

BE IT FURTHER AND FINALLY RESOLVED that the Council of the City of Berkeley strongly urges the University of California Police Department and any outside departments or agencies called to respond to mutual aid in Berkeley against using “less-lethal” weapons and tactics—including but not limited to CS gas, pepper spray, smoke, Long-Range Acoustic Devices, batons, rubber bullets, launched projectiles, and corralling—against nonviolent protesters, including those participating in nonviolent civil disobedience.



Berkeley Police Department Memorandum



From: Chief Jennifer Louis

Date: 2/18/2025

To: Berkeley City Council Public Safety Policy Committee

Subject: Berkeley Police Department Response Regarding the Police Accountability Board and Office of the Director of Police Accountability 2024 Texting Offenses Reports

The Berkeley Police Department (BPD) has reviewed the recent reports and their accompanying recommendations from the Police Accountability Board (PAB) and the Office of the Director of Police Accountability (ODPA) responding to the independent investigation completed by Swanson & McNamara into text exchanges among BPD officers on the bike team. It is important to note that neither the PAB nor ODPA reports dispute the findings of the independent investigation; rather, they offer recommendations based on their review of the report.

The Department remains committed to robust oversight and accountability in the performance of our core services. BPD must therefore carefully assess all recommendations to ensure they are warranted and appropriate and their benefits justify any cost and potential disruption to the provision of public safety services. We appreciate the opportunity to clarify our positions and explain how current practices address many of the concerns raised.

PAB Recommendations to the Department

The PAB report calls for revisions to several key policies as well as increased training on laws and policies. The ODPA companion report does not make recommendations directly to the police department.

Policy Updates

PAB Recommendation:

- Revise key policies including:
 - a. Fair and Impartial Policing (Policy 401)
 - b. Personal Communication Devices (Policy 701)
 - c. Employee Speech, Expression, and Social Networking (Policy 1029)
 - d. Early Warning System (Policy 1041)
 - e. Standards of Conduct (Policy 321)
 - f. Overtime Compensation (Policy 1019)
 - g. Adopt a standalone policy prohibiting formal or informal arrest quotas.

BPD Response:

BPD is actively collaborating with the PAB on a number of policy reviews initiated by the PAB. Additionally, the department is preparing to implement a next-generation Early Intervention System (EIS) platform to strengthen our existing EIS process and further enhance oversight. Over the course of the last several years, a number of the above policies have been updated, as BPD worked to complete Council recommendations related to fair and impartial policing, City Auditor recommendations regarding overtime, and our process to convert departmental General Orders to Lexipol Policies.

The Charter empowers the PAB to initiate reviews and propose specific policy amendments, and we welcome any detailed proposals. We remain committed to continuous improvement, and making thoughtful, intentional,



Berkeley Police Department Memorandum



and productive policy updates is a critical responsibility for the BPD that requires significant staff time and is undertaken only when it aligns with our departmental mission as well as our core commitment to public safety and operational efficiency. We currently have no additional substantive policy changes planned from the list provided.

Training and Oversight

PAB Recommendation:

- Increase training on state laws, stay-away orders, and internal policies. Implement clearer accountability mechanisms for policy enforcement.

BPD Response:

The department's Policy and Training Unit ensures that all officers understand state laws and internal policies through comprehensive and ongoing training programs. Our training needs are continuously driven by legal mandates, timely legal updates, data analysis, audits, and early intervention efforts. These mechanisms ensure that we are providing training exactly where it is needed. Currently, review of the independent investigation as well as our internal assessments show that our existing training adequately addresses these standards and no additional training measures regarding stay-away orders are warranted at this time.

Additional Considerations

A range of additional recommendations from the PAB and ODPa are directed to the City Council, City Manager and the community to further manage our law enforcement practices. The Department would like to provide the Public Safety Policy Committee additional background to assist as helpful with a deeper understanding of the key issues and needs.

Key themes emerging from these proposals include:

- **Expanded Access and Transparency:**
 - The reports articulate proposals to expand the PAB's authority to access unredacted internal records (under Charter Section 125) and to create a public database for sustained misconduct findings. It is important to note that there is an ongoing dialogue between the City and the Berkeley Police Officer's Association regarding the scope of PAB access as part of the process to establish PAB's Permanent Regulations for handling Investigations and Complaints. Currently, we continue to rely on Charter Provisions, existing PAB's Temporary Regulations as well as public record procedures, all which balance transparency with considerations for community member and officer privacy rights.
- **Accountability and Legislative Adjustments:**
 - A number of recommendations address accountability for officer misconduct—including both on- and off-duty behavior—and call for resolutions or legislative changes (such as extending the prohibition of arrest quotas to all law enforcement activities). Our current policies are designed to meet these accountability goals, and any proposed amendments would need to be weighed against broader policy priorities and fiscal implications.
- **Operational Enhancements and Oversight Mechanisms:**
 - Several proposals suggest operational improvements such as real-time audits of body-worn camera footage, revised protocols for handling complaints against the police chief, and the



Berkeley Police Department Memorandum



development of a comprehensive communications policy during investigations. Our established oversight processes already provide multiple layers of review and safeguard public communications. These suggestions would require serious trade-offs regarding funding, administrative processes, and the balance of oversight responsibilities between existing bodies (such as the City Manager's Office and the Chief of Police).

- **External Assessment and Accreditation:**
 - The reports express interest in evaluating the potential benefits of external assessment tools—including law enforcement accreditation and standardized performance metrics—to supplement our robust internal oversight systems. While external evaluations may offer additional insights, they also involve significant administrative requirements and must be considered in the context of Berkeley's unique operational, administrative and oversight environment.
- **Additional Proposals and Considerations:**
 - Other recommendations touch on topics such as randomized audits of city-issued devices, the formulation of an alcohol rehabilitation leave policy, and Charter amendments to expand investigative authority or secure independent legal counsel for oversight agencies. Each of these proposals carries distinct operational and fiscal trade-offs that should be properly weighed.

Our department remains committed to effective oversight, accountability, and continuous improvement. We believe these efforts must be rooted in our core departmental priorities and established practices to enhance public safety and operational efficiency. To that end, many of the proposals in these reports will require further stakeholder engagement, clear funding sources, and alignment with existing practices to ensure they don't interrupt our ability to deliver our core services at the high standard set by Council, the community, and ourselves.

Conclusion

We remain committed to working collaboratively with the PAB, ODP, and all stakeholders to ensure that our policies and practices continue to support public safety and fair, effective law enforcement. Our department will continue to engage in dialogue as these issues evolve.

Thank you for your attention to this response.

Cc:

Paul Buddenhagen, City Manager

Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability

Josh Cayetano, Police Accountability Board Chair

Mark Numainville, City Clerk



ACTION CALENDAR

January 21, 2025

To: Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council

From: Police Accountability Board (PAB)

Submitted by: John “Chip” Moore, Chair of the Police Accountability Board
Hansel A. Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability

Subject: Berkeley Police Department Texting Offences: An Independent Investigation by the Police Accountability Board

RECOMMENDATION

The Police Accountability Board formally recommends to the City Council that it:

1. Pass an ordinance or otherwise affirm the Police Accountability Board’s ability to access documents and records in furtherance of its central accountability function, consistent with Charter Amendment Section 125.
2. Adopt a robust resolution ensuring full and meaningful accountability for sworn officers—whether on-duty or off-duty—who engage in misconduct of any kind, but especially actions or expressions of racial or other types of bias.
3. Direct the City Manager to work with the Berkeley Police Department, Police Accountability Board, and the Office of the Director of Police Accountability to create a public repository to fulfill the vision of California Penal Code Section 832.7(b)(1), allowing for transparency in cases of sustained allegations of officer racism or other discriminatory conduct or expression.
4. Call on California state legislators to extend the prohibition on arrest quotas, which are currently limited to the California Vehicle Code (Section 41600 – 41603).

SUMMARY

In accordance with City Charter Section 125(17)(a), the City of Berkeley Police Accountability Board’s Subcommittee on Policy and Practices conducted an examination of policies, practices, and procedures within the Berkeley Police Department (BPD) concerning the Downtown Task Force (DTF) and Bike Unit allegations.

A Special Meeting of the PAB was convened on November 15, 2022, where the Board voted to establish a subcommittee to review all policies and practices related to the allegations made by former BPD Officer Corey Shedoudy, which were made public on November 10, 2022. The subcommittee, initially chaired by former Board Member Cheryl Owens and later by Board Member Kitty Calavita following Owens' resignation, also included PAB Chair John (Chip) Moore. The allegations involved racist text messages, bias against the unhoused, and pressure to meet arrest quotas, with the Sergeant of the DTF implicated.

Despite the PAB's authority under Section 125(3)(a) of the City Charter to access departmental records without redaction or limitation, the subcommittee encountered numerous obstacles in obtaining the necessary materials. This review revealed several areas where BPD policies and practices did not meet best practices, policy, or legal standards. Specifically, the findings included:

- Expectations to achieve certain arrest numbers.
- Exchange of racially charged and discriminatory text messages among DTF officers.
- Use of personal cellphones for discussing work-related matters.
- Essentially unlimited overtime for DTF officers.
- Vague or absent policies in critical areas that could lead to legal violations or undermine fair policing.
- Insufficient knowledge of BPD policies and State law among some DTF members.

The Board's preliminary recommendations for improving BPD policies and practices include:

- Establishing a new policy prohibiting formal or informal arrest quotas.
- Ensuring fair enforcement of stay-away orders in accordance with State law.
- Increasing training on BPD policies and State law.
- Revising policies related to Fair and Impartial Policing, Standards of Conduct, Early Warning System, Employee Speech, Expression and Social Networking, Personal Communication Devices, and Overtime Compensation Requests.

Additionally, the PAB recommends that the City Council:

- Pass an ordinance in line with Charter Amendment Section 125(3)(a)(7) to enable the PAB to self-initiate investigations of potential misconduct and access internal records for such investigations.
- Adopt a resolution to ensure comprehensive accountability for officers who engage in misconduct, consistent with the City's 2024 State and Federal Legislative Agenda.

- Direct the City Manager to collaborate with the BPD, PAB, and Office of the Director of Police Accountability to establish a public repository, as envisioned by California Penal Code Section 832.7(b)(1), to ensure transparency regarding sustained findings of discriminatory conduct.
- Advocate for state legislators to extend the prohibition on arrest quotas, currently limited to the California Vehicle Code (Section 41600–41603), to encompass all California law enforcement activities.

This report aims to not only highlight deficiencies in BPD policies and practices but also to offer concrete recommendations for addressing these issues. Achieving these goals will require the collective efforts of the PAB, BPD leadership, the City Manager, and the City Council. Through this report, the PAB reaffirms its commitment to collaboration, justice, fairness, trust, and community safety.

In support of these objectives, the ODPa submits a complementary report to provide additional information related to the PAB’s findings, in accordance with Chapter VI, Section C.1. of the City of Berkeley’s Commissioner’s Manual.

The PAB initially submitted this report to the City Council for presentation at the October 1, 2024 Regular Meeting but was deferred to the Public Safety Committee¹. During the PAB meeting on September 25, 2024, the PAB voted to request the withdrawal of the item², a request that was granted by the Public Safety Committee.

FISCAL IMPACTS OF RECOMMENDATION

Implementing the PAB’s recommendations will incur costs related to staff time, technology requirements, and maintenance of such technology.

CURRENT SITUATION AND ITS EFFECTS

On November 10, 2022, Corey Shedoudy, a former member of the Berkeley Police Department’s (BPD) Downtown Task Force and Bike Unit (DTF), alleged that the DTF had arrest quotas and used questionable legal tactics, such as “stop and frisk,” probationary searches without reasonable suspicion, and a broad interpretation of stay-away orders from UC Berkeley. To support his claims, Officer Shedoudy provided a series of text messages from the DTF that contained derogatory comments about homeless individuals and people of color.

In response to these allegations, the PAB began a policy review on November 15, 2022, exercising its authority under Section 125(17)(a) of the Berkeley City Charter. A subcommittee was formed to examine the policies and practices related to the allegations.

¹ September 26, 2024 Agenda & Rules Committee Special Meeting Minutes: <https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/legislative-body-meeting-minutes/09-16%20Minutes%20-%20Agenda%20Committee.pdf>

² The motion carried with 6 ayes in favor, 0 noes, and 2 PAB members absent. Police Accountability Board Regular Meeting Minutes for September 25, 2024: [link]

In December 2022, the City of Berkeley retained the law firm Swanson & McNamara to investigate the claims. During this investigation, the text messages provided by Mr. Shedoudy were authenticated.

BACKGROUND

The purpose of the PAB is to promote public trust through independent, objective civilian oversight of the Berkeley Police Department, provide community participation in setting and reviewing Police Department policies, practices, and procedures, and offer a means for prompt, impartial, and fair investigations of complaints brought by members of the public against sworn employees of the Berkeley Police Department.

ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY AND CLIMATE IMPACTS

There are no identifiable environmental effects or opportunities associated with this report.

RATIONALE FOR RECOMMENDATION

Accepting the recommendations from the Police Accountability Board will improve public trust by enhancing transparency and accountability within the Berkeley Police Department. Implementing these recommendations will strengthen oversight in the city, allowing the Board to fulfill its intended purpose effectively.

CONTACT PERSON

Hansel A. Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability

Office of the Director of Police Accountability, (510) 981-4950

Attachments:

- 1: PAB Report “Berkeley Police Department Texting Offences: An Independent Investigation by the Police Accountability Board”
- 2: ODPa Companion Report “Companion Report to Berkeley Police Department Texting Allegations An Independent Investigation by the Police Accountability Board”




BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT TEXTING OFFENCES

**An Independent Investigation by the
Police Accountability Board**

Prepared by:

**Police Accountability Board
City of Berkeley, CA**

**Approved by the PAB on
July 10, 2024**



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Lucky, Therapy Animal

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PREFACE

On November 10, 2022, Officer Corey Shedoudy, a former member of the Berkeley Police Department's (BPD) Downtown Task Force and Bike Unit (DTF)¹, claimed the DTF maintained arrest quotas and employed questionable legal tactics including "stop and frisk, probation searches without reasonable suspicion of a crime, and a broad interpretation of stay-away orders from UC Berkeley."²

The allegations and the explicitness of those texts jolted the Berkeley community and its political leaders. Subsequently, the City hired an outside law firm to investigate the authenticity of the texts and their implications. The texts were ultimately authenticated.

The community shock produced by these egregious sentiments and conduct by sworn BPD officers was compounded by the realization that this behavior was only publicly known because a terminated member of the Department exposed it more than two years after the fact. The Police Accountability Board (PAB) and the Office of the Director of Police Accountability (ODPA) recognize and respect the hurt and suffering these expressions of apparent racism and disdain for the unhoused elicited in the community, particularly among those who are directly affected by such discriminatory attitudes and behaviors.

We are deeply troubled by these events. The PAB is designed to be a bridge between the community, the BPD, and the City leadership. Most importantly, however, it was established to ensure accountability, trust, and transparency. According to Section 125(1) of the Berkeley City Charter, the purpose of the PAB "is to promote public trust through independent, objective, civilian oversight of the Berkeley Police Department..."³

The goal of this report is to fulfill that obligation to the Berkeley community. The PAB lacks the authority to independently initiate investigations into alleged misconduct by individual DTF members or to recommend discipline without a complaint being filed with the ODPA within 180 days of the incident.⁴ Instead, this report is mostly forward-looking in the hopes that policy and practices reforms, coupled with rigorous oversight, can restore trust and help prevent future misconduct.

Restoring trust and helping prevent misconduct through robust oversight is not only the morally right thing to do; it is the fiscally responsible thing as well. According to

¹ The Downtown Task Force began operations in October 2019. In July 2020, it transitioned into a Bike Unit. The term "Downtown Task Force" or "DTF" will be used in this report to designate the unit from its beginning in October 2019.

² Email send by Former Officer Shedoudy to the Berkeley City Council:

<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5edeeebc3032af28b09b6644/t/63725d28d35f087529c42dda/1668439336808/Shedoudy+email+11-10-22.png>

³ Berkeley City Charter Section 125(1): [https://berkeley.municipal.codes/Charter/125\(1\)](https://berkeley.municipal.codes/Charter/125(1))

⁴ Interim Regulations for Handling Complaints Against Sworn Officers of the Police Department, Section II.3.: https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-02/PAB-ODPA.Interim.Reggs_.Approved.2021-10-05.pdf

documents provided by the City Attorney's office, over the last decade the City of Berkeley has had to respond to 471 legal claims related to BPD activities, costing the City \$1,978,953, with more than \$1,300,000 of this incurred in the last five years. The two most costly categories of liability were "excessive force" (\$558,151) and "false arrest" (\$338,551).

Reforms will involve not only changes in BPD policy and practice, but City Council action, robust accountability demanded from the BPD leadership, and ongoing efforts by the PAB to ensure full-bodied enforcement of all policies. Changes in law-on-the-books in the form of policy reforms will amount to nothing in the absence of changes in law-in-action, as policing ultimately takes place on the ground. Deterring the kind of behavior that was alleged by former Officer Shedoudy, and that uniformly offended the Berkeley community and eroded public trust, is a daunting challenge. It is achievable only if all hands are on deck.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In accordance with City Charter Section 125(17)(a)⁵, the City of Berkeley Police Accountability Board's Subcommittee on Policy and Practices relating to the Downtown Task Force and Bike Unit Allegations conducted an examination of policies, practices, and procedures within the Berkeley Police Department concerning matters related to that unit.

A Special Meeting of the PAB was called on November 15, 2022, at which the Board voted to form a subcommittee to do a policy review of all policies and practices relating to Mr. Shedoudy's allegations⁶. The subcommittee was comprised of former Board Member Cheryl Owens, PAB Chair John (Chip) Moore, and Board Member Kitty Calavita, and was initially chaired by Board Member Owens. When Board Member Owens resigned from the Board, the subcommittee was Chaired by Board Member Calavita.⁷ The impetus for the review was the set of allegations brought forth by former Berkeley Police Department (BPD) Officer Corey Shedoudy and made public on November 10, 2022. Mr. Shedoudy alleged that text messages expressing racist attitudes, bias against the unhoused, and pressure to meet arrest quotas, had been sent among members of the DTF, with the Sergeant of the DTF playing a central role.

⁵Berkeley City Charter Section 125(17)(a): [https://berkeley.municipal.codes/Charter/125\(17\)\(a\)](https://berkeley.municipal.codes/Charter/125(17)(a))

⁶ Meeting Minutes for the PAB's Regular meeting on November 15, 2022: <https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/legislative-body-meeting-minutes/cc.2022-11-15%20SpecMtg.approved.minutes%20%281%29.pdf>

⁷ On July 7, 2023, the ODPa received a policy complaint from a member of the public (DPA Case #2023-PR-0004) regarding the allegations of the DTF's arrest quotas and bias against people of color and the unhoused. At their regular meeting on September 27, 2023, the PAB voted to refer that policy complaint to this subcommittee since its work was well underway and responds (to the extent possible) to the issues raised in the complaint.

The PAB faced multiple challenges in accessing the materials necessary for its review, notwithstanding Section 125(3)(a) of the City Charter, which gives the PAB the "powers and duties...to access records of City Departments"⁸, including "without redaction or limitation" records relating to policies and practices, disciplinary records, and internal investigative records⁹. The PAB Subcommittee spent many months of critical investigative time seeking—in some cases successfully, in other cases unsuccessfully—to overcome barriers to access that had ostensibly been removed by these sections of the Charter Amendment.

This review identifies key areas where the BPD fell short of best practices, existing policy and/or legal requirements. Specifically, the Board found:

- There were expectations to reach certain arrest numbers;
- BPD officers assigned to the DTF exchanged racially charged and discriminatory text messages;
- These BPD officers routinely used personal cellphones to discuss work-related matters;
- Overtime for DTF officers was essentially unlimited;
- Some BPD policies were vague or non-existent in subject areas that could prevent violations of law or compromise fair and impartial policing;
- There was insufficient knowledge of specific BPD policies and State law among some DTF members;

The Board's preliminary recommendations regarding BPD policies and practices include:

- Establishing a new freestanding policy prohibiting formal or informal arrest quotas;
- Ensuring that stay-away orders are enforced fairly and consistent with State law;
- Increasing training on BPD policies and State law; and
- Making changes to BPD policies regarding Fair and Impartial Policing (#401)¹⁰; Standards of Conduct (#321)¹¹; the Early Warning System (#1041)¹²; Employee

⁸ Berkeley City Charter Section 125(3)(a): [https://berkeley.municipal.codes/Charter/125\(3\)\(a\)\(5\)](https://berkeley.municipal.codes/Charter/125(3)(a)(5))

⁹ Berkeley City Charter Section 125(20)(a): [https://berkeley.municipal.codes/Charter/125\(20\)\(a\)](https://berkeley.municipal.codes/Charter/125(20)(a))

¹⁰ BPD Policy 401 "Fair and Impartial Policing": https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-02/PAB-ODPA.Interim.Regis_.Approved.2021-10-05.pdf#page=321

¹¹ BPD Policy 321 "Standard of Conduct":

https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/RELEASE_20240301_T161429_Berkeley%20PD%20Policy%20Manual.pdf#page=189

¹² BPD Policy 1041 "Early Warning System":

https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/RELEASE_20240301_T161429_Berkeley%20PD%20Policy%20Manual.pdf#page=903

Speech, Expression and Social Networking (#1029)¹³; Personal Communication Devices (#701)¹⁴; and Overtime Compensation Requests (#1019).¹⁵

The PAB further recommends that City Council:

- Pass an ordinance, consistent with Charter Amendment Section 125 (3)(a)(7)¹⁶, to allow the PAB to self-initiate investigations of potential misconduct and to access internal records in furtherance of those investigations. While policy reviews are important, it is at least as important to provide oversight of their implementation and practices on the ground.
- Adopt a robust resolution to ensure a full and meaningful accountability of sworn officers who engage in misconduct, whether on-duty or off-duty, consistent with the City's 2024 State and Federal Legislative Agenda to "support efforts to increase peace officer accountability..."¹⁷
- Direct the City Manager to work with the BPD, PAB and ODPa to create a public repository to fulfill the vision of California Penal Code Section 832.7(b)(1)¹⁸, including but not limited to 832.7(b)(1)(D) which states that an exception to peace officer confidentiality is required for "any record relating to an incident in which a sustained finding was made by any law enforcement agency or oversight agency that a peace officer or custodial officer engaged in conduct including, but not limited to, verbal statements, writings, online posts, recordings, and gestures, involving prejudice or discrimination against a person on the basis of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual orientation, or military and veteran status."
- Encourage state legislators to extend the prohibition on arrest quotas, both formal and informal, in the Penal Code, which is currently limited to the California Vehicle Code (Section 41600-41603)¹⁹, to include all California law enforcement activity.

¹³ BPD Policy 1029 "Employee Speech, Expression and Social Networking":

https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/RELEASE_20240301_T161429_Berkeley%20PD%20Policy%20Manual.pdf#page=860

¹⁴ BPD Policy 701 "Personal Communication Devices":

https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/RELEASE_20240301_T161429_Berkeley%20PD%20Policy%20Manual.pdf#page=584

¹⁵ BPD Policy 1019 "Overtime Compensation Request":

https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/RELEASE_20240301_T161429_Berkeley%20PD%20Policy%20Manual.pdf#page=827

¹⁶ Berkeley City Charter 125(3)(a)(7): [https://berkeley.municipal.codes/Charter/125\(3\)\(a\)\(7\)](https://berkeley.municipal.codes/Charter/125(3)(a)(7))

¹⁷ City of Berkeley's 2024 State and Federal Legislative Platform. February 13, 2024

¹⁸ California Penal Code Section 832.7:

https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=832.7.&lawCode=PEN

¹⁹ California Vehicle Code Section 41600 – 41603:

https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayText.xhtml?lawCode=VEH&division=17.&title=&part=&chapter=7.&article=

Our intent is not only to identify specific shortcomings in BPD policies and practices but to provide concrete steps toward rectifying them. This will require collective efforts by the PAB, the BPD and its leadership, the City Manager, and City Council. Through this report, the PAB reaffirms its commitment to the principles of collaboration, justice, fairness, trust, and community safety.

BACKGROUND

On November 10, 2022, former BPD Officer Corey Shedoudy who had been a member of the DTF but was terminated for misconduct, wrote to the Berkeley City Council alleging that text messages expressing racist attitudes, bias against the unhoused, and pressure to meet arrest quotas, had been sent among members of the DTF, with Sergeant Darren Kacalek playing a central role. The allegations included screenshots of the alleged texts.

On November 14, 2022, Secure Justice Executive Director Brian Hofer urged the California Attorney General to investigate the BPD arrest quota allegation.²⁰ Shedoudy's claims continued to attract extensive media and public attention. The Los Angeles Times, San Francisco Chronicle, Berkeleyside, East Bay Times, and other media outlets all devoted space to the allegations.²¹

On November 17, 2022, the Center for Policing Equity, which had been hired by the City in 2015 to study potential racial disparities in BPD stops (a report presented to the City in 2018), issued a blunt 3-page statement in response to Shedoudy's allegations. It began, "The Center for Policing Equity is appalled by the views, actions, and frank disregard for public safety revealed in a series of leaked group chats among officers

²⁰ Article: "Secure Justice Calls for Attorney General Investigation into BPD Arrest Quota Policy": <https://secure-justice.org/blog/secure-justice-calls-for-attorney-general-investigation-into-bpd-arrest-quota-policy>

²¹ Article: Berkeley Police Department in turmoil over leaked texts about arrest quotas - Los Angeles Times (latimes.com): <https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2022-11-17/berkeley-police-department-in-turmoil-over-leaked-texts-about-arrest-quotas> ; Article: Head of Berkeley police union on leave following text message scandal, claims of arrest quotas (sfchronicle.com): <https://www.sfchronicle.com/eastbay/article/Report-Head-of-Berkeley-police-union-on-leave-17590377.php> ; Article: Leaked texts from Berkeley police union leader show 'disturbing' comments (berkeleyside.org): <https://www.berkeleyside.org/2022/11/14/berkeley-police-text-messages-darren-kacalek-bpa> ; Article: Berkeley Police Department, Interim Chief will be investigated after ex-police officer leaked texts alleging racist, illegal behavior (eastbaytimes.com): <https://www.eastbaytimes.com/2022/11/16/berkeley-police-department-interim-chief-will-be-investigated-after-ex-police-officer-leaked-texts-alleging-racist-illegal-behavior/>; Article: Berkeley police officers' 'anti-homeless' text messages probed | KRON4 <https://www.kron4.com/news/bay-area/berkeley-police-officers-anti-homeless-text-messages-probed/>; Article: Leaked Text Messages Prompt Push to Delay New Police Chief in Berkeley – NBC Bay Area: <https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/east-bay/berkeley-police-text-messages-jennifer-louis/3078376/>; Article: Fired Berkeley cop leaks texts alleging bias, quotas (berkeleyscanner.com): <https://www.berkeleyscanner.com/2022/11/15/policing/fired-berkeley-cop-leaked-texts-corey-shedoudy/>

serving with the Berkeley, California Police Department (BPD).²² The statement went on to characterize the texts as including “vile dehumanization” of the unhoused and “openly racist” views. It concluded, “The burden is now on the City of Berkeley and BPD to act with appropriate urgency in addressing these revelations, the institutional culture informing them, and their dire implications for Berkeley’s residents.”²³

The City Council was poised to vote on appointing Interim BPD Chief Jen Louis as permanent Chief on November 15, 2022, but the vote was postponed in the context of the allegations, including a claim that then Captain Louis knew of, and ignored, the alleged misconduct. The Mayor and Council Members noted that the appointment should be put on hold pending an investigation into the allegations, and the City Manager withdrew the item.²⁴

In December 2022, the law firm of Swanson & McNamara was hired by the City of Berkeley²⁵ to investigate. That investigation took the place of an investigation by the Internal Affairs Bureau of the BPD to dispel the perception of a conflict of interest in the context of the possibly wide-ranging nature of the inquiry.

The allegations that Swanson & McNamara was tasked with investigating included the following claims made by Mr. Shedoudy:

1. Allegations of an "unethical and illegal practice of arrest quotas of downtown unhoused ordered by [name] to DTF/Bike Force," which purportedly commenced when Chief Louis held the position of BPD Police Captain and persisted after her appointment as Interim Chief.
2. Assertions that the DTF/Bike Force was instructed to make 100 arrests per month.
3. Claims of meeting the alleged quota through questionable legal tactics, including stop and frisk, probation searches without reasonable suspicion, and “a very loose interpretation of stay-away orders from UC Berkeley”.
4. Criticisms of Captain Louis's perceived inaction.

²² Statement on Leaked Text Messages out of Berkeley Police Department:

<https://policingequity.org/newsroom/official-statements/statement-on-leaked-text-messages-out-of-berkeley-police-department>

²³ Center for Policing Equity, 2022. <https://policingequity.org/newsroom/official-statements/statement-on-leaked-text-messages-out-of-berkeley-police-department>.

²⁴ On May 9, 2023, prior to conclusion of the investigations into the DTF texting allegations, City Manager Dee Williams-Ridley once again forwarded to City Council her selection of Interim Chief Louis as permanent Chief, and Council voted to appoint her.

²⁵ See Appendix 1: City of Berkeley Contract for services with Swanson & McNamara LLP, Vendor Contract #32300109

<https://records.cityofberkeley.info/PublicAccess/api/Document/AU3fuygXQXXZ%C3%81TG8am4tuCPyplZzCFLJZsbxFqBxmJ3aQZTBcxS%C3%89E7ECp9r6A30gZuhAlmseUFcNLLtKRrEld7g%3D/>

5. Allegations of "illegal arrest quotas, racism, evidence suppression, lying, and quid pro quos" supported by various forms of evidence, such as text messages, emails, sworn testimony transcripts, public arrest records, and photographs.

To investigate these claims, the Swanson team submitted Mr. Shedoudy's phone to a third-party vendor for data extraction, including text communications among DTF and/or Bike Unit members from October 1, 2019, to approximately March 1, 2023. The authenticity of each message was confirmed, except for one located on page 3 of Shedoudy's allegations letter, which could not be found on the phone.

The Swanson team also reviewed data on arrests made by DTF and Bike Unit officers from October 1, 2019 through November 22, 2020. This timeframe corresponded with Shedoudy's tenure in the DTF and Bike Unit, and involved review of 481 randomly selected arrest reports, accounting for over 50% of the total.

Additionally, internal Department message board posts concerning DTF activities were gathered and reviewed by Swanson's team, covering the period from November 6, 2019, to March 24, 2020. The investigation also included interviews with former Officer Shedoudy and members of the DTF, as well as with Chief Louis.

The Swanson & McNamara investigative report was completed in June 2023. Those findings have not been made public. A summary of the findings, however, revealed that the text messages expressing racist attitudes, animosity towards the unhoused, and pressure to achieve a certain number of arrests, were authenticated by forensic analysis of former Officer Shedoudy's phone.

While the Swanson & McNamara report was deemed confidential consistent with California Penal Code Section 832.7, the Berkeley Scanner²⁶ quoted City spokesperson Matthai Chakko that "the investigation found that the department does not have a practice of racial bias," that "the department does not have any arrest quotas," and that the department follows all state laws and the constitution. Berkeleyside also published an article summarizing the City spokesperson's report: "According to city spokesperson Matthai Chakko," the article read, "Swanson and McNamara's investigation found that: the department does not have a practice of racial bias; the department does not have any arrest quotas; the department follows state law and constitutional law...; and the department has existing policies that prohibit discrimination and harassment of protected classes."²⁷

This summary of the Swanson findings drew conclusions about the department as a whole and its official policies that went beyond any findings of the investigator whose

²⁶ Article: Berkeley police bike team cleared of claims made by fired cop (berkeleyscanner.com): <https://www.berkeleyscanner.com/2023/07/20/policing/berkeley-police-bike-team-cleared-systemic-problems/>

²⁷ Article: Berkeley police texts probe found no quotas or racial bias, city says (berkeleyside.org): <https://www.berkeleyside.org/2023/07/20/berkeley-police-text-scandal-investigation>

task and method were to focus on specific practices of the Downtown Task Force and Bike Unit in a limited period of time. The findings of the Swanson team eroded public trust because they were not made public—other than the authenticity of the text messages—and because these overly general statements by the City spokesperson were made in piecemeal fashion to the press.

A Berkeleyside article about this City messaging quoted Mayor Jesse Arreguin's public statement: "Regardless of the underlying findings and outcomes, the investigator verified the accuracy of the text messages. What is clear from a plain reading of the texts is that the behavior was unprofessional and does not meet the standards to which we should hold our City employees.... This episode further demonstrates the need to implement reforms."²⁸

Concurrent with, but independent of, the Swanson & McNamara investigation, the PAB launched a policy and practices review. According to the City Attorney's interpretation of the Charter Amendment relating to PAB powers and duties, we were required to limit our investigation to an inquiry into relevant policies and practices and to recommend reforms as appropriate. The Swanson team's authentication of the text messages and the allegations themselves have, among other issues, directed the PAB's attention to the need for an additional policy prohibiting arrest quotas--implicit or explicit--and the strengthening of many existing policies and practices. These recommendations are guided by a commitment to public safety and fair and impartial policing, and the need for a set of policies and Department culture that reflect those values.

While our investigation was necessarily limited to policy and practice recommendations, the PAB recognizes that policy is effective only to the extent that it is understood and enforced. A recent study published in *Nature Human Behavior* found that when officers in police organizations are not held accountable for policy violations and misconduct, the lack of serious accountability results in the propagation of misconduct in officers around them.²⁹ The study reported that even when shuffling the officer to a different unit, their peers are more likely to engage in misconduct themselves. The takeaway from that study is not only that policy reforms must be stringently enforced to be effective, but that unenforced policies breed infectious misconduct.

The PAB thus offers these policy reforms and at the same time commits itself to oversight of their enforcement. The PAB further makes recommendations for action by

²⁸ Article: Berkeley officials slam 'drips of information' in BPD text investigation (berkeleyside.org): <https://www.berkeleyside.org/2023/07/21/berkeley-bike-squad-investigation-criticized>

²⁹ "Causal Peer Effects in Police Misconduct," Quispe-Torreblanca, Edika and Neil Stewart. *Nature Human Behavior* 3(8): 797-807; "Police Misconduct May Spread like a Contagion, New Study Finds," Catherine Maticic, *Science*, May 27, 2019. <https://www.science.org/content/article/police-misconduct-may-spread-contagion-new-study-suggests>.

City Council in furtherance of accountability, transparency, and the PAB's ability to monitor implementation which is where policies are materially "enacted".

DATA SOURCES

This review is based on both quantitative and qualitative data and records. The primary data sources were:

- the authenticated text messages submitted by former Officer Shedoudy;
- the Swanson Report, including the audiotaped interviews with BPD members;
- stop and arrest data of the DTF, by race and across time;
- a comparison of DTF stop and arrest data to that of the BPD as a whole;
- the rate of DTF arrests for violations of court orders, such as "stay-away orders";
- the disposition patterns of the DTF and for the BPD as a whole;
- BPD policies relating to arrest quotas, stay-away orders, fair and impartial policing, standards of conduct, off-duty conduct, employee speech, personal communication devices, overtime compensation, and the Early Warning System.

These data³⁰ provide an important window into the practices and culture of the DTF and guide our recommendations for reforms. While the BPD Transparency Hub allows the public—which in this case includes the PAB—to access raw data on stops and arrests, it is labor-intensive to analyze systematically these data in a way that is useful to full oversight. The ODPA staff and PAB Subcommittee Members spent many hours scrutinizing these data, and processing and organizing them into a form that was usable for our purposes.

LIMITATIONS OF THE DATA

While the PAB utilized a substantial amount of data in its review, some of these data were already in the public domain. The PAB and the ODPA made concerted efforts to access other records that we believed fell within the purview of the policy and practices review provisions outlined in the City Charter. We were not initially allowed access to the Swanson Report, nor to the taped interviews with DTF officers. The ODPA spent many hours and valuable time attempting to access them. The ODPA also sought access to all records in possession of BPD's Internal Affairs Bureau regarding any disciplinary matters relating to former officer Shedoudy, Sergeant Kacelek and other members of the BPD Downtown Task Force and Bike Unit, and any complaints by members of the public filed with the BPD involving the Downtown Task Force. Despite concerted and repeated efforts, and despite the confidentiality oath taken by ODPA staff and PAB Members, these

³⁰ After much discussion with the BPD, in September 2023 the PAB obtained access to body-worn camera footage for the period under review. The videos contain thousands of hours of footage and given the time and staffing constraints the PAB was unable to analyze all this footage in time for this report. For future inquiries and investigations, the ODPA recommends acquisition of a program such as TRULEO which does computerized analyses of vast video footage.

records were initially withheld from the ODPa and the PAB. Many months later, the ODPa and Subcommittee Members Moore and Calavita were allowed to read the Swanson Report but without the ability to take notes or make copies.

Ultimately, the PAB decided to use its subpoena power and issued a subpoena for the outstanding records. The PAB delegated the issuance of the subpoena to the ODPa, who served it to the department on March 12, 2024. This included a request for “Text messages (beyond those publicly available) and or certification/affidavit from officers that no additional records exist” as well as records “between members of the task force and City Manager Dee Williams-Ridley.” Subsequently, Chief Louis informed the ODPa that the BPD did not hold any records beyond those that were publicly produced.

The ODPa and the PAB Chair continued to seek full PAB access to the Swanson Report and audiotaped interviews. Almost a year after the Swanson Report was completed, the ODPa finally received the Report and audiotaped interviews, and PAB Members were given access. We independently spent many hours over several weeks reviewing the Report and interviews.

California Penal Code Section 832.7(a)³¹ preclude us from quoting directly from these interviews or attaching officers’ identities to individual responses. Instead, these interviews will be used more generally as background information and collectively as collaborating evidence.

Given the already substantial delay in receiving the records we requested, the PAB has decided to issue this report now, with a potential addendum if additional relevant records are secured.

This lack of full access means that key questions could not be answered in this PAB analysis and accompanying recommendations. These unanswered questions include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Were these racially inappropriate sentiments and other biased expressions previously exhibited by these or other officers?
- Did the BPD have knowledge of such expressions or conduct, and if so, what actions were, or were not, taken to intervene?
- How have possible allegations of a similar nature been handled in the past?

The obstacles encountered in accessing internal records underscore the importance of transparency and cooperation between the City and the PAB. The PAB’s review of the Swanson team’s audiotaped recordings with DTF officers has deepened our conviction that for the PAB to fulfill its Charter-mandated function of providing police accountability, it must routinely have access to documents and records describing actual BPD practices.

³¹ California Penal Code Section 832.7:
https://leginfo.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=832.7.&lawCode=PEN

BPD cooperation with the City’s oversight body is critical to ensuring public safety and socially just policing. It is also the fiscally responsible management approach.

FINDINGS


Authenticated Text Messages

Through the Swanson & McNamara investigation, Mr. Shedoudy's provided text messages were authenticated and are appended as Appendix 2. Mr. Shedoudy submitted his phone to a third-party vendor for extraction of pertinent communications, encompassing text exchanges among DTF members from October 1, 2019, to approximately March 1, 2023.

Statistical Analyses


The average number of arrests per DTF officer in the period from October 1, 2019 to November 22, 2020—the period during which these text messages were sent—far exceeded that of the average number of arrests for other BPD officers. The eight officers in the DTF averaged 64 arrests that year, compared to the overall BPD average of 17. In addition, the number of arrests per DTF officer varied greatly from 6 arrests by one member to 228 by another.

FIGURE 1. NUMBER OF ARREST BY OFFICER OF THE DOWNTOWN TASK FORCE AND BIKE UNIT



Similarly, the number of DTF arrests varied substantially by month, peaking in November 2019 as DTF members were being pressured to reach 100 (“81 arrests! We can do 19 by Friday for sure!” “I was thinking whoever gets the least arrests today does the waxing.”).

FIGURE 2. DOWNTOWN TASK FORCE ARREST NUMBERS BY MONTH




These arrest numbers, together with the text messages, leave little doubt that pressure—more or less explicit, perhaps informal, seemingly jocular--was exerted to maximize arrest figures, sometimes the specific number of 100. The spike in arrests was so dramatic during some periods that, according to the Swanson team and some of the interviewed officers, jail staff complained they couldn't keep up with their booking and detention.

Approximately an equal proportion of these arrests involved Black individuals (42.63%) and White individuals (43.03%), while Latino/a individuals accounted for 8.84% of the total. According to the 2020 census³², the number of White individuals residing in Council District 4 which encompasses the downtown is approximately four times the number of Black residents in the area, suggesting that the arrest rate for Black people was almost four times as high as for White people. However, it is difficult to be precise about the racial disparity since the census may undercount the unhoused who were often the focus of DTF activity.

³² United States Census Bureau 2020 Census Data for Berkeley, California: <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/berkeleycitycalifornia/SBO030217>

FIGURE 3. RACE OF INDIVIDUALS ARRESTED BY THE DOWNTOWN TASK FORCE/BIKE UNIT (OCT.2019 TO NOV.2020)




Additionally, 20.63% of the 509 arrests made by the DTF during this period were for contempt of court (California Penal Code 166³³), typically considered a misdemeanor. Of these, 96 out of 105 contempt of court arrests also included a probation violation. Given the relatively large size of the unhoused population and its proximity to the UC campus and downtown businesses, it is likely that a significant portion of these arrests were at least in part for violations of stay-away orders. This is supported by audiotaped interviews with DTF officers, which indicate that stay-away orders are central to their enforcement actions. In some cases, officers even requested that judges impose stay-away orders, facilitating subsequent arrests. Without closely reviewing individual incident reports and probationary conditions imposed on arrested individuals, it is difficult to determine how many of these violations were specifically for stay-away orders as distinct from other probation violations.

A considerable number of DTF arrests were dismissed outright with no complaint filed by the Alameda County District Attorney, with dismissed cases rising from 70 in 2019 to 188 in 2020.

³³ California Penal Code Section 166:
https://leginfo.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=PEN§ionNum=166.

FIGURE 4. DOWNTOWN TASK FORCE ARREST SENT TO ALAMEDA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (OCT. 1, 2019 – NOV. 22, 2020)



Finally, it is notable that as documented in the City Auditor's 2022 report on BPD overtime, in 2020 the BPD outspent its overtime budget by more than \$5 million³⁴. While much of this was due to contracts with outside entities, some was also the result of the "chain reaction" of compensatory time. As the Auditor explained, when an officer does overtime, they may receive either overtime pay or compensatory time off. When they choose the latter, another officer fills in with overtime, who then may choose compensatory time, and so on, eventually magnifying many times over the effect of the original overtime.

The text messages revealed by Shedoudy suggest that overtime work was liberally authorized. Sgt. Kacalek enthused that if his officers "kick ass" and "arrest people" they "will never [be] jam[med] up about overtime." The DTF interviews corroborate the essentially open-ended, unlimited access to overtime.

The data presented above represent a moment in time. Because this report is forward-looking and is focused on policy and practices, it is important to examine the subsequent state of DTF operations. Seven of the original officers³⁵ were on the Downtown Task Force/Bike Unit for all eight quarters from January 2021 to December 2022; Sgt. Kacalek was on DTF duty for five of those quarters.

³⁴ City Auditor Report "Berkeley Police: Improvements Needed to Manage Overtime and Security Work for Outside Entities" [https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/Berkeley Police - Improvements Needed to Manage Overtime and Security Work for Outside Entities.pdf](https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/Berkeley_Police_-_Improvements_Needed_to_Manage_Overtime_and_Security_Work_for_Outside_Entities.pdf)

³⁵ These were officers Breaux, Michalczyk, Pickett, Schikore, Seaton, and Stern, all of whom were also on the earlier DTF.

Once again, the number of arrests by these seven officers ranges substantially from sixteen for one officer to 265 for another. Further, the 585 arrests by these eight officers constitute a significant portion of the 4,285 arrests made by the BPD during this period.

FIGURE 5. ARREST MADE BY THE BPD (JAN. 2021 - DEC. 2022)



Racial disparities in arrests by the DTF increased substantially in this period, with Black individuals constituting 46.9% of arrests, while White individuals made up 29.2% of arrests, and Latino/a people were 15.3% of those arrested.

Policy and Practices Deficiencies and Recommendations

These qualitative and quantitative findings strongly suggest that policy changes are necessary. Among the policies the PAB recommends strengthening are policies on:

- fair and impartial policing (Policy 401);
- the use of personal communication devices such as cellphones (Policy 701);
- employee speech, expression and social networking (Policy 1029);
- the early warning system (Policy 1041);
- standards of conduct (Policy 321); and
- overtime compensation requests (Policy 1019).

In addition, the PAB recommends:

- adding a stand-alone policy prohibiting implicit or explicit arrest quotas that go beyond the California Vehicle Code (Section 41600-41603) on vehicle stops³⁶ and
- consideration of an official standard for the enforcement of stay-away orders.

³⁶ California Vehicle Code. Section 41600-41603. Chapter 7. Arrest Quotas:

https://leginfo.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayText.xhtml?lawCode=VEH&division=17.&title=&part=&chapter=7.&article=

Before proceeding to these policy reviews, it is important to emphasize that policy changes are meaningless if they are not enforced or if BPD officers are not sufficiently informed on policy matters. In our review of the evidence and audiotaped interviews, it was clear that DTF officers in some cases engaged in practices that were not consistent with policy and in other cases expressed confusion as to what those policies were.

We turn now to specific concerns and preliminary recommendations for reform of existing policies. Following that, we offer recommendations for a new policy prohibiting all arrest quotas; consideration of a standard for enforcement of stay-away orders; and additional training. The PAB presents these preliminary policy recommendations with the intention of collaborating with the BPD to refine and enhance the necessary reforms, ensuring they effectively address the needs of the Berkeley community.

Fair and Impartial Policing, Policy 401

BPD data have consistently shown that Black and Latino/a motorists, cyclists and pedestrians are far more likely to be stopped, arrested and searched than are White people. The 2018 Center for Policing Equity (CPE)³⁷ report commissioned by the City found that Black motorists were 6.5 times more likely to be stopped by Berkeley police than White motorists and that Black pedestrians were 4.5 times more likely to be stopped.

Subsequent to this CPE report, Mayor Arreguin convened a Working Group on Fair and Impartial Policing. It met for almost two years and submitted a package of recommendations to City Council on February 23, 2021. The recommendations, which were passed largely intact, were wide-ranging and significant and included, among many other proposals, recommendations for a requirement that intensive training focused on implicit bias be administered annually, and for reforms of the Early Warning System.

Data in the BPD Transparency Hub reveal that the disparities reported by the CPE remain entrenched. According to the 2024 PAB report on the Implementation of Fair and Impartial Policing directives³⁸, for the period from April 2021 to October 2023, Black motorists were 5.8 times more likely to be stopped by the BPD than White motorists; 10 times more likely to be searched; and 10 times more likely to be arrested. Black pedestrians were 8 times more likely to be stopped than their White counterparts. Overall, Black residents of Berkeley were 6.55 times more likely to be stopped by BPD than White Berkeley residents.

As noted earlier, it is challenging to calculate with precision the racial disparities in arrests in the downtown area. What we do know, however, is that the racial disparity in

³⁷ Report, "The Science of Justice: Berkeley Police Department National Justice Database City Report May 2018": <https://rentboard.berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Berkeley-CPE-Report-May-2018.pdf>

³⁸ Police Accountability Board Report "Fair and Impartial Policing Implementation": https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2024%20PAB%20Report_FIP%20Implementation_Final.pdf

arrests has increased substantially from 2019-2020 when approximately equal numbers of Black people and Whites were arrested by the DTF, to 2021-2022 when the percentage of arrestees who were White had fallen to 29.2% and Blacks and Latinos made up more than 62%.

We know too that the text messages from 2019-2020 reveal open racial animus among at least some officers. As Sgt. Kacalek joked derisively when watching a blurry video of a distillery, “Shedoudy’s Obama phone fucked up the video” (presumably ridiculing a program that provided free cell phones to eligible low-income households).

In a subsequent text, Sgt. Kacalek wrote about a media report of a particular incident and the alleged perpetrator: “Interesting how he listed him as ‘Dennis Daniels, male, 51 years old, no address’. I guess he isn’t black or no one could decipher his race and he isn’t homeless or even unhoused, just no address. #Iwantthecoldhardtruth.”

The disdain extended to the unhoused people Sgt. Kacalek patrolled: “Stern [DTF patrol officer] is gonna come back with a new strain that wipes out the homeless pop. We will just ride by the bodies!”

Despite these inappropriate expressions of racial animus and disdain for the unhoused it appears that no DTF officers reported the inappropriate conduct and expressions until the terminated officer Shedoudy disclosed the text messages to City Council. DTF members interviewed by the Swanson team pushed back against the notion that such messages were inappropriate, viewing them instead as intended as humor and not to be taken seriously—suggesting a jarring disconnect between the public reaction to the racist undertone of these texts and their matter-of-fact reception by DTF members.

In light of these quantitative and qualitative findings, the PAB recommends the following additions to the Fair and Impartial Policing Policy (#401):

- A provision explicitly clarifying that the policy refers to both conduct and speech or expression and
- A provision that mandates annual intensive implicit bias training as called for in the Council directive in the Fair and Impartial Policing reforms of 2021³⁹

See Attachment 1 for the current Fair and Impartial Policing Policy, with recommended changes highlighted in red.

Personal Communication Devices, Policy 701

The cellphones used by the DTF to send these text messages were officers’ personal devices. While the department issues personal communication devices (in this case, cellphones) to all sworn members and encourages their use for work-related issues

³⁹ Report and Recommendations from Mayor’s Fair and Impartial Policing Working Group: <https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2021-02-23%20Special%20Item%2001%20Report%20and%20Recommendations.pdf>

when radio communication is not feasible, the policy allows wide discretion. As was the case in the Swanson & McNamara investigation, the fact that the messages in question were sent on officers' own personal devices—not those issued by the Department—complicated considerably investigators' access. Furthermore, some of the interviewed DTF members were not aware of *any* policy on this issue. The PAB therefore recommends:

- strengthening Policy 701 to stipulate that PCDs are to be used *only* when radio communication is not feasible;
- that members using a PCD be required to use department-issued PCDs, absent exigent circumstances;
- adding a provision making it clear that the prohibition on inappropriate use of a PCD, whether on duty or off-duty on work-related issues, includes any expression that damages the mission, function, reputation or professionalism of the BPD; and
- providing additional training on the use of PCD's.

See Attachment 2 for the current Personal Communication Devices with recommended changes highlighted in red.

Employee Speech, Expression, and Social Networking, Policy 1029

The text messages that were exchanged among members of the DTF expressed racial animus and disdain for the unhoused. In this, they appear to have violated the BPD policy on employee speech and expression. Specifically, the policy prohibits any speech “pursuant to an official duty that tends to compromise or damage the mission, function, reputation or professionalism of the Berkeley Police Department or its employees.” The meaning of this policy appears to be clear; however, in the context of DTF members' interpretation of the messages in question as jesting, the PAB recommends not only the implicit bias training referred to above, but also:

- adding further specificity to leave no doubt about its meaning, explicitly including reference to its application whether the speech is transmitted through a personal or department-issued electronic device and whether the member is on or off-duty.

See Attachment 3 with the current Employee Speech, Expression, and Social Networking Policy, with recommended changes highlighted in red.

Early Warning System, Policy 1041

An Early Warning System (EWS), sometimes referred to as an Early Intervention and Risk Management System, was a central component of the directives of the City Council, following the recommendation of the Mayor's Working Group on Fair and Impartial Policing. As the Working Group stated in its recommendation to Council in February 2021, an effective system involves “identifying officer outliers in stops, searches, and use of force...and examining the reasons for racial disparities.” “Outliers” is a term of art that refers to those whose performance on certain indicators is outside the Department

average. The system does not focus on discipline but rather on identifying behavior that may be problematic as early as possible. Such programs include monitoring, mentoring, training and, where appropriate, counseling.

In addition to enhancing public safety and officer welfare and safeguarding against bias, effective systems are a financially responsible approach. According to a report by the *Washington Post*, twenty-five cities paid out more than \$3.2 billion in settlements for police misconduct between 2010 and 2020, with claims for officers charged in more than one misconduct case accounting for \$1.5 billion.⁴⁰ Over the past decade, the City of Berkeley has paid \$1,242,860.97 across 471 claims in such settlements, with a total incurred cost of almost \$2 million, including the cost of processing these claims.

The current EWS in Berkeley does not have an effective way of systematically identifying outliers on indicators such as numbers of stops, arrests and searches. While random audits of a few officers on a quarterly basis have been instituted, the small number randomly singled out is unlikely to have an effective impact or to identify significant outliers, nor is it consistent with the directive from Council based on the Mayor's Working Group on Fair and Impartial Policing.

As criminologist Carol Archbold, who specializes in police accountability, said in the context of the *Nature Human Behavior* report on the contagiousness of misconduct, early intervention systems can be effective: "The spread [of misconduct] can be stopped if it's tracked, and if something is done about it."⁴¹

If an effective Early Warning System had been in effect, it is probable that, based on the statistics cited above—particularly the spike in arrests during certain periods—some members of the DTF would have been audited as outliers and the scrutiny could have minimized the damage.

In April 2023, City Council referred \$100,000 to the June 2023 budget to hire a consultant for the design and help with implementing a new Early Intervention and Risk Management System. It will take some time before that project is complete and a new system put in place. In the interim, the PAB recommends:

- quarterly audits of officers with unusually high numbers of stops, arrests, and/or searches, for people of color and the unhoused, instead of the current random audits of several officers

See attachment 4 for the current Early Warning System Policy 1041, with recommended changes outlined in red.

⁴⁰ "The Hidden Billion Dollar Cost of Repeated Police Misconduct," *The Washington Post*, March 9, 2022.

⁴¹ "Study Finds Misconduct Spreads among Police Officers Like Contagion," Nova KQED, May 27, 2019. <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/police-misconduct-peer-effects>.

Standards of Conduct, Policy 321

As Mayor Arreguin stated in his press release following the statements of City Spokesperson Chakko, “What is clear from a plain reading of the texts is that the behavior was unprofessional and does not meet the standards to which we should hold our City employees.... This episode further demonstrates the need to implement reforms.”

These authenticated texts reveal conduct that was clearly at odds with the official policy and underscore the need for explicit statements regarding the duty of all officers to report inappropriate conduct or violations of policy. It is of great concern that some DTF officers were not even aware of any mechanism for reporting observed misconduct.

The PAB is pleased that the Chief has adopted the Active Bystander for Law Enforcement (ABLE) program for which training will soon commence. That program will train officers to intervene when they witness their peers engaging in inappropriate conduct.

In addition to this important ABLE program, the reforms we recommend to this Standards of Conduct policy will:

- make it clear that any behavior or expressions that bring disrepute to the Department—whether an officer is on or off-duty—will not be tolerated, and
- Members have an obligation to report any such behavior or expressions by any other member, consistent with Policy 1010.9 concerning 'Employee Responsibility' to file a personnel complaint if misconduct by a BPD colleague is observed.

See Attachment 5 for the current Standards of Conduct Policy with recommendations highlighted in red.

Overtime Compensation Requests, Policy 1019

The police overtime issue is a longstanding concern. A 1998 report by the National Institute of Justice declared, “There is a sense both inside and outside the law enforcement community that overtime is overused, misused, and only halfheartedly controlled.”⁴²

On March 23, 2022, the Berkeley City Auditor submitted a report entitled “Berkeley Police: Improvements Needed to Manage Overtime and Security Work for Outside Entities.”⁴³ The report found that “BPD does not adhere to their overtime policies and controls.” In fiscal year 2020, 21% of officers worked more than their weekly overtime limit

⁴² Bayley, David and Robert Worden. 1998. “Police Overtime: An Examination of Key Issues.” National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice. Washington DC.

⁴³ Berkeley City Auditor, “Berkeley Police: Improvements Needed to Manage Overtime and Security Work for Outside Entities,” March 3, 2022. The report won an excellence award from the Association of Local Government Auditors.

of 44 hours at least once, risking their own health and safety and the safety of others. One officer exceeded the limit in eleven weeks during 2020. Further, the Auditor's report stated that the BPD did not "have an effective system to enforce their policy and manage overtime."

The Auditor's report further noted that "overtime was the biggest reason" why the BPD consistently spent more than their budget allocation. In order to align the overtime budget with actual outlays, in 2021 the City's overtime budget allocation was raised to \$5.3 million and another \$1 million was put in reserve.

The Auditor noted that there are many legitimate reasons for the police use of overtime—for example, a call that comes in at the end of a shift or the need to cover for absences or vacancies. However, excessive overtime imposes significant physical, mental, and fiscal risks. She also noted that compensatory time for overtime worked sets off a "chain reaction" of overtime expenses, and that while such comp time is limited by policy it was unclear "whether this policy is being enforced" (p. 16). On June 25, 2024, Chief Louis gave Council an update on implementation of the Auditor's twelve recommendations. She reported that five had been implemented and that the others were in process. However, we note that none of these recommendations deal squarely with the issue of the broad discretion related to overtime.

The Auditor advanced twelve recommendations—importantly, including improved security contracts with the outside entities that make up a large percentage of overtime hours. The Auditor's final report included responses from the Department indicating that many of the recommendations are in the process of being implemented. Among these BPD responses was a "proposed implementation plan" to "review existing policy and ensure that any policy updates or clarification are completed."

BPD policy on overtime requests and the verification of overtime worked relies on broad discretion and appears open to misuse. This wide discretion and potential for misuse are apparent in this text from Sgt. Kacalek: "I was at Kevin Reece's birthday party just now and Dave was there and we briefly talked about DTF. He said just kick ass, arrest people, have fun, and get results and I will never jam you about overtime." Indeed, the audiotaped interviews of DTF members suggest that DTF officers worked overtime at will.

While some supervisory discretion is inevitable and necessary, the current policy leaves wide gaps through which such misuse can proliferate. For example, Section 1019.1.1 of the Overtime Compensation Requests policy states, "All requests to work overtime shall be approved in advance by a supervisor." However, this clear mandate is followed by the broad exemption that "if circumstances do not permit prior approval," approval can be sought after the fact when the overtime is completed.

The PAB does not offer specific policy reforms here. Instead, we recommend that the review of existing policies referred to in the BPD response to the Auditor be robust

and foreground the need to narrow this broad discretion. Importantly, for example, among other provisions it might:

- stipulate what circumstances, or types of circumstances, would comprise the need to bypass the otherwise straightforward directive that “all requests shall be approved in advance...” and
- consider excessive overtime as a factor triggering an Early Warning System audit.

While discretion and flexibility are inevitable, the conditions under which discretion is applied need to be described. The current policy perhaps unintentionally sends a message of virtually unlimited flexibility--a flexibility that some DTF officers interpreted as open-ended. See Attachment 6 for the current Overtime Compensation Policy.

Prohibition on Arrest Quotas

The legislative issue of police arrest quotas, though often obscured and scattered across many states, has its origins in Berkeley—a city renowned for its progressive and forward-thinking stance in shaping societal norms and legal frameworks (Ossei-Owusu, 2021).

Significant legislative activity on arrest quotas emerged in the 1970s, with Black Democratic Assemblyman John Miller introducing California's bill in 1975. Miller, often described as a "progressive independent in local politics," demonstrated a keen political acumen, underpinning his support for quota bans with inclusive rhetoric (Id.). His district, which encompassed the diverse cities of Oakland and Berkeley, provided a unique perspective, one that resonated with concerns for both police officers and the public.

Miller articulated the inherent injustice in quotas, deeming them "unfair, undemocratic, and unjust."⁴⁴ He was troubled by the notion that an officer's failure to meet quotas could lead to demotion, while simultaneously expressing concerns for "the average California driver," who might find themselves disbelieved by a "rubber stamp traffic court system."⁴⁵

California's statute, based on a convergence of bipartisan concerns, remains relevant today, specifically in the City of Berkeley. It serves as a historical testament to the enduring pursuit of justice and fair play, core tenets that guide our efforts to maintain police accountability, foster public trust, and safeguard civil rights.

While most people assume that a ban on police arrest quotas is already enshrined in the California Penal Code, it is limited to the California Vehicle Code. This is an oversight that needs to be corrected, both locally and at the State level.

The brief summary of the Swanson report provided to the public by the City of Berkeley appears to absolve the DTF of establishing formal arrest quotas. However, the

⁴⁴ See Ossei-Owusu, 2021 citing *Measure to Outlaw CHP's Ticket Quotas*, *supra* note 69, at 1.

⁴⁵ Id.

Swanson report stipulates that while no formal arrest quotas were established, there was an expectation that a certain number of arrests was to be aimed for. The text messages quoted above are replete with explicit and implicit references to “Operation 100” in which DTF patrol officers were encouraged by Sgt. Kacalek to achieve at least 100 arrests per month. “How’s Operation 100 going?”, he asks. And, “81 arrests! We can do 19 by Friday for sure!” And, by way of a (presumably) teasing reminder, “I was thinking whoever gets the least arrests today does the waxing.” DTF members who were interviewed consistently eschewed the term “quota”, but they acknowledged an expectation of high arrest numbers as an indication that they were being proactive and doing their job.

A spike in arrests attests to the seriousness of the Operation 100 expectation and its implicit quota.

Given the legislative history of arrest quotas, their (incorrectly) assumed ban in California, and their potential impact on our most marginalized community members, the PAB recommends that the BPD, in collaboration with the PAB develop a new, freestanding policy prohibiting all arrest quotas whether they refer to vehicles, cyclists, or pedestrians, whether formal, informal, or implicit, and whether they are enforced with formal disciplinary measures or solely incentives/disincentives. A sample arrest quota prohibition is attached in Appendix 3.

Stay-away Orders

Violation of a stay-away order is considered a contempt of court misdemeanor under California Penal Code 166(c)(1). While the DTF text messages do not explicitly reference stay-away orders, BPD data indicate that over 20% of DTF arrests during this period were for violations of court orders. Among these cases, 91.4% were linked in part to violations of probation. Without a detailed review of individual incident reports, it is difficult to ascertain how many arrests stemmed primarily from a violation of a stay-away order.

Currently, BPD lacks a specific policy regarding stay-away orders. Some interviewed officers assert that enforcement allows no discretion, while others maintain that some discretion exists. Given the significant impact of stay-away orders on UC Berkeley property and downtown businesses, and officers' ability to request these orders post-arrest from a judge, the PAB strongly recommends that BPD establish a comprehensive stay-away order policy and provide training consistent with state law.

The current resources of the PAB do not allow for a detailed examination of the circumstances surrounding stay-away arrest. However, we recommend that BPD investigate the frequency and context of these arrests, and assess whether the district attorney's high dismissal rate (as noted earlier for DTF cases) is disproportionately related to stay-away orders.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CITY COUNCIL ACTION

1. Pass an ordinance or otherwise affirm the Police Accountability Board's ability to access documents and records in furtherance of its central "accountability" function, consistent with Charter Amendment Section 125.

The policy reforms recommended above are an important first step in ensuring that the kind of inappropriate conduct and expression revealed in the DTF text messages do not recur. However, policy reforms are only a first step. No policy is effective if it is not fully implemented and enforced. Real law—real policy—takes place on the ground where it is literally "enacted" every day through practice.

The PAB "policy and practices review" of the texting incidents of concern here are a case in point. The content of the audiotaped interviews of DTF Members which were accessed by the PAB only after persistent and lengthy efforts have underscored how critical such authority is if the PAB is to fulfill its function of Police Department accountability and transparency. Without such access, our oversight would be largely limited to formal policies, with no meaningful "practices" oversight.

The Charter Amendment creating the PAB established as one of its primary purposes the promotion of "public trust through independent, objective, civilian oversight of the Berkeley Police Department," including "setting and reviewing Police Department, policies, **practices**, and procedures..." (Section 125 (1); emphasis added)⁴⁶.

If the Police Accountability Board is to fulfill its Charter-mandated function of police oversight and accountability, it must have the ability to access the internal records of the BPD that track its actual practices. This would include, but not be limited to, Internal Affairs Bureau records of internal and external complaints and their processing, Early Warning System records, body-worn camera footage, and police reports.

It should be noted further that the inability of this oversight body to provide oversight of daily BPD practices limits its ability to prevent or forestall the kinds of misconduct that went undisclosed for more than two years before being exposed by an individual who was no longer part of the police force.

This restriction on the PAB oversight function plays out in other incidents of interest as well, including serious allegations of significant misconduct—incidents that we as the police oversight body sometimes only learn about from press reports months or years after the fact. We fully understand that the PAB is not authorized to recommend discipline outside of individual complaints. What is important is *patterns of practice* that may be revealed in a PAB investigation and that are integral to the PAB exercising its Charter-mandated oversight of not only BPD policy, but practices.

⁴⁶ Berkeley City Charter Section 125(1): [https://berkeley.municipal.codes/Charter/125\(1\)](https://berkeley.municipal.codes/Charter/125(1))

To this end, the PAB recommends that City Council pass an ordinance or otherwise ensure that the PAB has the authority to access BPD records that attest to how formal policies are being implemented and enforced, both through BPD procedures and in daily practice on the ground. This recommendation addresses the core of our Charter-mandated function of oversight, accountability, and the promotion of trust.

In 2023, City Council passed its priority list for legislative activity at the state and federal levels, a list which authorizes its lobbyists to act on its behalf to champion legislation consistent with Berkeley's values and interests. That list included a directive to "support efforts to increase peace officer accountability...". "Peace officer accountability" was once again a lobbying priority for Berkeley in 2024.

An ordinance to ensure that the PAB may self-initiate investigations of alleged incidents of serious misconduct will allow it to fulfill its Charter-mandated function of oversight. This would be consistent with the City's lobbying efforts to "support efforts to increase peace officer accountability."

2. Adopt a robust resolution ensuring full and meaningful accountability for sworn officers—whether on-duty or off-duty—who engage in misconduct of any kind but especially actions or expressions of racial or other types of bias.

Disciplinary actions imposed on sworn officers who engage in policy violations are not revealed to the public, consistent with California Penal Code 832.7. This lack of disclosure, combined with the inevitable rumor mill that works to fill the gap, has threatened to erode public trust. The erosion of trust has been furthered by revelations in the press that one recent incident resulted in a seeming exoneration by the BPD Internal Affairs Bureau, despite what Mayor Arreguin called his "shock and outrage" at the alleged incident.⁴⁷ Council could help ensure accountability by adopting a resolution underscoring its support for robust and meaningful accountability for officers, whether on or off-duty, who engage in misconduct of any kind, but with a special emphasis on racial or other types of bias.

3. Direct the City Manager to work with the BPD, PAB and ODPa to create a public repository to fulfill the vision of California Penal Code Section 832.7⁴⁸ (b)(1) to allow for transparency in cases of sustained allegations of officer racism or other discriminatory conduct or expressions.

⁴⁷ See "'Don't give me that Black crap': Video from 2017 shows embattled Berkeley sergeant" (berkeleyscanner.com. September 13, 2023): <https://www.berkeleyscanner.com/2023/09/14/policing/berkeley-police-sergeant-dave-marble-lawsuit-video/>

⁴⁸ California Penal Code Section 832.7: https://leginfo.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=832.7.&lawCode=PEN

The Penal Code that protects peace officers' personnel records from public disclosure (Section 832.7) has been amended several times. These amendments now exempt the following records from protection:

1. Discharge of a Firearm: Any incident where a peace officer discharges a firearm at a person (Section 832.7(b)(A)(i)).
2. Use of Force: Any use of force resulting in death or great bodily injury (Section 832.7(b)(A)(ii)).
3. Sexual Assault: Any sustained finding that a peace officer engaged in sexual assault (Section 832.7(b)(B)(i)).
4. Dishonesty: Any sustained finding of dishonesty by a peace officer made by any law enforcement or oversight agency (Section 832.7(b)(C)).

The most recent amendment further allows the disclosure of records related to “any record relating to an incident in which a sustained finding was made by any law enforcement agency or oversight agency that a peace officer or custodial officer engaged in conduct including, but not limited to, verbal statements, writings, online posts, recordings, and gestures, involving prejudice or discrimination against a person on the basis of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual orientation, or military and veteran status” (Section 832.7(b)(D)).

The Berkeley City Council should direct the City Manager to collaborate with the Berkeley Police Department (BPD), the Police Accountability Board (PAB), and the Office of the Director of Police Accountability (ODPA) to implement these amendments. Specifically, they should:

1. Create a public repository that proactively publishes relevant findings within 30 days of their conclusion, regardless of Public Records Act (PRA) requests; and
2. Ensure full transparency in cases of sustained allegations and other incidents eligible for public disclosure.

This action will fulfill the vision of the amendments to California Penal Code Section 832.7 as outlined in Senate Bill 16 (SB 16)⁴⁹, Senate Bill 1421 (SB 1421)⁵⁰, and Assembly Bill 748 (AB 748)⁵¹.

⁴⁹ Senate Bill 16, Skinner. Peace officers: release of records:

https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202120220SB16

⁵⁰ Senate Bill 1421, Skinner. Peace officers: release of records:

https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB1421

⁵¹ Assembly Bill 748, Ting. Peace officers: video and audio recordings: disclosure:

https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB748

4. Call on California state legislators to extend the prohibition on arrest quotas, which are currently limited to the California Vehicle Code (Section 41600-41603).

Most people assume that a ban on police arrest quotas is already enshrined in California law, but it is limited to vehicle stops. This is an oversight that needs to be corrected, both locally and at the State level. Given the legislative history of arrest quotas, their (incorrectly) assumed ban in California's Penal Code, and their potential impact on our most marginalized community members, the PAB recommends that Council call on the legislature to correct that oversight by extending the prohibition on arrest quotas, whether they be implicit or explicit, in the Penal Code.

Whatever the findings of the Swanson & McNamara team, the DTF text messages as well as the spikes in arrests during that month, drew the PAB's attention to arrest quotas and, eventually, to the absence of their general prohibition in the Penal Code. Once again, Berkeley could take the lead on spearheading a remedy for this apparent oversight.

SUMMARY

The Police Accountability Board is charged by the City Charter with oversight of the Berkeley Police Department's policies, practices, and procedures, in the interest of promoting accountability, transparency and public trust.

This report was triggered by a series of text messages sent among sworn officers of the BPD's Downtown Task Force and Bike Unit, and its goal is to fulfill—to the extent possible under current restrictions--its Charter-mandated oversight functions. The report is forward-looking, providing recommendations for policy and practice changes that may help prevent such harmful incidents in the future.

We draw our recommended policy reforms from implications of the text messages themselves, publicly available statistical data, the Swanson & McNamara Report, and DTF officers' audiotaped interviews.

The policies focused on in this report are Fair and Impartial Policing (#401); Personal Communication Devices (#701); Employee Speech, Expression, and Networking (#1029); Standards of Conduct (#321); the Early Warning System (#1041); and Overtime Compensation Requests (#1019). In addition, the PAB recommends a freestanding prohibition on all arrest quotas, implicit or explicit, and a clear policy on the enforcement of stay-away orders.

These policy reforms are one important step. However, policy reforms are only meaningful to the extent that they are fully understood, implemented, and robustly enforced. The PAB thus recommends, as a key priority, that City Council enact an ordinance or other mechanism to ensure that this oversight body—which has sworn an

oath of confidentiality--has the authority to access internal BPD records in the interest of preventing such damaging practices in the future.

Less significant perhaps, but of great symbolic value, the PAB recommends that Council pass a resolution affirming its strong support for full and meaningful accountability for officers who have engaged in misconduct whether they are on or off-duty.

The PAB also recommends that the Council call on the State Legislature to 1) add an exemption in cases of sustained racism or other bias, to 832.7 which protects police records from public disclosure; and 2) rectify an oversight with regard a prohibition on arrest quotas--which is currently limited to the California Vehicle Code—by extending that prohibition in the California Penal Code. By doing so, the City of Berkeley can exhibit its leadership on these important social justice issues.

The text messages that were sent among officers of the Downtown Task Force were harmful to the community and arguably demoralizing to the many BPD officers who find such sentiments repugnant. This report is necessarily forward-looking and aims to provide an environment in which transparency, accountability, and justice can flourish. This cannot be accomplished through policy changes alone. It requires collective efforts by the PAB, BPD and its leadership, the City Manager, and City Council. The PAB looks forward to this collaboration.

ATTACHMENTS

ATTACHMENT 1. Fair and Impartial Policing: POLICY 401 (with recommended changes in red).

401.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This policy is intended to reaffirm the commitment of the Berkeley Police Department to fair and impartial policing; to clarify the circumstances in which dispatchers and officers can consider race, ethnicity and other demographics; and to reinforce procedures that serve to assure the public that we are providing service and enforcing laws in an equitable way, including identifying, intercepting, and documenting profiling by proxy.

California Penal Code Section 13519.4(e) prohibits racial profiling by law enforcement officers. This policy explicitly prohibits racial profiling and other biased policing. This policy describes the limited circumstances in which members can consider race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, age, religion, sexual orientation/identity or socio-economic status in making law enforcement decisions.

401.1.1 DEFINITIONS

Definitions related to this policy include:

Bias-based policing - Any police-initiated action that relies on the race, ethnicity or national origin rather than the behavior of an individual or information that leads the police to a particular individual who has been identified as being engaged in criminal activity.

401.2 POLICY

Investigative detentions, traffic stops, arrests, searches and property seizures by officers will be based on a standard of reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Officers must be able to articulate specific facts and circumstances that support reasonable suspicion or probable cause.

Officers shall not consider race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, age, religion, sexual orientation/ identity or socio-economic status in establishing either reasonable suspicion or probable cause, or when carrying out other law enforcement activities except when officers are:

1. Seeking specific person(s) who have been described in part by any of the above listed characteristics, or
2. The person(s) are being sought for a specific law enforcement purpose.

Discrimination or harassment based on a trait or class described above is considered a “serious allegation” of misconduct.

401.3 RESPONSIBILITY TO REPORT AND TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION

Employees who become aware of another employee engaging in biased policing—**including both conduct and speech or expression—shall** report it and shall adhere to reporting procedures set forth in the Personnel Complaints Policy.

A supervisor or command officer who becomes aware of biased policing shall adhere to notification and administrative procedures set forth in the Personnel Complaints Policy.

All reports of biased policing shall be investigated in accordance with the Personnel Complaints Policy.

401.4 PROFILING BY PROXY

Bias, racism or profiling by proxy occurs in a call for service when an individual call the police and makes false or ill-informed claims about persons they dislike or are biased against. Dispatchers and Officers have a role in mitigating bias-based calls for service (CFS), and proper handling of these calls is important to maintain and build trust between the police and the community.

Call takers have a responsibility to do an initial screen and triage of all calls to ensure they are accurately entered as the correct CFS with the appropriate priority attached. Call takers should ask questions and explore whether there are concrete, observable behaviors that form the basis of the suspicious activity or crime the RP is reporting. Calls for service (CFS) should focus on behaviors of involved parties, not appearance. Reports of suspicious activity require the reporting party (RP) to articulate something criminal or reasonably suspicious about a person's behavior.

If a Call Taker believes an RP is making a bias-based call for service, they should:

1. Create a call for service,
2. Enter the details provided by the RP in the call narrative
3. In the Nature of Call field enter: "Supervisor review required" which will ensure that the call is not ready for dispatch, and
4. Notify the on-duty supervisor. Supervisor will review the merits of the call for service and either approve for dispatching or notify a Watch Commander (or designee)
5. Watch Commander will determine if a response will be provided and/or follow-up up with the RP for more information.

401.5 REPORTING TO CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

The Chief of Police or the authorized designee shall ensure that all data required by the California Department of Justice (DOJ) regarding complaints of racial bias against officers is collected and reported annually to the DOJ (Penal Code § 13012; Penal Code § 13020).

401.5.1 DEMOGRAPHIC DATA PROCEDURES

All sworn officers shall provide demographic statistical data once for each individual as listed below:

1. All vehicle and bicycle detentions.
2. All pedestrian detentions
3. Anytime anyone is detained, regardless of the cause
4. Anytime anyone is searched regardless of the cause.

Officers shall provide demographic statistical data pursuant to the requirements of the RIPA statute, AB 953.

401.6 ADMINISTRATION

Each year, the Operations Division Captain shall review the efforts of the Department to prevent racial or biased based profiling and submit an overview, including public concerns and complaints, to the Chief of Police.

The annual report should not contain any identifying information about any specific complaint, member of the public or officers. It should be reviewed by the Chief of Police to identify any changes in training or operations that should be made to improve service.

Supervisors should review the annual report and discuss the results with those they are assigned to supervise.

401.7 TRAINING

Training on racial or bias-based profiling and review of this policy should be conducted as directed by the Personnel and Training Bureau.

All sworn members of this department will be scheduled to attend Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST)-approved training on the subject of racial or bias-based profiling.

Pending participation in such POST-approved training and at all times, all members of this department are encouraged to familiarize themselves with and consider racial and cultural differences among members of this community.

Each sworn member of this department who received initial racial or bias-based profiling training will thereafter be required to complete an approved refresher course every five years, or sooner if deemed necessary, in order to keep current with changing racial, identity and cultural trends (Penal Code § 13519.4(i)).

All sworn members of the Department will be required to receive annual intensive implicit bias training.

ATTACHMENT 2. Personal Communication Devices: POLICY 701 (with recommended changes in red)

701.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this policy is to establish guidelines for the use of mobile telephones and communication devices, whether issued or funded by the Department or personally owned, while on-duty or when used for authorized work-related purposes.

This policy generically refers to all such devices as Personal Communication Devices (PCDs) but is intended to include all mobile telephones, personal digital assistants (PDAs), wireless capable tablets and similar wireless two-way communications and/or portable Internet access devices. PCD use includes, but is not limited to, placing and receiving calls, text messaging, blogging and microblogging, emailing, using video or camera features, playing games and accessing sites or services on the Internet.

701.2 POLICY

The Berkeley Police Department allows members to utilize department-issued or funded PCDs and to possess personally owned PCDs in the workplace, subject to certain limitations. **PCDs shall only be used in the workplace on work-related matters when radio communication is not feasible. Further, personally owned PCDs shall only be used on non-work-related issues, absent exigent circumstances.** Any department-issued PCD used while on-duty, or used off-duty in any manner reasonably related to the business of the Department, will be subject to monitoring and inspection consistent with the standards set forth in this policy.

The inappropriate use of a PCD while on-duty may impair officer safety. Additionally, members are advised and cautioned that the use of a personally owned PCD either on-duty or after duty hours for business-related purposes may subject the member and the member's PCD records to civil or criminal discovery or disclosure under applicable public records laws. **Inappropriate use of a PCD, whether on duty or off-duty on work-related issues, includes but is not limited to any expression or speech that compromises or damages the mission, function, reputation or professionalism of the BPD.**

Members who have questions regarding the application of this policy or the guidelines contained herein are encouraged to seek clarification from supervisory personnel.

701.3 PRIVACY EXPECTATION

Members forfeit any expectation of privacy with regard to any communication accessed, transmitted, received, or reviewed on any PCD issued or funded by the Department and

shall have no expectation of privacy in their location should the device be equipped with location-detection capabilities. This includes records of all keystrokes or web-browsing history made on the PCD. The fact that access to a database, service, or website requires a username or password will not create an expectation of privacy if it is accessed through department PCDs or networks (see the Information Technology Use Policy for additional guidance).

Members have no expectation of privacy regarding any communications while using a personally owned PCD for department-related business or when the use reasonably implicates work-related misconduct.

701.3.1 CALIFORNIA ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT (CALECPA)

No member is authorized to be the sole possessor of a department-issued PCD. Department-issued PCDs can be retrieved, reassigned, accessed or used by any member as directed by a supervisor without notice. Member use of a department-issued PCD and use of a personal PCD at work or for work-related business constitutes specific consent for access for department purposes. Prior to conducting an administrative search of a PCD, supervisors should consult legal counsel to ensure access is consistent with CalECPA (Penal Code § 1546; Penal Code § 1546.1).

701.4 DEPARTMENT-ISSUED PCD

Depending on a member's assignment and the needs of the position, the Department may, at its discretion, issue or fund a PCD. Department-issued or funded PCDs are provided as a convenience to facilitate on-duty performance only. Such devices and the associated telephone number shall remain the sole property of the Department and may be subject to inspection or monitoring (including all related records and content) at any time without notice and without cause.

701.4.1 CITY OF BERKELEY AR 2.15 - CITY ISSUED COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT POLICY

Pursuant to City of Berkeley Administrative Regulation 2.15, text messages held on Department-issued or funded PCDs are to be maintained on the communication device for no less than 30 days from the date sent or received. PCDs that have text features enabled will be set to retain text message history for 30 days. Employees are not permitted to alter the text message history setting or to manually delete saved text messages.

701.5 PERSONALLY OWNED PCD

Members may carry a personally owned PCD while on-duty, subject to the following conditions and limitations:

- a. Permission to carry a personally owned PCD may be revoked if it is used contrary to provisions of this policy.
- b. The Department accepts no responsibility for loss of or damage to a personally owned PCD.
- c. The PCD and any associated services shall be purchased, used and maintained solely at the member's expense.
- d. The device shall not be utilized to record or disclose any business-related information, including photographs, video or the recording or transmittal of any information or material obtained or made accessible as a result of employment with the Department, without the express authorization of the Chief of Police or the authorized designee.
- e. All work-related documents, emails, photographs, recordings or other public records created or received on a member's personally owned PCD should be transferred to the Berkeley Police Department and deleted from the member's PCD as soon as reasonably practicable but no later than the end of the member's shift.

Except with prior express authorization from their supervisor, members are not obligated or required to carry, access, monitor or respond to electronic communications using a personally owned PCD while off-duty. If a member is in an authorized status that allows for appropriate compensation consistent with policy or existing memorandum of understanding or collective bargaining agreements, or if the member has prior express authorization from his/her supervisor, the member may engage in business-related communications. Should members engage in such approved off-duty communications or work, members entitled to compensation shall promptly document the time worked and communicate the information to their supervisors to ensure appropriate compensation. Members who independently document off-duty department-related business activities in any manner shall promptly provide the Department with a copy of such records to ensure accurate record keeping.

701.6 USE OF PCD

The following protocols shall apply to all PCDs that are carried while on-duty or used to conduct department business:

- a. Members may use a PCD to communicate with other personnel **only** in situations where the use of radio communications is either impracticable or not feasible. PCDs should not be used as a substitute for, as a way to avoid, or in lieu of regular radio communications.
- b. Members are prohibited from taking pictures, audio or video recordings or making copies of any such picture or recording media unless it is directly related to official department business. Disclosure of any such information to any third party through any means, requires the express authorization of the Chief of Police or the authorized designee.
- c. Members will not access social networking sites for any purpose that is not official department business. This restriction does not apply to a personally owned PCD used during authorized break times.
- d. Using PCDs to harass, threaten, coerce or otherwise engage in inappropriate conduct with any third party is prohibited. Any member having knowledge of such conduct shall promptly notify a supervisor.

701.7 SUPERVISOR RESPONSIBILITIES

The responsibilities of supervisors include, but are not limited to:

- a. Ensuring that members under their command are provided appropriate training on the use of PCDs consistent with this policy.
- b. Monitoring, to the extent practicable, department-issued PCD use in the workplace and taking prompt corrective action if a member is observed or reported to be improperly using a department-issued PCD.
 - 1. An investigation into improper conduct should be promptly initiated when circumstances warrant.
 - 2. Before conducting any administrative search of a member's personally owned device, supervisors should consult with the Chief of Police or the authorized designee.

701.8 USE WHILE DRIVING

The use of a PCD while driving can adversely affect safety, cause unnecessary distractions and present a negative image to the public. Officers operating emergency vehicles should restrict the use of these devices to matters of an urgent nature and should, where practicable, stop the vehicle at an appropriate location to use the PCD.

Members who are operating department vehicles that are not authorized emergency vehicles shall not use a PCD while driving unless the device is specifically designed and

configured to allow hands-free use. In an emergency, a wireless phone may be used to place an emergency call to the Department or other emergency services agency (Vehicle Code § 23123; Vehicle Code § 23123.5). Hands-free use should be restricted to business-related calls or calls of an urgent nature.

701.9 OFFICIAL USE

Members are reminded that PCDs are not secure devices and conversations may be intercepted or overheard. Caution should be exercised while utilizing PCDs to ensure that sensitive information is not inadvertently transmitt

ATTACHMENT 3. Employee Speech, Expression and Social Networking: POLICY 1029 (with recommended changes in red)

1029.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This policy is intended to address issues associated with employee use of social networking sites and to provide guidelines for the regulation and balancing of employee speech and expression with the needs of the Department.

Nothing in this policy is intended to prohibit or infringe upon any communication, speech or expression that is protected or privileged under law. This includes speech and expression protected under state or federal constitutions as well as labor or other applicable laws. For example, this policy does not limit an employee from speaking as a private citizen, including acting as an authorized member of a recognized bargaining unit or officer associations, about matters of public concern, such as misconduct or corruption.

Employees are encouraged to consult with their supervisor regarding any questions arising from the application or potential application of this policy.

1029.1.1 APPLICABILITY

This policy applies to all forms of communication including, but not limited to, film, video, print media, public or private speech, use of all Internet services, including the World Wide Web, email, file transfer, remote computer access, news services, social networking, social media, instant messaging, blogs, forums, video and other file-sharing sites.

1029.2 POLICY

Public employees occupy a trusted position in the community, and thus, their statements have the potential to contravene the policies and performance of this department. Due to the nature of the work and influence associated with the law enforcement profession, it is necessary that employees of this department be subject to certain reasonable limitations on their speech and expression. To achieve its mission and efficiently provide service to the public, the Berkeley Police Department will carefully balance the individual employee's rights against the Department's needs and interests when exercising a reasonable degree of control over its employees' speech and expression.

1029.3 SAFETY

Employees should consider carefully the implications of their speech or any other form of expression when using the Internet. Speech and expression that may negatively affect

the safety of the Berkeley Police Department employees, such as posting personal information in a public forum, can result in compromising an employee's home address or family ties. Employees should therefore not disseminate or post any information on any forum or medium that could reasonably be anticipated to compromise the safety of any employee, an employee's family or associates. Examples of the type of information that could reasonably be expected to compromise safety include:

- Disclosing a photograph and name or address of an officer who is working undercover.
- Disclosing the address of a fellow officer.
- **Otherwise disclosing where another officer can be located off-duty.**

1029.4 PROHIBITED SPEECH, EXPRESSION AND CONDUCT

To meet the department's safety, performance and public-trust needs, the following are prohibited unless the speech is otherwise protected (for example, an employee speaking as a private citizen, including acting as an authorized member of a recognized bargaining unit or officer associations, on a matter of public concern). **These prohibitions pertain whether the device is department-issued or personal and whether the member is on or off duty:**

- a. Speech or expression **related to** an official duty that tends to compromise or damage the mission, function, reputation or professionalism of the Berkeley Police Department or its employees.
- b. Speech or expression that, while not made pursuant to an official duty, is significantly linked to, or related to, the Berkeley Police Department and tends to compromise or damage the mission, function, reputation or professionalism of the Berkeley Police Department or its employees. Examples may include:
 1. Statements that indicate disregard for **Berkeley policies**, the law or the state or U.S. Constitution.
 2. Expression that demonstrates support for criminal activity.
 3. Participating in sexually explicit photographs or videos for compensation or distribution.
 4. **Expressions or speech that may reasonably be interpreted as exhibiting animus toward any racial group, gender identity, nationality, religion, disability, or housing status.**
- c. Speech or expression that could reasonably be foreseen as having a negative impact on the credibility of the employee as a witness. For example, posting statements or expressions to a website that glorify or endorse dishonesty, unlawful discrimination or illegal behavior.
- d. Speech or expression of any form that could reasonably be foreseen as having a negative impact on the safety of the employees of the Department. For example,

a statement on a blog that provides specific details as to how and when prisoner transportations are made could reasonably be foreseen as potentially jeopardizing employees by informing criminals of details that could facilitate an escape or attempted escape.

- e. Speech or expression that is contrary to the canons of the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics as adopted by the Berkeley Police Department.
- f. Use or disclosure, through whatever means, of any information, photograph, video or other recording obtained or accessible as a result of employment with the Department for financial or personal gain, or any disclosure of such materials without the express authorization of the Chief of Police or the authorized designee.
- g. Posting, transmitting or disseminating any photographs, video or audio recordings, likenesses or images of department logos, emblems, uniforms, badges, patches, marked vehicles, equipment or other material that specifically identifies the Berkeley Police Department on any personal or social networking or other website or web page, without the express authorization of the Chief of Police.
- h. Accessing websites for non-authorized purposes, or use of any personal communication device, game device or media device, whether personally or department-owned, for personal purposes while on-duty, except in the following circumstances:
 1. When brief personal communication may be warranted by the circumstances (e.g., to inform family of extended hours).
 2. During authorized breaks, in which case such usage should be limited as much as practicable to areas out of sight and sound of the public and shall not be disruptive to the work environment.

Employees should take reasonable and prompt action to remove any content, including content posted by others, that is in violation of this policy from any web page or website maintained by the employee (e.g., social or personal website).

1029.4.1 UNAUTHORIZED ENDORSEMENTS AND ADVERTISEMENTS

While employees are not restricted from engaging in the following activities as private citizens or as authorized members of a recognized bargaining unit or officer associations, employees may not represent the Berkeley Police Department or identify themselves in any way that could be reasonably perceived as representing the Berkeley Police Department in order to do any of the following, unless specifically authorized by the Chief of Police (Government Code § 3206; Government Code § 3302):

- a. Endorse, support, oppose or contradict any political campaign or initiative.
- b. Endorse, support, oppose or contradict any social issue, cause or religion.
- c. Endorse, support or oppose any product, service, company or other commercial entity.

- d. Appear in any commercial, social or nonprofit publication or any motion picture, film, video, public broadcast or on any website.

Additionally, when it can reasonably be construed that an employee, acting in his/her individual capacity or through an outside group or organization (e.g., bargaining group or officer associations), is affiliated with this department, the employee shall give a specific disclaiming statement that any such speech or expression is not representative of the Berkeley Police Department.

Employees retain their right to vote as they choose, to support candidates of their choice and to express their opinions as private citizens, including as authorized members of a recognized bargaining unit or officer associations, on political subjects and candidates at all times while off duty.

However, employees may not use their official authority or influence to interfere with or affect the result of an election or a nomination for office. Employees are also prohibited from directly or indirectly using their official authority to coerce, command or advise another employee to pay, lend or contribute anything of value to a party, committee, organization, agency or person for political purposes (5 USC § 1502).

1029.5 PRIVACY EXPECTATION

Employees forfeit any expectation of privacy with regard to e-mails, texts or anything published or maintained through file-sharing software or any Internet site (e.g., Facebook, MySpace) that is accessed, transmitted, received or reviewed on any department technology system.

The Department reserves the right to access, audit and disclose for whatever reason any message, including attachments, and any information accessed, transmitted, received or reviewed over any technology that is issued or maintained by the Department. This includes the department e-mail system, computer network or any information placed into storage on any department system or device.

It also includes records of all key strokes or web-browsing history made at any department computer or over any department network.

The fact that access to a database, service or website requires a user name or password will not create an expectation of privacy if it is accessed through a department computer or network. However, the Department may not require an employee to disclose a personal user name or password or open a personal social website, except when access is reasonably believed to be relevant to the investigation of allegations of work related misconduct (Labor Code § 980).

1029.6 CONSIDERATIONS

In determining whether to grant authorization of any speech or conduct that is prohibited under this policy, the factors that the Chief of Police or authorized designee should consider include:

- a. Whether the speech or conduct would negatively affect the efficiency of delivering public services.
- b. Whether the speech or conduct would be contrary to the good order of the Department or the efficiency or morale of its members.
- c. Whether the speech or conduct would reflect unfavorably upon the Department.
- d. Whether the speech or conduct would negatively affect the member's appearance of impartiality in the performance of his/her duties.
- e. Whether similar speech or conduct has been previously authorized.
- f. Whether the speech or conduct may be protected and outweighs any interest of the Department.

1029.7 TRAINING

Subject to available resources, the Department should provide training regarding employee speech and the use of social networking to all members of the Department.

ATTACHMENT 4. EARLY WARNING SYSTEM: POLICY 1041 (recommended changes in red)

1041.1 PURPOSE

The purpose of this Order is to establish policy and procedures for an informal performance review and intervention program, the “Early Warning System” (EWS). The program monitors employee performance that may be inconsistent with professional police conduct and cooperatively engages employees to resolve areas of concern. The goal of EWS is early identification of employee performance issues and correction of these issues through constructive counseling sessions rather than the formal disciplinary process.

1041.2 POLICY

All employees shall participate in the EWS program and comply with the guidelines set forth in this Order.

Participation in the EWS program shall not be deemed punitive, nor **is it** a formal disciplinary process.

- a. Notwithstanding the initiation of the EWS process, the Department retains its right and responsibilities with regard to investigation of policy violation and enforcement of employee discipline.

1041.3 PROCEDURES

Employee behavior or performance that is subject to EWS review includes, but is not limited to:

- a. **Racial, housing status, or other demographic disparities on stop, arrest, and/or search data that are higher than the department average;**
- b. Poor attendance and/or abusive use of leave;
- c. Multiple formal sustained or not sustained complaints;
- d. Multiple informal complaint inquiries;
- e. Multiple use of force incidents;
- f. Multiple obstructing/resisting arrest incidents;
- g. Multiple vehicle collisions; and,
- h. Substandard conduct/performance concerns observed by a superior officer.

The Racial and Identify Protection Act (RIPA) data will be available to supervisors in the form of an electronic data dashboard. This will provide supervisors and commanders with

the ability to review stop data created by officers assigned under their span of control. The individual stop data for individual officers should be considered a personnel record as it may provide supervisory guidance for specific officer stop data, if necessary. The public release of any RIPA data will remain anonymized as previously agreed upon Meet and Confer with the Berkeley Police Association and provisions of Government Code 3300 et.al.

Supervisors, commanders and managers shall monitor the activity of their subordinate employees to identify actual or perceived unprofessional behavior and/or substandard performance that is subject to EWS review, and if identified, communicate such information to the Chief of Police via the Chain of Command.

Personnel assigned to the Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) shall monitor all formal and informal allegations of employee misconduct received by their office for behavior or performance that is subject to EWS review, and if identified, communicate such information to the Chief of Police.

Personnel assigned to the Support Services Division Report Review Detail shall forward to the Chief of Police copies of all reports pertaining to:

- a. Obstruction/resisting arrests cases (i.e., Penal Code §§148, 69, etc.)

Administrative reports regarding use of force shall be forwarded to the Chief of Police as directed in Policy 300.

Quarterly audits will be conducted of employees whose behavior or performance includes any of the factors included in (a) through (h) above.

1041.4 MANAGEMENT OF PROGRAM RECORDS

The Office of the Chief of Police shall be responsible for aggregation and administrative management of information, data and records associated with the EWS program.

- a. The administrative assistant assigned to the Office of the Chief of Police shall be responsible for preparing a quarterly report summarizing information and activities associated with the EWS program for use in administrative review.

Information, data and records associated with the EWS program are used for personnel purposes. Accordingly, they are confidential personnel files and not public records.

Documents, data and records shall be maintained by the Office of the Chief of Police for a period of two (2) years.

Access to EWS records shall be restricted to the supervisor, commander and/or manager involved in the monitoring of a particular employee, subject to the approval of the Chief of Police.

- a. An individual employee may be granted access to EWS records that pertain to him/her.

1041.5 ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD

The Chief of Police will convene a quarterly Review Board comprised of all Division Commanders to review program records to determine if initiation of the EWS Program is recommended.

Upon consideration of the Review Board's recommendation, the Chief of Police may direct an employee to participate in the EWS program.

1041.6 INITIATION OF EWS PROGRAM

Upon the direction of the Chief of Police, an informal counseling meeting will be held that may include:

- a. The subject employee;
- b. The employee's supervisor;
- c. An Internal Affairs Bureau sergeant;
- d. The employee's Lieutenant; and,
- e. The employee's Division Commander, who shall preside over the meeting.

Unless impractical, the counseling meeting shall be held during the employee's regularly scheduled working hours.

- a. If the meeting cannot be scheduled during the employee's regularly scheduled working hours, personnel participating while off-duty shall be compensated with compensatory time (minimum time as may be authorized by the employee's MOU) or, with Division Commander approval, allowed to flex an equal amount of time within that same work week.

The subject employee may have one fellow employee accompany him/her to the counseling meeting.

- a. The accompanying employee's presence is allowed to offer general support to the subject employee, not to be an active participant in the counseling meeting.

As in general supervisor counseling meetings, the employee shall be informed of the behavioral and/or performance concern(s) at issue, and he/she shall be allowed an opportunity to offer a response.

The subject employee may be given information regarding the City of Berkeley Employee Assistance Program.

No formal document will be generated referencing this meeting, and the meeting shall not be deemed a punitive or disciplinary proceeding against the employee. There shall be no permanent record of the meeting.

ATTACHMENT 5. STANDARDS OF CONDUCT: Policy 321 (with recommended changes in red)

321.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This policy establishes standards of conduct that are consistent with the values and mission of the Berkeley Police Department and are expected of all department members. The standards contained in this policy are not intended to be an exhaustive list of requirements and prohibitions but they do identify many of the important matters concerning conduct. In addition to the provisions of this policy, members are subject to all other provisions contained in this manual, as well as any additional guidance on conduct that may be disseminated by this department or a member's supervisors.

321.2 POLICY

The continued employment or appointment of every member of the Berkeley Police Department shall be based on conduct that reasonably conforms to the guidelines set forth herein. Failure to meet the guidelines set forth in this policy, whether on- or off-duty, may be cause for disciplinary action.

321.3 DIRECTIVES AND ORDERS

Members shall comply with lawful directives and orders from any department supervisor or person in a position of authority, absent a reasonable and bona fide justification.

321.3.1 UNLAWFUL OR CONFLICTING ORDERS

Supervisors shall not knowingly issue orders or directives that, if carried out, would result in a violation of any law or department policy. Supervisors should not issue orders that conflict with any previous order without making reasonable clarification that the new order is intended to countermand the earlier order.

No member is required to obey any order that appears to be in direct conflict with any federal law, state law, local ordinance, or policy. Following a known unlawful order is not a defense and does not relieve the member from criminal or civil prosecution or administrative discipline. If the legality of an order is in doubt, the affected member shall ask the issuing supervisor to clarify the order or shall confer with a higher authority. The responsibility for refusal to obey rests with the member, who shall subsequently be required to justify the refusal.

Unless it would jeopardize the safety of any individual, members who are presented with a lawful order that is in conflict with a previous lawful order, department policy or other directive shall respectfully inform the issuing supervisor of the conflict. The issuing supervisor is responsible for either resolving the conflict or clarifying that the lawful order is intended to countermand the previous lawful order or directive, in which case the member is obliged to comply. Members who are compelled to follow a conflicting lawful order after having given the issuing supervisor the opportunity to correct the conflict, will not be held accountable for disobedience of the lawful order or directive that was initially issued.

The person countermanding the original order shall notify, in writing, the person issuing the original order, indicating the action taken and the reason.

321.3.2 SUPERVISOR RESPONSIBILITIES

Supervisors and managers are required to follow all policies and procedures and may be subject to discipline for:

- a. Failure to be reasonably aware of the performance of their subordinates or to provide appropriate guidance and control.
- b. Failure to promptly and fully report any known misconduct of a member to his/her immediate supervisor or to document such misconduct appropriately or as required by policy.
- c. Directing a subordinate to violate a policy or directive, acquiesce to such a violation, or are indifferent to any such violation by a subordinate.
- d. The unequal or disparate exercise of authority on the part of a supervisor toward any member for malicious or other improper purpose.

321.4 GENERAL STANDARDS

Members shall conduct themselves, whether on- or off-duty, in accordance with the United States and California Constitutions and all applicable laws, ordinances, policies, and rules enacted or established pursuant to legal authority.

Members shall familiarize themselves with policies and procedures and are responsible for compliance with each. Members should seek clarification and guidance from supervisors in the event of any perceived ambiguity or uncertainty.

Employees shall at all times be courteous and civil to the public and to one another. They shall be quiet, orderly, attentive and respectful and shall exercise patience and discretion in the performance of their duties.

Discipline may be initiated for any good cause. It is not mandatory that a specific policy or rule violation be cited to sustain discipline. This policy is not intended to cover every possible type of misconduct.

321.5 CAUSES FOR DISCIPLINE

The following are illustrative of causes for disciplinary action. This list is not intended to cover every possible type of misconduct and does not preclude the recommendation of disciplinary action for violation of other rules, standards, ethics and specific action or inaction that is detrimental to efficient department service.

321.5.1 LAWS, RULES AND ORDERS

- a. Violation of, or ordering or instructing a subordinate to violate any policy, procedure, rule, order, directive, requirement or failure to follow instructions contained in department or City manuals.
- b. Disobedience of any legal directive or order issued by any department member of a higher rank.
- c. Violation of federal, state, local or administrative laws, rules, **policies**, or regulations.

321.5.2 ETHICS

- a. Using or disclosing one's status as a member of the Berkeley Police Department, **whether on duty or off-duty**, in any way that could reasonably be perceived as an attempt to gain influence or authority for non-department business or activity.
- b. The wrongful or unlawful exercise of authority on the part of any member for malicious purpose, personal gain, willful deceit or any other improper purpose.
- c. The receipt or acceptance of a reward, fee or gift from any person for service incident to the performance of the member's duties (lawful subpoena fees and authorized work permits excepted).
- d. Acceptance of fees, gifts or money contrary to the rules of this department and/or laws of the state.
- e. Offer or acceptance of a bribe or gratuity.
- f. Misappropriation or misuse of public funds, property, personnel or services.

321.5.3 DISCRIMINATION, OPPRESSION, OR FAVORITISM

Discriminating against, oppressing, or providing favoritism to any person because of actual or perceived characteristics such as race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sex,

sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, age, disability, economic status, cultural group, veteran status, marital status, housing status, and any other classification or status protected by law, or intentionally denying or impeding another in the exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, is unlawful.

321.5.4 RELATIONSHIPS

- a. Unwelcome solicitation of a personal or sexual relationship while on-duty or through the use of one's official capacity, **whether on duty of off-duty**.
- b. Engaging in on-duty sexual activity including, but not limited to, sexual intercourse, excessive displays of public affection or other sexual contact.
- c. Establishing or maintaining an inappropriate personal or financial relationship, as a result of an investigation, with a known victim, witness, suspect or defendant while a case is being investigated or prosecuted, or as a direct result of any official contact.
- d. Associating with or joining a criminal gang, organized crime and/or criminal syndicate when the member knows or reasonably should know of the criminal nature of the organization. This includes any organization involved in a definable criminal activity or enterprise, except as specifically directed and authorized by this department.
- e. Associating on a personal, rather than official basis with persons who demonstrate recurring involvement in serious violations of state or federal laws after the member knows, or reasonably should know of such criminal activities, except as specifically directed and authorized by this department.
- f. Participation in a law enforcement gang as defined by Penal Code § 13670. Participation is grounds for termination (Penal Code § 13670).

321.5.5 ATTENDANCE

- a. Leaving the job to which the member is assigned during duty hours without reasonable excuse and proper permission and approval.
- b. Unexcused or unauthorized absence or tardiness.
- c. Excessive absenteeism or abuse of leave privileges.
- d. Failure to report to work or to place of assignment at time specified and fully prepared to perform duties without reasonable excuse.
- e. Failure to sign in/out for duty on the timesheet, unless specifically authorized by a supervisor.

321.5.6 UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS, DISCLOSURE OR USE

- a. Unauthorized and inappropriate intentional release of confidential or protected information, materials, data, forms or reports obtained as a result of the member's position with this department.
 - 1. Members of this department shall not disclose the name, address or image of any victim of human trafficking except as authorized by law (Penal Code § 293). (b)
- b. Disclosing to any unauthorized person any active investigation information.
- c. The use of any information, photograph, video or other recording obtained or accessed as a result of employment or appointment to this department for personal or financial gain or without the express authorization of the Chief of Police or the authorized designee.
- d. Loaning, selling, allowing unauthorized use, giving away or appropriating any Berkeley Police Department badge, uniform, identification card or department property for personal use, personal gain or any other improper or unauthorized use or purpose.
- e. Using department resources in association with any portion of an independent civil action. These resources include, but are not limited to, personnel, vehicles, equipment and non-subpoenaed records.

321.5.7 EFFICIENCY

- a. Neglect of duty.
- b. Unsatisfactory work performance including, but not limited to, failure, incompetence, inefficiency or delay in performing and/or carrying out proper orders, work assignments or the instructions of supervisors without a reasonable and bona fide excuse.
- c. Concealing, attempting to conceal, removing or destroying defective or incompetent work.
- d. Unauthorized sleeping during on-duty time or assignments.
- e. Failure to notify the Department within 72 hours of any change in name, residence address or contact telephone number(s).

321.5.8 PERFORMANCE

- a. Failure to disclose or misrepresenting material facts, or making any false or misleading statement on any application, examination form, or other official document, report or form, or during the course of any work-related investigation.
- b. The falsification of any work-related records, making misleading entries or statements with the intent to deceive or the willful and unauthorized removal,

alteration, destruction and/or mutilation of any department record, public record, book, paper or document.

- c. Failure to participate in, or giving false or misleading statements, or misrepresenting or omitting material information to a supervisor or other person in a position of authority, in connection with any investigation or in the reporting of any department-related business.
- d. Being untruthful or knowingly making false, misleading or malicious statements that are reasonably calculated to harm the reputation, authority or official standing of this department or its members.
- e. Disparaging remarks or conduct concerning duly constituted authority to the extent that such conduct disrupts the efficiency of this department or subverts the good order, efficiency and discipline of this department or that would tend to discredit any of its members.
- f. Unlawful gambling or unlawful betting at any time or any place. Legal gambling or betting under any of the following conditions:
 - 1. While on department premises.
 - 2. At any work site, while
 - 3. on-duty or while in uniform, or while using any department equipment or system.
 - 4. Gambling activity undertaken as part of an officer official duties and with the express knowledge and permission of a direct supervisor is exempt from this prohibition.
- g. Entering any place of amusement while on duty, except when necessary in the performance of duty or periodic inspection.
- h. Improper political activity including:
 - 1. Unauthorized attendance while on-duty at official legislative or political sessions.
 - 2. Solicitations, speeches or distribution of campaign literature for or against any political candidate or position while on-duty or, on department property except as expressly authorized by City policy, the memorandum of understanding, or the Chief of Police.
- i. Engaging in political activities during assigned working hours except as expressly authorized by City policy, the memorandum of understanding, or the Chief of Police.
- j. Joining or participating in any employee organization except an employee organization which is composed solely of peace officers which concerns itself solely and exclusively with the wages, hours, working conditions, welfare and advancement of academic and vocational training in furtherance of the police profession and which is not subordinate to any other organization.

- k. Failure to secure the permission of a Commanding Officer before placing any material on a Departmental bulletin board.
- l. Using departmental business cards for anything other than official business.
- m. Any act on- or off-duty that brings discredit to this department.

321.5.9 CONDUCT

- a. Failure of any member to promptly and fully report activities on his/her part or the part of any other member where such activities resulted in contact with any other law enforcement agency that may result in criminal prosecution or discipline under this policy.
- b. Failure of any member to report conduct or expressions of any other member that are in violation of Department policy, state law, or the Constitution.
- c. Unreasonable and unwarranted force to a person encountered or a person under arrest.
- d. Exceeding lawful peace officer powers by unreasonable, unlawful or excessive conduct.
- e. Unauthorized or unlawful fighting, threatening or attempting to inflict unlawful bodily harm on another.
- f. Engaging in horseplay that reasonably could result in injury or property damage.
- g. Engaging in discourteous, disrespectful or discriminatory treatment of any member of the public or any member of this department or the City.
- h. Use of obscene, indecent, profane or derogatory language while on-duty or in uniform, or while off-duty in a way that brings discredit on the Department.
- i. Engaging in criminal, dishonest, or disgraceful conduct, whether on- or off-duty, that adversely affects the member's relationship with this department.
- j. Unauthorized possession of, loss of, or damage to department property or the property of others, or endangering it through carelessness or maliciousness.
- k. Attempted or actual theft of department property; misappropriation or misuse of public funds, property, personnel or the services or property of others; unauthorized removal or possession of department property or the property of another person.
- l. Activity that is incompatible with a member's conditions of employment or appointment as established by law or that violates a provision of any memorandum of understanding or contract to include fraud in securing the appointment or hire.
- m. Initiating any civil action for recovery of any damages or injuries incurred in the course and scope of employment or appointment without first notifying the Chief of Police of such action.

- n. Incurring unauthorized expense - Employees shall not knowingly and intentionally incur any unauthorized Departmental expense or liability without approval of a superior officer or supervisor when necessary under emergency conditions.
- o. Failure to provide information to citizens - Employees shall comply whenever possible with requests by citizens for public information. If necessary, they shall direct such persons to the nearest location where information may be obtained.
- p. Failure to Identify - Employees on official business shall identify themselves as Berkeley Police employees or officers. When requested, employees shall promptly state their name, rank and badge number, except when disclosure of identity could compromise safety and/or an investigation (i.e., riot situations, undercover operations, etc.).
- q. Failure to maintain communication, when on duty or officially on call - Employees who are on duty or officially on call shall be directly available by normal communication or shall keep their office, supervisor, or commanding officer informed of the means by which they may be reached when not immediately available.
- r. Any other on-- or off--duty conduct which any member knows or reasonably should know is unbecoming a member of this department, is contrary to good order, efficiency or morale, or tends to reflect unfavorably upon this department or its members.

321.5.10 SAFETY

- a. Failure to observe or violating department safety standards or safe working practices.
- b. Failure to maintain current licenses or certifications required for the assignment or position (e.g., driver license, first aid).
- c. Failure to maintain good physical condition sufficient to adequately and safely perform law enforcement duties.
- d. Unsafe firearm or other dangerous weapon handling to include loading or unloading firearms in an unsafe manner, either on- or off- duty.
- e. Carrying, while on the premises of the work place, any firearm or other lethal weapon that is not authorized by the member's appointing authority.
- f. Unsafe or improper driving habits or actions in the course of employment or appointment.
- g. Any personal action contributing to a preventable traffic collision in the course of employment or appointment.
- h. Concealing or knowingly failing to report any on-the-job or work-related accident or injury as soon as practicable but within 24 hours.

321.5.11 INTOXICANTS

- a. Reporting for work:
 - 1. Reporting for work or being at work while intoxicated or when the member's ability to perform assigned duties is impaired due to the use of alcohol, medication or drugs, whether legal, prescribed or illegal.
- b. Possession:
 - 1. Possession or use of alcohol at any work site or while on-duty, except as authorized in the performance of an official assignment. A member who is authorized to consume alcohol is not permitted to do so to such a degree that it may impair on-duty performance.
 - 2. Unauthorized possession, use of, or attempting to bring a controlled substance, illegal drug or non-prescribed medication to any work site.
- c. Intoxicants on-duty:
 - 1. Use of Intoxicants. Except as necessary in the performance of an official assignment, having the odor of an alcoholic beverage on the person, clothing, or breath, being under the influence of alcohol or other intoxicants, or the consumption of alcohol or other intoxicants while on duty is strictly prohibited.
 - 2. A Command Officer must give prior approval for any use of alcohol in the performance of an official assignment.
- d. Prescription medication:
 - 1. Employees may use prescription medications, except medical marijuana, while on duty pursuant to the specific instructions of a physician who has advised the employee that the prescribed medication in the amount actually ingested does not adversely affect the employee's ability to safely perform their duties, including tasks that require physical coordination, mental alertness and sound judgment, such as, operating office equipment and driving a vehicle, or, in the case of sworn officers, making detentions/arrests and handling weapons.
- e. Use of marijuana:
 - 1. Possession of marijuana, including medical marijuana, or being under the influence of marijuana on or off-duty is prohibited and may lead to disciplinary action.
- f. Intoxicants in uniform:
 - 1. No employee off duty and in uniform, or in any part of uniform dress, shall:
 - i. Consume any alcoholic beverage or other intoxicant in public view or in any place accessible to the public;
 - ii. Be in public with the odor of an alcoholic beverage on the person, clothing, or breath; or
 - iii. Be under the influence of alcohol or other intoxicants.

g. Intoxicants off-duty:

1. No off-duty employee shall consume any alcoholic beverage or other intoxicant to an extent which renders one unfit to report for one's next regular tour of duty (including having the odor of an alcoholic beverage on the person), which results in the of violation of any law, or which results in the commission of an obnoxious or offensive act which might tend to discredit the Department.

ATTACHMENT 6. Overtime Compensation Requests: Policy 1019

The PAB does not recommend specific changes here; however, the policy should stipulate the circumstances, or types of circumstances, that would necessitate bypassing the otherwise straightforward directive in Section 1019.1.1 of this policy that “all requests to work overtime should be approved in advance.” Additionally, excessive overtime should be included as a factor that triggers an early system audit.

1019.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE

It is the policy of the Department to compensate non-exempt salaried employees who work authorized overtime either by payment of wages as agreed and in effect through the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), or by the allowance of accrual of compensatory time off. In order to qualify for either, the employee must complete and submit an Extraordinary Duty Report as soon as practical after overtime is worked.

1019.1.1 DEPARTMENT POLICY

Because of the nature of police work, and the specific needs of the Department, a degree of flexibility concerning overtime policies must be maintained.

Non-exempt employees are not authorized to volunteer work time to the Department. All requests to work overtime shall be approved in advance by a supervisor. If circumstances do not permit prior approval, then approval shall be sought as soon as practical during the overtime shift and in no case later than the end of shift in which the overtime is worked.

Short periods of work at the end of the normal duty day (e.g., less than one hour in duration) may be handled unofficially between the supervisor and the employee by flexing a subsequent shift schedule to compensate for the time worked rather than by submitting requests for overtime payments. If the supervisor authorizes or directs the employee to complete a form for such a period, the employee shall comply.

The individual employee may request compensatory time (aka "comp time") in lieu of receiving overtime payment.

1019.2 TYPES OF OVERTIME AND COMPENSATION

Time spent in a pay status but not actually worked (e.g., sick leave, vacation leave, comp time, holiday leave, etc.) shall be considered "time worked" in computing the basic forty-hour week. However, employees shall be eligible to work in an overtime capacity while

actually on such absence, but only in accordance with the provisions of the current MOU between the City of Berkeley and the employee's working group.

When a City recognized holiday falls within the workweek, the employee's basic workweek is reduced by eight hours for each holiday.

If an employee commences or terminates employment with the City within the workweek or is on suspension or leave of absence without pay during the workweek, the employee is not eligible for overtime benefits until hours worked exceed forty hours during that week.

With the exception of court overtime situations, an employee's name and overtime worked shall be reflected on a time sheet.

Unless specifically stated otherwise, all overtime is awarded at time and a half.

- a. Non-sworn personnel receive double time after 12 hours in any 24-hour period.
- b. Sworn personnel receive holiday overtime at the straight time rate;
- c. Non-sworn personnel receive double time for Christmas and Thanksgiving.
- d. An explosives technician shall receive double time for time spent (from call to completion) in dealing with explosives, whether on or off duty.
- e. Special Response Team members shall receive an additional 5% pay when involved in an active SRT incident, either on or off duty.
- f. Field Training Officers shall receive an additional 10% differential when actually working as a Field Training Officer.
- g. The Field Training Program Sergeant shall receive a 5% salary differential while occupying that position.
- h. The Homicide Sergeant shall receive a 4% salary differential. Homicide detectives shall receive a 3% salary differential.

Those holding the classification of Captain are excluded from overtime benefits.

1019.3 REQUEST FOR OVERTIME COMPENSATION

1019.3.1 EMPLOYEES RESPONSIBILITY

Employees shall complete the Extraordinary Duty Reports immediately after working the overtime and turn them in to their immediate supervisor or the Watch Commander. Employees submitting Extraordinary Duty Reports for on-call pay when off duty shall submit the forms to their supervisor the first day after returning for work.

1019.3.2 SUPERVISORS RESPONSIBILITY

The supervisor who verifies the overtime earned shall verify that the overtime was worked before approving the request.

After approval, the Extraordinary Duty Report shall be forwarded to the employee's Division Captain for final approval.

1019.3.3 DIVISION CAPTAIN RESPONSIBILITY

The Division Captain, after approving payment, shall then forward the report to the Payroll Clerk for review.

1019.4 ACCOUNTING FOR OVERTIME WORKED

Employees are to record the actual time worked in an overtime status. In some cases, the Memorandum of Understanding provides that a minimum number of hours will be paid, (e.g., four hours for Court). The supervisor will enter the actual time worked.

1019.4.1 ACCOUNTING FOR PORTIONS OF AN HOUR

When accounting for less than a full hour, time worked shall be rounded up to the nearest quarter of an hour as indicated by the following chart:

<u>TIME WORKED</u>	<u>INDICATE ON CARD</u>
1 to 15 minutes	.25
16 to 30 minutes	.50
31 to 45 minutes	.75
46 to 60 minutes	1 hour

1019.4.2 VARIATION IN TIME REPORTED

Where two or more employees are assigned to the same activity, case, or court trial and the amount of time for which payment is requested varies from that reported by the other officer, the Watch Commander or other approving supervisor may require each employee to include the reason for the variation on the Extraordinary Duty Report.

1019.5 RECOVERY / COMPENSATORY OVERTIME (COMP TIME)

Recovery / Compensatory overtime (comp time) is overtime credited with time rather than pay.

To obtain comp time credit the employee shall promptly submit a completed Extraordinary Duty Report for approval by both the employee's supervisor and commanding officer.

It is City and Police Department policy that employees not be permitted to accumulate excessive comp time.

- a. Sworn employees are allowed to accrue up to 120 hours of comp time.
- b. Non-sworn employees are allowed to accrue up to 90 hours of comp time.

Employees may be allowed comp time off only when that amount of time has been previously accumulated.

An employee who wishes to use accumulated comp time shall make such request on an Absence Report submitted to his/her supervisor, who shall determine if the absence would hinder the unit's operation and either approve or deny the request. Within the Operations Division, the final decision rests with the Patrol Staffing Lieutenant.

1019.6 OVERTIME / SHIFT EXTENSION

Overtime shall be defined as time worked by an employee in excess of 40 hours per week. For paid overtime to be credited, an employee is required to submit an Extraordinary Duty Report immediately following the overtime assignment.

An Extraordinary Duty Report requires approval from the employee's supervisor and commanding officer, both of whom must check the report for accuracy, ensuring that the "reason" and the paid overtime budget designations are properly stated.

- a. Completed Extraordinary Duty Reports must be routed to the Division Captain for final approval.
- b. Completed reports must be routed to the Payroll Clerk no later than 1400 hours on the Monday before the payday in order to be included in that pay period.

1019.7 HOLIDAY OVERTIME

Holiday overtime is earned in lieu of taking the time off during the same week of a holiday or when an employee works any part of a recognized City of Berkeley holiday or has that day as a regularly scheduled day off.

Holiday overtime is awarded at time for time for sworn employees; for non-sworn employees it is awarded at time and a half, however on Thanksgiving and Christmas it is awarded at double time.

Holiday overtime may be received as either paid overtime or compensatory overtime (if the maximum accrual of compensatory overtime has not been reached).

- a. Sworn employees have the option of either pay or compensatory overtime.

- b. Non-sworn employees require Division Captain approval for compensatory overtime.

In lieu of pay or comp time, an employee may be allowed an alternative day off during the same calendar week as the holiday with supervisor approval.

When a holiday occurs during an employee's vacation leave, the holiday shall not be charged as vacation leave and the employee's leave may be extended accordingly, with supervisor approval.

The choice of comp time or holiday pay shall be computed by the Payroll Clerk from information provided on the timesheets.

1019.8 COURT OVERTIME

Court overtime is defined as that overtime worked in connection with an assigned appearance before any criminal or civil court, Police Review Commission meeting or Board of Inquiry, BPD Board of Review, and any other specially approved appearance on behalf of another City department or commission.

Unless otherwise approved by a Commanding Officer, all court overtime shall be paid.

A sworn employee who makes an off-duty court appearance shall receive a minimum of four hours overtime unless his or her scheduled duty reporting time, regular shift or overtime shift is less than four hours after the scheduled court appearance in which case the employee will receive overtime in the lesser amount.

Non-sworn employees shall receive a minimum of three hours overtime unless their scheduled duty reporting time is less than three hours after the scheduled court appearance in which case the non-sworn employee will receive overtime in the lesser amount.

Overtime spent conferring with the prosecuting attorney will be considered as court overtime and part of the court session only if the employee's presence is required in court shortly after the conference.

For off duty, out of town court appearances, travel constitutes court overtime and is determined by the round-trip time from the Public Safety Building.

An employee required to attend two or more court sessions on the same day is eligible for overtime compensation during the period between the sessions if subpoenaed on his/her day off (limited to a maximum of two hours between each session) but is not eligible for session break compensation if court appearance falls on a regular duty day.

To receive court overtime credit an employee shall submit an Extraordinary Duty Report.

- a. The subpoena should be attached and case number indicated if either or both are available.
- b. The overtime report is to be completed by the employee and should specify the amount of time required for "testifying/conferring" or "time waiting" or indicate that they were "not needed".
- c. The employee's supervisor shall review the report for accuracy and complete the lower boxed area, indicating the court paid overtime budget code, the activity code and the proper project designation.

1019.9 COURT OVERTIME - TELEPHONE STANDBY

- a. Sworn employees who are placed on telephone standby for court will be given comp time (in accordance with the current MOU between the City of Berkeley and the Berkeley Police Association) as follows:
 - 1. Duty Day: One-hour minimum comp time and hour for hour thereafter.
 - 2. Day Off: Two-hour minimum comp time and hour for hour thereafter.
- b. To receive compensatory overtime credit for telephone standby an officer shall submit an Extraordinary Duty Report.
 - 1. The subpoena should be attached and case number indicated if either or both are available.
 - 2. The report is to be completed by the officer and shall specify the case number and the name of the Deputy District Attorney placing him/her on telephone standby.

1019.10 TRAINING OVERTIME

Training overtime is earned when an employee is assigned to attend a class, conference or seminar during off duty hours. Training overtime shall be reported on an Extraordinary Duty Report. To receive credit for the time spent training, a Training Time Credit Record shall be completed and routed to Personnel and Training.

Employees attending schools or classes away from the PSB will normally be credited with an eight-hour day even though the number of hours may vary due to the nature of the instruction, see also the Attendance at Conferences and Meetings Policy.

1019.11 EMERGENCY / EMERGENCY ON-CALL OVERTIME

An employee shall be paid or given comp time off for being placed on emergency on-call status as follows:

- a. An employee who is placed on emergency on-call status on his or her regularly scheduled work day shall be paid for a minimum of one hour and at a one quarter ($\frac{1}{4}$) time rate.
- b. An employee who is placed on emergency on-call status on his or her regularly scheduled day off shall be paid for a minimum of two hours and at a one quarter ($\frac{1}{4}$) time rate.
- c. Emergency Overtime - An employee is guaranteed at least three hours overtime when called to emergency overtime duty from his or her residence. If the employee's regular reporting time is less distant than the guaranteed overtime the employee will receive overtime in that lesser amount.

APPENDIX

**Appendix 1. City of Berkeley Contract for services with Swanson & McNamara LLP,
Vendor Contract #32300109**

Contract Number: 32300109

Contractor Name: Swanson & McNamara

Contract Link:

<https://records.cityofberkeley.info/PublicAccess/api/Document/AU3fuyqXQXXZ%C3%81TG8am4tuCPyplZzCFLJZsbxFqBxmJ3aQZTBcxS%C3%89E7ECp9r6A30gZuhAlmseUFcNLLtKRrEld7g%3D/>

CONTRACT

THIS CONTRACT is entered into on November 28, 2022, between the CITY OF BERKELEY ("City"), a Charter City organized and existing under the laws of the State of California, and Swanson & McNamara LLP ("Attorneys"), who agree as follows:

WHEREAS, the City of Berkeley requires the services for legal advice and consultation with the City Attorney's office concerning issues arising out of text messages allegedly sent by Sgt. Darren Kacalek, including but not limited to whether such messages were sent, who was aware of the messages and what action they took in response, whether there existed an "arrest quota" as described in the purported text messages, if so who was aware of the arrest quota and involved in its implementation, and to recommend to the appropriate authority whether and what discipline should be imposed as a result of our findings, and

WHEREAS, Attorneys are willing to be retained by the City in connection with said legal issues; and

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises contained herein, City and Attorneys agree as follows:

1. **SCOPE OF SERVICES**

Attorneys designated herein will consult and provide legal advice and shall use the best professional skill and ability therein to the end that the most favorable results may be attained on behalf of City. The advice will be provided by Edward Swanson as lead counsel with the assistance of other associates.

2. **PAYMENT**

a. The City agrees to pay the designated attorneys at the following rates:

Edward W. Swanson	\$750.00 per hour
Mary McNamara	\$750.00 per hour
August Gugelmann	\$650.00 per hour
Britt Evangelist	\$600.00 per hour
Audrey Barron	\$575.00 per hour
Carly Bittman	\$550.00 per hour
Paralegal	\$120.00 per hour

b. Attorneys shall furnish monthly statements to the City Attorney of City showing the number of hours devoted to said matter/s and all expenses paid during said period. Said statements shall conform as closely as practicable to the format attached hereto as Exhibit A. City shall pay Attorneys the amounts shown thereon upon approval thereof by the City Attorney of the City as soon as possible after receipt of such statements. Payment for services by non-designated attorneys will be denied, unless approved in advance by the City Attorney or his delegate.

c. The entire fees and expenses pursuant to this Contract shall not exceed the amount of \$50,000 without amendment hereto. Attorneys shall not earn fees for services or incur expenses in excess of the aforesaid amount prior to executing with the City a written amendment to this contract increasing the amount payable hereunder. Attorneys shall notify the City as soon as practicable that a contract amendment increasing the amount payable may be necessary.

3. **TERM**

a. This Contract shall begin on the date it is executed by all parties and continue until Attorneys' services are no longer required by the City.

b. The City may terminate this Contract at any time upon five (5) days written notice to the other party. In the event of such termination, Attorneys will be paid a fee for services performed prior to the time of termination as specified in Paragraph 2 of this Contract, except that in no event will the amount paid exceed the full amount in Paragraph 2, as amended from time to time.

c. A written notice is deemed served when a party sends the notice in an envelope addressed to the other party to this Contract and deposits it with the U.S. Postal Service, registered mail, postage prepaid. For purposes of this Contract, all notices to City shall be addressed as follows:

City Attorney
City of Berkeley
2180 Milvia Street, 4th Fl.
Berkeley, CA 94704

For purposes of this Contract, all notices to Attorneys shall be addressed as follows:

Edward W. Swanson
Swanson & McNamara LLP
300 Montgomery Street, Suite 1100
San Francisco, CA 94104

4. **INDEMNIFICATION**

Attorneys, for itself and its heirs, successors and assigns, agree to release, defend, indemnify and hold harmless City, its officers, agents, volunteers and employees from and against any and all claims, demands, liability, damages, lawsuits or other actions arising out of the negligent acts or willful misconduct in the performance of this Contract by Attorneys or its officers, employees, partners, directors, subcontractors or agents.

5. **CONFORMITY WITH LAW AND SAFETY**

a. Attorneys shall observe and comply with all applicable laws, ordinances, codes and regulations of governmental agencies, including federal, state, municipal and local governing bodies having jurisdiction over any or all of the scope of services, including all provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1979 as amended, all California Occupational Safety and Health Regulations, and all other applicable federal, state, municipal and local safety regulations. All services performed by Attorneys must be in accordance with these laws, ordinances, codes and regulations. Attorneys shall release, defend, indemnify and hold harmless City, its officers, agents, volunteers and employees from any and all damages, liability, fines, penalties and consequences from any noncompliance or violation of any laws, ordinances, codes or regulations.

b. If a death, serious personal injury or substantial property damage occurs in connection with the performance of this Contract, Attorneys shall immediately notify the City's Risk Manager by telephone. If any accident occurs in connection with this Contract, Attorneys shall promptly submit a written report to City, in such form as the City may require. This report shall include the following information: 1) name and address of the injured or deceased

person(s); 2) name and address of Attorney's subcontractor, if any; 3) name and address of Attorney's liability insurance carrier; and 4) a detailed description of the accident, including whether any of City's equipment, tools or materials were involved.

6. **NON-DISCRIMINATION**

Attorneys hereby agree to comply with the provisions of Berkeley Municipal Code ("B.M.C.") Ch. 13.26 as amended from time to time. In the performance of this Contract, Attorneys agree as follows:

a. Attorneys shall not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, age (over 40), sex, pregnancy, marital status, disability, sexual orientation or AIDS.

b. Attorneys shall permit the City access to employment advertisements, blank application forms, EEO-1 forms, affirmative action plans and any other documents, which, in the opinion of the City, are necessary to monitor compliance with this non-discrimination provision. In addition, Attorneys shall fill-out, in a timely fashion, forms supplied by the City to monitor this non-discrimination provision.

7. **INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR**

For purposes of this Contract and for the duration of this Contract, Attorneys shall be an independent contractor and not an employee of the City. The City shall not have the right to control when, where or how the service is rendered, but shall have the right to specify the results of the service rendered pursuant to this Contract.

8. **CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROHIBITED**

a. In accordance with Government Code section 1090, Berkeley City Charter section 36 and B.M.C. Ch. 3.64, neither Attorneys nor any employee, officer, director, partner or member of Attorneys, or immediate family member of any of the preceding, shall have served as an elected officer, an employee, or a City board, committee or commission member, who has directly or indirectly influenced the making of this Contract.

b. In accordance with Government Code section 1090 and the Political Reform Act, Government Code section 87100 *et seq.*, no person who is a director, officer, partner, trustee, employee or consultant of the Attorneys, or immediate family member of any of the preceding, shall make or participate in a decision made by the City or a City board, commission or committee, if it is reasonably foreseeable that the decision will have a material effect on any source of income, investment or interest in real property of that person or Attorneys.

c. Interpretation of this section shall be governed by the definitions and provisions used in the Political Reform Act, Government Code section 87100 *et seq.*, its implementing regulations, manuals and codes, Government Code section 1090, Berkeley City Charter section 36 and B.M.C. Ch. 3.64.

d. Immediately upon discovering a breach of this paragraph City may terminate this Contract. Additionally, City may deem Attorneys a non-responsible bidder for five (5) years from the date the Contract is terminated.

9. **OPPRESSIVE STATES CONTRACTING PROHIBITION**

Unless a written exemption has been approved by the City Manager, the following provisions will apply for this agreement:

a. In accordance with Resolution No. 59,853-N.S., Attorneys certify that they have no contractual relations with, and agree during the term of this Contract to forego contractual relations to provide personal services to, the following entities:

- (1) The governing regime in any Oppressive State.
- (2) Any business or corporation organized under the authority of the governing regime of any Oppressive State.
- (3) Any individual, firm, partnership, corporation, association, or any other commercial organization, and including parent-entities and wholly-owned subsidiaries (to the extent that their operations are related to the purpose of its contract with the City), for the express purpose of assisting in business operations or trading with any public or private entity located in any Oppressive State.

b. Appendix A to Resolution No. 59,853-N.S. designates the following as Oppressive States for the purposes of this Contract: Tibet Autonomous Region and the provinces of Abo, Kham, and U-Tsang.

c. Attorneys' failure to comply with this section shall constitute a default of this Contract and City may terminate this Contract pursuant to Section 3. In the event that the City terminates Attorneys due to a default under this provision, City may deem Attorneys a non-responsible bidder for five (5) years from the date this Contract is terminated.

10. **SETOFF AGAINST DEBTS**

Attorneys agree that City may deduct from any payments due to Attorneys under this Contract any monies that Attorneys owe City under any ordinance, contract or resolution for any unpaid taxes, fees, licenses, unpaid checks or other amounts.

11. **NUCLEAR FREE BERKELEY**

Attorneys agree to comply with B.M.C. Ch. 12.90, the Nuclear Free Berkeley Act, as amended from time to time.

12. **GOVERNING LAW**

The laws of the State of California shall govern this Contract.

13. **AMENDMENTS**

The terms and conditions of this Contract shall not be altered or otherwise modified except by a written amendment to this Contract executed by City and Attorneys.

14. **CONSULTANTS TO SUBMIT STATEMENTS OF ECONOMIC INTEREST**

The City's Conflict of Interest Code, Resolution No. 51,425-N.S., as amended, requires every consultant to disclose conflicts of interest by filing a Statement of Economic Interest (Form 730). Attorneys serving as consultants to the City under this Contract agree to file such statements with the City Clerk at the beginning of the contract period and upon termination of the Contract.

15. **CITY BUSINESS LICENSE, PAYMENT OF TAXES, TAX I.D. NUMBER**

Attorneys have obtained a City business license as required by B.M.C. Ch. 9.04, and its license number is written below; or, Attorneys are exempt from the provisions of B.M.C. Ch. 9.04 and have written below the specific B.M.C. section under which it is exempt. Attorneys shall pay all state and federal income taxes and any other taxes due. **Attorneys certify under penalty of perjury that the taxpayer identification number written below is correct.**

Business License No. [application submitted]
Taxpayer Identification No. 94-3309866

16. **RECYCLED PAPER FOR WRITTEN REPORTS**

If Attorneys are required by this Contract to prepare a written report or study, Attorneys shall use recycled paper for said report or study when such paper is available at a cost of not more than ten percent more than the cost of virgin papers, and when such paper is available at the time it is needed. For the purposes of this Contract, recycled paper is paper that contains at least 50% recycled product. If recycled paper is not available, Attorneys shall use white paper. Written reports or studies prepared under this Contract shall be printed on both sides of the page whenever practical.

17. **INSURANCE**

a. Attorneys shall maintain at all times during the performance of this Contract a professional liability insurance policy in the minimum amount of \$1,000,000 to cover any claims arising out of Attorneys' performance of services under this Contract. Attorneys shall provide an original Certificate of Insurance evidencing the required coverage.

b. If Attorneys employ any person, it shall carry workers' compensation and employer's liability insurance and shall provide a certificate of insurance to the City. The workers' compensation insurance shall: 1) provide that the insurance carrier shall not cancel, terminate or otherwise modify the terms and conditions of said insurance except upon thirty (30) days written notice to the City Attorney; 2) provide for a waiver of any right of subrogation against City to the extent permitted by law; and 3) shall be approved as to form and sufficiency by the Risk Manager.

c. Attorneys shall forward all insurance documents to:

City Attorney
City of Berkeley
2180 Milvia St., 4th Floor
Berkeley, CA 94704

18. **BERKELEY LIVING WAGE ORDINANCE**

a. Attorneys hereby agree to comply with the provisions of the Berkeley Living Wage Ordinance, B.M.C. Chapter 13.27. If Attorneys are currently subject to the Berkeley Living Wage Ordinance, as indicated by the Living Wage Certification form, attached hereto, Attorneys will be required to provide all eligible employees with City mandated minimum compensation during the term of this Contract, as defined in B.M.C. Chapter 13.27, as well as comply with the terms enumerated herein. Attorneys expressly acknowledge that, even if Attorneys are not currently subject to the Living Wage Ordinance, cumulative contracts with City may subject Attorneys to the requirements under B.M.C. Chapter 13.27 in subsequent contracts.

b. If Attorneys are currently subject to the Berkeley Living Wage Ordinance, Attorneys shall be required to maintain monthly records of those employees providing service

under the Contract. These records shall include the total number of hours worked, the number of hours spent providing service under this Contract, the hourly rate paid, and the amount paid by Attorneys for health benefits, if any, for each of its employees providing services under the Contract. Attorneys agree to supply City with any records it deems necessary to determine compliance with this provision. These records are expressly subject to the auditing terms described in Section 20.

c. If Attorneys are currently subject to the Berkeley Living Wage Ordinance, Attorneys shall include the requirements thereof, as defined in B.M.C. Chapter 13.27, in any and all subcontracts in which Attorneys engages to execute its responsibilities under this Contract. All subcontractor employees who spend 25% or more of their compensated time engaged in work directly related to this Contract shall be entitled to a living wage, as described in B.M.C. Chapter 13.27 and herein.

d. If Attorneys fail to comply with the requirements of this Section, the City shall have the rights and remedies described in this Section, in addition to any rights and remedies provided by law or equity.

Attorneys' failure to comply with this Section shall constitute a material breach of the Contract, upon which City may terminate this Contract pursuant to Section 3. In the event that City terminates Attorneys due to a default under this provision, City may deem Attorneys a non-responsible bidder for not more than five (5) years from the date this Contract is terminated.

In addition, at City's sole discretion, Attorneys may be responsible for liquidated damage in the amount of \$50 per employee per day for each and every instance of an underpayment to an employee. It is mutually understood and agreed that Attorneys failure to pay any of its eligible employees at least the applicable living wage rate will result in damages being sustained by the City; that the nature and amount of the damages will be extremely difficult and impractical to fix; that the liquidated damage set forth herein is the nearest and most exact measure of damage for such breach that can be fixed at this time; and that the liquidated damage amount is not intended as a penalty or forfeiture for Attorneys' breach. City may deduct any assessed liquidated damages from any payments otherwise due Attorneys.

19. **BERKELEY EQUAL BENEFITS ORDINANCE**

a. Attorneys hereby agree to comply with the provisions of the Berkeley Equal Benefits Ordinance, B.M.C. Chapter 13.29. If Attorneys are currently subject to the Berkeley Equal Benefits Ordinance, as indicated by the Equal Benefits Certification form, attached hereto, Attorneys will be required to provide all eligible employees with City mandated equal benefits, as defined in B.M.C. Chapter 13.29, during the term of this contract, as well as comply with the terms enumerated herein.

b. If Attorneys are currently or becomes subject to the Berkeley Equal Benefits Ordinance, Attorneys agree to provide the City with all records the City deems necessary to determine compliance with this provision. These records are expressly subject to the auditing terms described in Section 20.

c. If Attorneys fail to comply with the requirements of this Section, City shall have the rights and remedies described in this Section, in addition to any rights and remedies provided by law or equity.

Attorneys' failure to comply with this Section shall constitute a material breach of the Contract, upon which City may terminate this contract pursuant to Section 3. In the event the City terminates this contract due to a default by Attorneys under this provision, the City may deem Attorneys a non-responsible bidder for not more than five (5) years from the date this

Contract is terminated.

In addition, at City's sole discretion, Attorneys may be responsible for liquidated damages in the amount of \$50.00 per employee per day for each and every instance of violation of this Section. It is mutually understood and agreed that Attorneys' failure to provide its employees with equal benefits will result in damages being sustained by City; that the nature and amount of these damages will be extremely difficult and impractical to fix; that the liquidated damages set forth herein is the nearest and most exact measure of damages for such breach that can be fixed at this time; and that the liquidated damage amount is not intended as a penalty or forfeiture for Attorneys' breach. City may deduct any assessed liquidated damages from any payments otherwise due Attorneys.

20. **SANCTUARY CITY CONTRACTING**

Contractor hereby agrees to comply with the provisions of the Sanctuary City Contracting Ordinance, B.M.C. Chapter 13.105. In accordance with this Chapter, Contractor agrees not to provide the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Division of the United States Department of Homeland Security with any Data Broker or Extreme Vetting Services as defined herein:

- a. "Data Broker" means either of the following:
 - i. The collection of information, including personal information about consumers, from a wide variety of sources for the purposes of reselling such information to their customers, which include both private-sector business and government agencies;
 - ii. The aggregation of data that was collected for another purpose from that for which it is ultimately used.
- b. "Extreme Vetting" means data mining, threat modeling, predictive risk analysis, or other similar services. Extreme Vetting does not include:
 - i. The City's computer-network health and performance tools;
 - ii. Cybersecurity capabilities, technologies and systems used by the City of Berkeley Department of Information Technology to predict, monitor for, prevent, and protect technology infrastructure and systems owned and operated by the City of Berkeley from potential cybersecurity events and cyber-forensic based investigations and prosecutions of illegal computer based activity.

21. **AUDIT**

Pursuant to Section 61 of the Berkeley City Charter, the City Auditor's Office may conduct an audit of Attorneys' financial, performance and compliance records maintained in connection with the operations and services performed under this Contract. In the event of such audit, Attorneys agree to provide the City Auditor with reasonable access to Attorneys' employees and make all such financial, performance and compliance records available to the Auditor's Office. City agrees to provide Attorneys an opportunity to discuss and respond to any findings before a final audit report is filed.

22. **ENTIRE CONTRACT**


a. The terms and conditions of this Contract, all exhibits attached and any documents expressly incorporated by reference represent the entire Contract between the parties with respect to the subject matter of this Contract.

b. This Contract shall supersede any and all prior contracts, oral or written, regarding the subject matter between City and Attorneys. No other contract, statement, or promise relating to the subject matter of this Contract shall be valid or binding except by a written amendment to this Contract.

c. If any conflicts arise between the terms and conditions of this Contract and the terms and conditions of the attached exhibits or any documents expressly incorporated, the terms and conditions of this Contract shall control.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, City and Attorneys have executed this Contract as of the date written on the first paragraph of this Contract.

CITY OF BERKELEY

By: 
City Attorney


Registered by:

City Auditor


Attest:


ASST. City Clerk

Registered on behalf of the City Auditor:


Finance Department

ATTORNEYS



By Edward W. Swanson
Swanson & McNamara LLP

Taxpayer Identification No.

Incorporated: Yes (X) No ()


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
Certified Minority Business Enterprise: Yes () No(X)


If yes, state ethnicity: _____

Certified Disadvantaged Business Enterprise: Yes () No (X)

Appendix 2. Text Messages Sent by the Downtown Task Force and Bike Unit Members














I like that way of thinking. I'm gonna come with a bike force board game. You do shit around the city to go forward. I'll come up with a cool award for the winner. Maybe like a week long challenge. Famous people arrested you get extra points.



































Appendix 3. Sample Quota Ban Policy

STOP, ARREST, AND TICKET QUOTAS PROHIBITION

XXX.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The Berkeley Police Department (BPD) is committed to fostering fair and equitable law enforcement practices that prioritize public safety and community well-being. The purpose of this policy is to explicitly prohibit the imposition of stop, ticket, and arrest quotas in any law enforcement activities conducted by the Berkeley Police Department. This goes beyond the parameters defined in the California Vehicle Code § 41603.

Stop, ticket and arrest quotas, whether formal or informal, establish numerical targets for officers, compelling them to issue citations or make arrests based on predetermined numbers rather than legitimate law enforcement needs. This policy aims to uphold the values of fairness, impartiality, and community-focused policing, ensuring that enforcement actions are driven by genuine circumstances and the safety needs of our community.

This policy reflects the Berkeley Police Department's unwavering dedication to maintaining high standards of ethical conduct and professionalism while serving and safeguarding the interests of the Berkeley community.

XXX.2 POLICY

This policy unequivocally prohibits the use of quotas (**whether informal or formal**) to require or encourage officers to meet predetermined numerical targets for stops, tickets, or arrests.

The Berkeley Police Department is committed to promoting public trust, transparency, and accountability in all law enforcement endeavors. This policy serves as a cornerstone in guiding our officers to conduct themselves with integrity, professionalism, and a commitment to community service, devoid of the imposition of arbitrary enforcement quotas that could compromise these principles.

Officers are encouraged to prioritize public safety and law enforcement compliance based on objective circumstances and genuine enforcement necessities, fostering a culture of equitable and community-oriented policing.

XXX.3 DEFINITION

The following words and terms shall have these assigned meanings throughout the Policy Manual, unless it is apparent from the content that they have a different meaning:

STOP, ARREST AND TICKET QUOTAS PROHIBITION

Arrest quota means any policy, practice, or directive that explicitly requires or pressures a peace officer or parking enforcement employee to make a certain number of arrests.


Ticket quota means any policy, practice, or directive that explicitly requires or pressures a peace officer or parking enforcement employee to issue a certain number of citations or tickets.


Informal quota means any policy, practice, or directive that implicitly requires or pressures a peace officer or parking enforcement employee to make a certain number of arrests or issue a certain number of citations. This includes, but is not limited to, the following:

- (a) Talking about specific stop, arrest, or citation targets in a way that suggests they are important.
- (b) Linking performance evaluations or promotions to arrest or citation numbers.
- (c) Providing incentives such as barbecue (BBQ), pizza, gift cards, car wash coupons, and trophies to officers who meet quotas.
- (d) Offering overtime.
- (e) Establishing adverse employment actions such as denial of days off, transfers, undesirable assignments, and termination.
- (f) Creating a competitive environment where officers are encouraged to make more arrests or issue more citations than their colleagues.
- (g) Making jokes or innuendos that incentivize achieving a specific number of stops, arrests, or tickets.



COMPANION REPORT TO
BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT TEXTING ALLEGATIONS:
AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION BY THE POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD





MAYOR

Jesse Arreguín

CITY COUNCIL

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Ben Bartlett, District 3
Igor Tregub, District 4

Sophie Hahn, District 5
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Cecilia Lunaparra, District 7
Mark Humbert, District 8

City Manager

LaTanya Bellow, Interim City Manager

Berkeley Police Department

Jennifer Louis, Chief of Police

POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD (PAB) MEMBERS

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Leah Wilson, Vice-Chair
Brent Blackaby
Kitty Calavita
Joshua Cayetano
Juliet Leftwich
Alexander Mozes
David Williams

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY (ODPA) STAFF

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Jose De Jesus Murillo, Policy Analyst
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Keegan Horton, Investigator
Melanie E. Beasley, Administrative Analyst
Lucky, Therapy Animal

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PREFACE

On November 10, 2022 former Berkeley Police Department (BPD) Officer Corey Shedoudy brought allegations forward regarding improper conducted committed by BPD's Downtown Task Force and Bike Unit (DTF). The explicit nature of the texts and the gravity of the accusations of arrest quotas and questionable legal tactics jolted the Berkeley community and its political leaders. In response to these serious allegations, the City, through direction of the city manager, hired an external law firm to investigate the authenticity and implications of these texts, which were ultimately confirmed as genuine. The Police Accountability Board (PAB) conducted an independent investigation of the policies and practices related to the allegations. The report was approved for submission to the Council on July 10th, 2024.

According to the City of Berkeley Commissioners' Manual¹, a companion report from the City Manager is required when the City Manager differs with the recommendations of a commission or wishes to include additional or different information. While the Commissioners' Manual does not specifically reference a companion report from the Director of Police Accountability (DPA), the DPA, as a Charter officer and secretary to the Police Accountability Board (PAB), when supporting the PAB, has in effect the same authority as it relates to the City Manager's relationship with other Boards and Commissions. Therefore, this companion report aims to augment the recommendations by providing additional objective analysis. This companion report is intended to complement the PAB report, ensuring the City Council fully understands the issue and the necessary actions.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

- Former Board Members who served during the revelation of these allegations: Nathan Mizell, Ismael Ramsey, Dobbie Levine, and Cheryl Owens
- Berkeley Copwatch for sharing the analysis of their independent investigation
- Community member Mr. Charles Clarke for his independent analysis
- Late Assemblyman John Miller for his contributions to reducing unjust practices in policing.
- People of Berkeley

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The objective of this companion report is to propose additional necessary reforms to prevent future occurrences and institutional missteps that may still occur without firm city council, city manager and or community guidance. The report emphasizes the importance of transparency, accountability, and community trust in policing practices.

To that end the ODPa recommends the following actions for **COUNCIL**:

¹ CITY OF BERKELEY COMMISSIONERS' MANUAL 2019 EDITION: BACKGROUND INFORMATION RULES AND PROCEDURES

<https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/Commissioners-Manual.pdf>

1. Call on the California Legislature to amend Government Code section 12519² to include heads of civilian oversight agencies as one of the enumerated requestors.
2. Direct the City Manager and Chief of Police, with input from the newly formed Office of Strategic Planning and Accountability (OSPA), to procure the services of a vendor that can conduct real-time audits and analysis of BWC footage.
3. Direct the City Manager to work with the City Attorney's Office to establish a protocol, subject to Council approval, with clear guidelines for how the City Manager should handle complaints against the Chief of Police including designating the PAB/ODPA as an investigative body. (consider PRC Ordinance: "*that all such complaints filed with other offices, boards, bureaus, and departments of the City, including the Police Department, shall be referred to the Commission for investigation*").
4. Direct the City Manager to work with the City Attorney's Office to establish a communications policy, corresponding training, and compliance mechanisms to ensure impartiality and neutrality during the pendency of an active personnel investigation
5. Direct the City Manager and Chief of Police, with input from the OSPA, to expand the Berkeley Police Transparency Hub by including data on the prosecutorial outcomes of each arrest made by the BPD.
6. Direct the City Manager and Chief of Police, with input from the OSPA, to work with the PAB/ODPA to research the:
 - Viability and the fitness for law enforcement accreditation for BPD.
 - Viability and the fitness for utilizing a law enforcement agency assessment tool like NYU's Policing Project SAJE tool³
7. Direct the City Manager and Chief of Police, with input from the OSPA, to utilize the guidelines in the DOJ report " Considerations for Specialized Units A Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies to Ensure Appropriateness, Effectiveness, and Accountability Specialized Units A Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies to Ensure Appropriateness, Effectiveness, and Accountability " to critically

² Government Code section 12519 states:

"The Attorney General shall give the Attorney General's opinion in writing to any Member of the Legislature, the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Controller, Treasurer, State Lands Commission, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Insurance Commissioner, any state agency, and any county counsel, district attorney, or sheriff when requested, upon any question of law relating to their respective offices.

"The Attorney General shall give the Attorney General's opinion in writing to a city prosecuting attorney when requested, upon any question of law relating to criminal matters."

Under this statute, the Attorney General may give opinions only to these specified public officials, and not to private individuals or to public officials who are not listed in the statute.

Source: <https://oag.ca.gov/opinions/faqs#:~:text=Government%20Code%20section%2012519%20states%20that%20opinions%20shall%20be%20provided,cases%20arising%20in%20the%20city.>

³ The SAJE Policing Assessment is a tool designed to define and measure the characteristics of a sound, accountable, just, and effective policing agency. This much-needed resource helps police leaders and agencies, municipal leaders, and the communities they serve understand agency performance across 100 critical metrics.

Source: <https://www.policingproject.org/saje-policing-assessment>

examine the necessity, effectiveness, and oversight of specialized units within the Berkeley Police Department (BPD)

8. Adopt a resolution issuing a formal apology to the City of Berkeley community for the improper messaging displayed by this incident and reaffirm a commitment to support the work of the Fair and Impartial Committee, the PAB, the ODPa, the Peace and Justice Commission and other City Departments, community stakeholders working towards a more equitable and just City of Berkeley.

The ODPa additionally recommends that the **CITY MANAGER**:

1. Work with the City Auditor and IT to modify existing policies regarding city-issued devices and ensure compliance through randomized audits.
2. Work with the BPD to draft and adopt an Alcohol Rehabilitation Leave Procedure similar to Dallas Police Department General Order 446.00⁴

Lastly, the ODPa calls on the **COMMUNITY** to consider the following:

1. Seek Charter amendment to Section (15) Legal Counsel⁵: To provide independent counsel to the ODPa/PAB for all legal advice. Independent Counsel may be a staff employed by the ODPa or on retainer.
2. Seek Charter amendment to allow ODPa/PAB to conduct personnel misconduct investigations *sua sponte* (of one's own accord).

In instances where public trust has been impacted in such a manner, it is not only important to look at ways in which systems can be improved but also to be intentional about ways to heal the community and improve relationships down the line. This requires ongoing dialogue, community engagement, and concrete actions to rebuild trust and demonstrate a genuine commitment to change.

In closing, this report seeks to fulfill our commitment to the Berkeley community by providing a thorough examination of the incident and offering actionable recommendations. The goal is to foster a law enforcement environment that upholds the highest standards of integrity and

⁴ 446.01 Purpose

“The purpose of the Alcohol Rehabilitation Leave Procedure is to provide employees of the police department with support and assistance in securing confidential care to help them overcome the detrimental use of alcohol before their career and personal lives are irreparably damaged. A concerning number of alcohol-related arrests and incidents involving members of the department have occurred and continue to occur. Employee safety and well-being is paramount for the Dallas Police Department. As a proactive measure, this procedure is being implemented immediately to support department employees. Our success as a Department is dependent on a physically and mentally healthy workforce who care for themselves just as much as the community they serve.”

Source: <https://dallaspolice.net/resources/Shared%20Documents/General-Orders.pdf>

⁵ Berkeley Charter Section 125(15)(a):

The Board and the Director of Police Accountability shall use the services of the City Attorney’s Office for legal advice.

Source: [https://berkeley.municipal.codes/Charter/125\(15\)\(a\)](https://berkeley.municipal.codes/Charter/125(15)(a))

accountability, thereby restoring public trust and aligning policing practices with the values of the Berkeley community.

Introduction

The ODPa presents this companion report subsequent to an exhaustive review conducted by the Subcommittee on Policy and Practices concerning the Downtown Task Force and Bike Unit Allegations of the PAB which was then formally discussed and approved by the full Board. Central to the concerns under scrutiny is the grave allegation of police quotas attributed to the Downtown Task Force, a matter that resonates deeply with both historical precedent and contemporary societal discourse.

The allegation of police quotas strikes at the core of the delicate balance between law enforcement's role in ensuring public safety and the imperative to safeguard individual rights and dignity. This issue's legislative history, though often obscured and scattered across many states, finds its origins rooted in Berkeley—a city renowned for its progressive and forward-thinking stance in shaping societal norms and legal frameworks (see Ossei-Owusu, 2021).

Remarkable legislative activity emerged in the 1970s, with Black Democratic Assemblyman John Miller at the helm, introducing California's bill in 1975. Miller, often described as a "progressive independent in local politics," demonstrated a keen political acumen, underpinning his support for quota bans with inclusive rhetoric (Id.). His district, which encompassed the diverse cities of Oakland and Berkeley, provided a unique perspective, one that resonated with concerns for both police officers and the general public.

Miller's stance articulated the inherent injustice in quotas, deeming them "unfair, undemocratic, and unjust." (see Ossei-Owusu, 2021 citing *Measure to Outlaw CHP's Ticket Quotas*⁶, *supra* note 69, at 1.) He was troubled by the notion that an officer's failure to meet quotas could lead to demotion, while simultaneously expressing concerns for "the average California driver," who might find themselves disbelieved by a "rubber stamp traffic court system." (Id.)

California's statute, birthed from a convergence of multi-constituent concerns, remains relevant today, specifically in the City of Berkeley. It serves as a historical testament to the enduring pursuit of justice and fair play, core tenets that guide our efforts in maintaining police accountability, fostering public trust, and safeguarding the principles of democracy within the City of Berkeley.

This report endeavors to shed light on the contemporary implications of the allegations surrounding police quotas, while acknowledging their historical resonance within our community's consciousness. Through our investigations, we aim to contribute to the ongoing dialogue surrounding public safety, police conditions, and the eradication of police corruption, underscoring our commitment to a just and equitable Berkeley.

⁶ Ossei-Owusu, S. (2021). Police quotas. NYUL Rev., 96, 529.

Additionally, this report investigates the alarming findings related to the DTF, particularly the use of arrest quotas, inappropriate behavior among officers, and the troubling internal culture that has surfaced through the examination of text messages exchanged within the unit. These findings underscore the need for immediate and decisive action to address the systemic issues within the BPD, particularly those related to the DTF's operations. This report presents a series of recommendations aimed at reforming the BPD to ensure transparency, accountability, and a renewed commitment to fair and just policing. These recommendations include proposed amendments to local legislation, the adoption of new internal policies, and the implementation of rigorous oversight mechanisms. By confronting these issues head-on and implementing the suggested reforms, Berkeley can restore public trust in its police department and reaffirm its dedication to upholding the highest standards of law enforcement.

Recommendations for Council

Call on the State Legislature to Amend Government Code section 12519

Civilian oversight agencies play a crucial role in maintaining transparency and accountability within law enforcement. However, their effectiveness is often limited by the scope of their authority and access to necessary resources. The current Government Code section 12519 restricts the ability to request investigative assistance from the Attorney General's office to a limited group of officials, thereby excluding civilian oversight leaders who are often at the forefront of addressing public concerns regarding police misconduct. Amending this section to include heads of civilian oversight agencies as authorized requestors would not only empower these agencies but also ensure that they can perform their duties without unnecessary hindrances, especially in cases where their investigations encounter substantial resistance or require specialized expertise.

The recent findings in the PAB report highlight the numerous obstacles civilian oversight bodies face when attempting to access critical information, such as the Swanson report and other internal records. These challenges underscore the need for civilian oversight agencies to have the legal backing necessary to overcome such barriers, particularly when investigating serious allegations of misconduct. By allowing civilian oversight leaders to request assistance from the Attorney General's office, the Legislature would be affirming the importance of transparency and accountability in law enforcement, while also providing these agencies with the tools needed to conduct thorough and effective investigations.

Moreover, this amendment would signal the Legislature's commitment to strengthening civilian oversight in California, a state that has been at the forefront of progressive policing reforms. By expanding the scope of section 12519, the Legislature would not only bolster the independence of civilian oversight agencies but also promote a more robust system of checks and balances within law enforcement. This change would be a significant step towards ensuring that all investigations into police misconduct, particularly those involving complex or sensitive issues, are conducted with the highest standards of integrity and thoroughness.

Procure the services of a vendor that can conduct real-time audits and analysis of BWC footage.

The integration of body-worn cameras (BWC) into police operations was initially heralded as a key tool for enhancing transparency and accountability. However, the effectiveness of BWC footage in holding officers accountable depends heavily on the ability to analyze and audit this data in a timely and systematic manner. As highlighted in the PAB report, the current oversight mechanisms are insufficient, often leaving critical data unanalyzed due to limited resources and access issues. By procuring the services of a vendor that specializes in real-time audits and analysis of BWC footage, the City can ensure that this valuable resource is fully utilized to monitor police conduct, identify potential issues early, and provide an objective record of interactions between officers and the public.

Real-time analysis of BWC footage would also serve as a proactive measure to deter misconduct and reinforce a culture of accountability within the Berkeley Police Department. By enabling continuous monitoring, the City can swiftly address any deviations from policy, reducing the likelihood of incidents escalating into more severe issues. This approach aligns with the PAB's recommendations for more robust oversight and reflects the City's commitment to upholding the highest standards of policing. Moreover, the use of advanced technology to audit BWC footage can provide comprehensive insights into patterns of behavior, helping to inform future policy decisions and training programs.

Furthermore, the involvement of the Office of Strategic Planning and Accountability (OSPA) in this process ensures that the procurement of these services aligns with the broader strategic goals of the City and the Police Department. The OSPA can provide valuable input on the selection of the vendor, ensuring that the chosen solution is tailored to the specific needs of Berkeley's oversight framework. By integrating real-time BWC footage analysis into the City's accountability systems, Berkeley can set a new standard for transparency and public trust, demonstrating a commitment to continuous improvement in police oversight.

Establish a protocol, subject to Council approval, with clear guidelines for how the City Manager should handle complaints against the Chief of Police

The authority and responsibility of the Chief of Police place them at the center of law enforcement operations, making it essential that any complaints against them are handled with the utmost transparency and impartiality. The recent PAB report revealed significant challenges in accessing information necessary for oversight, particularly in cases involving high-ranking officials. To address these concerns, it is recommended that the City Manager, in collaboration with the City Attorney's Office, develop a clear and robust protocol for handling complaints


against the Chief of Police. This protocol should be subject to Council approval to ensure it reflects the community's expectations for transparency and accountability.

Central to this protocol should be the designation of the PAB and the ODPa as the primary investigative bodies for such complaints. This approach is consistent with the precedent established by the PRC Ordinance, which mandates that complaints filed with other city offices, boards, or departments be referred to the appropriate oversight commission for investigation. By formalizing this process, the City can ensure that complaints against the Chief of Police are not only investigated thoroughly but also in a manner that is independent of the Police Department's internal mechanisms, thereby avoiding any potential conflicts of interest.

Additionally, the establishment of clear guidelines for handling these complaints would provide all stakeholders, including the public, with confidence in the process. It would outline the specific steps to be taken from the receipt of a complaint through to its resolution, including timelines, investigative procedures, and reporting requirements. This transparency is crucial for maintaining public trust, particularly in situations where the actions of the Chief of Police are called into question. By implementing a well-defined protocol, the City of Berkeley can demonstrate its commitment to holding all members of its law enforcement agencies accountable, regardless of rank, and ensure that the principles of justice and fairness are upheld in all circumstances.

Establish a communications policy, corresponding training, and compliance mechanisms to ensure impartiality and neutrality during the pendency of an active personnel investigation

Figure 1 City Manager Email to City Council acknowledging allegations



On November 10, 2022 City Manager Williams-Ridley, by way of email, acknowledged to the Mayor and Council the allegations as brought forth by former BPD Officer Shedoudy (see Figure 1). In the email, the City Manager classified the email from the former officer as "disturbing". Furthermore, she assured the Mayor and Council that the "allegations will be investigated fully and any additional investigative oversight needed will be sought." This initial paragraph is without concern to the Board, but the subsequent paragraph reveals practices and policies (or lack thereof) regarding the operation of the Berkeley Police Department- as they relate to investigations of higher-ranking law enforcement officials- that are ripe for yielding prejudiced or biased conclusions.

Specifically, in the follow up paragraph, the City Manager states that she does "*not see any reason to pause the upcoming item requesting the appointment of Jen Louis to Chief of Police.*" This statement is extremely concerning in the context of serious allegations that needed to be "fully investigated" and where the item dealt with the potential subject of an investigation to be undertaken. Additionally, the City Manager adds that her "*initial inquiry affirms that she [Chief Louis] had no knowledge of the allegations or text messages provided by Former Officer Shedoudy.*" It is unclear to the Board what the depth and scope of the "initial inquiry" was, but if at that time the City Manager had not independently corroborated the lack of knowledge of the allegations by Chief Louis through independent witnesses that may had knowledge about this, through an administrative review of emails and text

messages of the Chief, it is difficult to understand how an “initial inquiry” could have *affirmed* that information. If at that time, the “initial inquiry” merely included a discussion with Chief Louis about the matter, that information, in and of itself, would have been insufficient by a preponderance of the evidence to “affirm” that the Chief had no knowledge about these allegations. At most, the Chief’s denial about having knowledge could have “suggested” that the allegations lacked or possessed questionable merit.

Notwithstanding, considering that at this juncture of the events, the City Manager had not formally recused herself from investigating this matter⁷ and the other Departments/units within the City with authority to investigate the matter *sua sponte*⁸ were the BPD and IAB respectively, statements made by her (or her office) could had the effect of prejudicing the investigation. From an investigative and adjudicatory perspective, this presents various obvious problems that must be addressed through the enactment of policies or the guidance of practices.

There are many sources for policy and or practice guidance on navigating the delicate nature of investigations, but two important ones that can guide our City are:

- State Bar of California- RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT⁹ ; and
- U.S Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS)- STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS: Recommendations from a Community of Practice¹⁰

In Rule 3.6 Trial Publicity, the State Bar of California prohibits lawyers who are participating or have participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter from making, “*extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows* or reasonably should know* will (i) be disseminated by means*

⁷ Section 28(f) of the City Charter indicates that one of the powers and duties of City Manager is: “To make investigations into the affairs of the City, or any department or division thereof, or any contract, or the proper performance of any obligation running to the City.”

In practice, the City Manager does not personally investigate affairs of the City, but rather delegates them to the appropriate personnel. In this instance, a matter concerning the Berkeley Police Department (in accordance with the BMC 2.64.030) would also be under the control and supervisory authority of the Chief of Police: “*The Chief of Police shall be responsible for the supervision and control of all divisions of the department and for the performance of the functions herein assigned to the department.*”

⁸ Section 125(3)(a)(3) of the City Charter specifies that the Board has authority to receive and consider findings of the Director of Police Accountability, where a complaint is filed by members of the public: “*To receive and consider the findings and recommendations of the Director of Police Accountability regarding complaints filed by members of the public against sworn employees of the Police Department and to recommend if discipline is warranted when misconduct is found and, pursuant to Section 18, the level of discipline for sustained findings of misconduct*”;

⁹ State Bar of California- RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/rules/Rule_3.6-Exec_Summary-Redline.pdf

¹⁰ U.S Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS)- STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS: Recommendations from a Community of Practice
<https://portal.cops.usdoj.gov/resourcecenter/ric/Publications/cops-p164-pub.pdf>

of public communication and (ii) have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.*” Serving in her capacity as the City Manager, it can be reasonably concluded that the City Manager knew or reasonably should have known (i.e. Brown Act) that her extrajudicial statements could be 1) disseminated by means of public communication and 2) have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding¹¹ in the matter.

Furthermore, the Rule provides guidance on what statements can be made depending on whether they focus on non-criminal or criminal cases. Specifically, in cases that are non-criminal in nature, according to Rule 3.6 (b), a lawyer may state:

- (1) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons* involved;
- (2) information contained in a public record;
- (3) that an investigation of a matter is in progress;
- (4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
- (5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto;
- (6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person* involved, when there is reason to believe* that there exists the likelihood of substantial* harm to an individual or to the public but only to the extent that dissemination by public communication is reasonably* necessary to protect the individual or the public;

Given the guidance provided by the State Bar of California's Rules of Professional Conduct, it is evident that the City Manager's public statements regarding the allegations against the Berkeley Police Department's leadership, and specifically Chief Louis, should have been more cautiously framed to avoid any potential for prejudicing ongoing investigations. The premature affirmation of the Chief's lack of knowledge, without a thorough and independent inquiry, not only risks undermining the integrity of the investigation but also erodes public trust in the fairness of the process. It is crucial for city officials, particularly those in positions of authority, to refrain from making statements that could be perceived as influencing or pre-judging the outcome of such investigations.

To address the concerns raised by this incident, it is recommended that Berkeley adopt clear policies and procedures that align with the best practices outlined in the DOJ's "Standards and Guidelines for Internal Affairs" and the State Bar's Rules of Professional Conduct. These policies should emphasize the importance of impartiality and caution in public communications,

¹¹ Currently, the BPD's adjudicative proceeding consists of a hearing process which includes members of the City Manager's Office.

particularly when an investigation is ongoing. Moreover, the City should consider implementing training for city officials on these standards to ensure that future communications do not inadvertently compromise the integrity of investigations. By doing so, Berkeley can strengthen its commitment to transparency, accountability, and the rule of law, ensuring that all investigations are conducted with the highest standards of fairness and integrity.

Expand the Berkeley Police Transparency Hub by including data on the prosecutorial outcomes of each arrest made by the BPD

Expanding the Berkeley Police Transparency Hub¹² to include data on the prosecutorial outcomes of each arrest made by the BPD represents a significant step toward enhancing transparency and accountability within the city's law enforcement operations. The report titled "Purging the Poor: Arrest Quotas, Racist Texts and the Role of City Leadership in the "Textgate" Scandal" by Berkeley Copwatch¹³ underscores the importance of examining the entire spectrum of police interactions, from initial stops to final prosecutorial outcomes. Subsequently, Mr. Charles Clarke submitted his independent analysis on the prosecutorial outcomes related to this unit for the PAB's and ODP's consideration (see attachments 1 and 2). Currently, the Transparency Hub provides valuable data on police stops, arrests, and other metrics, but it lacks critical information on how these arrests are processed and adjudicated within the criminal justice system. By including prosecutorial outcomes—such as charges filed, cases dismissed, plea bargains, and trial results—the City can offer a more complete picture of the effectiveness and fairness of BPD practices, allowing the community and oversight bodies to better understand the full impact of police actions, as well as any potential disparities in how justice is administered.

This expanded dataset would also provide crucial insights into potential disparities in the criminal justice process. For instance, if data reveals that certain demographic groups are disproportionately facing harsher prosecutorial outcomes, it could signal the need for further investigation and reforms within both the police department and the prosecutorial system. Moreover, such transparency would enable the PAB and other oversight entities to identify patterns of concern, such as frequent dismissals of cases due to insufficient evidence, which might indicate systemic issues in how arrests are conducted or how evidence is gathered. Ultimately, this initiative would empower the City of Berkeley to address these issues proactively, fostering greater trust between the police department and the community it serves.

Furthermore, the inclusion of prosecutorial outcomes in the Transparency Hub would reinforce Berkeley's commitment to data-driven decision-making and continuous improvement in public safety practices. By making this information publicly available, the City would not only increase accountability but also encourage a broader dialogue among stakeholders—including law enforcement, community leaders, and policymakers—about the intersections between policing and the judicial system. This holistic approach to transparency would set a precedent for other

¹² <https://bpd-transparency-initiative-berkeleypd.hub.arcgis.com/>

¹³ https://www.berkeleycopwatch.org/files/ugd/9faa72_175f75bda71646b983857d0a0e352434.pdf?index=true

jurisdictions, demonstrating Berkeley's leadership in advancing equitable and just law enforcement practices.

Research the viability and fitness for law enforcement accreditation for BPD and the viability of utilizing a law enforcement agency assessment tool like NYU's Policing Project SAJE tool¹⁴

The pursuit of law enforcement accreditation and the adoption of advanced assessment tools are crucial strategies for ensuring that the BPD meets the highest standards of professional conduct and operational effectiveness. By directing the City Manager and Chief of Police, in consultation with the OSPA, to explore the viability and fitness of these initiatives, Berkeley can systematically evaluate its policing practices against national and international benchmarks. Accreditation from recognized bodies like CALEA (Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies) would not only affirm the BPD's commitment to excellence but also provide a structured framework for continuous improvement, covering critical areas such as policy development, training, and accountability mechanisms.

In addition to exploring accreditation, researching the potential adoption of a law enforcement assessment tool like NYU's Policing Project SAJE (Sound, Accountable Just, and Effective) would allow Berkeley to engage in a more nuanced evaluation of its policing practices. The SAJE tool is specifically designed to assess law enforcement agencies on key metrics related to justice, equity, and public safety outcomes. By implementing such an assessment, the BPD can gain deeper insights into areas that require reform or enhancement, particularly in the context of community trust and fairness in policing. This would also enable the PAB and ODPA to play a more informed role in oversight, ensuring that the department's practices align with the community's expectations and the City's commitment to equitable law enforcement.

These initiatives—pursuing accreditation and employing advanced assessment tools—would significantly strengthen Berkeley's oversight capabilities and enhance the BPD's transparency and accountability. By rigorously evaluating the department's operations through these lenses, Berkeley can identify best practices and areas for improvement, ensuring that its police force not only meets but exceeds the standards of modern, community-oriented policing. This forward-looking approach would reinforce Berkeley's role as a leader in innovative police reform and set a high bar for law enforcement agencies nationwide.

¹⁴ For preliminary research on these tools consider ODPA's memo presented to the PAB on March 13, 2024: <https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/legislative-body-meeting-attachments/2024-03-13%20PAB%20Agenda%20Packet.pdf>

Utilize the guidelines in the DOJ report " Considerations for Specialized Units: A Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies to Ensure Appropriateness, Effectiveness, and Accountability" to critically examine the necessity, effectiveness, and oversight of specialized units within the BPD

The findings from the PAB report on the BPD Downtown Task Force and Bike Unit raise serious concerns about the operations and oversight of these specialized units, including potential misuse of power and negative community impact. To address these issues and ensure that specialized units within the BPD are functioning effectively and justly, it is recommended that the City Manager and Chief of Police, with input from the OSPA, adopt the guidelines provided in the DOJ's "Considerations for Specialized Units: A Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies to Ensure Appropriateness, Effectiveness, and Accountability."¹⁵

This guide offers a comprehensive framework for law enforcement agencies to assess the appropriateness, effectiveness, and accountability of their specialized units. By applying these guidelines, the BPD can conduct a thorough evaluation of its specialized units to determine whether they are necessary, whether their operations are aligned with the department's mission and values, and whether they have appropriate oversight mechanisms in place to prevent misconduct and ensure transparency.

The evaluation should include a review of the units' goals, operational practices, and community impact, with a particular focus on identifying any areas where reforms may be needed to align with best practices for accountability and fairness. Implementing the recommendations from the DOJ guide will help ensure that all specialized units within the BPD operate in a manner that promotes public trust and community safety, reinforcing Berkeley's commitment to equitable and just policing.

Adopt a resolution issuing a formal apology to the City of Berkeley community for the improper messaging displayed by this incident and reaffirm a commitment to support the work of the Fair and Impartial Policing Committee

The recent revelations of improper messaging within the Berkeley Police Department, as detailed in the PAB report, have understandably caused significant concern within the community, undermining trust in local law enforcement. To address this breach of public confidence, it is essential that the City Council adopt a resolution issuing a formal apology to the City of Berkeley community. This apology should acknowledge the harm caused by the insensitive and inappropriate communications, recognizing their impact on the community's perception of the

¹⁵ National Policing Institute. 2024. Considerations for Specialized Units: A Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies to Ensure Appropriateness, Effectiveness, and Accountability. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

Source: <https://portal.cops.usdoj.gov/resourcecenter/content.ashx/cops-r1140-pub.pdf>

police and reaffirming the City's commitment to maintaining the highest standards of professionalism and respect within its police force.

In addition to the apology, the resolution should also explicitly reaffirm the City's ongoing commitment to supporting the work of key oversight and community-oriented bodies, including the Fair and Impartial Policing Committee, the PAB, the Office of the Director of Police ODP, the Peace and Justice Commission, and other relevant City departments and stakeholders. These entities play a vital role in promoting equity, justice, and accountability in Berkeley, and their work is more important than ever in the wake of this incident. By publicly committing to support these bodies, the City Council can help ensure that they have the resources and authority needed to carry out their mandates effectively, fostering a culture of transparency and continuous improvement.

Moreover, this resolution would serve as a critical step in healing the relationship between the BPD and the community it serves. By taking responsibility for the actions of its police force and demonstrating a sincere commitment to addressing the underlying issues, the City of Berkeley can begin to rebuild trust and move forward with a renewed focus on equity and justice. This formal apology, coupled with a reaffirmed commitment to oversight and reform, would underscore the City's dedication to creating a police department that truly reflects the values and expectations of its diverse and vibrant community.

Recommendations for the City Manager

Work with the City Auditor and IT to modify existing policies regarding city-issued devices and ensure compliance through randomized audits

The effective management and oversight of city-issued devices are critical to maintaining the integrity and security of Berkeley's operations. Current policies governing the use of these devices must be updated to reflect evolving technology, security risks, and the need for accountability in their use. Collaborating with the City Auditor and IT department will allow Berkeley to establish more stringent guidelines for the use of city-issued devices, ensuring that they are utilized appropriately and securely for official purposes. By refining these policies, the City can mitigate risks associated with data breaches, unauthorized use, and potential misconduct related to the use of these devices.

To ensure compliance with the updated policies, the City should implement a system of randomized audits. These audits will serve as a critical oversight mechanism, verifying that city-issued devices are being used in accordance with the established guidelines. Randomized audits provide a deterrent effect, reducing the likelihood of misuse by ensuring that all city employees are aware that their device usage may be subject to review at any time. This proactive approach will help to identify any instances of non-compliance or security vulnerabilities early, allowing the City to address issues before they escalate.

Moreover, this initiative will enhance transparency and accountability across all departments, demonstrating Berkeley's commitment to responsible governance and the

safeguarding of public resources. Regular audits and policy reviews will not only protect the City's technological assets but also foster a culture of accountability and ethical conduct among employees. By prioritizing the proper management of city-issued devices, Berkeley can ensure that its operations remain secure, efficient, and aligned with best practices in public administration.

Work with the BPD to draft and adopt an Alcohol Rehabilitation Leave Procedure similar to DPD GO 446.00

Recognizing the importance of supporting the well-being and health of police officers, and in light of the troubling references to alcohol in the text messages exchanged among members of the Downtown Task Force, it is recommended that Berkeley work with the BPD to draft and adopt an Alcohol Rehabilitation Leave Procedure, modeled after DPD GO 446.00¹⁶. The text messages revealed that alcohol was frequently mentioned as a prize or reward for making arrests, raising serious concerns about the role of alcohol within the department's culture. This procedure would provide a structured and compassionate approach for officers who are struggling with alcohol dependency, offering them the opportunity to seek treatment without fear of stigma or career repercussions. By adopting such a policy, Berkeley would demonstrate its commitment to the holistic health of its law enforcement personnel, acknowledging that the mental and physical well-being of officers is integral to their ability to serve the community effectively.

The Alcohol Rehabilitation Leave Procedure would outline clear guidelines for officers to request leave for alcohol rehabilitation, ensuring confidentiality and support throughout the process. This policy would include provisions for treatment programs, reintegration plans, and monitoring to ensure that officers receive the help they need while maintaining the integrity of the department's operations. By providing a pathway to recovery, the City can help officers address substance use issues proactively, reducing the risk of related misconduct, such as the troubling behaviors highlighted in the PAB report, and enhancing overall department morale.

Furthermore, implementing this procedure would align Berkeley with best practices in law enforcement, emphasizing the importance of health and wellness initiatives within the police force. By adopting a proactive stance on alcohol rehabilitation, particularly in response to the issues revealed in the text messages, the City can foster a supportive environment where officers feel empowered to seek help when needed, ultimately leading to a more resilient and effective police department. This initiative would also reflect the City's broader commitment to public health, extending support to those who serve and protect the community while addressing the underlying cultural issues that may contribute to unhealthy behaviors within the force.

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Recommendations for the Community

Seek Charter amendment to Section (15) Legal Counsel: To provide independent counsel to the ODPa/PAB for all legal advice

To enhance the independence and effectiveness of the ODPa and the PAB, it is recommended that Berkeley seek a Charter amendment to Section 15, which governs Legal Counsel. This amendment would provide for the appointment of independent legal counsel dedicated solely to the ODPa and PAB, ensuring that all legal advice and representation is free from potential conflicts of interest. By establishing independent counsel, either as a staff position within the ODPa or through a retainer arrangement, the City can ensure that the ODPa and PAB receive unbiased, expert legal guidance tailored to their unique oversight functions.

Independent counsel would play a critical role in advising the ODPa and PAB on a wide range of legal issues, including investigations, policy reviews, and disciplinary recommendations. This arrangement would allow the ODPa and PAB to operate with greater autonomy, as they would no longer need to rely on legal advice from the City Attorney's office, which also represents the police department and other city entities. Ensuring that the ODPa and PAB have their own legal counsel would reinforce their ability to carry out their mandates effectively, without concerns about divided loyalties or conflicts of interest that might arise when the same legal office advises both oversight bodies and the police department.

Moreover, this amendment would signal Berkeley's commitment to robust civilian oversight of law enforcement, providing the ODPa and PAB with the tools they need to perform their duties independently and effectively. By securing independent legal counsel, Berkeley would enhance the credibility and authority of its police oversight institutions, fostering greater public trust in the integrity of the oversight process. This move would align Berkeley with best practices in police accountability, ensuring that the ODPa and PAB are equipped to fulfill their critical role in promoting transparency, accountability, and justice within the Berkeley Police Department.

Seek Charter amendment to allow ODPa/PAB to conduct personnel misconduct investigations sua sponte (of one's own accord)

To further strengthen the oversight capabilities of the ODPa and the PAB, it is recommended that Berkeley seek a Charter amendment allowing these bodies to initiate personnel misconduct investigations *sua sponte*, or of their own accord. Currently, the ODPa and PAB are often limited to responding to complaints filed by members of the public, which can restrict their ability to address misconduct proactively. By granting the authority to initiate investigations independently, the ODPa and PAB would be better equipped to address potential issues of police misconduct that may not come to light through public complaints alone.

This amendment would empower the ODPa and PAB to act on credible information or patterns of behavior that suggest misconduct, even in the absence of a formal complaint. Such

authority is crucial for addressing systemic issues within the police department that may otherwise go unchecked. By allowing these oversight bodies to investigate proactively, Berkeley can ensure that all instances of misconduct are thoroughly examined and addressed, reinforcing the city's commitment to maintaining high standards of conduct within its police force.

Moreover, this change would align Berkeley with national effective practices in police oversight, where independent civilian bodies are granted the authority to initiate investigations based on their observations or information received from other sources. By enabling the ODPA and PAB to conduct investigations *sua sponte*, Berkeley would enhance the effectiveness of its police oversight mechanisms, ensuring that the department remains accountable to the public it serves. This amendment would further solidify Berkeley's leadership in police reform and its commitment to transparency, accountability, and justice in law enforcement.

Conclusion

The investigation into the BPD's Downtown Task Force and Bike Unit has revealed significant issues within the department, including the existence of arrest quotas, problematic messaging, and a culture that at times prioritizes performance metrics over ethical and just policing. The verified text messages that circulated among DTF members not only exhibited racial and socioeconomic biases but also suggested that alcohol was used as a reward for meeting arrest targets. These revelations underscore the urgent need for comprehensive reforms within the BPD to restore public trust and ensure that all policing practices align with the principles of fairness, equity, and transparency that Berkeley holds dear.

This companion report has provided a series of recommendations aimed at addressing the systemic issues uncovered during this investigation. These recommendations are designed to enhance the accountability of the BPD, strengthen oversight mechanisms, and support the well-being of officers to prevent future occurrences of misconduct. Key among these recommendations is the call for amendments to state legislation, the adoption of rigorous auditing and real-time monitoring of body-worn camera footage, and the establishment of clear protocols for handling complaints against high-ranking officials within the department.

The City of Berkeley has a longstanding commitment to progressive policing and community-oriented public safety. To honor this commitment, it is essential that the City Council, City Manager, and all relevant stakeholders take decisive action in implementing the recommendations outlined in this report. By doing so, Berkeley can lead by example, demonstrating that accountability and integrity are non-negotiable values in law enforcement. Moving forward, continuous dialogue, community engagement, and transparent governance will be critical in healing the divisions caused by these recent events and in building a more just and equitable future for all residents of Berkeley.

ATTACHMENT 1.
Arrest Quotas Memorandum from Charles Clarke,
August 18, 2023 To the City of Berkeley Police
Accountability Board and Director of Police
Accountability

Arrest Quotas

Memorandum from Charles Clarke, August 18, 2023 To the City of Berkeley Police Accountability Board and Director of Police Accountability

On November 10, 2022, ex-Berkeley Police Department (BPD) Officer Corey Shedoudy e-mailed to the Berkeley City Council a collection of text messages that, among other things in Shedoudy's words, "clearly outline a practice of illegal arrest quotas".¹ Arrest quotas have been prohibited by the California Vehicle Code since 1976:²


"No..local agency employing peace officers...may establish any policy requiring any peace officer...to meet an arrest quota."

This memorandum addresses the arrest quota element of Shedoudy's allegations.

The "Operation 100" Bike Unit Text Messages Suggest an Arrest Quota

The Shedoudy text messages³ provided to the City Council have been (with one exception, not relevant here) authenticated by a vendor retained by the outside investigator Swanson & McNamara.⁴

On November 12, 2019, an unnamed officer (most likely then-Ofcr. Shedoudy) asked Ofcr. Greg Michalczyk about "Operation 100".⁵



¹ Police Accountability Board Special Meeting Agenda Packet, July 24, 2023, https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/legislative-body-meeting-attachments/2023-07-24%20PAB%20Spe.Mtg_.Pkt_.pdf, "November 10, 2022, Email from Corey Shedoudy to the Mayor and Berkeley City Council," p. 36

² California Vehicle Code § 41602 *Arrest Quotas*, https://leginfo.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayText.xhtml?division=17.&chapter=7.&lawCode=VEH, attached as Exhibit 1.

³ PAB Packet, supra n. 1, "Text Messages Attached to Shedoudy's November 10, 2022 Email to the Mayor and City Council," pp. 38 et seq.


⁴ PAB Packet, supra n. 1, "Summary of Investigation Process," p. 25

⁵ PAB Packet, supra n. 1, p. 49

Later that day the meaning of “100” as a count of arrests was illustrated in an exchange between Ofcr. Michalczyk and Sergeant Darren Kacalek, the Bike Unit supervisor.⁶



The preceding month Sgt. Kacalek had suggested penalizing the officer with the fewest arrests to the drudgery of waxing (bikes, presumably).⁷



Also that same month Sgt. Kacalek had emphasized arrests to his unit (then known as the DTF, Downtown Task Force).⁸



(Overtime then as now had become a perennial challenge to the Berkeley Police Department,⁹ so relaxing that constraint in explicit exchange for arrests ran the implicit risk of establishing a quota.)


⁶ PAB Packet, supra n. 1, p. 43

⁷ PAB Packet, supra n. 1, p. 45

⁸ PAB Packet, supra n. 1, p. 48, apparent approximate date October 19, 2019


⁹ Berkeley City Auditor, *Berkeley Police: Improvements Needed to Manage Overtime and Security Work for Outside Entities*, March 3, 2022, <https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/Berkeley%20Police%20-%20Improvements%20Needed%20to%20Manage%20Overtime%20and%20Security%20Work%20for%20Outside%20Entities.pdf>

However, beleaguered local businesses might not connect arrest counts to their own sense of security – an issue raised by an unnamed officer (likely ex-Ofcr. Shedoudy) in an undated message.¹⁰

A screenshot of a text message with a white background and black text. The text reads: "Imho arrests are the means not the ends. For all the businesses know, we arrest 20 people a day. XX arrests wont impress them. Solving their pain points will impress them. Solving the problems they know of will impress them, arresting the right people. Making their sidewalk not smell like piss." There is a blue vertical bar on the right side of the screenshot.

Imho arrests are the means not the ends. For all the businesses know, we arrest 20 people a day. XX arrests wont impress them. Solving their pain points will impress them. Solving the problems they know of will impress them, arresting the right people. Making their sidewalk not smell like piss.

Sgt. Kacalek responded that “numbers are a way of quantifying it...a notification to problematic people that we are out and about.”¹¹

A screenshot of a text message with a white background and black text. The sender is identified as "BPD Darren Kacalek, SS". The text reads: "For sure Corey but numbers are a way of quantifying it as we move to really solving long term problems. Tickets and arrests are more of a notification to problematic people that we are out and about and there to enforce problematic criminal behavior and public nuisances. It's the official paper way of reminding them that what they are doing is not okay and will get our attention." There is a green vertical bar on the left side of the screenshot.

BPD Darren Kacalek,
SS

For sure Corey but numbers are a way of quantifying it as we move to really solving long term problems. Tickets and arrests are more of a notification to problematic people that we are out and about and there to enforce problematic criminal behavior and public nuisances. It's the official paper way of reminding them that what they are doing is not okay and will get our attention.

From this evidence I conclude that the Bike Unit, in the person of its supervisor Sgt. Kacalek, paid attention to the count of arrests made in late 2019. At least with Ofcr. Michalczyk there was an explicit numerical target. Whether this attention constituted a *quota* – for Ofcr. Michalczyk or the entire Bike Unit – with the attendant suggestion that at least some arrests were made *unlawfully*, is suggested but not proven by the sample of text messages so far produced. A deeper look is needed.

¹⁰ PAB Packet, supra n. 1, p. 40

¹¹ PAB Packet, supra n. 1, p. 41

The Downtown Task Force/Bike Unit Has Met A City Policing Priority

Swanson & McNamara identified the Downtown Task Force's start date as October 22, 2019.¹² However, as early as 2018 BPD had "[s]taffed overtime patrols in the downtown,"¹³ partially in response to a campaign position from Councilmember Kate Harrison reflecting concerns of her Downtown constituents:¹⁴

"More community policing – with foot and bicycle police – would improve community relations, particularly in the Downtown. Officers would get to know the merchants, residents and high school students and diffuse [sic] situations."

BPD would count among its 2019 strategies and accomplishments:¹⁵

"Downtown Task Force...Began Bike Patrol training and equipment acquisition."

This priority was reflected in the FY 2020/2021 biennial budget adopted in mid-2019:¹⁶

"The Bike Patrol will provide proactive patrols in the downtown and south campus, and support problem-solving efforts associated with those areas."

The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020 led to increased concern about safety in Downtown and south of campus. In the words of three members of the City Council in June 2020:¹⁷

"During this COVID-19 emergency, City staff have received numerous complaints from local businesses regarding problematic and violent behavior, including assault of employees and property damage. As a result of increased criminal activity, the Berkeley Police Department have deployed overtime shifts in Telegraph and the Downtown to increase police patrols to respond more quickly to calls for service and to increase police presence to deter crime. While

¹² "Summary of Investigation Process," supra n. 4

¹³ Berkeley Police Department, *2018 Annual Crime Report*, March 19, 2019, p. 3, <https://records.cityofberkeley.info/PublicAccess/api/Document/Ae3FvWxdiUDVkdDsWDvvyxHM492HuYFW0lIpEpp601ZyyWihrOgcndqMWadQzZ9OpPkazKJgV5uZUIWmgvutEEac%3D/>

¹⁴ Kate Harrison, *Berkeley Progressive Alliance Candidate Questionnaire*, p. 3, <https://www.berkeleytenants.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Questionnaire.-Harrison.pdf>

¹⁵ Berkeley Police Department, *2019 Crime Report and Five Year Use of Force Report*, October 13, 2020, p. 3,4, <https://records.cityofberkeley.info/PublicAccess/api/Document/AfPSh1Yn6aAYFbhJYqtROgUtEmAT74LfpBLjvP9AwFsfVemWdd89cg9B4IFNHSMak8ApAlICAr2wmQEKnnbbQ%3D/>

¹⁶ City Manager, *FY 2020 & FY 2021 Biennial Budget Adoption*, June 25, 2019, p. 295 of 570, <https://records.cityofberkeley.info/PublicAccess/api/Document/AcuCVnDbGawvbulJ5bA6dAkBWuDHZpxNnJyKMWTP7MeEgslmZNIpG3s0vBJM4McaNB8jGcD2WeKCmVPNhEOAjU0%3D/>

¹⁷ Mayor Arreguín, Councilmembers Harrison and Robinson, *Establishing a COVID-19 Business Damage Mitigation Fund*, June 2, 2020, p. 1, <https://records.cityofberkeley.info/PublicAccess/api/Document/Aa4fp020coTCJkfwrmE7ffbVgxl0b0QMhpO7jxf9dboKOZUwMkWucvfvNNoVODsyCv1JG6i1chEaCdjZu48evu4%3D/>

the deployment of the Downtown Task Force has provided additional presence and support for businesses, crime is still occurring.”

By September 2020 the Bike Unit had been fully re-launched with a complement of six officers supervised by Sgt. Kacalek.¹⁸ Since the re-launch Berkeley Copwatch has added Ofcr. George Schikore, the Area 4 (West Berkeley) Coordinator,¹⁹ as a target for scrutiny in the Operation 100 text messages matter.²⁰ This deeper look will focus on these eight officers, pictured in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Downtown Task Force/Bike Unit Officers



(upper, from left) Darren Kacalek (Badge #88 and S-18), Greg Michalczyk (#9), James Seaton (#66), Tom Stern (#8); (lower, from left) Marissa Pickett (#81), Corey Shedoudy (#127), Dan Breaux (#15), George Schikore (#13). Photos: Berkeley Copwatch

¹⁸ Berkeley Police Department, *Berkeley PD re-launches our Bike Detail*, September 22, 2020, <https://berkeleyca.gov/community-recreation/news/berkeley-pd-re-launches-our-bike-detail>

¹⁹ Berkeley Police Department, *Community Liaisons*, <https://berkeleyca.gov/safety-health/police/community-liaisons> (accessed August 8, 2023)

²⁰ Berkeley Copwatch, *BPD Textgate Scandal, View The Officers Here*, <https://www.berkeleycopwatch.org/textgate> (accessed August 8, 2023)

What Do The Data Say?

The Berkeley Police Department has released Department-wide officer-level arrest activity in response to a public records request.²¹ The dataset includes:

Arrest Identifiers: Date and Time; Arrest Number; Case Number; Statute(s) Violated
Arrest Type, one of: Court Filed (Warrant), Field Cite, On-view by Citizen, On-view by Officer, Suspicion of Felony, Other Arrest
Arrestee Demographics: Race (Asian, Black, Hispanic, White, Other); Sex (Male, Female)
Arresting Officer ID (last name, first name initial when needed to disambiguate)

A total of 10,330 arrests spanning 60 months (calendar years 2018 to 2022, inclusive) have been reported. These arrests collectively accounted for a total of 22,829 reported statutory violations (on average a bit more than 2 violations per arrest, ranging from 1 to a maximum of 16).

Table 1. Arrests Per Officer, 2018-2022 Total and Monthly Average, Bike Unit vs. BPD

	Kacalek	Breaux	Michalczyk	Pickett	Schikore	Seaton	Shedoudy	Stern	DTF/ Bike Unit	Rest of BPD
Arrests	52	121	536	114	117	198	84	168	1,390	8,940
Months*	28	43	60	51	39	51	24	40	60	60
Monthly Average	1.9	2.8	8.9	2.2	3.0	3.9	3.5	4.2	3.8	2.5

* Months in which at least one arrest is reported

Table 1 summarizes the counts of arrests for the 8 Bike Unit officers, individually and as a group, and for the remaining non-Bike Unit officers of the Berkeley Police Department. In a typical month in the sample period about 60 non-Bike Unit BPD officers would make at least one arrest. The monthly average denotes the average over months in which that officer reported at least one arrest.

The most remarkable feature in Table 1 is the average arrest activity of Officer Michalczyk (8.9 arrests per month), more than double the monthly Bike Unit average (3.8), which is itself about 50% higher than the BPD non-Bike Unit average (2.5).

Distinguishing an officer’s voluntary vigor from his laboring under a quota is a difficult task with the data in hand. Table 2 shows the five BPD officers making the most arrests in the sample period. Ofcr. Michalczyk made significantly more arrests

²¹ City of Berkeley, Public Record Request 23-138, <https://cityofberkeleyca.nextrequest.com/requests/23-138>

than any other BPD officer. Only one other Bike Unit member, Ofcr. Seaton, was in the top 5.


Table 2. Top 5 BPD Officers, by Arrests, 2018-2022

Officer	Arrests	Months*	Monthly Average
Greg Michalczyk **	536	60	8.9
Jason Muniz	228	50	4.6
Wesley Grover	202	54	3.7
James Seaton **	198	51	3.9
Graham Shivas	190	26	7.3

* Months in which at least one arrest is reported ** DTF/Bike Unit

Figure 2 displays the time patterns of Bike Unit and non-Bike Unit arrest activities. The Bike Unit (the solid blue line) attained its monthly maximum of 83 arrests in February 2020, when Ofcr. Michalczyk (the dotted blue line) also reached his monthly arrest maximum (23). Over the 3+ years of the Downtown Task Force/Bike Unit in the dataset, Ofcr. Michalczyk accounted for over one-third of the unit’s arrests. The peak in DTF/Bike Unit arrest activity shortly before and in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic is evident.

Figure 2. Time Pattern of Bike Unit Arrests vs. BPD’s Arrest Average



The DTF/Bike Unit average (the solid orange line) of about 3.8 arrests per officer per month (including Ofcr. Michalczyk) is about 50% higher than the non-Bike Unit BPD average (the solid black line), about 2.5 arrests per arresting officer per month.

Figure 2 indicates that the “Operation 100” moniker was not literally realized, but failure to attain a quota does not disprove its existence. It is worth noting at the very time the quota was allegedly in effect (2019) the Berkeley Police Association recognized Ofcr. Michalczyk as its Officer of the Year.²² Two years later a supervising sergeant recognized his (and Ofcr. Stern’s) vigor on the Bike Unit, attached as Exhibit 2.²³

The Bike Unit (and its predecessor Downtown Task Force) was intended to increase police presence to deter crime. Because a bike officer could be said to be “closer” to the public than a car-borne officer, I would expect a Bike Unit officer to see more instances of crime directly and to respond more rapidly to citizen reports of crimes. This expectation is broadly fulfilled by the relative proportions of arrest types reported in Table 3 below.

In particular, 50% of DTF/Bike Unit arrests were made pursuant to direct observation by the officer (vs. 38% for the rest of BPD). The proportion of Bike Unit arrests due to citizen identifications was also somewhat greater (18% vs. 15%). The shares due to warrant service – aggregating warrants from BPD and outside jurisdictions, felonies and misdemeanors – were equal (15%) between the Bike Unit and the rest of the BPD.

In summary the DTF/Bike Unit arrest type mix shown in Table 3 broadly reflects a more up-close community policing approach than the rest of the BPD. The variation of arrest types across Bike Unit officers does not immediately suggest to me a Unit-wide quota based on the type of arrest.

²² Berkeley Police Association, December 12, 2019, <https://www.facebook.com/BerkeleyPoliceAssoc/posts/pfbid02kCFphZQkQLccoszcUMBtVQAxDsN5tmocjdKumwetFAycNN12zzK3KsZXcKs2Bftkl>

²³ Berkeley Police Department Memorandum, *Commendation for Officers Michalczyk and Stern*, April 21, 2021, p. 72 in PAB Special Meeting Packet (part 1 of 3), April 27, 2022, https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/legislative-body-meeting-attachments/2022.04.27.PAB_.Pkt%281of3%29.pdf. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2.

Table 3. Arrest Type Proportions, DTF/Bike Unit vs. BPD, 2018-2022

	Kacalek	Breaux	Michalczyk	Pickett	Schikore	Seaton	Shedoudy	Stern	DTF/ Bike Unit	Rest of BPD
On-View by Officer	50%	43%	53%	32%	59%	58%	46%	40%	50%	38%
On-View by Citizen	13%	14%	21%	14%	6%	21%	24%	17%	18%	15%
Warrant	2%	17%	12%	24%	28%	11%	8%	17%	15%	15%
Susp. Of Felony	31%	14%	13%	19%	4%	9%	14%	23%	14%	27%
Field Cite	4%	10%	0%	11%	2%	2%	7%	4%	3%	5%
Other Arrest	0%	2%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Did the Bike Unit Charge Different Violations From the Rest of BPD?

Ex-Ofcr. Shedoudy has alleged the DTF/Bike Unit under Sgt. Kacalek used “questionable legal tactics that included stop and frisk, probation searches with no reasonable suspicion of a crime, and a very loose interpretation of stay-away orders from UC Berkeley.”²⁴ The available *arrest* data do not directly measure Bike Unit *search* behavior but they do indicate the frequency that officers (claimed to have) found probable cause that certain statutory violations could be charged to make an arrest.

The top ten statutory violations charged by the Bike Unit and by the rest of BPD over the sample period 2018-2022 are shown in Table 4. These statutory violations (*charges*) can be grouped into meaningful categories of the California Penal Code²⁵ as follows:

- *Warrants* for arrest issued by a court pursuant to a probable-cause statement by BPD or another law enforcement agency, for felony or misdemeanor offenses;²⁶
- *Violation of a court order*, including *probation* for felony (f) or misdemeanor (m) offenses, or prohibition of some other activity (e.g. a stay-away order);²⁷

²⁴ “November 10, 2022, Email from Corey Shedoudy,” supra n. 1, p. 36

²⁵ California Penal Code, <https://leginfo.ca.gov/faces/codesTOCSelected.xhtml?tocCode=PEN&tocTitle=+Penal+Code+-+PEN>

²⁶ Cal. P.C. §§ 813-829, The Warrant of Arrest. Note that the Table 4 proportions for Warrant arrests are lower than in Table 3 because other offenses for a given arrest may have been reported in Table 4.

²⁷ Cal. P.C. §§ 1203.2 (felony & misdemeanor), 166(A)(4)

- *Substance abuse*, specifically possession of drug paraphernalia or methamphetamine, or public intoxication;²⁸
- *Property crime*, specifically petty theft (value less than \$950) or burglary;²⁹ and
- *Resisting arrest* incident to apprehension for some other offense.³⁰

These listed charges in Table 4 constituted 63% of Bike Unit arrests but only 44% of arrests by the rest of BPD, consistent with more diffuse crime patterns across the wider city.

Table 4. Arrest Charge Proportions, DTF/Bike Unit vs. BPD, 2018-2022

Charge	Kacalek	Breaux	Michalczyk	Pickett	Schikore	Seaton	Shedoudy	Stern	DTF/ Bike Unit	Rest of BPD
Warrant*	6%	12%	11%	18%	21%	10%	7%	12%	12%	11%
Probation violation (m)	10%	7%	15%	8%	11%	15%	16%	11%	13%	5%
Probation violation (f)	4%	5%	2%	1%	2%	3%	2%	2%	2%	4%
Violation of court order	5%	0%	4%	1%	5%	3%	3%	1%	3%	1%
Poss. of drug paraphernalia	7%	9%	14%	11%	9%	9%	11%	14%	12%	5%
Poss. of methamphetamine	3%	4%	8%	5%	7%	6%	5%	7%	7%	4%
Public intoxication	7%	2%	2%	5%	4%	6%	3%	2%	3%	3%
Petty theft	2%	3%	9%	8%	1%	6%	11%	7%	7%	4%
Burglary	1%	0%	1%	0%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	4%
Resisting arrest	4%	2%	3%	4%	2%	4%	4%	5%	3%	3%
Subtotal	48%	44%	69%	61%	63%	64%	63%	62%	63%	44%
Other	52%	56%	31%	39%	37%	36%	37%	38%	37%	56%
Grand Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

* Warrant = BPD & Outside Agency, felony (f) & misdemeanor (m) Poss. = possession

The Bike Unit executed warrants in approximately the same proportion of its arrests (12%) as the rest of BPD (11%), and arrested approximately the same proportion due to property crime (both totaling about 8%) and for resisting arrest (both 3%).

²⁸ Cal. P.C. §§ 11364(A), 11377(A), 647(F)

²⁹ Cal. P.C. §§ 484(A), 459

³⁰ Cal. P.C. § 148(A)(1)

Bike Unit arrests for violation of court orders were about twice as frequent relative to the rest of BPD, especially for misdemeanor probation violation (13% vs. 5%) and other court orders (3%, about triple BPD’s 1%).

This relatively greater frequency bears upon the “questionable legal tactics” that ex-Ofcr. Shedoudy has alleged. It is noteworthy that, among Bike Unit members, the ex-officer made proportionately the most arrests for misdemeanor probation violation (16% of his total) and approximately the Bike Unit average (3%) for violation of court orders (e.g. stay-aways).

Bike Unit arrests for substance abuse were about twice as frequent relative to the rest of BPD, particularly possession of drug paraphernalia (12% vs. 5%) and possession of methamphetamine (7% vs. 4%).

The prevalence of drug abuse in the Bike Unit’s territory – and consequent arrests – should come as no surprise to anyone who walked the streets of downtown Berkeley (especially Shattuck Avenue from Hearst Ave. south to Derby St.) or south of campus (including Peoples Park), particularly in the 2019-2022 period.

For example, on August 30, 2021, about 7:30 PM, I walked past an encampment on the southeast corner of Shattuck Ave. and Blake St. Three men focused intently on a vessel they held over a camp stove. They glowered at me as I passed, seemingly irritated at my presence on a public street corner. A fourth man wearing a blanket in the manner of a cape danced with a nearby streetlight pole, oblivious to the world. I later learned that, two hours later at that site, a BPD officer revived a man who may have overdosed on fentanyl.³¹ The encampment, the glowering, the oblivion, the overdose has become all too typical in Berkeley, particularly in the Bike Unit’s territory.

Bike Unit arrests solely for resisting arrest were slightly more frequent than for the rest of BPD. Arrests for which the only statutory violation listed is 148 (A)(1) (resisting the arrest itself) naturally invite scrutiny to determine whether the arrest was otherwise baseless – a possible abuse of police discretion – or whether a legitimate basis for arrest was not captured in the dataset. In the data 20 of the BPD’s 8,940 arrests were solely for resisting arrest, or a rate of 0.22%. The corresponding rate for the Bike Unit was 4 of 1,390 arrests, or 0.29% (slightly higher, implying 1 more such arrest by the Bike

³¹ Berkeley Police Department, *Unresponsive man revived with Narcan*, August 31, 2021, <https://berkeleyca.gov/community-recreation/news/unresponsive-man-revived-narcan>

Unit than if the BPD rate had obtained). This difference does not point toward a quota being satisfied with this potentially worrisome cause for arrest.

In summary the DTF/Bike Unit mix of charges (statutory violations) is more heavily weighted toward probation violations and substance abuse violations than the rest of the Police Department. Whether this emphasis reflects *lowered thresholds* below Constitutionally and Departmentally acceptable standards, or *higher prevalence* among the arrestee community in the Bike Unit territory, is an open question with the data in hand.

Were Bike Unit Arrests Racially Discriminatory?

Ex-Ofcr. Shedoudy has alleged a “practice of...racism...inside that [DTF/Bike] unit.”³² The arrest data can identify what the Bike Unit officers *did* in practice, but not what they *felt* in principle or attitude. The racial categorization of each Bike Unit officer’s arrests, and for the DTF/Bike Unit as a whole and for the rest of the BPD, is presented in Table 5.

Table 5. Arrestee Race Proportions, DTF/Bike Unit vs. BPD

Race	Kacalek	Breaux	Michalczyk	Pickett	Schikore	Seaton	Shedoudy	Stern	DTF/ Bike Unit	Rest of BPD
Black	42%	52%	48%	54%	30%	44%	44%	51%	47%	50%
White	52%	27%	41%	31%	51%	40%	37%	39%	40%	28%
Asian	0%	2%	1%	3%	5%	1%	2%	1%	2%	3%
Hispanic	2%	17%	8%	10%	9%	12%	13%	5%	9%	14%
Other	4%	2%	3%	3%	4%	3%	4%	4%	3%	5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

As a unit, the DTF/Bike Unit arrested proportionately fewer Black and Hispanic persons than the rest of the BPD as a whole (Black: 47% vs. 50%, Hispanic: 9% vs. 14%), and markedly proportionately more white persons (40% vs. 28%).

The variation across Bike Unit officers displays no distinct pattern. Of the Bike Unit members, Ofcr. Pickett arrested proportionately the most Black persons (54%); Sgt. Kacalek arrested proportionately the most white persons (52%); Ofcr. Schikore arrested proportionately the fewest Black persons (30%); while Ofcr. Breaux arrested

³² “November 10, 2022, Email from Corey Shedoudy,” supra n. 1, p. 36

proportionately the fewest white persons (27%) but proportionately the most Hispanic persons (17%, nearly twice the Bike Unit average).


As the Center for Policing Equity summarized in 2018, at least two competing but not mutually exclusive explanations could be at work: *community factors* such as racially disparate crime rates, and *policing factors* whereby officer discretion results in observed differences.³³ It would be premature to assign variation only to policing factors from outcome data such as in Table 5. Additional information such as text messages among the Bike Unit could be illuminating.

In summary, compared to the rest of the Berkeley Police Department during the sample period 2018-2022, the DTF/Bike Unit racial disparities of arrests are weighted more heavily toward white arrestees and less toward Black and Hispanic arrestees. Nonetheless there persists a disparity in arrests of Black persons relative to their proportion of Berkeley residents due to a mix of community and policing factors. But I do not observe the operation of a quota according to race – a traditional concern about quotas – from the proportions shown for Bike Unit officers in Table 5.

Berkeley’s History Against Arrest Quotas

August Vollmer, the first chief of the Berkeley Police Department, was applauded by an audience of his fellow police chiefs in 1919 when he identified arrests as an incomplete measure of public safety:³⁴

“Police efficiency should be measured by the amount of crime, poverty and sickness which is prevented on the beat, and not by the number of arrests made by the officer. (Applause)”




August Vollmer in 1929
Photo: Library of Congress

(Chief Vollmer’s speech is attached as Exhibit 3. I commend it as a marker of police thought from a century ago that could inform today’s Reimagining Public Safety initiative.)

³³ Center for Policing Equity, *Berkeley Police Department - National Justice Database City Report*, May 2018, pp. 7-8, in *Report and Recommendations From Mayor’s Fair and Impartial Policing Working Group*, February 23, 2021, <https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2021-02-23%20Special%20Item%2001%20Report%20and%20Recommendations.pdf> (pp. 51-52 of 201)

³⁴ August Vollmer, “The Policeman as a Social Worker,” *Proceedings of the 26th Convention of the International Association of Chiefs of Police*, New Orleans, Louisiana, April 14-16, 1919, p. 36. Attached hereto as Exhibit 3.



Assemblymember John J. Miller in 1969. Photo: California State Library

Since 1976 California has legislated against arrest quotas³⁵ due to the advocacy of Assemblymember John J. Miller, who chaired the Assembly Judiciary Committee while representing Berkeley and Oakland in the then-13th District. As he said at the time,³⁶

“[A police officer] will feel under an obligation to write a ticket even in those cases where a citizen may not have committed a crime beyond all reasonable doubt...[It] goes against our historical concepts of justice and fair play.”

(Asm. Miller represented Berkeley until 1978 when he was succeeded by Elihu Harris. He then served on the California First District Court of Appeal until his death in 1985.)

Recent legal commentary has explored *police quotas*, of which arrest quotas are an important variety. Professor Shaun Ossei-Owusu of the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School has explained that, despite objections from police unions and racial minorities, arrest quotas are still practiced, even in jurisdictions in which they have been prohibited.³⁷

Quotas risk sacrificing quality (particularly legality) for quantity in undesirable ways.³⁸ His article is attached as Exhibit 5.

(To continue the Berkeley theme of this section: Professor Ossei-Owusu earned his J.D. from Berkeley Law School and his Ph.D. from the U.C. Berkeley Department of African American Studies.)³⁹



Shaun Ossei-Owusu
Photo: Penn Carey Law School

Issues of Potential Interest to the Police Accountability Board

The PAB should continue its investigation, I hope with the benefit of this memorandum’s findings. I suggest several investigative directions:

³⁵ California Vehicle Code §§ 41600-41603, *Arrest Quotas*, supra n. 2. Also attached as Exhibit 1.

³⁶ *Berkeley Gazette*, “Measure to outlaw CHP’s ticket quotas,” July 22, 1975, p. 1. Attached as Exhibit 4.

³⁷ Shaun Ossei-Owusu, “Police Quotas,” 96 *New York University Law Review* 529-605, available as Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law, https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2835. Attached as Exhibit 5.

³⁸ E.g. Ossei-Owusu, supra n. 37, pp. 579-580, “Thin Evaluations,” esp. fn. 305

³⁹ Shaun Ossei-Owusu LPS ’08, <https://www.law.upenn.edu/faculty/oss>

1. Ex-Ofcr. Shedoudy has characterized the text messages he has already released as “the tip of the iceberg,” and that he would release “hundreds of DTF / Bike Force text messages” at the conclusion of his arbitration (appealing his termination from BPD service).⁴⁰ **This Board should request those additional text messages from ex-Ofcr. Shedoudy** for review to more fully understand the operation of the alleged arrest quota that my analysis in this memorandum has failed to detect.
2. Ex-Ofcr. Shedoudy has alleged that the Bike Unit was ordered to perform “probation searches with no reasonable suspicion of a crime.”⁴¹ Table 4 above indicates that (among Bike Unit members) ex-Ofcr. Shedoudy arrested proportionally the most persons for misdemeanor probation violations. **This Board should invite the ex-officer to disclose whether the alleged arrest quota induced him to make arrests that were, in retrospect, unjustifiable in the eyes of the law.**
3. The strongest evidence that a quantitative target may have driven arrests concerned Ofcr. Michalczyk’s “Operation 100.” Table 2 and Figure 2 illustrate that Ofcr. Michalczyk has arrested far more people than any other BPD officer in the past five years. **This Board should seek Ofcr. Michalczyk’s account of this activity**, including his perception of the beat he has patrolled, and whether Bike Unit practices (including but not limited to a quota) have given rise to it. Under the City Charter this Board can compel attendance, and even subpoena, an officer,⁴² but I do not envision this account to require those measures. The purpose of my suggestion is for the Board to review this particular Police Department practice so as to understand it.
4. The arrest *quantities* reported in this memorandum are separate from their *quality*, most notably their adequacy for prosecution by the Alameda County District Attorney (ACDA). **This Board should seek from ACDA the prosecutorial outcomes for the cases brought by Bike Unit arrests and for the**

⁴⁰ “November 10, 2022, Email from Corey Shedoudy,” supra n. 1, p. 37, 36

⁴¹ “November 10, 2022, Email from Corey Shedoudy,” supra n. 1, p. 36

⁴² Berkeley City Charter, Article XVIII, *Police Accountability Board and Director of Police Accountability*, § 125(3)(a)(5), <https://berkeley.municipal.codes/Charter/ArtXVIII>

Department as a whole. In particular, charges that ACDA deems *legally insufficient* (possibly indicating inadequate police work) should be distinguished from charges dropped for other reasons such as the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The consultation of an outside source as to arrest quality would benefit the Board's understanding of BPD arrest activity.

5. A separate (albeit coarse) measure of an arrest's quality is whether it has given rise to a citizen complaint to the Board, the Police Department, or the courts.

This Board should seek from BPD all complaints (indexed with the BPD Case Number) in the past 5 years to determine whether any were connected to the Bike Unit, and how they compared to complaints about the rest of BPD.

Any inquiry by this Board into legal actions resulting from BPD arrests would likely compete with Berkeley Copwatch's recruitment of class-action plaintiffs to sue the City of Berkeley,⁴³ so I am less optimistic about that effort.

6. There has been much recent discussion of an early intervention system (EIS) to "inform goals and strategies and improve [BPD] accountability and transparency."⁴⁴ **This Board should consider in its investigation the**

informational requirements of an EIS capable of (correctly) detecting an alleged arrest quota, including in the case of the energetic Ofcr. Michalczyk.

Would information outside the Police Department be required to correctly identify an undesirable (indeed, illegal) practice such as an arrest quota? If so, what? This consideration may help set realistic expectations for the performance of the EIS ultimately adopted (now in the acquisition process).

7. The quantitative analysis presented here has compared the Bike Unit (and its individual officers) to the rest of BPD to determine whether the Bike Unit exhibited problematic behavior due to the alleged arrest quota on its operations. Such problematic behavior has not been found. This analysis has *not* established that the rest-of-BPD comparator is free from problematic behavior, contrary to

⁴³ Berkeley Copwatch, *BPD Textgate Scandal*, supra n. 20, "We are now in a process of gathering information and looking for plaintiffs for a class-action lawsuit" (accessed August 9, 2023)

⁴⁴ Councilmember Harrison and Vice Mayor Bartlett, *Referral \$100,000 to the June 2023 Budget Process to Design a Comprehensive Berkeley Police Early Intervention and Risk Management System*, April 11, 2023, <https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2023-04-11%20Item%2025%20Referral%20100%2C000%20to%20the%20June%2C%202023.pdf>

the assertions of one City official.⁴⁵ Indeed, these assertions were rejected by deputy city manager LaTanya Bellow: “We regret that the investigation’s findings were characterized too broadly in the press.”⁴⁶ I quite agree.

The analysis here *has* established that Black persons in Berkeley are arrested by both the Bike Unit and the rest of BPD at a rate more than six times their proportion of the City’s residential population. Table 6 compares the racial proportions of Table 5 to the proportions from the 2020 Census.⁴⁷

Table 6. Berkeley Population vs. Arrestee Race Proportions, DTF/Bike Unit & BPD

Race	2020 Census	DTF/ Bike Unit	Rest of BPD
Black	7.6%	47%	50%
White	50.2%	40%	28%
Asian	19.9%	2%	3%
Hispanic	13.7%	9%	14%
Other	8.6%	3%	5%
Total	100%	100%	100%

This disparity likely traces to the community factors and policing factors touched on by the Center for Policing Equity.⁴⁸ In any event the true measure of fair and impartial policing would be whether the *threshold of arrest* across the racial categories is equal. Assessing such a threshold turns out to be a remarkably difficult technical problem.⁴⁹ Arrest data such as in Tables 5 and 6 do not suffice to establish that proposition, so sliding from (mathematical) racial *disparity* to (behavioral) racial *bias* would be unjustified at this stage.

⁴⁵ Emilie Raguso, “No arrest quotas, no racial bias: Berkeley police bike team cleared of claims by fired cop,” The Berkeley Scanner, July 20, 2023, <https://www.berkeleyscanner.com/2023/07/20/policing/berkeley-police-bike-team-cleared-systemic-problems/>. (“The investigation found that the department does not have a practice of racial bias,” said city spokesman Matthai Chakko. “The investigation found that the department does not have any arrest quotas.”)

⁴⁶ LaTanya Bellow remarks, City Council regular meeting, July 25, 2023, 2:12:01-2:13:24, http://berkeley.granicus.com/player/clip/5093?view_id=5&redirect=true&entrytime=7921&stoptime=8024&autostart=0&embed=1&redirect=true&h=40d32dbeb55e5e9296a17e679bea5bb0

⁴⁷ Wikipedia, *Berkeley, California – Demographics – 2020 Census*, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berkeley,_California#2020_census

⁴⁸ Center for Policing Equity, *supra* n. 33

⁴⁹ Camelia Simoiu, Sam Corbett-Davies, and Sharad Goel, “The Problem of Infra-Marginality in Outcome Tests for Discrimination,” 11 *The Annals of Applied Statistics* 3: 1193-1216, September 2017, <https://5harad.com/papers/threshold-test.pdf>

A police officer's task is to arrest the arrest-worthy, not some arbitrary percentage of the population. For the arrestee population to match the residential population along some dimension would require (incongruously enough) a sort of quota. **This Board should remain aware of the range of factors that lead to arrest outcomes** as displayed in Tables 5 and 6. At this stage those outcomes neither indict nor exonerate the Police Department as to racial discrimination.

Conclusions

1. I do not find quantitative evidence of an arrest quota despite the attention of the Bike Unit supervisor to the count of arrests.
2. I do find that one particular Bike Unit officer has made an unusually large number of arrests during the past five years.
3. The mix of Bike Unit arrest types is broadly consistent with the community policing orientation of the Bike Unit.
4. The mix of statutory violations charged is more heavily weighted toward drug offenses and probation violations than the overall BPD, possibly a consequence of the types of offenders found in the Bike Unit's territory.
5. The racial disparity in Bike Unit arrests is more heavily weighted toward white arrestees than arrests by the rest of the Police Department, but still exhibits the same disparity of arrests of Black persons that has long characterized police activity in Berkeley.

I recommend that the Police Accountability Board continue its investigation to understand more completely the alleged arrest quota scheme and whether individual officer behavior suffices to explain observed arrest patterns. I also recommend that other elements beyond the alleged arrest quota – notably, racist and malicious communications during City work time – be fully investigated.

Exhibit 1 – California Vehicle Code §§ 41600-41603 Arrest Quotas

Exhibit 2 – Commendation for Officers Michalczyk and Stern, April 21, 2021

Exhibit 3 – August Vollmer, "The Policeman as a Social Worker," April 1919

Exhibit 4 – *The Berkeley Gazette*, "Measure to outlaw CHP's ticket quotas," July 22, 1975

Exhibit 5 – Shaun Ossei-Owusu, "Police Quotas," *New York University Law Review*, May 2021

EXHIBIT 1



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VEHICLE CODE - VEH

DIVISION 17. OFFENSES AND PROSECUTION [40000.1 - 41610] (*Division 17 enacted by Stats. 1959, Ch. 3.*)

CHAPTER 7. Arrest Quotas [41600 - 41603] (*Chapter 7 added by Stats. 1976, Ch. 1111.*)

41600. For purposes of this chapter, "arrest quota" means any requirement regarding the number of arrests made, or the number of citations issued, by a peace officer, or parking enforcement employee, or the proportion of those arrests made and citations issued by a peace officer or parking enforcement employee, relative to the arrests made and citations issued by another peace officer or parking enforcement employee, or group of officers or employees.

(Amended by Stats. 2002, Ch. 105, Sec. 1. Effective January 1, 2003.)

41601. For purposes of this chapter, "citation" means a notice to appear, notice of violation, or notice of parking violation.

(Added by Stats. 1976, Ch. 1111.)

41601.5. For purposes of this chapter, "agency" includes the Regents of the University of California.

(Added by Stats. 2002, Ch. 105, Sec. 2. Effective January 1, 2003.)

41602. No state or local agency employing peace officers or parking enforcement employees engaged in the enforcement of this code or any local ordinance adopted pursuant to this code, may establish any policy requiring any peace officer or parking enforcement employees to meet an arrest quota.

(Amended by Stats. 2002, Ch. 105, Sec. 3. Effective January 1, 2003.)

41603. No state or local agency employing peace officers or parking enforcement employees engaged in the enforcement of this code shall use the number of arrests or citations issued by a peace officer or parking enforcement employees as the sole criterion for promotion, demotion, dismissal, or the earning of any benefit provided by the agency. Those arrests or citations, and their ultimate dispositions, may only be considered in evaluating the overall performance of a peace officer or parking enforcement employees. An evaluation may include, but shall not be limited to, criteria such as attendance, punctuality, work safety, complaints by civilians, commendations, demeanor, formal training, and professional judgment.

(Amended by Stats. 2016, Ch. 99, Sec. 7. (AB 1953) Effective January 1, 2017.)

EXHIBIT 2



BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT MEMORANDUM



April 21st, 2021

To: Chief Louis
Via Chain of Command

From: Sergeant Bonaventure S-10

Re: Commendation for Officers Michalczyk and Stern

On 4/10/21, approximately 1030 hours, Bike Force Officers Greg Michalczyk and Thomas Stern were proactively patrolling the downtown area when dispatch broadcast a bank robbery in progress at Bank of America, located at [redacted]. Within 1 minute of the broadcast, Officers Michalczyk and Stern arrived on scene and exited their vehicle. As they were approaching the bank, Officers Michalczyk and Stern observed a male, later identified as [redacted], walking in a rapid pace away from the bank. As [redacted] was walking away he peered over his shoulder, looked directly at Officers Stern and Michalczyk, and began to run away. Both Officers chased after [redacted] as he ran across the street and into a Wells Fargo Bank.

In an effort to detain [redacted] before he could victimize anyone else inside Wells Fargo Bank, Officers Stern and Michalczyk drew their firearms and entered through the front doors.

As Officers Stern and Michalczyk entered the bank, they saw [redacted] leaning against a table with his right hand concealed behind his back. They immediately gave [redacted] commands to show his hands, however, he did not immediately comply. After several commands, [redacted] exposed his right hand which was holding a significant amount of U.S. currency. [redacted] then began to walk away from the Officers and towards a glass door that connected the bank to another business. Both Officers Michalczyk and Stern ran towards [redacted], grabbed him before he could escape, and placed him in handcuffs.

A search of [redacted] revealed he was in possession of a large knife and the U.S. Currency that he stole from the bank.

A records check revealed that [redacted] was on parole for prior bank robberies.

Officers Michalczyk and Stern deserve to be commended for their proactive policing and their courageous effort to detain a dangerous parolee who had just robbed a bank, and ran into another bank to elude capture. If it was not for their quick response, [redacted] would have gotten away with bank robbery that day. If it was not for their courage, [redacted] would have had the time to victimize more Berkeley Citizens within the second bank.

EXHIBIT 3

International Association
... of ...
CHIEFS of POLICE



Proceedings 26th Convention

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA
April 14, 15 and 16, 1919

President Long: We shall next hear a paper prepared by Chief Vollmer, of Berkeley, California. (Applause).

Chief Vollmer: Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: I always esteem it a privilege to prepare a paper. When the President calls upon me to prepare a paper, I am pretty well flattered. I think it is a wonderful thing to get an opportunity to present your views, even if they may be wrong. It gives the other fellow an opportunity to tell you that you are wrong, and you may get a good idea.

The subject of my paper is: "The policeman as a social worker." Crime prevention, that all-important police function, is compelling the attention of some of the world's greatest thinkers, and though

the appreciation of criminology as a science is still in its infancy, and the surface has been merely scratched, sufficient light has been thrown on the subject to prove that old methods of dealing with crime must be changed, and newer ones adopted. The time to begin is past but the time to keep going what has been started is now.

Ordinarily, the policeman feels that his duty is well done when the offender is promptly apprehended and placed behind the bars. His failure to note that the prisoner may be the sole support of a large family, who, left to shift for themselves, must steal or starve, is only one of numerous mistakes that our peace guardians are making, in their efforts to serve the public faithfully.

Big, healthy, honest, and kind, ready to die without hesitancy when duty calls them, their usefulness is impaired by reason of their ignorance of the many causes of delinquency. Even though the experienced policeman knows that poverty, unemployment, defective home conditions, bad companions, sickness, alcohol, gambling and prostitution are crime factors, he does not feel that it is any part of his duty to assist in the correction or elimination of these great contributors to criminality.

Co-operation with social service agencies is out of the question; they can do nothing to help him, nor has he the time nor the inclination to assist them. Policemen do aid the injured, give the needy lodger a cot to sleep on, search for missing persons, and render other services not necessarily police duties, but here ends their activities as humanitarians.

However, the pendulum is beginning to swing the other way, and the policeman is beginning to realize his power as a social worker, and the future is fraught with wonderful possibilities, if all will realize their potential worth.

The policeman is learning that dependency, criminality and industrial unrest have a common origin, and that upon him rest far more important and far greater obligations than the mere apprehending and prosecuting of lawbreakers. He is fast learning that dealing with criminals after the evil habits have been formed is a hopeless task as far as the eradication, or even lessening of crime is concerned.

If he would serve his community by reducing crime he must go up the stream a little further and dam it up at its source, and not wait until it is a rushing torrent, uncontrollable and resistless. Moreover, if he would succeed in his efforts he must utilize to the fullest extent every helpful agency in the community, such as schools, churches, recreation and juvenile departments, public welfare and employment bureaus, clinics, dispensaries, hospitals and fraternal and labor organizations. Co-operation is also necessary with character forming organizations, such as Boy Scouts, Campfire Girls, well organized boys' clubs, community social centers and auxiliary and junior police forces.

Nor must the modern police overlook the importance of publicity in social police work, since after all is said and done, unless the public is informed his efforts to bring about a better state of affairs will not be fruitful of results. This most desirable publicity of police social work should be spread by the citizens of the community and by proper newspaper propaganda.

And the work which Major Pullman has just referred to is one of the things that we should keep going, and keep going fast.

Much desirable publicity can also be spread by means of special educational circularization, and not by any means the least important, an occasional instructive as well as interesting moving picture of such police work should be presented.

Such moving pictures as have been spoken of by Major Pullman just

now, and others, think, specially prepared by the Los Angeles Police Department, showing the things that actually confronts the policeman, showing the difficulties and the temptations that beset him, showing after all that the policeman is not such a bad fellow.

You will ask what can the policeman do, and how shall he proceed to get the best results. My answer is,—fight for everything which helps to decrease crime and dependency, and in this connection a few suggestions are offered for social service work in the community and state. And let me add that these are merely a few suggestions. There are many, many possibilities.

In many cities the schools are unable to accommodate all of the school children. This results in many of them being on the streets, with the attendant evils. The policeman can do his share to correct this condition by stating the facts to the voters whenever an opportunity is afforded.

It is also true that no city in this country gives sufficient thought to the physical welfare of the children. Supervised recreation grounds are few in number, and we know from experience that much of our juvenile problem may be traced to misdirected energy. Here again, the policeman in his rounds, and in contact with people generally, can be useful by calling attention to the community's need for sufficient play ground space for children to give expression to their play tendencies.

The school and the church as community social centers have passed the experimental stage in several cities. As agencies for the Americanization of the community's foreign element the school and the church community social centers rank first. Social centers will displace the saloons, the dance halls and gambling dens and will serve to dispel or prevent other social factors of evil tendencies. Social center activities should be encouraged in every way.

The child study departments in our schools are of great importance in detecting the child of unusual abilities or disabilities, thus making it possible to give timely physical, mental and moral direction to the potentially dependent or delinquent child as well as to give wholesome encouragement and special direction to the child of more than average ability. The data which the child study department is able to furnish will be of immense value to the teachers in our schools in training our children toward better citizenship.

Free clinics and dispensaries are invaluable in the community, but frequently are handicapped by lack of funds. Statistics are not wanting of cases of delinquency directly attributable to physical abnormalities, such as defective vision, defective hearing, defective teeth, adenoids, and numerous other pathological conditions. Poor people may be unable to employ the services of a family physician to correct these defects, and if there are no well conducted clinics to which the child can be taken for diagnosis and treatment, there is always the possibility that the police may have to deal with the child as a delinquency problem.

Public welfare bureaus, like the clinics and dispensaries, actually have to fight for existence in this civilized country. Their efforts are often viewed with suspicion, due to the lack of knowledge of social service work. Often the public does not understand that the rehabilitation of the family by scientific social service is more beneficial than sporadic donations of money, food, fuel, clothing and shelter. The public welfare bureau performs excellent crime preventive work, and should have the support of every police official. Where is there a police department that has not dealt with the man or woman who in desperation has stolen to keep the family from starving, and further,

that has not dealt with the product of the other family which starved rather than steal?

Considering at this time only the unemployed, and not the unemployable (the latter being institutional problems), the police should not only advocate the establishment of municipal, state and federal employment bureaus, but in addition thereto, should cooperate with such bureaus to the fullest extent in finding positions for the deserving and capable. Friendly relations must be established with labor unions as their assistance is occasionally required in these cases.

Furthering the cause of laws to provide funds for orphans, industrial compensation for the injured, prevention of child labor, eight hour labor laws, probation laws, prohibition, venereal disease control and other legislative acts having for their purpose the prevention of feeble-mindedness, insanity, criminality, prostitution, dependency, and the protection of the family, is the bounden duty of every member of the police force.

From investigations conducted by Healy, Bowers, Glueck, Stearns, Ball, Hoag and others, we are safe in assuming that at least one-half of our criminals and prostitutes are persons suffering from mental peculiarities or abnormalities. This immediately suggests the need for psychopathic clinics in juvenile detention homes, police departments and state prisons in order that we may reclaim those who may be helped and permanently confine the defective or insane criminal, who will always be a menace to society if permitted to roam at large. The psychopathic clinics should be identified with a state psychopathic hospital which will not only serve as a clearing house for their activities, but will also care for the incipient mental and nervous cases. The policeman can render no greater service to the community than to participate in the movement to establish psychopathic clinics and hospitals in his city and state.

I may say, just at this moment, before going further, that the Boston psychopathic hospital had sent to them, year before last, over 1500 suspected cases of venereal disease, and out of that group, just one fourth of them were found to be suffering from syphilitic infection, and this institution sent out their workers and brought in to the institution the other members of the families, and in that one-fourth of those persons who were found suffering, one-third of the persons who were brought in—coming willingly in most cases—were actually found to be infected, and not known to be infected. Now, we know that 25 per cent of all of our insane are syphilitic. You will find the figures are absolute in every institution throughout the country.

Every humane and intelligent official recommends and should work for, the establishing of industrial farms for prostitutes, drunkards, drug addicts, and criminals, and more modern institutions and a more sane treatment for the insane or defective criminal.

Any one who has given thought to the conditions in the average city prison and county jail must know that they are schools for crime, and few men profit morally by their confinement in these institutions. Some better method of dealing with minor offenders should be devised. Who, assuming that the official has the proper training, is better qualified to solve this problem than the policeman?

We have discussed briefly what can be done by the policeman in the city and state, let us next consider the neighborhood, or, in language more familiar to the police, the beat. No single individual in the community has more opportunities to do good, solid, constructive social service than the intelligent, sympathetic and trained policeman. His intimate knowledge of the character of the people residing on his beat makes it possible for him to acquaint immigrants liv-

ing therein with the laws of this country, protect them from petty political and business grafters, as well as from other unscrupulous persons, and help them to become decent, law-abiding citizens.

By close co-operation with schools and public welfare agencies, he will soon learn who the potential delinquents and dependents are, and can do much to assist in preventing them from becoming social failures. Boy gangs may be transformed into juvenile police and taught to be friendly helpers, or they may be helped to join boy scouts or similar boys' organizations, and through these agencies become helpful members of the community.

Wayward girls may be saved from taking the final plunge into a life of evil, and many homes saved from disgrace and sadness, by the kindly counsel of the policeman. Sick and poor may be directed to the established places for their relief. These cases should be carefully followed up and nothing left undone which would be of assistance in their rehabilitation.

Police efficiency should be measured by the amount of crime, poverty and sickness which is prevented on the beat, and not by the number of arrests made by the officer. (Applause.)

In his daily contact with cases of delinquency the policeman has unlimited opportunities to demonstrate his ability as a social worker and public benefactor. The few cases cited below illustrate what may be done if policemen are properly trained.

Now, let me say to you that the men who took care of these cases, the men who followed up the cases that I am going to mention, are the old-time policemen that you and everybody here knows, men who have been trained; but they were the old-type, the old fellow who believed that the way to suppress crime was to knock them down and bring them in.

Annie,—aged 14, stole five dollars from the purse of a fellow employée who reported the theft to the police. The officer detailed discovered that Annie had been systematically pilfering money and articles from other employées. He learned, too, that these thefts began shortly after she had been engaged by the firm. During the examination the girl gave as her reason for taking money, "I just wanted to look nice like the other girls." The officer visited the home and found that her family were living in an unclean and poorly furnished three-room house. Because the father earned but little money it was impossible to provide sufficient wholesome food for the family. The mother was tubercular, and the father an unstable and nervous fellow. Two sisters died in infancy. One sister now ten years of age was suffering from heart trouble, and one eight year old brother was physically weak. Annie's school teacher said that she was an ordinary pupil until she reached the fifth grade; at the age of thirteen she left the school, at which time she was doing poor work in the sixth grade. She was taken to the psychopathic clinic, where it was found that she was somewhat retarded mentally. It was the opinion of the medico-psychologist that adenoids and enlarged tonsils might be responsible for her defect. Accordingly the consent of the mother and child was secured and an appointment made with the specialist at the public clinic to perform the required operations. A change in environment and employment was also recommended by the medico-psychologist, and a position was obtained for Annie in a respectable family. The rest of the family are receiving medical aid at the dispensary and some financial help through a public welfare bureau.

Harry,—aged thirteen, was arrested for burglary, and turned over to his parents for attention and correction. Later this boy entered not less than twenty stores during the night hours, and took money from

the cash registers. His family history was good, no evidence of anything serious on either side. Two sisters, sixteen and eighteen, respectively, were apparently normal girls. From the family physician and parents it was learned that Harry was an ordinary boy physically. He had had measles, mumps and whooping cough when a little fellow, but had never suffered any severe ills. This child was also taken to the psychopathic clinic where it was learned that he was two years above his age. His parents accepted the suggestion made by the medico-psychologist and sent the boy to a relative in the country. It was also arranged at the same time to have him advanced two grades in his school work. From the last report received concerning this boy he is making good, absolutely, and without the advantage of the psychopathic clinic, plus intelligent handling of the case by the policeman he would have been in a reform school learning to be a real crook.

John Doe—age fifty eight years, high school teacher and inventor, was arranged on a charge of burglary. From the investigation conducted by the officers it was learned that his previous reputation for honesty in the community was excellent. Some years prior to his arrest the prisoner suffered a nervous collapse and quit teaching for two or three years. During this period he conducted a curio store in a neighboring town; there was no patronage, and he was obliged to close the doors of his place of business. He was heavily in debt and again took up teaching as a profession. His creditors crowded him for money and he eventually fell into the hands of some loan sharks. At this time he was also busily engaged in perfecting an invention which would assist in aerial navigation. Between teaching and work on his invention he was considerably overworked. From the general appearance and conduct of Doe at the time of his arrest the investigating officer came to the conclusion that he was a medical problem, despite the fact that he answered questions intelligently, and seemingly was possessed of all of his faculties. The medical examiner reported that the prisoner was a neurasthenic with morbid impulses; the result of over-work and financial worries. He was turned over to his family for care and treatment, and subsequently confined in a private sanitarium where he remained for a year or more. Through a few friends who were interested in the case, sufficient money was secured to tide the family over the difficult period immediately following his arrest. John Doe has recovered sufficiently to return to the community where he has again firmly established himself, and is regarded as one of our best citizens.

Now, I might go on and cite to you cases indefinitely. I am full of them. But it is enough to show you what may be done by the policeman.

Regardless of the policeman's efforts to contribute to social and economic betterment in the manner described above, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that crime will always be with us. Much can be done to further reduce the evil, providing we raise the educational and intellectual standard of our police departments, elevate the position of the policeman to that of a profession, eliminate politics entirely from the force, and secure the people's confidence, sympathy, respect and co-operation.

Policemen should jealously guard the reputation of their profession, and establish a code of ethics. Any and every member of the force who violates the provisions of the code should be vigorously prosecuted and expelled from the ranks. Policemen's lives must be dominated by the highest ideals if they hope to establish themselves in the affections of the people, and win for the profession such an exalted

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INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION

plane that positions on the force will be sought for by the nation's best manhood. Let us speed the day when the appointment as a policeman shall be considered the greatest honor that the municipality may bestow upon one of its citizens. (Applause.)

EXHIBIT 4



BERKELEY GAZETTE

DM
PAID ALFO, CALIF. 94303
737 Loma Verde Avenue
Berkeley, Inc.

WEATHER

Fair through tomorrow except patchy night and morning clouds along the coast. Slightly warmer with highs today and tomorrow in the 60s along the coast to low 80s inland. Lows tonight in the 50s. West to northwest winds at 10-20 m.p.h.

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No. 267

Measure to outlaw CHP's ticket quotas

The Chairman of the Assembly Judiciary Committee, Assemblyman John J. Miller (D-Berkeley-Oakland) said today the CHP "ticket slow-down" has persuaded him to introduce legislation out-lawing ticket quotas.

"For years we have been told that the highway patrol and various city and county traffic police do not have a quota of tickets to write," Miller said, "but recent statements by the CHP Commissioner which promise discipline and even dismissal of officers whose number of tickets fall below a certain number convinces me that an expected level of crimes is depended on by the CHP management. A quota by any other name — 'historical level of citation issuance' — is still a quota."

"If a CHP officer or any city or

county police officer knows that he is expected to write so many citations, he will feel under an obligation to write a ticket even in those cases where a citizen may not have committed a crime beyond all reasonable doubt," Miller said. "It is simply unrealistic to tell the average California driver that his word is as good as that of a traffic cop in court. So the driver, I believe, has 2 1/2 strikes against him: an officer who is pressured by his superiors to write citations; and a rubber stamp traffic court system which finds 90 percent of those cited guilty."

Miller said his legislation will prohibit ticket quotas in California for the same reason that speed traps were outlawed: "they are unfair, undemocratic and unjust. The spectacle of cities gaining revenue for the

conviction of citizens, and judges creating revenue by making criminals out of those brought before them for fair trials somehow goes against our historical concepts of justice and fair play," he said.

The Bay Area legislator said he believes that traffic policemen should be guardians of safety on California streets and highways. "They should catch speeders who are endangering others and be helpful to motorists who are stranded or have flat tires. But if they find more stranded motorists on a given week than speeding motorists, should they be demoted or disciplined?"

Miller said he expects his legislation to be opposed by cities and counties "who make money off ticket quotas."

EXHIBIT 5

POLICE QUOTAS

SHAUN OSSEI-OWUSU*

The American public is slowly recognizing the criminal justice system's deep defects. Mounting visual evidence of police brutality and social protests are generating an appetite for something different. How to change this system is still an open question. People across the political spectrum vary in their conceptions of the pressing problems and how to solve them. Interestingly, there is one consequential and overlooked area of the criminal justice system where there is broad consensus: police quotas.

Police quotas are formal and informal measures that require police officers to issue a particular number of citations or make a certain number of arrests. Although law enforcement leadership typically denies implementing quotas, courts, legislators, and officers have all confirmed the existence of this practice and linked it to odious criminal justice problems such as racial profiling, policing for profit, and over-criminalization. These problems have led legislators in many states to implement statutory prohibitions on quotas. Some of these statutes are of recent vintage and others are decades old. Nevertheless, these prohibitions and their attendant litigation have escaped sustained analytical scrutiny. Legal scholars typically overlook police quotas, subsume them within other categories (e.g., broken windows policing), or give pat acknowledgment of their existence without explaining how they work.

This Article corrects these omissions and makes two arguments. First, it contends that police quotas are a significant but undertheorized feature of criminal law and procedure. Quotas make police rewards and sanctions significant features of punishment in ways that can trump criminal offending and pervert due process principles. Second, it argues that quota-based policing is a unique area where there is widespread agreement and possibilities for change. Liberals, libertarians, conservatives, police officers, police unions, and racial minorities have all criticized police quotas. These vastly different constituents have argued that quotas distort police discretion and produce unnecessary police-civilian interactions. This Article supplements these arguments with a novel descriptive, statutory, and jurisprudential account of police quotas in the United States. It offers a framework for understanding the arguments for and objections to quotas, and proposes some normative strategies that could build on statutory and litigation successes.

* Copyright © 2021 by Shaun Ossei-Owusu, Presidential Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. This Article benefitted from feedback and conversations with Regina Austin, Mitch Berman, Stephanos Bibas, Nathaniel Bronstein, Guy-Uriel Charles, Cary Coglianese, Dan Epps, Kimberly Ferzan, Allison Hoffman, Paul Heaton, Leo Katz, Jonathan Klick, Eisha Jain, Elizabeth Joh, Ben Levin, Sandra Mayson, Sunita Patel, John Rappaport, Dan Richman, Paul Robinson, Stephen Rushin, Madeline Verniero, and the faculties of the Loyola University Chicago and Penn Law. Additional thanks to Madeline Verniero for excellent research and editorial support as well as the editors at the *New York University Law Review*. All errors are mine.

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INTRODUCTION

Before the Great Lockdown, criminal justice reformers across the ideological spectrum lamented “policing for profit.”¹ Commentators usually discuss this practice through the more sanitized sounding category of “legal financial obligations” (LFOs).² The economic implications of the COVID-19 pandemic have put a spotlight on this type of predatory “cash register justice.”³ As of this writing, the National League of Cities has reported that 2,100 cities anticipate budget deficits.⁴ Since hundreds of jurisdictions have relied on LFOs in the past,⁵ and some have continued to do so during the crisis,⁶ there is good cause for concern that LFOs will figure into an uncertain economic future. As Professor Brandon Garrett notes, “[a]fter the last financial crisis, most states ramped up on fines and fees,” transformed police

¹ DICK M. CARPENTER II, LISA KNEPPER, ANGELA C. ERICKSON & JENNIFER McDONALD, *INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE* (2d ed. 2015); Roger Pilon, *America’s Frightening “Policing for Profit” Nightmare*, NAT’L INT. (Jan. 23, 2015), <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-frightening-policing-profit-nightmare-12094>; Emma Andersson & Susan Dunn, *‘Policing For Profit’ Is Alive and Well in South Carolina*, ACLU (Feb. 12, 2019, 3:45 PM), <https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/reforming-police/policing-profit-alive-and-well-south-carolina>.

² These LFOs include, but are not limited to: “usage fees” levied on defendants for their arrest, adjudication, incarceration, probation, and electronic monitoring; statutory fines that impose economic sanctions as punishments for crimes; and civil forfeiture laws that allow governments to confiscate money and property that are purportedly linked to crime.

³ See Laura I. Appleman, *Nickel and Dimed into Incarceration: Cash Register Justice in the Criminal System*, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1483 (2016) (discussing the turning of the criminal justice system into a revenue center for state courts and corrections); see also *Developments in the Law—Policing and Profit*, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1723–46 (2015) (discussing usage fees, for-profit probation supervision and civil forfeiture); Bernadette Atuahene, *Predatory Cities*, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 107, 175–78 (2020) (discussing predatory fees various U.S. cities impose on residents through excessive fines, property forfeiture, and debtors’ prisons); Beth A. Colgan, *Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause*, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 285–88 (2014) (describing various economic sanctions, including statutory fines, restitution, forfeitures, administrative court costs, incarceration costs, parole processing, and probation fees).

⁴ NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES & U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, *THE ECONOMY AND CITIES: WHAT AMERICA’S LOCAL LEADERS ARE SEEING* (2020), <https://www.usmayors.org/2020/04/14/the-economy-and-cities-what-americas-leaders-are-seeing>.

⁵ See Mike Maciag, *Addicted to Fines*, GOVERNING (Sept. 2019), <https://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-addicted-to-fines.html> (finding through an extensive national analysis that fines fund “more than 10 percent of general fund revenues in nearly 600 U.S. jurisdictions”).

⁶ Brandon L. Garrett, *Guest Post: Court Fines and Fees Shouldn’t Be Used to Recover Lost Revenue from Pandemic*, WASH. POST (May 12, 2020, 7:00 AM), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/crime-law/2020/05/12/guest-post-court-fines-fees-shouldnt-be-used-recover-lost-revenue-pandemic/> (“[S]ome jurisdictions are still jailing people for unpaid debt, potentially exposing them to the novel coronavirus, which is exploding in our jails.”).

officers into “revenue collectors,” and relied on “our poorest citizens to fund basic functions of government.”⁷

Amidst the epidemiological crisis, the summer 2020 protests inspired a new, popular reexamination of policing. Rooted primarily in anger around anti-Black police violence, the protests productively altered public opinion and amplified longstanding issues tied to the political economy of policing.⁸ Concerns about cities using the police to generate municipal funds—which garnered attention after the Ferguson unrest six years ago⁹—remain on the reform agenda. But now there is closer scrutiny on the core functions of the police. Popular opinion still hews to the belief that law enforcement serves a public safety function,¹⁰ but visual evidence of racialized police killings is applying pressure to that assumption. These instances of state violence have forced the general public to grapple with the racially and financially exploitative nature of the criminal justice system. Lurking beneath these concerns is a practice that has eluded legal scholars despite its reported prominence in criminal justice administration: police quotas.

Police quotas are formal and informal measures that require police officers to issue a particular number of citations or make a certain number of arrests. They are sometimes formal and pre-specify a quantity.¹¹ Other times, they are informal and premised on an implied understanding that employment actions—promotion, compensation, or discipline—will be predicated on an officer’s ability to engage in a “sufficient” amount of enforcement activity.¹² Evaluative jargon such

⁷ *Id.*

⁸ See Nate Cohn & Kevin Quealy, *How Public Opinion Has Moved on Black Lives Matter*, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2020), <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/10/upshot/black-lives-matter-attitudes.html> (noting leftward public opinion shift in support of race and criminal justice issues).

⁹ See Editorial, *Policing for Profit Perverts Justice: Our View*, USA TODAY (Mar. 11, 2015, 7:01 PM), <https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/03/11/ferguson-mo-police-traffic-tickets-justice-department-editorials-debates/70175690> (bringing attention to “policing for profit” after Ferguson protests).

¹⁰ See Kendall Karson, *64% of Americans Oppose ‘Defund the Police’ Movement, Key Goals: Poll*, ABC NEWS (June 12, 2020, 5:30 AM), <https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/64-americans-oppose-defund-police-movement-key-goals/story?id=71202300> (describing how Americans oppose calls for defunding the police).

¹¹ See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 304.125 (West, Westlaw through 2020 2d Reg. Sess.) (“No political subdivision or law enforcement agency shall have a policy requiring or encouraging an employee to issue a certain number of citations for traffic violations on a daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, yearly, or other quota basis.”).

¹² See, e.g., TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 720.002(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through end of 2019 Reg. Sess.) (“A political subdivision or an agency of this state may not establish or maintain, formally or informally, a plan to evaluate, promote, compensate, or discipline a peace officer according to the officer’s issuance of a predetermined or specified number of any type or combination of types of traffic citations.”).

as “benchmarks,”¹³ “productivity goals,”¹⁴ and a host of other terms often obscure the operation of what are sheer police quotas.¹⁵

Quotas may seem like an inapt object of inquiry considering current calls for radical change as opposed to incremental reforms. But, as this Article shows, quotas animate important criminal justice issues, chiefly racial profiling, civil rights violations, and police corruption. In *Floyd v. City of New York*, the federal decision that struck down the New York Police Department’s racially discriminatory stop-and-frisk policy, quotas were prominent themes.¹⁶ The Department of Justice’s report on Ferguson, which made the country aware of policing for profit, highlighted quota abolition in its Recommendation section.¹⁷ Interestingly, more than twenty states have statutory prohibitions on police quotas.¹⁸ Criminal defendants, civil rights plaintiffs, aggrieved police officers, and police unions have deployed these statutes in state and federal courts to challenge quotas and extract concessions from municipalities.¹⁹ Nevertheless, police quotas, like criminal enforcement mechanisms more generally,²⁰ have not received meaningful consideration by legal academics.²¹ Instead, scholars typically engage quotas via the related but analytically distinct practice of broken windows policing or anecdotal accounts.²² This lack of sustained attention

¹³ SERDAR KENAN GUL & PAUL E. O’CONNELL, POLICE PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 71 (2013) (acknowledging the existence of quotas and noting how some police departments use “benchmark targets for summonses and arrests”).

¹⁴ POLICE REFORM ORG. PROJECT, WORKING TOWARDS A MORE SAFE AND FAIR CITY: ABOLISHING QUOTAS AND INVOLVING COMMUNITIES 2 (2014), https://www.policereformorganizingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Working_Towards_a_More_Safe_and_Fair_City.pdf (“[P]roductivity goals”[sic] are a euphemism for a ‘quota system.’”).

¹⁵ See *infra* notes 32–36.

¹⁶ 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 596–602 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

¹⁷ U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., C.R. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 91 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [hereinafter Ferguson Report].

¹⁸ See *infra* Appendix A.

¹⁹ See *infra* Part II.

²⁰ Alice Ristroph, *The Thin Blue Line from Crime to Punishment*, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 305 (2018) (describing how substantive criminal law scholarship rarely addresses issues of police conduct).

²¹ Some noteworthy exceptions that have given some attention to quotas include Nathaniel Bronstein, Note, *Police Management and Quotas: Governance in the CompStat Era*, 48 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 543 (2015) and Mary De Ming Fan, *Disciplining Criminal Justice: The Peril Amid the Promise of Numbers*, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2007).

²² On broken windows policing, see generally ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2018) (investigating the consequences of broken windows policing in New York City). For anecdotal accounts, see COREY PEGUES, ONCE A COP: THE STREET,

persists despite scores of case law,²³ empirical evidence,²⁴ references in government reports,²⁵ and annual settlements,²⁶ that all point to the existence of police quotas across the country.

THE LAW, TWO WORLDS, ONE MAN 146 (2016) (former NYPD officer describing the existence of quotas in the department); NORM STAMPER, TO PROTECT AND SERVE: HOW TO FIX AMERICA'S POLICE 1–4 (2016) (former San Diego officer describing the existence of quotas in his department); John Marzulli, *We Fabricated Drug Charges Against Innocent People to Meet Arrest Quotas, Former Detective Testifies*, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 13, 2011), <https://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/fabricated-drug-charges-innocent-people-meet-arrest-quotas-detective-testifies-article-1.963021> (officer admitting that the NYPD framed people to meet quota requirements).

²³ See, e.g., *Becker-Ross v. State*, 595 S.W.3d 261, 265, 269, 272 (Tex. App. 2020) (finding that there was sufficient evidence to show that the city administrator pressured the city marshal to write a certain number of traffic tickets within a specified period in violation of state prohibition on quotas); *Policemen's Benevolent Labor Comm. v. City of Sparta*, No. 5-19-0039, 2019 WL 5457948, at *1, *7 (Ill. App. Ct. Oct. 22, 2019) (concluding that a police department's practice of evaluating citations, traffic stop warnings, and extra-duty assignments violated state law prohibiting the implementation of quotas); *Gerwer v. Kelly*, 980 N.Y.S.2d 275, 275 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (ruling against an officer who falsified thirty-seven fictitious summonses in order to meet an alleged quota requirement); *People v. Schwartz*, No. 282028, 2009 WL 30457, at *1, (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2009) (noting that the defendant officer's issuing of four undated speeding tickets to meet a quota would secure entitlement to overtime).

²⁴ See JOHN McLAUGHLIN, McLAUGHLIN & ASSOC.'S, *NEW YORK PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP STUDY* 53 (2016), <https://www.nycpba.org/media/19346/160315-pbasurvey.pdf> (surveying approximately 6,000 members of New York City's police union which found that 89% of respondents believed that NYPD supervisors imposed quotas); Jonathan Auerbach, *Are New York City Drivers More Likely to Get a Ticket at the End of the Month?*, SIGNIFICANCE MAG., Aug. 2017, at 25 (using significance testing to conclude that New York City drivers are more likely to receive a ticket at the end of the month, substantiating a long-held belief about the use of quotas); Scott W. Phillips, *Police Discretion and Boredom: What Officers Do When There Is Nothing to Do*, 45 J. CONTEMP. ETHNOG. 580, 589 (2016) (qualitative study of a police department finding that officers noted that there was no formal quota but that they were expected write about ten tickets a month).

²⁵ See Ferguson Report, *supra* note 17, at 11; U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., C.R. DIV. & U.S. ATT'Y.'S OFF., DIST. OF N.J., *INVESTIGATION OF THE NEWARK POLICE DEPARTMENT* 21 (2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/07/22/newark_findings_7-22-14.pdf.

²⁶ See Mike Sprague, *Whittier to Pay \$3 Million to Settle Police Ticket Quota Case*, WHITTIER DAILY NEWS (Jan. 16, 2020, 2:11 PM), <https://www.whittierdailynews.com/2020/01/15/whittier-to-pay-3-million-to-settle-police-ticket-quota-case>; Matt Sledge, *Gretna Police Agree to \$70K Settlement in Ex-Cop's Lawsuit Claiming Arrest Quotas*, NEW ORLEANS ADVOC., (June 3, 2019, 11:12 AM), https://www.nola.com/news/courts/article_b1990837-e425-5c46-a3d8-4817a8b81367.html; Joshua Sharpe, *DeKalb Still Denies Police 'Quota' System After Settling Suit for \$150K*, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Sept. 27, 2018), <https://www.ajc.com/news/crime-law/dekalb-still-denies-police-quota-system-after-settling-suit-for-150k/IuFHQg3pT4lnsVyPETZxkM>; Peggy Wright, *Mendham Twp. Cop's 'Ticket Quota' Lawsuit Settles for \$650K*, MORRISTOWN DAILY REC. (Dec. 5, 2017, 8:37 AM), <https://www.dailyrecord.com/story/news/2017/12/04/mendham-twp-cops-ticket-quota-lawsuit-settles-650-k/918964001>; Hailey Branson-Potts & Emily Alpert Reyes, *City Will Pay LAPD Officer Nearly \$1 Million to End Lawsuit over Ticket Quotas*, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2016, 11:05 PM), [59 | Page 184](https://www.latimes.com/local/cityhall/la-me-0114-lapd-</p>
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This Article makes two straightforward arguments. First, it contends that police quotas shape the enforcement of criminal laws by introducing a host of perverse incentives into an already insecure body of criminal procedure. This leads to the Article's second claim. I argue that quota-based policing is a discrete area where there is widespread agreement about the problems with quota-based policing and possibilities for change. Police unions, often considered the source of our penal status quo, have argued that such requirements distort discretion and generate unnecessary police-civilian contact.²⁷ Liberal, conservative, and libertarian reformers have all lodged similar arguments and emphasized the ways quotas lead to violations of civil liberties.²⁸

The broad condemnation of quota-based policing makes this issue a particularly ripe place for reform, and an area that should be scrutinized by legal scholars and advocates. This Article inaugurates the conversation. It builds on the fragments of existing scholarship to offer a robust framework for understanding police quotas. It offers a novel descriptive and statutory account of police quotas and is the first piece of scholarship to describe the jurisprudential landscape of this practice.

Eliminating police quotas would be no panacea. However, it is an underappreciated area that has synergies with a larger constellation of penal change strategies. For abolitionists, addressing quotas could be an interim step toward a world with a smaller police imprint.²⁹ If advocates achieve the goal of defunding the police, addressing quotas will become especially central, as smaller police forces may increas-

settlement-20160114-story.html; J. David Goodman, *Officer Who Disclosed Police Misconduct Settles Suit*, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2015), <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/30/nyregion/officer-who-disclosed-police-misconduct-settles-suit.html> (\$600,000); Dave Phillips, *Former Novi Officer Gets \$280,000 in Ticket Quota Lawsuit Settlement*, OAKLAND PRESS (Apr. 17, 2014), https://www.theoaklandpress.com/news/nation-world-news/former-novi-officer-gets-280-000-in-ticket-quota-lawsuit-settlement/article_35e4db17-f817-5965-98c9-cef2484f562b.html; Joel Rubin & Catherine Saillant, *L.A. Approves \$6-Million Settlement over Alleged Traffic Ticket Quotas*, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2013, 12:00 AM), <https://www.latimes.com/local/la-xpm-2013-dec-10-la-me-tickets-20131204-story.html>.

²⁷ See *infra* Section III.C.1.

²⁸ See *infra* Section III.C.3.

²⁹ See Dorothy E. Roberts, *The Supreme Court, 2018 Term - Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism*, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11, 114–18 (2019) (arguing that abolition movement activists can utilize the Reconstruction Amendments and “non-reformist reforms” to temporarily further their aims and ultimately build a society without prisons); Anna A. Akbar, *Toward a Radical Imagination of Law*, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 460 (2018) (describing how the abolitionist approach focuses on reducing the greater social and fiscal footprint of police on society as opposed to efforts to improve the police and criminal law).

ingly rely on quotas and technology to do more with less personnel.³⁰ This is precisely what has occurred in Camden, New Jersey, a city that is considered a model for police reform.³¹ For law enforcement officials who oppose quotas and a general public who believe the police have a role in our social order, attention to quotas could lead to more rigorous conversations about the function of police.

This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I sketches the different ways police quotas take shape organizationally. It then offers a brief legislative history and analysis of anti-quota statutes.

Part II moves to the caselaw and describes how police officers, criminal defendants, and civil rights plaintiffs have challenged police quotas. This Part shows how doctrinal and evidentiary hurdles have hampered claims, but also details how some parties have succeeded in court or extracted settlements from municipalities.

Part III captures the definitional contours of quotas. First, I discuss the defensibility of this practice. Though often unarticulated, police quotas give law enforcement leadership a way to monitor, measure, and evaluate police activity while guarding against legitimate concerns about officers shirking their duties. Such evaluations are akin to the kinds of assessments that are standard in many workplaces. This Part offers responses to these defenses. It also describes additional problems that police quotas pose for three groups: police officers forced to comply with these requirements; marginalized communities that are often the subjects of quota-satisfying officers; and a general public that can be deprived of efficiently used resources because of quotas.

Part IV takes a normative turn. This Part offers suggestions for how to raise public awareness of quota-based policing and generate coalition-building in states that do not already have quota prohibitions. This Part also provides suggestions on how to improve existing statutes.

The Conclusion offers thoughts on the urgency of this topic, and the Appendices offer a comprehensive list of quota bills and statutes.

³⁰ Stephen Rushin & Roger Michalski, *Police Funding*, 72 FLA. L. REV. 277, 285 (2020) (suggesting that defunding police could lead to excessive ticketing and civil asset forfeiture); see Ingrid Burrington, *What Amazon Taught the Cops*, NATION (May 27, 2015), <https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/what-amazon-taught-cops> (discussing how algorithmic criminal justice assumes the credibility of the underlying crime data and noting how “countless scandals over quotas” in policing suggest that this is a huge assumption).

³¹ See Sidney Fussell, *What Disbanding the Police Really Meant in Camden, New Jersey*, WIRED (July 1, 2020, 3:03 PM), <https://www.wired.com/story/disbanding-police-really-meant-camden> (describing the increase in electronic surveillance after the city overhauled its police department); see *infra* notes 177–83 and accompanying text.

I

THE TEXTURE OF POLICE QUOTAS

This Part maps the terrain of police quotas. Scholars and the media often discuss the existence of quotas, but the term itself is often undefined or poorly described. Section I.A offers a robust representation of how quotas are administered. Section I.B details the statutory landscape of anti-quota laws and categorizes the twenty-one states that have enacted such legislation.

A. *The Definitional Landscape*

Quotas are formal and informal measures that require law enforcement to have a certain number of contacts with individuals or issue a certain number of citations or arrests. Because quotas have a pejorative connotation, law enforcement organizations use a range of alternative terms to accomplish the same work. These phrases—which are sometimes used earnestly and sometimes as subterfuge—include “benchmarks,”³² “productivity goals,”³³ “targets,”³⁴ “performance management,”³⁵ and “objectives.”³⁶ To get a more granular understanding of quotas, one might consider four features of this police practice: 1) the level of formality; 2) how they are quantified; 3) the law enforcement action that is required; and 4) the prospect of an adverse/favorable employment action.

1. *Formality*

Quotas range in their formality. Like any other policy, quotas can operate through formal channels (e.g., in writing or through official

³² GUL & O’CONNELL, *supra* note 13.

³³ See POLICE REFORM ORG. PROJECT, *supra* note 14; Robert Gangi, *When Police Are Encouraged to Abuse, Not Protect*, ALTERNET (Nov. 30, 2012), <https://www.alternet.org/2012/11/when-police-are-encouraged-abuse-not-protect> (“NYPD officials use the term ‘productivity goals’ as a poorly veiled euphemism for the Department’s quota system, as a thin cover for the pressure placed on street officers to make an expected number of arrests, or to issue a sufficient number of summonses.”).

³⁴ Malcolm K. Sparrow, *Measuring Performance in a Modern Police Organization*, NEW PERSPS. POLICING BULL., Mar. 2015, at 1, 18 (“[S]ome departments set targets for functional outputs, including enforcement activities such as arrests, stops, searches and traffic citations.”).

³⁵ Jen Chung, *Bloomberg Says Police Quotas Will Be Investigated*, GOTHAMIST (Nov. 9, 2010, 5:45 PM), <https://gothamist.com/news/bloomberg-says-police-quotas-will-be-investigated> (quoting Mayor Bloomberg as saying “we don’t have quotas . . . but we certainly have performance management”).

³⁶ TODD DOUGLAS, *THE POLICE IN A FREE SOCIETY: SAFEGUARDING RIGHTS WHILE ENFORCING THE LAW* 71 (2017) (noting that many police agencies “have informal quotas: *precinct averages, benchmarks, performance goals, objectives, targets*, and other euphemistic references to what is essentially a quota”).

communication) or through informal mechanisms. A useful example of a formal quota can be found in Ridgetop, Tennessee.³⁷ The city of approximately 2,000 people disbanded its police department in 2019 after officers exposed an attempt by the mayor and vice mayor to impose a quota. Officers recorded both officials demanding that the department write 210 citations to help generate revenue for the city.³⁸ Another example is from Brooklyn, New York, where a New York Police Department (NYPD) official posted memos in a police stationhouse detailing how many summonses cops were required to hand out.³⁹ One document outlined the specific number of tickets needed: sixty cell phone, fifty seatbelts, sixty-five double park, forty bus stops, and twenty-five tints.⁴⁰ Another memo began, “[g]ood day we need the following,” and proceeded to list various moving violations.⁴¹ That document required that summonses be handed out at accident-prone locations and specified five intersections.⁴²

Quotas can also be informal and based on unwritten requirements or implied understandings.⁴³ In North Brunswick, New Jersey, one veteran officer recounted how officers would receive four hours of overtime pay for every forty tickets written.⁴⁴ Though the police department had no official policy, there was an “unwritten understanding.”⁴⁵ Another law enforcement official described how officers would “go hunting” in Black and Latinx neighborhoods and compete to see who could issue the most tickets.⁴⁶ This kind of informality is especially common in states that legally prohibit police quotas, since police brass want to avoid memorializing requirements in ways that

³⁷ Zuri Davis, *A Tennessee Police Department's Last Officer Resigns over Ticket Quotas*, REASON (Nov. 6, 2019, 2:45 PM), <https://reason.com/2019/11/06/a-tennessee-police-departments-last-officer-resigns-over-ticket-quotas/printer>.

³⁸ *Id.*

³⁹ See Chung, *supra* note 35.

⁴⁰ *Id.*

⁴¹ James Fanelli, *Cops at Brooklyn's Crime-Ridden 77th Precinct Told to Meet Quotas for Moving Violations, Memos Say*, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 8, 2010), <https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/cops-brooklyn-crime-ridden-77th-precinct-told-meet-quotas-moving-violations-memos-article-1.452621>.

⁴² *Id.*

⁴³ See Rich Morin, Kim Parker, Renee Stepler & Andrew Mercer, *Inside America's Police Departments*, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 11, 2017), <https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/01/11/inside-americas-police-departments> (finding that about a third of police officers say they are expected to meet a quota for arrests and tickets).

⁴⁴ Sarah Wallace, *NJ Police Targeted Black and Latino Neighborhoods to Fulfill Ticket Quotas, Cops Say*, NBC N.Y. (Feb. 13, 2020, 8:08 PM), <https://www.nbcnewyork.com/investigations/nj-police-targeted-black-and-latino-neighborhoods-to-fulfill-ticket-quotas-cops-say>.

⁴⁵ *Id.*

⁴⁶ *Id.*

can be subject to discovery in future litigation or scrutinized by the media.

2. Numerical Requirements

Police quotas have quantitative dimensions. Sometimes they are numerically specific, as in the Brooklyn example mentioned above. Other examples are instructive. Police documents from Dekalb County, Georgia, for instance, revealed that officials kept detailed statistics on officer activities, with categories including “citation goal[s],” “total citations,” and “% to goal citations.”⁴⁷ A slogan for the police department was, “[t]wo tickets a day keep the sergeants away. Five a day keep the lieutenants at bay.”⁴⁸ In Pennsylvania, two officers lied about a DUI arrest and were caught on police dashcam video conferring about which one would get credit for the arrest because they both needed their “20 for the month.”⁴⁹ When criminal justice commentators discuss quotas, they usually focus on these numerically specific requirements.

But not all quotas are numerically precise. Sometimes the numerical dimension of a quota requirement is just a general guide and some quotas don’t specify any number at all. On the former, Denver, Colorado, is noteworthy. Colorado has no statutory prohibition on quotas. In 2016, the City, which generated \$30 million annually from parking citations, inked a \$50 million contract with a software company to manage its parking enforcement.⁵⁰ Contract documents indicated that predictive algorithms produced a “daily citation expectation” for agents.⁵¹ The City insisted that the goal was not a strict requirement but a “guide.”⁵² A legislative audit of West Virginia State Police, which identified an informal quota regime, illustrates the further vagueness of quotas that specify no number at all. The auditor’s survey included many responses from officers who indicated

⁴⁷ Rhonda Cook, *Arrest Quotas Led Dekalb Officer to Plant Drugs, Lawsuit Claims*, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Nov. 28, 2016), <https://www.ajc.com/news/local/arrest-quotas-led-dekalb-officer-plant-drugs-lawsuit-claims/5AMfRowntaQrZfQLsAhL6K>.

⁴⁸ Sharpe, *supra* note 26.

⁴⁹ Peter Hall, *Lawsuit Ends with Reminder to Pennsylvania State Troopers About Rule Against Ticket Quotas*, MORNING CALL (June 26, 2018), <https://www.mcall.com/news/police/mc-nws-pa-state-police-dui-quota-settlement-20180626-story.html>.

⁵⁰ Jeremy Jojola, *A Quota Behind Denver Parking Citations?*, 9NEWS (Feb. 27, 2017, 11:12 PM), <https://www.9news.com/article/news/local/investigations/a-quota-behind-denver-parking-citations/415777446>.

⁵¹ *Id.*

⁵² *Id.*

that no specific requirements existed, but that “numbers are strongly emphasized.”⁵³

3. Law Enforcement Activity

Quotas require a particular kind of law enforcement activity. This is typically an arrest, citation, or ticket. In rare instances, they require contacts, warnings, or stops. Arrests, citations, and tickets are at the center of police quotas and constitute much of this Article’s discussion. Allegations and settlements surrounding arrest quotas have hounded the NYPD for years.⁵⁴ Citations and tickets were at the center of the Department of Justice’s Ferguson Report.⁵⁵ Contacts or stops require more explanation.

Sometimes contacts substitute for arrests and citations. For example, in Arizona, a state without a statutory prohibition on quotas, a Tucson police chief was criticized for an overt one-ticket-a-day policy. After he changed it to a one-contact-a-day requirement,⁵⁶ Republicans led a push for an anti-quota bill. Though the Fraternal Order of Police supported the bill, Governor Doug Ducey ultimately vetoed it.⁵⁷ As a result, police in Arizona remain free to use contacts to fulfill quota requirements.

South Carolina, which does have a statutory prohibition,⁵⁸ highlights the importance of contacts in police quotas. The Santee Police Department, situated along the well-traveled Interstate 95, came under scrutiny in 2019 after a memo demanding “a heavy increase” in traffic stops surfaced.⁵⁹ Lieutenant Riley Null authored the memo,

⁵³ W. VA. LEGIS. AUDITOR, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION & RSCH. DIV., LEGISLATIVE PERFORMANCE REVIEW—WEST VIRGINIA STATE POLICE: SURVEY COMMENTS 46, 52, 54 (2008). The auditor asked: “Does the WVSP require each Trooper to issue a specified number of traffic citations or warning citations on a monthly basis?” Some of the responses included: “No specific #, but we have to show results. . . . No specific number is given, but ‘numbers’ are strongly emphasized. . . . There is no specific number but if you don’t have contacts they reprimand you. . . . No specific #, but get bad [employee performance appraisals] or verbally reprimand [sic] for not having a considerable amount of contacts.” *Id.* at 43–54.

⁵⁴ See *infra* notes 194–95.

⁵⁵ See Ferguson Report, *supra* note 17.

⁵⁶ Howard Fischer, *Arizona Bill Would Outlaw Police Traffic Ticket Quotas*, TUSCON.COM (Jan. 23, 2015), https://tucson.com/news/local/crime/arizona-bill-would-outlaw-police-traffic-ticket-quotas/article_d6bf8125-aec6-5e2e-ad0d-4ab16b181d4c.html.

⁵⁷ Ducey argued that “in its current form, I worry that police chiefs and local entities will be prevented from objectively gauging performance in their departments—a concern for officers themselves, the public and overall public safety.” Matthew Hendley, *Ducey Vetoes Ban on Police Ticket Quotas*, PHX. NEW TIMES (Apr. 2, 2015, 5:57 AM), <https://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/ducey-vetoes-ban-on-police-ticket-quotas-6661896>.

⁵⁸ See S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1-245 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Sess.).

⁵⁹ Michael Majchrowicz, *Internal Memo Suggests SC Police Department Violated Law Banning Ticket Quotas*, POST & COURIER (May 16, 2019), <https://>

sent it to patrol officers, and called for increased “contacts” with motorists.⁶⁰ Null threatened, “if activity is not increased, you will be required to have your body cameras recording during your entire shift to try and determine what activity is consuming your time.”⁶¹ Because the South Carolina statute makes an exception for points of contact,⁶² the memo is likely legal. This is why it is important to offer the definitional landscape of quotas before delving into the statutory prohibitions: many of the statutes that prohibit quotas do not cover the full range of police activity that could be considered a quota.

4. Incentives/Adverse Employment Actions

Incentives and adverse employment decisions loom in the background of police quotas. Police departments have offered overtime, barbecue, pizza, gift cards, car wash coupons, and trophies to officers who meet quotas.⁶³ Failure to meet quotas can result in adverse employment actions, including denial of days off, transfers, undesirable assignments, and, of course, termination.⁶⁴ Police leadership can communicate the threat of an adverse employment action to an officer in an attempt to make them comply with a quota. In the cash-strapped city of Gretna, Louisiana, situated across the Mississippi River from New Orleans, threats of adverse employment decisions were rampant. In a recorded conversation with a patrolman, Lieutenant J.R. Rogers

www.postandcourier.com/news/internal-memo-suggests-sc-police-department-violated-law-banning-ticket-quotas/article_aa02a4d6-77f2-11e9-8a32-b75a8475adde.html.

⁶⁰ *Id.*

⁶¹ *Id.*

⁶² See § 23-1-245 (defining “points of contact” as a “law enforcement officer’s interaction with citizens and businesses within their jurisdictions and the law enforcement officer’s involvement in community-oriented initiatives” and allowing for evaluations based on this category).

⁶³ Randy Travis, *Douglasville Cops Offered BBQ if They Wrote Enough Traffic Tickets*, FOX 5 ATLANTA (Mar. 10, 2020), <https://www.fox5atlanta.com/news/douglasville-cops-offered-bbq-if-they-wrote-enough-traffic-tickets> (barbeque); Daniela Altimari & John Lender, *Police Commissioner Says ‘Pizza Memo’ Was Not Ticket Quota*, HARTFORD COURANT (Apr. 2, 2012), <https://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-xpm-2012-04-02-hc-pizza-tickets-report-0403-20120402-story.html> (pizza); Justin George, *Metro Transit Police Held a Competition to Encourage Arrests and Other Enforcement*, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2020, 7:02 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/metro-transit-police-held-a-competition-to-encourage-arrests-and-other-enforcement/2020/02/12/02146d84-4dd7-11ea-9b5c-eac5b16dafa_story.html (gift cards); Debbie Dujanovic, *Emails Reveal Incentives Behind Cottonwood Police Issuing Tickets*, KSL BROAD. (Oct. 24, 2013, 11:01 PM), <https://www.ksl.com/article/27376993/emails-reveal-incentives-behind-cottonwood-police-issuing-tickets> (carwash coupons and gift cards); Jack Douglas Jr. and Jason Allen, *One North Texas Officer Says Ticket Quotas Do Exist. . . And It May Be a Ticket to a Trophy*, CBS DFW (May 20, 2013, 10:23 PM), <https://dfw.cbslocal.com/2013/05/20/one-north-texas-officer-says-ticket-quotas-do-existand-it-may-be-a-ticket-to-a-trophy> (trophies and letters of appreciation).

⁶⁴ Cook, *supra* note 47.

insisted, “[s]omebody has got to go to jail every 12 hours,” and threatened termination if the subordinate failed to comply.⁶⁵ Another officer testified that officers were told the city would stop paying for their insurance and contribute less to their retirement fund if they did not increase their arrests and citations.⁶⁶ The tethering of quota compliance to job security was so blatant that one officer gave a sergeant who was recently passed over for a promotion “a gift of knee pads, vaseline [sic], and ink pen refills—the implication being that the only way he’d be able to get that promotion was to either write up more of his patrolmen for not meeting the quota or perform sexual favors.”⁶⁷

Understanding these four features of quota-based policing—the level of formality, the nature of the numerical requirement, the enforcement activity demanded, and the potential employment actions—is important for a few reasons. First, the scholarly literature has yet to offer a robust description of quotas that captures the different permutations of the practice. Second, statutory prohibitions fall short of capturing the full scope of police activities that constitute quotas, which partially explains why quotas still exist in places that have enacted rules proscribing the practice. Third, these categories highlight gray areas in a non-transparent culture of policing. The strongest version of a quota would be a memorialized demand that police arrest a specific amount of people or face termination. A less detectable iteration might involve an informal communication to an officer to “increase their activity” with no threat of adverse employment outcome.⁶⁸ Such conduct would be permissible under some statutes and prohibited in others. Therefore, having a definitional grasp of these features is integral to understanding the following discussion about statutory prohibitions.

B. Statutory Landscape

This subsection briefly describes the politics that animated some of the legislative prohibitions on quotas. Some of these statutes are of late-twentieth-century vintage and developed against the backdrop of police professionalization. These early anti-quota laws were driven by interests in police work conditions, public safety, and fair policing.

⁶⁵ Michael Isaac Stein, *Police Lawsuits Provide an Inside View of Cash Register Justice in Louisiana*, SCALAWAG (Nov. 5, 2018), <https://www.scalawagmagazine.org/2018/11/louisiana-cash-register-justice>.

⁶⁶ *Id.*

⁶⁷ *Id.*

⁶⁸ See, e.g., CRIME + PUNISHMENT (Hulu 2018) (describing a conversation in which an NYPD lieutenant tells an officer that he needs to “catch up with everybody” in terms of numbers of arrests).

These issues, along with concerns about racial justice, have continued to inspire more recent statutes. After explaining this history, this subsection categorizes the various anti-quota statutes.

1. *A Brief History*

The legislative history of quota prohibitions is scattered because, in many states, legislators passed these laws without fanfare. However, a close inspection can impose some coherence and highlight themes of public safety, police conditions, and police corruption. Noteworthy legislative activity surfaced in the 1970s. Black Democratic Assemblyman John Miller ushered California's bill in 1975.⁶⁹ Miller, who has been described as a "progressive independent in local politics," was politically shrewd and couched his support for quota bans in inclusive rhetoric.⁷⁰ The Howard University-trained lawyer—whose district included the racially and socio-economically diverse cities of Oakland and Berkeley—voiced a simultaneous concern for police officers and for the public. Describing quotas as "unfair, undemocratic, and unjust," Miller was troubled by the idea that failure to meet quotas could lead to an officer's demotion.⁷¹ At the same time, Miller expressed concern about "the average California driver" who would be unbelievably by a "rubber stamp traffic court system which finds 90 percent of those cited guilty."⁷² Finally, Miller highlighted due process issues and pre-saged the problems the Department of Justice would find forty years later in Ferguson when he stated: "The spectacle of cities gaining revenue for the conviction of citizens, and judges creating revenue by making criminals out of those brought before them . . . goes against our historical concepts of justice and fair play."⁷³ In many ways, California's statute was motivated by multi-constituent concerns that remain applicable today.

New York passed its bill in 1978, and though police and the public may have been beneficiaries, the statute was a response to outright police corruption.⁷⁴ The Commission to Investigate Alleged Police

⁶⁹ See *Measure to Outlaw CHP's Ticket Quotas*, BERKELEY GAZETTE, July 22, 1975, at 1 (describing Miller's role in helping pass California's anti-quota law).

⁷⁰ David Mundstock, *Chapter 10 – The June 1976 Campaign and the New Slate Politics*, BERKELEY CITIZENS ACTION, https://berkeleycitizensaction.org/?page_id=397 (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).

⁷¹ See *Measure to Outlaw CHP's Ticket Quotas*, *supra* note 69, at 1.

⁷² *Id.*

⁷³ *Id.*; see Ferguson Report, *supra* note 17, at 2 ("This emphasis on revenue has compromised the institutional character of Ferguson's police department, contributing to a pattern of unconstitutional policing, and has also shaped its municipal court, leading to procedures that raise due process concerns and inflict unnecessary harm on members of the Ferguson community.").

⁷⁴ See Bronstein, *supra* note 21, at 544.

Corruption, or the Knapp Commission (led by United States District Court Judge Percy Knapp), produced one of the earliest and most extensive insights into the use of quotas in modern urban policing.⁷⁵ The Commission found that “informal arrest quotas” were “an inducement to a particular kind of corruption,” most specifically, “the arrest of individuals not actually apprehended in the commission of the charged crime.”⁷⁶ Testimony to the Commission described “a pattern of requiring a quota of four felony arrests per month.”⁷⁷ The informal policy led to a practice of “flaking,” which is when police plant drugs on suspects.⁷⁸ The longstanding, sexist practice of arresting sex workers and not their procurers also featured prominently in New York’s quota-based culture. “Plainclothesmen assigned to prostitution details were faced with the necessity of producing a stipulated number of arrests a night and, in order to do so, often arrested persons they considered to be ‘obvious’ prostitutes, without obtaining sufficient legal evidence.”⁷⁹

Finally, the Commission unearthed widespread collusion between police and numbers runners, particularly in “ghetto neighborhoods” where investigators discovered “numerous bookmaking operations and some high-stakes, organized card and dice games.”⁸⁰ These operations were brazenly public and payoffs to police ensured that these activities would go unpunished, “except for token arrests made to give an appearance of activity.”⁸¹ The report’s description, which reveals the intricacy of corruption and its relationship to quotas, is worth quoting at length:

Most often, when plainclothesmen needed a token arrest to meet arrest quotas or to give the appearance of activity, they would tell the operator of a spot and arrange a time and place for the arrest. The operator would then select someone to take the arrest, who was usually either one of his employees who had a relatively clean arrest record or an addict who was paid for his trouble. Whoever took the arrest would put a handful of bogus policy slips in his pocket and meet the plainclothesman at the designated time and place, where, often as not, he would get into their car without even waiting to be asked.⁸²

⁷⁵ COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE CITY’S ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES, COMM’N REP. 28 (1972).

⁷⁶ *Id.* at 28.

⁷⁷ *Id.*

⁷⁸ *Id.*

⁷⁹ *Id.*

⁸⁰ *Id.* at 71.

⁸¹ *Id.*

⁸² *Id.* at 83.

Whereas work conditions and the unfair doling out of tickets helped generate the enactment of the California statute, in New York it was the excesses of police culture and corruption that necessitated statutory prohibitions on quotas. In the ensuing decades, many states would pass laws that drew on one or more of these rationales.

Concerns about the work environment of police inspired the enactment of a few statutes. Democratic State Representative Perry Bullard introduced Michigan's statute in 1988 after speaking with police officers who described how the pressure to comply with quotas diminished their ability to fight crime.⁸³ During testimony for the bill, Jack Brown, executive director of the Fraternal Order of Police, lamented, "One of the most disgusting things we have as police officers is these quotas."⁸⁴ Wisconsin, led by Republican State Assemblyman DuWayne Johnsrud, passed its bill more than a decade later in 1998.⁸⁵ Before the bill's passage, Johnsrud said, "[a]ny time an officer has to work under a quota, he has to make decisions with a hammer hanging over his head."⁸⁶ Reflecting on the bill fifteen years after its passage, Johnsrud's rationale was the same. He explained that the bill came at the wishes of the State Patrol Troopers Union, which was concerned that officers were writing tickets at the expense of other safety-related work.⁸⁷ In Utah, Republican State Senator Howard Stephenson helped the state pass its bill in 2018.⁸⁸ Stephenson noted his opposition to police operating as revenue generators and claimed, "I don't believe policemen should be looking to meet a quota on bad behavior. What if there isn't enough bad behavior? Do you just have to make it up?"⁸⁹ The various statutes, passed in states spanning the east coast to the west coast, demonstrate the public safety-interested, police officer-protecting nature of quota prohibitions.

⁸³ See Jim Mitzfield, *Ticket Quotas Cost Undeserving Drivers: Police*, S. BEND TRIB., Sept. 1, 1987, at B2; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.750 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2020, No. 256 of 2020 Reg. Sess.).

⁸⁴ Mitzfield, *supra* note 83.

⁸⁵ *Police Banned from Using Speeding Ticket Quotas*, J. TIMES (Mar. 25, 1998), https://journaltimes.com/news/national/police-banned-from-using-speeding-ticket-quotas/article_a6faa127-90da-566f-a702-d46300ecf88f.html.

⁸⁶ Reid Magney, *Officials Say Standards Are Needed for Police*, LA CROSSE TRIBUNE, Jan. 8, 1998, at A6.

⁸⁷ Adam Schragar, *Legislators: State Patrol Policy Lists Quota, is 'Against the Law.'*, CHANNEL3000 (Dec. 28, 2018, 1:32 AM), <https://www.channel3000.com/legislators-state-patrol-policy-lists-quota-is-against-the-law>.

⁸⁸ See Ben Winslow, *Utah Could Soon Ban Police Quotas in Traffic Stops*, FOX 13 (Feb. 5, 2018, 11:58 PM), <https://www.fox13now.com/2018/02/05/utah-could-soon-ban-police-quotas-in-traffic-stops>.

⁸⁹ *Id.*

Racial controversy has also inspired some states' prohibitions on police quotas. After the killing of Michael Brown exposed Ferguson's police practices, then-state congressman and future Republican Attorney General Eric Schmitt shepherded Missouri's legislation. Schmitt said that he authored the bill to "ensure that our citizens wouldn't simply be used as ATMs to fill municipal government coffers."⁹⁰ The police killing of Walter Scott, an unarmed Black motorist, likely led to the enactment of South Carolina's statute. After thirty-three-year-old officer Michael Slager stopped fifty-year-old Scott for a broken taillight, Scott fled, and Slager shot him in the back.⁹¹ Slager claimed that he struggled with Scott over his taser and shot him out of fear.⁹² Video evidence taken by a bystander later revealed that Scott was seventeen feet away when the officer shot him and that Slager had dropped his taser near him in "an attempt to plant evidence and skew the investigation."⁹³ Justin Bamberg, a civil rights attorney who represented the Scott family and serves as a Democratic Representative in the South Carolina General Assembly, subsequently authored the bill.⁹⁴ After Tennessee passed its quota bill in June 2020, Democratic Representative Rick Staples noted that quotas lead to Black people being frisked by police officers, and said that the "legislation will limit unnecessary contact between the two."⁹⁵ The existence of bipartisan and multi-constituent opposition to quotas is apparent from the widespread enactment of these statutory prohibitions.

2. *Types of Quota Prohibitions*

This subsection details the different types of anti-quota laws. The varying types of legislation make straightforward generalizations

⁹⁰ *Missouri's Attorney General Sues City of Marshfield for Illegal Traffic Ticket Quota Scheme*, KY3 (Dec. 9, 2019, 4:06 PM), <https://www.ky3.com/content/news/Missouris-attorney-general-sues-city-of-Marshfield-for-illegal-traffic-ticket-quota-scheme-565986731.html>.

⁹¹ See Alan Blinder, *Michael Slager, Officer in Walter Scott Shooting, Gets 20-Year Sentence*, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2017), <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/07/us/michael-slager-sentence-walter-scott.html>.

⁹² *Id.*

⁹³ *Id.*

⁹⁴ Grace Beahm, *Haley Signs Bill Banning Law Enforcement Ticket Quotas*, POST & COURIER (June 9, 2016), https://www.postandcourier.com/politics/haley-signs-bill-banning-law-enforcement-ticket-quotas/article_7449a3c5-b4ff-509f-b716-7bd7b72a38c7.html (reporting on Bamberg's representation of the Scott family and his sponsorship of the bill).

⁹⁵ Tyler Arnold, *Criminal Penalties for Issuing Police Ticket Quotas Passes Tennessee House*, CENTER SQUARE (June 11, 2020), https://www.thecentersquare.com/tennessee/criminal-penalties-for-issuing-police-ticket-quotas-passes-tennessee-house/article_eb5a2f34-ac0e-11ea-b5cc-6fd6b8293d42.html.

tricky. Indeed, the difficulty of offering a general framework might help explain the scholarly gap on police quotas. Some of these laws are either poorly drafted or cover a small amount of activity. Consider two examples. Florida's statute simply states: "a traffic enforcement agency may not establish a traffic citation quota."⁹⁶ This prohibition does not define what a quota is or whether it has to be numerically specific in order to fall under the scope of the statute. Such interpretative tasks are left to courts, assuming that allegations of quotas get that far.

Utah's statute, passed in 2018, is a bit more specific. It defines quotas as "any requirement or minimum standard regarding the *number or percentage* of citations or arrests."⁹⁷ But this provision still does not specify whether the prohibited "requirement" or "standard," must be formal.

The shortcomings of Utah and Florida's statutes are representative of the many limitations of anti-quota laws. Most statutes only cover some aspects of quota-based policing, and each statute is different. What one state considers an illegal quota, another state may find permissible. Most basically, anti-quota laws vary on how formal or numerically specific quotas must be to fall under the statute. All statutes prohibit departments from requiring officers to issue a certain amount of citations or traffic violations. Some laws go further and include arrests, while others cover precursory law enforcement activities such as stops and warnings. Most focus on whether the failure to meet a quota leads to some kind of employment action.

Formality: As Figure 1 demonstrates, state statutes vary in their language and their characterization of quotas as formal and/or informal. "Direct" and "indirect" are also words used to capture formality. For example, Nebraska only prohibits law enforcement from "directly" requiring an officer to meet a quota.⁹⁸ Informal pressure put on a police officer to improve their numbers is not covered. Pennsylvania's statutory language, by contrast, forbids any law enforcement agency from establishing or maintaining any policy "directly or indirectly."⁹⁹ Other jurisdictions, like New Jersey, are silent on which communicative mechanisms are forbidden and state that law enforcement may not "establish any quota for arrests or cita-

⁹⁶ FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.640 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 184 of 2020 2d Reg. Sess.).


⁹⁷ UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-27 (West, Westlaw through 2020 6th Spec. Sess.) (emphasis added).

⁹⁸ NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-235 (West, Westlaw through end of 2020 2d Reg. Sess.).

⁹⁹ 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2001 (West 2020).


tions.”¹⁰⁰ This might include direct or indirect quotas, or encapsulate only formal quotas. Since many of these statutes are under-litigated, the available language is crucial for parties seeking to bring a claim that an agency violated the prohibition.

FIGURE 1. FORMALITY AND QUOTA STATUTES



Quantification: Numerical requirements are also present in some state prohibitions. Michigan’s statute is typical in that it bars agencies from requiring a “predetermined or specified number of citations.”¹⁰¹ Some states, like Florida, do not make any reference to numbers, which could simply mean that a number is implied in the definition of quota but could also leave room for the use of averages, which some departments use to circumvent quota prohibitions.¹⁰²

FIGURE 2. QUANTIFICATION AND QUOTA STATUTES



Law Enforcement Activity: All statutes specify which law enforcement activities cannot be subject to a quota. Seventeen states prohibit

¹⁰⁰ N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-181.2 (West, Westlaw through L.2020, c.136 and J.R. No. 2).

¹⁰¹ MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.750 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2020, No. 256 of 2020 Reg. Sess.).

¹⁰² See Sparrow, *supra* note 34.

quotas for citations and traffic violations.¹⁰³ Nine states include citations, traffic violations, *and* arrests.¹⁰⁴ Other states are overinclusive or underinclusive when it comes to activity outside of citations, traffic violations, and arrests. Two states, Wisconsin and Rhode Island, include warning notices and investigative stops, respectively.¹⁰⁵ These states seem to recognize that warnings and stops can lead to the kind of law enforcement activity that quota legislation is designed to cover, and accordingly include these precludes into their statutory schemes. Some jurisdictions take the opposite approach. Missouri excludes warnings from its statute,¹⁰⁶ whereas South Carolina and Illinois make *exceptions* for “points of contact.”¹⁰⁷ In these three jurisdictions, such precursory activity does not fall under the state statute. All other states are silent on whether these kinds of law enforcement activities are covered by their statutes. Thus, read in whole, American statutes that prohibit quotas focus primarily on citations, traffic violations, and arrests, leaving significant room for penumbral pursuits that are related but do not fall into those specific law enforcement activities.

¹⁰³ These states include Connecticut, Illinois, Florida, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin.

¹⁰⁴ Arkansas, California, Louisiana, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Utah all include citations, tickets, and arrests.


¹⁰⁵ WIS. STAT. ANN. § 349.025 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 186); 31 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-27-25 (West, Westlaw through ch. 79 of 2020 2d Reg. Sess.).

¹⁰⁶ MO. ANN. STAT. § 304.125 (West, Westlaw through 2020 2d Reg. Sess.) (“This section shall not apply to the issuance of warning citations.”).

¹⁰⁷ S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1-245 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Sess.); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2610/24 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-651).

FIGURE 3. LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY AND QUOTA STATUTES

Least Expansive



Most Expansive

Employment Actions: A few states use specific language prohibiting the use of quotas for incentives and adverse employment actions. Texas, for example, prohibits the use of quotas to “*evaluate, promote, compensate, or discipline*” police officers.¹⁰⁸ Some states focus only on adverse employment actions. New York’s ban, which has been subject to the most litigation, prohibits “a reassignment, a scheduling change, an adverse evaluation, a constructive dismissal, the denial of a promotion, or the denial of overtime, based in whole or in part on such employee’s failure to meet a quota.”¹⁰⁹ By specifying the range of employment actions, these statutes supply potential plaintiffs (typically police officers) with the statutory language to bring claims against departments that implement quotas. States like Arkansas, by contrast, are silent on this issue. One could interpret this silence to mean that employment action is impliedly forbidden by the statute or as an intentional omission by the legislature.

¹⁰⁸ TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 720.002 (West, Westlaw through end of 2019 Reg. Sess.) (emphasis added).

¹⁰⁹ N.Y. LAB. LAW § 215-a (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2019, ch. 758 and L.2020, chs. 1 to 387).

FIGURE 4. EMPLOYMENT ACTIONS AND QUOTA STATUTES



Silent

(No language on Type of Employment Action; e.g., Arkansas)



Adverse Employment Action Only

(e.g., New York)



Employment Benefits + Adverse Action

(e.g., Texas)

Additional Features: Two statutes have unique features that are worth noting. First, Illinois has a provision that attempts to address potential funding complications that may arise from prohibitions.¹¹⁰ Its statute states that the prohibition on quotas “shall not affect the conditions of any federal or State grants or funds awarded to the municipality and used to fund traffic enforcement programs.”¹¹¹ Second, Tennessee amended its prohibition in July 2020 and made violation of the statute a Class B misdemeanor subject to a fine.¹¹² Since it is a new amendment, time will tell if this will successfully deter police brass attempting to implement quotas. The shortcomings of each of these different types of state quota prohibitions often interface with other legal obstacles and shape litigation outcomes. That will be the topic of the next Part.

II

POLICE QUOTA LITIGATION

The national patchwork of quota-based statutes has produced a variegated body of caselaw. Police officers are the typical plaintiffs that bring these cases to court. They usually argue that their resistance to or inability to meet a quota led to some adverse employment action. Alternatively, officers claim that they endured retaliation for speaking out about quotas—a claim that usually involves First Amendment issues.

People subject to criminal law enforcement are also common parties in police quota litigation.¹¹³ These individuals fall into two catego-

¹¹⁰ 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1-12 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-651).

¹¹¹ *Id.*

¹¹² Act of July 15, 2020, ch. 801, 2020 Tenn. Pub Acts, <https://publications.tnsosfiles.com/acts/111/pub/pc0801.pdf>.

¹¹³ There are a handful of cases where governments have brought charges against public officials who implemented or conformed to quotas, but these are rare. *See* Becker-Ross v. State, 595 S.W.3d 261 (Tex. App. 2020); Gerwer v. Kelly, 980 N.Y.S.2d 275 (Sup. Ct. 2013).

ries. They can be criminal defendants who argue that their contact with law enforcement was predicated on an officer's compliance with an illegal quota system. In essence, these parties raise the practice of quota-based policing as an affirmative defense. In instances where alleged quota-based contact resulted in dropped charges or the termination of the criminal action, parties have also brought federal civil rights lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.¹¹⁴ In these cases, which sometimes emerge from jurisdictions without anti-quota laws, plaintiffs argue that law enforcement's adherence to police quotas led to a violation of their civil rights.

Whether the party challenging the quota is an officer or a civilian, there are a range of socio-legal, doctrinal, and evidentiary hurdles that litigants must overcome before courts will meaningfully engage with their claims. This subsection briefly describes these hurdles for both groups, then describes the varying outcomes of these cases.

A. *Police Speech and the Blue Code*

Police officers are the group most likely and best positioned to litigate challenges to quotas, but the "code of silence," which prohibits officers from reporting misconduct, serves as a barrier.¹¹⁵ This code¹¹⁶—which commentators also refer to as "the blue wall of

¹¹⁴ 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

¹¹⁵ See, e.g., Isidoro Rodriguez, *The Plight of the Police Whistleblower*, CRIME REPORT (June 18, 2020), <https://thecrimereport.org/2020/06/18/the-plight-of-the-police-whistleblower> (quoting Seth Stoughton, law professor and former police officer, saying "[t]here is tremendous pressure in policing, a cultural pressure, to not expose fellow officers to either professional or physical threats").

¹¹⁶ See SANJA KUTNJAK IVKOVIC, *FALLEN BLUE KNIGHTS: CONTROLLING POLICE CORRUPTION* 20 (2005) (describing the code as "the informal prohibition within police culture of reporting misconduct by fellow officers—binds police together"); see also Bret D. Asbury, *Anti-Snitching Norms and Community Loyalty*, 89 OR. L. REV. 1257, 1285–92 (2011) (describing the code as an anti-snitching norm rooted in ideas about group loyalty and family); David Rudovsky, *Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained?*, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 487 (1992) ("The code of silence does more than prevent testimony. It mandates that no officer report another for misconduct, that supervisors not discipline officers for abuse, that wrongdoing be covered up, and that any investigation or legal action into police misconduct be deflected and discouraged."). Courts have also recognized the code in § 1983 actions. See Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, *The "Blue Wall of Silence" as Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury*, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 239, n.16 (1998) (listing cases). See generally Myriam E. Gilles, *Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering "Custom" in Section 1983 Municipal Liability*, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 18 (2000) (exploring the police "code of silence" as an unconstitutional police practice under § 1983). In the context of quotas, the blue code could be understood in two ways. First, it could be understood as a prohibition against one officer revealing another officer's compliance with an illegal quota (a form of misconduct) to a perceived outsider (i.e. the public, the media). Alternatively, it could apply to an officer who reveals that law enforcement leadership is enforcing quotas. At its core, the code is about a brotherhood in which some police officers might not include management. Put another way, there is an

silence,” “blue cocoon,” “blue shield,” or “blue curtain”¹¹⁷—has been a problem in American policing for almost a century.¹¹⁸ One police misconduct attorney explains how a breach of this code can be consequential: “while police officers may feel that a fellow officer has acted wrongfully, they fear that they will lose their job, or be subject to ridicule, ostracization, and physical reprisals from their comrades if the truth is told.”¹¹⁹ The same applies to speaking out about quotas. The case of Adrian Schoolcraft is telling. Schoolcraft worked for the NYPD and secretly recorded superiors discussing illegal quotas or, as some officials described it, “paying the rent.”¹²⁰ Three weeks after he made misconduct allegations, a dozen officers, led by a deputy chief, went to his apartment.¹²¹ A tape recording of the event revealed that the deputy chief Mike Marino, who has been described as a devotee of NYPD’s numbers-driven policing,¹²² warned Schoolcraft, “they are going to treat you like an EDP [emotionally disturbed person] Now, you have a choice. You get up like a man and put your shoes on and walk into that bus, or they’re going to treat you as an EDP and

argument that the blue code is about protecting not police leadership, but rank and file. But actual instances involving police officers revealing the existence of quotas suggest that leadership is considered part of the code. See generally Radley Balko, Opinion, *The Blue Wall: Stronger than Ever*, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2015), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/09/04/the-blue-wall-stronger-than-ever> (describing instances of police officers who have revealed the existence of quotas and allege retaliation from their peers and leadership).

¹¹⁷ See Chin & Wells, *supra* note 116, at 237 n.15 (describing the different terms for the code).

¹¹⁸ See Craig B. Futterman, Chaclyn Hunt & Jamie Kalven, *Youth/Police Encounters on Chicago’s South Side: Acknowledging the Realities*, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 125, 182 (noting that “over the last eighty-five years, at least nine different commissions around the nation have identified the police code of silence as a serious problem that prevents accountability” and listing all of the reports).

¹¹⁹ G. Flint Taylor, *A Litigator’s View of Discovery and Proof in Police Misconduct Policy and Practice Cases*, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 747, 758 (1999); see also Aziz Z. Huq & Richard H. McAdams, *Litigating the Blue Wall of Silence: How to Challenge the Police Privilege to Delay Investigation*, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 213, 247–48 (“Scholarship on policing amply shows that police officers enforce the code of silence with social ostracism, refusals to answer calls for backup, denials of promotion, reassignments to less desirable postings, and threats of violence.”).

¹²⁰ Graham Rayman, *The NYPD Tapes: Inside Bed-Stuy’s 81st Precinct*, VILLAGE VOICE (May 4, 2010), <https://www.villagevoice.com/2010/05/04/the-nypd-tapes-inside-bed-stuys-81st-precinct>.

¹²¹ See Graham Rayman, *NYPD Tapes Update: Queens DA Richard Brown’s Report on Whistleblower Cop Raises More Questions than It Answers*, VILLAGE VOICE (Dec. 13, 2012), <https://www.villagevoice.com/2012/12/13/nypd-tapes-update-queens-da-richard-browns-report-on-whistleblower-cop-raises-more-questions-than-it-answers>.

¹²² See Graham Rayman, *Deputy Chief Michael Marino in Stop-and-Frisk Trial: ‘Do Your Job or Suffer the Consequences,’* VILLAGE VOICE (Mar. 25, 2013), <https://www.villagevoice.com/2013/03/25/deputy-chief-michael-marino-in-stop-and-frisk-trial-do-your-job-or-suffer-the-consequences>.

that means handcuffs.”¹²³ Schoolcraft was subjected to the latter and forcibly committed to a psychiatric ward.¹²⁴ After six days in the ward, he was discharged and suspended and continued to receive visits from police officers.¹²⁵ Ultimately, he made the tapes public and sued the NYPD for retaliation.¹²⁶ The NYPD settled.¹²⁷ Since the incident, the City has not “released one report, document or even scrap of paper which explains the NYPD’s handling of the episode or details the department’s conclusions about Schoolcraft’s allegations.”¹²⁸ While this is one of the more spectacular examples of what happens when the code of silence is breached, it highlights its retaliatory nature.¹²⁹ As some of the cases discussed in this Article show, the threat of retaliation can determine whether quota cases make it to courts and, if they do, the posture in which they enter the legal system.

The code of silence bleeds into First Amendment issues involving police speech. The Supreme Court in *Garcetti v. Ceballos* ruled that public employees who speak pursuant to their job duties have no First Amendment protection from retaliation for such speech.¹³⁰ If an officer speaks about a quota in their official capacity, then a First Amendment retaliation claim cannot succeed. The only way such a claim could prevail is if the officer demonstrates that she spoke as a citizen and not as an employee. Post-*Garcetti*, federal district and appeals courts have rejected retaliation claims brought by police officers who argued that they were subject to an adverse employment action due to their complaints about police quotas.¹³¹ Considering the

¹²³ Graham Rayman, *NYPD Tapes 4: The WhistleBlower, Adrian Schoolcraft*, VILLAGE VOICE (June 15, 2010), <https://www.villagevoice.com/2010/06/15/nypd-tapes-4-the-whistleblower-adrian-schoolcraft>.

¹²⁴ *Id.*

¹²⁵ *Id.*

¹²⁶ Goodman, *supra* note 26.

¹²⁷ *Id.*

¹²⁸ Graham Rayman, *Adrian Schoolcraft: The Other NYPD Scandal in the Room*, VILLAGE VOICE (Apr. 20, 2011), <https://www.villagevoice.com/2011/04/20/adrian-schoolcraft-the-other-nypd-scandal-in-the-room>.

¹²⁹ Roberta Ann Johnson, *Whistleblowing and the Police*, 3 RUTGERS J.L. & URB. POL’Y 74, 83 (2005) (“The threat of retaliation against whistleblowers has a chilling effect. The threat prevents officers from coming forward to expose corrupt and abusive practices and it prevents serious wrongdoing from being addressed in-house.”).

¹³⁰ 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006).

¹³¹ See, e.g., *Taylor v. Pawlowski*, 551 F. App’x 31, 31 (3d Cir. 2013) (ruling that officer’s statements to his superiors about the illegality of a quota system for traffic stops were not protected speech under the First Amendment, and that he was acting as a public employee speaking pursuant to his duties); *Cid v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs*, No. 18-4012, 2019 WL 161495, at *7 (D. Kan. Jan. 9, 2019) (rejecting a First Amendment retaliation claim brought by a terminated officer because he “directed his speech to his immediate supervisors and others in his chain of command—but no one outside that chain of command” and did not make a showing that his speech “involve[d] a matter of public concern and not merely a

inadequacy of whistleblower laws, which often fail to cover police officers and impose technical requirements, *Garcetti* presents a quagmire.¹³² Officers concerned about quota-based policing in their departments can keep their objections in-house and follow typical grievance procedures. However, this process typically requires the grievant to inform a chain of command (e.g., their immediate supervisor, then chief of police, then the city manager).¹³³ The grievance process can subject the officer to the hazards of retaliation for breaking the code of silence, and under *Garcetti*, the officer may not be protected. The officer could also go public, as some have recently done,¹³⁴ but that option can be similarly, if not more, antagonizing to colleagues and lead to resignations that are difficult to remediate.¹³⁵ These social and legal constraints provide some insight into why statutes prohibiting quotas are infrequently litigated.

B. Evidentiary Challenges for Civilians

Challenges to quota-based policing brought by civilians raise many of the evidentiary problems discussed in “access to justice” scholarship. This body of work describes how infidelity to discovery rules, strict pleading standards, and the judicial hostility to the enforcement of civil rights make courts inaccessible to civilians.¹³⁶ As a threshold matter, discovery disputes can preclude parties from demonstrating that quota-based policing exists. For example, in cases

personal issue internal to the workplace”); *Whitehead v. City of New York*, 953 F. Supp. 2d 367, 375 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[P]laintiff’s refusal to comply with the quota policy is not protected by the First Amendment because he confined his opposition to and criticism of the quota policy within the NYPD and never attempted to communicate his complaints to the public.”). *But see* *Matthews v. City of New York*, 779 F.3d 167, 176 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding that officer spoke as a citizen when he spoke to his commanding officers about its arrest policy).

¹³² Whistleblower laws sometimes lack statutory coverage for municipal and county employees (categories police officers often fall in) and have various technical requirements for coverage (e.g., mandated initial disclosure to supervisors for protection to attach). *See* Ann C. Hodges & Justin Pugh, *Crossing the Thin Blue Line: Protecting Law Enforcement Officers Who Blow the Whistle*, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 1, 26–31 (2018).

¹³³ *See* LARRY K. GAINES & JOHN L. WORRALL, *POLICE ADMINISTRATION* 344–45 (2012) (describing grievance procedures).

¹³⁴ *See infra* note 330; *supra* notes 37, 44, 65, 120–29.

¹³⁵ *See* Huq & McAdams, *supra* note 119, at 247–48 (suggesting that harassment that forces an officer to resign should be understood as a constructive discharge and noting “the well-known reality is that it remains difficult or impossible to prove constructive discharge in any individual case, given the code of silence”).

¹³⁶ *See* STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, *RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION* (2017); ERWIN CHERMERINSKY, *CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR: HOW YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BECAME UNENFORCEABLE* (2017); SARAH STASZAK, *NO DAY IN COURT: ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL RETRENCHMENT* (2015).

involving criminal defendants who were charged with driving while intoxicated and sought arrest data to prove the existence of police quotas, some courts have ruled that such information is not relevant or would not bear any material information.¹³⁷

Some civil rights plaintiffs have unsuccessfully brought legal actions arguing that quota-satisfying officers violated their rights. For example, in *D.H. v. City of New York*, a group of women of color were arrested and charged with loitering for the purposes of prostitution.¹³⁸ They brought a § 1983 suit against the City of New York and their arresting officers. The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the loitering statute and argued that they were discriminated against on the basis of their race, gender, and gender identity.¹³⁹ The plaintiffs also argued that the arrests were products of quota-based policing.¹⁴⁰ To support their claim, they relied on statistical evidence and a statement from a former police officer who noted that arrest quotas led cops to go after “black, . . . Hispanic, . . . [and] LGBT communit[ies].”¹⁴¹ Notwithstanding this evidence, New York’s anti-quota statute,¹⁴² and the NYPD’s documented struggles with quotas,¹⁴³ the court found their arguments unpersuasive. The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to show that “one of *these* defendants needed to make these arrests to meet his or her performance goals and arrest quotas, assuming such goals and quotas existed.”¹⁴⁴ By requiring this kind of evidence at the pleading stage, particularly in a jurisdiction that has

¹³⁷ See, e.g., *Mayes v. City of Oak Park*, No. 05-CV-74386-DT, 2007 WL 9751967, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2007), *aff’d*, 285 F. App’x 261 (6th Cir. 2008) (ruling that the plaintiff, a former public safety officer who claimed his termination was based on race and disability discrimination, was not entitled to racial data on arrests and tickets in Oak Park because it was not relevant to his claim); *Page v. State*, 7 S.W.3d 202, 206 (Tex. App. 1999) (rejecting defendant’s request for DWI task force information, which he argued was material and could be used to impeach the arresting officer since a DWI quota directive would have given the officer a motive to falsify his report); *County of Nassau Police Dep’t v. Judge*, 654 N.Y.S.2d 174, 175 (App. Div. 1997) (ruling that motorist was not entitled to production of internal police directives and orders that allegedly established DWI quota system because the respondent did not demonstrate that any information would be relevant or exculpatory).

¹³⁸ 309 F. Supp. 3d 52, 63 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).

¹³⁹ *Id.* at 64.

¹⁴⁰ *Id.* at 76.

¹⁴¹ *Id.* at 75.

¹⁴² N.Y. LAB. LAW § 215-a (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2019, ch. 758 and L.2020, chs. 1 to 387).

¹⁴³ See Bronstein, *supra* note 21 (arguing that the New York anti-quota statute has largely failed to rectify the negative practices of the NYPD).

¹⁴⁴ *D.H.*, 309 F. Supp. 3d at 76 (emphasis added).

been the poster-child for police quotas, the court created a high bar for future civil rights plaintiffs seeking to challenge this practice.

Many of the same problems arise in federal cases out of jurisdictions that do not have quota legislation. Before Tennessee passed its legislation, a federal court in that state heard a case brought by Terry Wynn, a Black physician who was stopped by the police after speeding to a hospital to help deliver a patient's baby.¹⁴⁵ Despite the intervention of a hospital supervisor who came to the hospital parking lot to inform the arresting officer that Wynn was indeed a doctor, the officer prepared a criminal summons against Wynn for speeding, felony evading arrest, resisting arrest, and a host of other violations.¹⁴⁶ A local prosecutor dropped the charges.¹⁴⁷ Meanwhile, the officer was suspended for a month for what the police chief described as a failure of judgement.¹⁴⁸ Wynn brought a § 1983 suit, arguing that the officer and the City had violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.¹⁴⁹ She argued that the City of Pulaski had a quota that required law enforcement to obtain "10 'traffic or custodial arrests' per month as a work performance goal," citing the arresting officer's own testimony as evidence.¹⁵⁰ The court ruled that this testimony was not indicative of a "hard-and-fast policy of the department."¹⁵¹ If it was a formal policy, the court added, "municipal liability cannot attach in the absence of showing some link between the quota and the allegedly false arrest of, and use of excessive force on, Dr. Wynn."¹⁵² Ultimately, in the federal tribunals where non-officers bring their challenges to quotas, courts demand tight causal links between the alleged quota and the constitutional violation. These evidentiary demands, along with different statutory conceptions of quotas, have likely stunted the development of case law in this area.

C. Wins and Losses

Challenges to quotas that get beyond these hurdles have had mixed success. This subsection describes the few wins that plaintiffs have achieved when litigating police quotas, as well as the many losses.

¹⁴⁵ Wynn v. City of Pulaski, No. 11-0025, 2013 WL 527154 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 11, 2013).

¹⁴⁶ *Id.* at *3.

¹⁴⁷ *Id.*

¹⁴⁸ *Id.*

¹⁴⁹ *Id.*

¹⁵⁰ *Id.* at *13.

¹⁵¹ *Id.*

¹⁵² *Id.*

Some criminal defendants have persuaded appellate tribunals that quotas governed their arrests and were not adequately considered by trial courts. In Pennsylvania, for example, various courts have interpreted the state's anti-quota law as creating an affirmative defense if defendants can prove a violation of the statute by a preponderance of the evidence.¹⁵³ In *Commonwealth v. Greene*, a Pennsylvania court reversed a speeding conviction after the defendant produced a memo from a sergeant to patrol supervisors imploring them to increase their citations from 168 to 450 a month and insisting that they "get the numbers up."¹⁵⁴ The court ruled that the defendant met his burden, and interpreted the memo as creating an impermissible quota.¹⁵⁵

A Texas appeals court came to a similar conclusion, reversing the DWI conviction of a defendant who was precluded from cross-examining the arresting officer about a departmental quota for DWI arrests, even though the officer was the state's sole witness and had testified that a quota existed.¹⁵⁶ The appellate court ruled that the trial court had abused its discretion and deprived the appellant of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.¹⁵⁷ A cross-examination that revealed the existence of a DWI quota would also play a role in a Louisiana court's decision to vacate a conviction.¹⁵⁸

Police officers who exposed the existence of quotas have also successfully brought retaliation claims against police departments. These decisions were not per se challenges to the alleged quota system, but they remain important because they contribute to the small body of litigation that addresses quotas, shed light on the existence of the practice, and demonstrate the stakes for police officers who complain about this kind of policing. Many of these challenges were First Amendment retaliation cases, decided before *Garcetti* ruled out employee claims of retaliation for things they said while on duty.¹⁵⁹ Other cases, decided before and after *Garcetti*, did not hinge on First Amendment claims, and involved officer complaints about quotas and

¹⁵³ See, e.g., *Woolston v. Cutting*, 474 A.2d 698, 701 (Pa. 1984) (holding that in authoring the anti-quota statute, the legislature intended it to function as an affirmative defense rather than a civil cause of action).

¹⁵⁴ *Commonwealth v. Greene*, 32 Pa. D. & C.3d 48, 52–53 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1984).

¹⁵⁵ *Id.* at 53–54.

¹⁵⁶ *Alexander v. State*, 949 S.W.2d 772, 773–74 (Tex. App. 1997).

¹⁵⁷ *Id.* at 775. *But see* *Hollier v. State*, No. 14-99-01348-CR, 2001 WL 951014, at *7 (Tex. App. Aug. 23, 2001) (rejecting a similar claim because, unlike in *Alexander*, the appellant could not show that the arresting officer was operating under a quota at the time of arrest).

¹⁵⁸ See *State v. Sampia*, 696 So. 2d 618, 620 (La. Ct. App. 1997).

¹⁵⁹ See, e.g., *Begg v. Moffitt*, 555 F. Supp. 1344, 1365 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (finding a violation under the First Amendment); *Ruhlman v. Barger*, 435 F. Supp. 447, 450 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (same).

police misconduct. Two are noteworthy. *Iglesias v. City of Hialeah*, the more modest and recent of the two, took place in a small city outside of Miami.¹⁶⁰ Juan Iglesias, an officer in the City's police department,¹⁶¹ sent letters to the City's police chief and mayor protesting the enforcement of illegal ticket quotas.¹⁶² Nevertheless, he received multiple disciplinary notices for not meeting traffic enforcement standards.¹⁶³ He used the state's whistleblower law to argue that the City had illegally retaliated against him for complaining about the quotas.¹⁶⁴ The trial court awarded him lost wages but precluded him from seeking noneconomic damages—a decision that the appellate court reversed.¹⁶⁵

Martinez v. Village of Mount Prospect is the most noteworthy court victory involving a police challenge to a quota.¹⁶⁶ The case involved a Latinx police trainee, Martinez, who brought a national origin employment discrimination claim against the Village of Mount Prospect, a community outside of Chicago.¹⁶⁷ He argued that police leadership directed officers to target Latinx drivers to meet ticket quota requirements; to support his claim, he presented evidence highlighting the disproportionate number of traffic tickets given to Latinx drivers.¹⁶⁸ A federal district court entered an approximately \$1.1 million settlement for Martinez¹⁶⁹ and enjoined the Village from “directing, suggesting, ordering or otherwise communicating that any police officer should focus, concentrate, target, profile, or otherwise modify law enforcement efforts in any way on the sole basis of the national origin of any person.”¹⁷⁰ Finally, the presiding judge sent a letter, included in the opinion, to the Department of Justice.¹⁷¹ The

¹⁶⁰ *Iglesias v. City of Hialeah*, No. 3D18-639, 2019 WL 3309040 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 24, 2019).

¹⁶¹ *Id.* at *1.

¹⁶² *Id.*

¹⁶³ *Id.*

¹⁶⁴ *Id.*

¹⁶⁵ *Id.* at *2. This dispute spawned a separate ongoing case involving Iglesias's sergeant, Paul DiPietro. In his testimony for Iglesias's case, DiPietro was reprimanded for failing to adequately discipline Iglesias, and then in Iglesias's civil suit, gave testimony that contradicted the City's position that there was no traffic quota. He argued that he was retaliated against by reassignment to a far location and then terminated. DiPietro brought his own claim into federal court, which the parties settled in 2020. *See* Joint Stipulation for Dismissal With Prejudice at 1, *DiPietro v. City of Hialeah*, No. 19-cv-23212 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2020), ECF No. 50.

¹⁶⁶ 92 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. Ill. 2000).

¹⁶⁷ *Id.* at 781.

¹⁶⁸ *Id.*

¹⁶⁹ *Id.*

¹⁷⁰ *Id.* at 782.

¹⁷¹ *Id.*

letter highlighted the interface of the quota policy and racial profiling and encouraged the agency to investigate the Village for civil rights violations.¹⁷²

Martinez represents one of the more significant rulings on police quotas, but when cases are decided on the merits, it is much more common for plaintiffs to lose. Judicial rebuffs come in a variety of forms. Sometimes courts, relying on *Garcetti*, rule that officer objections to police quotas do not constitute protected speech, which often ends the analysis.¹⁷³ Sometimes courts are unpersuaded by evidence that points to the existence of quotas.¹⁷⁴ Sometimes the claims are outright unpersuasive, as in *Gravitt v. N.C. Division of Motor Vehicles*,¹⁷⁵ where the Fourth Circuit rejected claims brought by a police officer and a police union who argued that North Carolina's quota policy violated officers' right to equal protection because the policy operated in some districts but not others.¹⁷⁶

Two litigation losses are particularly instructive for thinking about quota-based policing in the future. Both cases, brought by police unions, reveal how departments and jurisdictions can work around statutory prohibitions. The first concerns Camden, New Jersey, which has been at the center of police reform for its drastic reboot of its police department.¹⁷⁷ In *Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 1 v. City of Camden*, the Fraternal Order of Police challenged the City's implementation of a "directed patrol" program that required

¹⁷² *Id.*

¹⁷³ See, e.g., *Whitehead v. City of New York*, 953 F. Supp. 2d 367, 375 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that the plaintiff officer's objections to the quota were not protected by the First Amendment because refusing to comply with the quota does not constitute expressive conduct).

¹⁷⁴ See, e.g., *Statewide Univ. Police Ass'n v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ.*, B290293, 2020 WL 2213040, at *5–6 (Cal. Ct. App. May 7, 2020) (finding no violation of the state's quota statute where personal evaluation "comment cards" offering feedback on the lack of parking enforcement citations were not punitive in nature); *Oliverio v. Butler Univ.*, No. 15-cv-01630, 2017 WL 1650501, at *9 (S.D. Ind. May 2, 2017) (rejecting plaintiff's invocation of the respondent's quota requirement for parking tickets as not relevant because he was arrested for battery); *Matarazzo v. Safir*, 689 N.Y.S.2d 494, 495 (App. Div. 1999) (dismissing claim because petitioners gave no indication of how many tickets petitioners had to write and the only evidence offered was from two supervising officers from two different precincts who directed the individual petitioners to perform duties, during their meal breaks, that were likely to result in the issuance of tickets); *Commonwealth v. McClellan*, 45 Pa. D. & C.3d 627, 628 (C.P. Chester 1987) (rejecting defendant's affirmative quota defense because he only offered budget statements that showed projected revenues, which the court argued did not establish the existence of a quota system).

¹⁷⁵ 33 F. App'x 45, 47 (4th Cir. 2002).

¹⁷⁶ The plaintiffs also raised relatively unpersuasive claims under the Due Process clause, the Privileges and Immunities clause, and the Fourth Amendment. See *id.* at 47, 49.

¹⁷⁷ See *Fussell*, *supra* note 31.

police officers to “engage” people whether or not they were suspected of wrongdoing.¹⁷⁸ The directed patrol program consisted of “a structured 15–20 minute deployment into a targeted area to accomplish a specific patrol or crime reduction function.”¹⁷⁹ The contacts were to be tracked and recorded, and officers on regular patrol were expected to perform a minimum of eighteen contacts.¹⁸⁰ According to plaintiffs, failure to comply with these numerical requirements was cause for disciplinary action.¹⁸¹ The City argued that the program was not a quota because it required police-civilian interactions and not arrests or citations.¹⁸² The Third Circuit relied on the text of the statute and, in a short analysis, agreed.¹⁸³ *Fraternal Order* is a paradigmatic example of how a police department can circumvent a statutory prohibition on quotas by focusing on precursory activity such as stops and contacts.

Another failed litigation challenge highlights the sophisticated ways through which police departments can subvert quota statutes. In *Phillipsburg Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n Local No. 56 v. Township of Phillipsburg*, a local police union challenged a township’s “self-directed patrol index policy,” which created a point system to evaluate police officers.¹⁸⁴ The index assigned different values to different kinds of arrests and citations:

- 4 Points - Narcotics arrests (4 points per subject arrested)
- 4 Points - Burglary and theft arrests
- 3 Points - Warrant arrests (1 subject, multiple warrants = 3 points)
- 2 Points - All moving motor vehicle summonses
- 2 Points - Quality of life summonses (e.g., excessive noise, alcohol related offenses, and animal offenses)
- 2 Points - Other arrests (e.g., disorderly conduct, domestic violence offense; 2 points per subject)
- 2 Points - Unsecured business found (report completed)
- 1 Point - All other town ordinance violations
- 1 Point - Hazardous conditions reported (report must be completed for incident)
- 1 Point - All parking tickets

¹⁷⁸ 842 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 2016).

¹⁷⁹ *Id.*

¹⁸⁰ *Id.*

¹⁸¹ *Id.*

¹⁸² *Id.* at 237.

¹⁸³ *Id.* at 239.

¹⁸⁴ *Phillipsburg Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n Local No. 56 v. Twp. of Phillipsburg*, A-5016-12T3, 2014 WL 8765463, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 5, 2015).

- 1/2 Point - For every two individual community policing contacts per tour of duty (4 contacts = 2 points, 6 contacts = 3 points, etc.)¹⁸⁵

Officers who received an index of two or more points received an exceptional performance evaluation.¹⁸⁶ The union argued that the policy undermined the state's prohibition on quotas, and the trial court agreed.¹⁸⁷

The appellate court struggled because the statute's language only prohibited traffic violations and arrests and, according to the Township, officers could achieve an excellent evaluation without resorting to either.¹⁸⁸ The court acknowledged that the policy "does not, on its face, require quotas" but went on to find that the "defendants cannot avoid the statutory prohibition by crafting a carefully worded policy that does not, when read literally, violate a statutory mandate, but does so when implemented."¹⁸⁹ It added, "if it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck."¹⁹⁰ Notwithstanding the court's acknowledgment of possible subterfuge, it reversed the trial court's conclusion that the policy constituted an illegal quota.¹⁹¹ As I explain in more detail in Part IV, decisions like *Fraternal Order* and *Phillipsburg* are more than simple losses for police unions. They demonstrate how quota statutes can be evaded in ways that harm the public and frustrate efforts to reign in police malfeasance.

D. Settlements

Social norms, legal hurdles, and an unfavorable jurisprudential landscape are features of quota litigation, but so are settlements. Government settlements with officers and civilians have touched various parts of the country—from small cities to big cities—and have ranged from five-figure to eight-figure payouts.¹⁹² Though settlements often come with the qualification that they are not admissions of guilt, they provide a provisional glimpse behind the "blue wall" that quotas sometimes operate behind. Settlements typically come after courts reject motions by governments to dispense with litigation, leaving a body of law that may be useful for future challenges. At a bare min-

¹⁸⁵ *Id.*

¹⁸⁶ *Id.*

¹⁸⁷ *Id.* at *2.

¹⁸⁸ *Id.* at *3.

¹⁸⁹ *Id.*

¹⁹⁰ *Id.*

¹⁹¹ *Id.* at *4.

¹⁹² *See supra* note 26.

imum, settlements reveal how much a jurisdiction wants to avoid litigating their public insistence that they do not use quotas.

New York City, the jurisdiction with the country's largest police force,¹⁹³ has struggled with quota allegations and doled out the most in settlements. Adrian Schoolcraft—the involuntarily committed officer discussed above—survived a motion for summary judgment after a federal judge ruled that his speech was protected because he spoke as a citizen. Shortly thereafter, the City of New York settled with Schoolcraft for \$600,000.¹⁹⁴ That same year, the City settled with Craig Matthews, an NYPD officer who complained that his Bronx precinct had competitions for who could make the most arrests, conduct the most stop-and-frisks, and issue the most summonses.¹⁹⁵ The Second Circuit ruled that Matthews's speech was protected by the First Amendment and the City subsequently settled with Matthews for \$280,000 to avoid further litigation.¹⁹⁶

A little less than a year later, after a federal judge certified a class of defendants subject to quota-based policing and subsequently imposed sanctions on the NYPD for destroying relevant evidence, the City of New York settled with the class for \$75 million.¹⁹⁷ Under the settlement, the City agreed to reiterate its policy that quotas were illegal and that supervisors who implemented them could be subject to discipline.¹⁹⁸ In *Floyd v. City of New York*, the famous “stop and frisk” decision, quotas were a significant theme.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹³ SHELLEY S. HYLAND & ELIZABETH DAVIS, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2016: PERSONNEL 3 (2019), <https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd16p.pdf> (noting that in 2016, New York City had the largest local police department with more than three times the number of employees than any other department).

¹⁹⁴ Goodman, *supra* note 26.

¹⁹⁵ *Mathias v. City of New York*, 779 F.3d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 2015); *see also* Christopher Mathias, *NYC to Pay \$280,000 Over Cop Who Exposed City's Quota System*, HUFFPOST (Dec. 7, 2015, 3:48 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/craig-matthews-nypd-quotas_n_5665cab8e4b072e9d1c6d86b.

¹⁹⁶ Mathias, *supra* note 195.

¹⁹⁷ *See* *Stinson v. City of New York*, No. 10 Civ. 4228, 2016 WL 54684, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2016) (describing how the City failed to issue a litigation hold until three years after the complaint was filed, maintained a policy that provided for the destruction of evidence, destroyed materials related to CompStat meetings, destroyed activity reports, failed to preserve text messages, produced few responsive documents, was “grossly negligent,” and acted in “bad faith”); Benjamin Weiser, *New York City to Pay Up to \$75 Million Over Dismissed Summonses*, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/nyregion/new-york-city-agrees-to-settlement-over-summonses-that-were-dismissed.html>.

¹⁹⁸ Weiser, *supra* note 197.

¹⁹⁹ *Floyd v. City of New York*, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 596–602 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (analyzing the pressure that quotas impart on officers to increase their stop numbers); *see also* Jenn Rolnick Borchetta, *Continuing to Reform the NYPD's Stop and Frisk Practice*, DEMOS (Feb. 16, 2016), <https://www.demos.org/blog/continuing-reform-nypds-stop-and-frisk-practice> (noting the NYPD norm of officers being judged “on how many stops they do”).

On the other side of the country, the City of Los Angeles has paid millions in settlements to police officers who claim that the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) illegally required them to comply with ticket quotas. All of the settlements derive from allegations that Captain Nancy Lauer ordered officers to write at least eighteen traffic tickets each shift and required that eighty percent of citations be for major violations.²⁰⁰ Officers who did not comply would be denied overtime or receive undesirable work assignments.²⁰¹ Despite the City's claim that the number was a goal and not a mandate, a jury awarded two officers over \$1 million in damages.²⁰² Two years later, the City agreed to pay a settlement of almost \$6 million to eleven police officers in a separate lawsuit over the same quota system.²⁰³ In 2016, the City paid \$950,000 to a former officer who also claimed that he was retaliated against for not participating in a ticket quota system.²⁰⁴ Most recently, the City of Whittier, located in Los Angeles County, settled for \$3 million with six officers who refused to participate in an arrest quota scheme.²⁰⁵

Miami Gardens, which has the largest Black population in Florida and has been called the “stop-and-frisk capital of America,”²⁰⁶ has produced two settlements tied to quota-based policing. The first involved Earl Sampson, a Black man who was stopped more than four hundred times between 2008 and 2013, often for trespassing at his place of work.²⁰⁷ Sampson led a class of Black and Latinx defendants who sued the City of Miami Gardens, arguing that the City's police department violated their constitutional rights by adhering to a racialized system of quota-based policing that led officers to selectively stop and frisk Black males ages fifteen to thirty.²⁰⁸ A few weeks after a

²⁰⁰ Joel Rubin & Catherine Saillant, *LAPD to Pay \$10 Million in Traffic Ticket Quota Controversy*, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2013, 12:00 AM), <https://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/10/local/la-me-ln-ticket-quota-20131210>.

²⁰¹ *Id.*

²⁰² Special Verdict, *Chan v. City of Los Angeles*, No. BC 418750 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 11, 2011); Andrew Blankstein & Joel Rubin, *LAPD Officers Who Complained About Ticket Quotas Are Awarded \$2 Million*, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2011, 12:00 AM), <https://www.latimes.com/local/la-xpm-2011-apr-12-la-me-ticket-quotas-20110412-story.html>.

²⁰³ Rubin & Saillant, *supra* note 200.

²⁰⁴ Branson-Potts & Reyes, *supra* note 26.

²⁰⁵ Sprague, *supra* note 26; *see also* Rivera v. City of Whittier, No. BC574443, 2017 WL 3579659, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 7, 2017) (evaluating the six plaintiffs' claims that they had been retaliated against for whistleblowing the existence of an illegal quota).

²⁰⁶ Meg O'Connor, *Inside 'The Stop-and-Frisk Capital of America,'* APPEAL (Feb. 21, 2019), <https://theappeal.org/inside-the-stop-and-frisk-capital-of-america>.

²⁰⁷ *Id.*

²⁰⁸ *Sampson v. City of Miami Gardens*, No. 13-CV-24312, 2015 WL 11202372, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 27, 2015).

federal court declined a motion for summary judgment on those issues, the City settled with the plaintiffs for an undisclosed amount.²⁰⁹

During the litigation and subsequent settlement, a dispute about the use of quotas took place inside the police department. Wanda Gilbert, a Black crime analyst responsible for the police department's statistics, grew concerned about dubious arrests and quota-based policing that she claimed were tied to five percent yearly raises.²¹⁰ She corroborated the testimony in the *Sampson* litigation and claimed that the Black police chief, Matthew Boyd, directed officers "to stop all Black males between the ages of 15 and 30 years old."²¹¹ She also described how "boys as young as seven," and adolescents "riding their bikes home from school" were accosted by police.²¹² Gilbert wrote multiple memos to Boyd and met with City administrators, who told her not to put her concerns in writing because they would become public record.²¹³ She was fired after she wrote a final memo in 2011 protesting the department's practices. After Gilbert's own protracted legal battles, which made their way to the Eleventh Circuit, the City settled with her for approximately \$1 million.²¹⁴

Quota-based policing can also be fatal, as was the case in Atlanta when police officers killed an elderly woman during an illegal raid of her home. Officers in the Atlanta Police Department's narcotics unit, operating under a quota, pulled a gun on a man they had previously arrested, planted marijuana on him, and demanded that he tell them where they could find drugs.²¹⁵ He made up an address, which happened to be the residence of ninety-two-year-old Kathryn Johnston and had a wheelchair ramp in the front.²¹⁶ The officers made false statements to a magistrate judge to secure a no-knock search warrant.²¹⁷ They could not kick down the security gate, so they used a pry bar and a battering ram during the nighttime raid.²¹⁸ Johnston lived

²⁰⁹ See Order and Notice of Settlement, *Sampson v. City of Miami Gardens*, No. 13-CV-24312 (S.D. Fla. June 23, 2015), ECF No. 228.

²¹⁰ See Charles Rabin, *She Was Fired After Speaking Out About Bad Arrests. She Sued and Just Won \$1 Million*, MIAMI HERALD (Dec. 4, 2018, 6:01 PM), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/crime/article222442315.html>.

²¹¹ Heather Dunhill, *Retired Crime Analyst Wanda F. Gilbert on Police Reform and Growing Up in Segregated South Florida*, SARASOTA MAG. (Aug. 17, 2020, 11:42 AM), <https://www.sarasotamagazine.com/news-and-profiles/2020/08/wanda-f-gilbert>.

²¹² *Id.*

²¹³ *Id.*

²¹⁴ Rabin, *supra* note 210.

²¹⁵ Radley Balko, *The Militarization of America's Police Forces*, 11 CATO'S LETTER 1, 1–2 (2013).

²¹⁶ Ted Conover, *A Snitch's Dilemma*, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 29, 2012), <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/magazine/alex-white-professional-snitch.html>.

²¹⁷ *Id.*

²¹⁸ *Id.*

alone in a dangerous neighborhood, where an elderly neighbor was recently raped.²¹⁹ She fired one shot, which provoked 39 shots by the officers, some of which ultimately killed her.²²⁰ After the shooting, the officers searched the home, found no drugs, and subsequently planted three bags of marijuana they had seized earlier that day in Johnston's basement.²²¹ Afterward, the officers conspired to fabricate a story that they then shared with homicide investigators.²²² An FBI investigation found that the narcotics unit had a performance quota of nine arrests per month.²²³ In her sentencing of the three officers, U.S. District Judge Julie Carnes concluded that the pressure to adhere to the quotas played a role in the killing.²²⁴ The City of Atlanta ultimately awarded a \$4.9 million settlement to the family of Kathryn Johnston.²²⁵

It would be a mistake to understand quota settlements as a big city phenomenon. Some of these settlements have surfaced in small towns across the country. Local governments have settled cases involving allegations of quota-based policing in the City of Mendham in central New Jersey,²²⁶ Smyrna, Delaware,²²⁷ Lehighton, Pennsylvania,²²⁸ Novi, Michigan,²²⁹ Byrnes Mills, Missouri,²³⁰ and the central California city of Paso Robles.²³¹ Financially, law professors Joanna Schwartz and John Rappaport have explained how these kinds

²¹⁹ *Id.*

²²⁰ *Id.*

²²¹ *Third Atlanta Police Officer Pleads Guilty in Fatal Shooting of Elderly Woman*, DEPT. OF JUST. (Oct. 30, 2008), <https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/October/08-crt-972.html>.

²²² *Id.*

²²³ Bill Rankin, *Ex-Cops Get 5–10 Years for Drug Raid – Judge Agrees Atlanta Police Quotas Influenced Officers' Behavior*, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 25, 2009, at C1.

²²⁴ *Id.*

²²⁵ Ernie Suggs, *City to Pay Slain Woman's Family \$4.9 Million*, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Aug. 11, 2012), <https://www.ajc.com/news/local/city-pay-slain-woman-family-million/GWqsgDARzmOhvpb7iPY6FI>.

²²⁶ See Wright, *supra* note 26.

²²⁷ *ACLU Reaches Settlement with Smyrna Police over Wrongful Arrests*, ACLU (Feb. 19, 2015), <https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-reaches-settlement-smyrna-police-over-wrongful-arrests>.

²²⁸ See Hall, *supra* note 49.

²²⁹ See Phillips, *supra* note 26.

²³⁰ See Robert Patrick & Jeremy Kohler, *Former Byrnes Mill Police Chief Stole \$12,800 from Suspects, Feds Say*, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/former-byrnes-mill-police-chief-stole-from-suspects-feds-say/article_faa278bd-25ef-5a8d-953a-534bc11f62c0.html.

²³¹ See Scott Brennan, *City Pays \$125,000 to Settle Lawsuit over Ticket Quotas*, PASO ROBLES DAILY NEWS (Mar. 24, 2014, 8:23 PM), <https://pasoroblesdailynews.com/city-pays-125000-settle-lawsuit-ticket-quotas/15896>.

of settlements can be consequential for smaller jurisdictions.²³² Socially, such settlements—which circulate in mainstream media outlets as well as in local papers of the day—can lead to the kinds of distrust in police that exists in bigger cities. The crucial difference is that many of these localities are not freighted by the same racial politics of large urban cities.²³³ The geographical diversity of these settlements highlights how disputes about quota-based policing impact not only racial minorities—the presumed subjects of mass incarceration—but a broader and unassuming public.

Overall, one can glean a few themes from the legal challenges to police quotas discussed in this Part. First, many hurdles preclude these cases from being meaningfully heard by courts. Some obstacles reflect the general “closing of the courthouse doors” to civil rights litigants and criminal defendants.²³⁴ Other impediments, like the code of silence, are specific to police culture and jurisprudence. Second, cases that do make it to a trial on the merits are still unlikely to win. Third, and relatedly, quota litigation is especially likely to settle. Settlements sit alongside victories, allegations, memoirs, police recordings, and criminological scholarship that all point to the existence of police quotas. With the definitional, statutory, and jurisprudential landscape sketched out, the Article will now turn to consider policy considerations both for and against the practice of police quotas.

III

THE THEORETICAL CONTOURS OF POLICE QUOTAS

Most observers of the criminal justice system typically understand quotas through a pejorative lens. In scholarly literature, robust defenses of quotas are relatively rare. The closest thing to a defense is the claim by criminology scholars and law enforcement officials that police need to be evaluated and monitored in some way. This Part begins by considering the best possible rationales for why quotas

²³² See John Rappaport, *How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police*, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1565–66 (2017) (describing how large municipalities have “broad tax bases and big budgets” that allow them “to absorb the shock of large judgments and settlements that might seriously damage a smaller city”); see also Joanna C. Schwartz, *How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform*, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1174 (2016) (“Smaller jurisdictions will presumably feel the financial effects of lawsuits more acutely.”).

²³³ See KIM PARKER ET AL., PEW RSCH. CTR., WHAT UNITES AND DIVIDES URBAN, SUBURBAN, AND RURAL COMMUNITIES 4 (2018), <https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2018/05/Pew-Research-Center-Community-Type-Full-Report-FINAL.pdf> (describing the racial makeup and attitudes across different types of geographical communities).

²³⁴ See CHEMERINSKY, *supra* note 136 (describing how the Supreme Court’s decisions have resulted in restricted access to the courts for those hoping to enforce their constitutional rights).

might be desirable and defensible. Despite the normative position this Article adopts, it is analytically unsatisfying to oppose police quotas without confronting possible arguments.

Although some of the arguments in favor of quotas are weighty, Section III.B contends there are more compelling reasons on the side of prohibiting them. This Section builds on arguments that have been raised by opponents by offering a more comprehensive view of why quotas constitute bad policy. Moreover, it situates these objections within the definitional, statutory, and jurisprudential context described in Parts I and II. In doing so, Section III.B lays the groundwork for Part IV's normative claims.

A. Defenses

There are at least four possible defenses of quotas that surface in criminology, in the media, and in public statements made by law enforcement officials. The first is that quotas protect against police shirking and idleness. The second is that quotas make the police more productive (e.g., through “performance targets,” “goals,” “expectations”). Both of these defenses assume that there is a specific amount of illegal activity occurring in the world, and that officers should respond to some portion of it. The third defense involves the evaluative utility of quotas and maintains that quotas provide an ostensibly neutral way to assess police performance. The final defense of quotas is rare and accepts the profit-generating nature of policing.

1. Police Idleness

The cultural stereotype of lazy, underactive police officers is tied to a longstanding anxiety about police productivity. Concerns about shirking invoke basic agency theory where police officers act as agents for the principal. It is assumed that police officer-agents, “will shirk their responsibilities when given half a chance.”²³⁵ If they are not “sufficiently monitored or bonded, agents will be lazy or irresponsible—or at least not entirely selfless in their motivations.”²³⁶ Quotas are an attempt to reduce the agency costs that come with police administration. Although concerns about shirking exist across many organizations,²³⁷ these worries have unique expressions in policing. In 1909, Leonhard Fuld, one of the earliest scholars of American urban

²³⁵ Eric W. Orts, *Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm*, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 265, 276–77 (1998).

²³⁶ *Id.*

²³⁷ See generally JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING, AND SABOTAGE: BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSE TO A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC (1997) (studying shirking in federal, state, and local bureaucracies in order to debunk the concept of the “lazy bureaucrat”).

policing, observed that “the policeman’s life is a lazy life . . . as much of his time is spent doing nothing.”²³⁸ Fuld also noted that police are different because “[t]he authority with which they are invested . . . create in them an inordinate desire to shirk their work or, as they themselves express it, ‘to take it easy.’”²³⁹ NYPD spokesman Al O’Leary captured this sentiment in the 1990s. When six transit cops donned nooses at a news conference to protest their “bondage” to quotas, O’Leary lambasted: “If the union is suggesting we should go back to the days of coffee-drinking, doughnut eating, do-nothing cops, then they’re way out of sync with policing today.”²⁴⁰

Most defenses of quotas reject the formal label but embrace the idea of evaluating officers because of a concern about laziness. When Atlanta Police Chief Richard Pennington rejected the idea that his department utilized quotas, he conceded to maintaining a related euphemism and admitted, “Yes, we have performance measures in the Atlanta Police Department. We have to have performance measures because if we don’t have them, the officers would come in every day with nothing on their sheets.”²⁴¹ Departments certainly cannot eliminate shirking, but quotas can address this concern by demanding a minimum amount of law enforcement activity while utilizing employment sanctions to ensure compliance. Considering the significant amount of money spent on policing,²⁴² it is reasonable to expect some minimum output level, whether in the seemingly mundane realm of traffic enforcement or the more serious world of arrests.²⁴³

²³⁸ LEONHARD FELIX FULD, *POLICE ADMINISTRATION: A CRITICAL STUDY OF POLICE ORGANISATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD* 91 (2d ed. 1910).

²³⁹ *Id.* at 48–49.

²⁴⁰ Dean Chang, *Tix Quota No Token Rule: TA Cops*, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 17, 1992, at 15.

²⁴¹ Brenda Goodman, *Atlanta’s Mayor Defends Chief Against Misconduct Accusations*, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2007), <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/01/us/01atlanta.html>.

²⁴² See Niall McCarthy, *How Much Are U.S. Cities Spending on Policing in 2020?*, FORBES (June 12, 2020, 5:21 AM), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2020/06/12/how-much-are-us-cities-spending-on-policing-in-2020-infographic> (stating that police budgets run as high as billions of dollars in several major cities in the United States, including New York (\$5.61 billion), Los Angeles (\$1.73 billion), and Chicago (\$1.68 billion)).

²⁴³ See generally CHARLES R. EPP, STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY & DONALD P. HAIDER-MARKEL, *PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP* (2014) (describing the impact of police stops on racial disparities and perceptions of citizenship in the United States); Anna Roberts, *Arrests as Guilt*, 70 ALA. L. REV. 987 (2019) (examining the consequences of arrests and the implicit fusion of arrests and guilt); Rachel A. Harmon, *Why Arrest?*, 115 MICH. L. REV. 307 (2016) (arguing against the outsized role arrests play in policing); Eisha Jain, *Arrests as Regulation*, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2015) (examining how arrests are systematically used as a regulatory tool outside of the criminal justice system).

2. Productivity

Ensuring sufficient police activity is another rationale for quotas.²⁴⁴ While related to idleness, this defense is premised on the idea that there is a certain amount of illegal activity in the world (i.e., traffic violations or criminal offenses) and that officers should attend to some portion of it.²⁴⁵ Lieutenant Colonel Kelly of Chesterfield County, located outside of Richmond, Virginia, captured this sentiment when he stated, “Our officers are on the road 12 hours a day, so, if in a 12-hour period of time they stop three cars, I don’t think that’s unfairly targeting our citizens.”²⁴⁶ Productivity rationales also ostensibly ensure the fair distribution of work within a police force.²⁴⁷ An officer in Georgia recently recounted how one of his colleagues refused to answer calls or provide backup to other officers, and admitted that the department would “need a quota system to get a guy like that moving or he’d just park his car and sleep.”²⁴⁸

To make this productivity rationale more concrete, consider the case of drunk driving. Although Americans generally agree that driving while drunk is wrong and dangerous, many still tolerate it.²⁴⁹ Setting aside real and often consequential issues of implementation,²⁵⁰ as a general matter, one might argue that the careful dedication of police resources to drunk driving is uncontroversial. It would also be

²⁴⁴ See Bronstein, *supra* note 21, at 551–53.

²⁴⁵ See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DEP’T OF TRANSP., 2 MANUAL FOR POLICE TRAFFIC SERVICES PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SYSTEM 1 (1977) (“Productivity is not another name for ‘quotas.’ Productivity refers to measures of job performance to be used in comparison to expected levels of performance.”).

²⁴⁶ Melissa Hipolit, *Former Police Officer Exposes Chesterfield’s Ticket Quota Goals*, WTVR (July 15, 2014, 6:04 AM), <https://wtvr.com/2014/07/14/chesterfield-quota-investigation>.

²⁴⁷ See ATLANTA CITIZEN REV. BD., STUDY AND INQUIRY INTO THE ATLANTA POLICE DEPARTMENT’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE DEATH OF MS. KATHRYN JOHNSTON 24 (2010) (“A manager must ensure that officers are working and the work is fairly distributed.”).

²⁴⁸ Bill Torpy, *Did DeKalb’s Cops Have Arrest and Ticket Quotas?*, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Oct. 2, 2016), <https://www.ajc.com/news/local/bill-torpy-large-did-dekalb-cops-have-arrest-and-ticket-quotas/GxkflThnOJlUaFTSQ5Fd7N>.

²⁴⁹ See generally BARRON H. LERNER, ONE FOR THE ROAD: DRUNK DRIVING SINCE 1900 (2011) (tracing the history of drunk driving and efforts to stop it); JAMES B. JACOBS, DRUNK DRIVING: AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1989) (analyzing Americans’ drunk driving problem and anti-drunk driving policies); Fredrick Kunkle, *Americans Are Still Way Too Tolerant of Drunken Driving*, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2016, 8:02 AM) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/tripping/wp/2016/08/31/americans-are-still-way-too-tolerant-of-drunk-driving-safety-advocates-say> (discussing the problem of drunk driving in the United States today).

²⁵⁰ Implementation questions are related but not necessarily fatal to this rationale; instead such administrative issues—which unavoidably implicate questions of race, poverty, gender, and sexual orientation—can be attended to by training, oversight, and compliance.

reasonable to expect results, particularly in places where drunk driving is likely to occur (e.g., large sporting events) or during times of the year when people may be more willing to drink and drive (e.g., holidays). The absence of a numerical goal or a threat of adverse employment action would render this enforcement priority an empty mandate. For supporters of this defense, ticket quotas raise the stakes.

3. Evaluation

One might also argue that quotas can be useful for evaluative purposes. Various arguments are available on this front. First, as a general matter, employment-based, numerical expectations are unremarkable. In its discussion of quotas, the Atlanta Citizen Review Board explained, “Production quotas are a common part of modern life. Almost all of us work at jobs where [sic] we have explicit or implicit numerical goals.”²⁵¹ The power to arrest and a legally sanctioned monopoly over violence differentiate police from typical employees, but it is not obvious that these extraordinary powers should exempt law enforcement from standard models of employer evaluation. In fact, such an exemption might add another layer to “police exceptionalism,” much to the chagrin of criminal justice reformers.²⁵² Defenders of quotas might argue that numbers-based imperatives should not be the *only* standards for evaluating police officers, but they would certainly include quotas among them. They would likely point to the fact that many statutes expressly prohibit law enforcement from relying exclusively on numbers when assessing officers.²⁵³ This argument for the evaluative utility of quotas focuses on the standard nature of numbers-based evaluations in the employment world and highlights the need to consider numbers alongside other factors.

Besides the normalcy of quantitative requirements in work settings, evaluation-based defenses of quotas also focus on their perceived tangibility and neutrality. On the former, Joe Giacalone, a former New York City law enforcement officer who defends the use

²⁵¹ ATLANTA CITIZEN REV. BD., *supra* note 247, at 22.

²⁵² See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, *Democratic Policing*, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1843 (2015) (“Policing agencies—for that is what they are, agencies of executive government—fail to play by the rules of administrative governance.”).

²⁵³ See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-181.2 (West, Westlaw through L.2020, c.126 and J.R. No. 2) (“The department or force shall not use the number of arrests or citations issued by a law enforcement officer as the sole criterion for promotion, demotion, dismissal, or the earning of any benefit provided by the department or force.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-187.3 (West, Westlaw through S.L. 2020-97 of 2020 Reg. Sess.) (“Pay and promotions of members of the Highway Patrol shall be based on their overall job performance and not on the basis of the volume of citations issued or arrests made.”).

of quantitative benchmarks, claims that “[t]here are very few ways we can evaluate police officers’ activity.”²⁵⁴ Since it is impossible to “count how many times [police officers] shake someone’s hand on the street,” Giacalone is unbothered by critiques of quotas and insists that “it’s written in the job description to make arrests and write summons.”²⁵⁵ Alongside this results-oriented approach to policing is the idea that quotas are straightforward and empirically superior to subjective assessments. Indeed, criminologists have acknowledged that quotas are sometimes justified because “such numbers are easy to calculate and compare.”²⁵⁶ Some describe these quantitative metrics as less vulnerable to the idiosyncrasies of police management.²⁵⁷

The idea of objectivity is significant because promotion in policing is notoriously nepotistic and subject to interpersonal politics.²⁵⁸ Quotas, it could be argued, provide a more impersonal way to assess employee productivity and address longstanding concerns about diversity in law enforcement.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁴ George Joseph, *NYPD Commander’s Text Messages Show How the Quota System Persists*, APPEAL (Dec. 12, 2018), <https://theappeal.org/nypd-commanders-text-messages-show-how-the-quota-system-persists>.

²⁵⁵ *Id.*

²⁵⁶ STEVEN M. COX, SUSAN MARCHIONNA & BRIAN D. FITCH, INTRODUCTION TO POLICING 243–44 (3d ed. 2017).

²⁵⁷ See FRANK J. LANDY, PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL IN POLICE DEPARTMENTS 6 (1977) (“One of the major issues in performance measurement is the nature of the information gathered Most critics of subjective or judgmental performance evaluation imply that the judgment made by the supervisor is more related to personal idiosyncrasies than to the behavior of the person being rated.”).

²⁵⁸ See THOMAS J. GRADEL & DICK SIMPSON, CORRUPT ILLINOIS: PATRONAGE, CRONYISM, AND CRIMINALITY 136 (2015) (discussing how a Chicago police officer failed to receive a promotion for failing to follow the directions of a corrupt local politician); STEVEN LEINEN, BLACK POLICE, WHITE SOCIETY 136 (1984) (discussing how promotion for detectives in the NYPD relied on both quantitative factors (number of arrests), and the leveraging of personal connections (“having ‘sponsors’ or ‘personal contacts’ on the job”)); Andrea Shalal & Jonathan Landay, *Black Cops Say Discrimination, Nepotism Behind U.S. Police Race Gap*, REUTERS (July 2, 2020, 10:28 AM), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-minneapolis-police-blackofficers/black-cops-say-discrimination-nepotism-behind-u-s-police-race-gap-idUSKBN2432T8> (stating that discrimination in hiring and promotion has hampered Black representation in police forces in the United States).

²⁵⁹ On diversity, see MANGAI NATARAJAN, WOMEN POLICE IN A CHANGING SOCIETY: BACK DOOR TO EQUALITY (2008) (describing the development of women police over the past twenty years); DAVID E. BARLOW & MELISSA HICKMAN BARLOW, POLICE IN A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY: AN AMERICAN STORY (2018) (describing the role that social, political, and economic relationships have played in the historical development of the police); see generally David Alan Sklansky, *Not Your Father’s Police Department: Making Sense of the New Demographics of Law Enforcement*, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209 (2006) (describing the recent dramatic shift in the demographics of police departments).

4. Revenue Generation

The image of mercenary police officers seizing civilians to meet quantitative goals is unsavory and makes explicitly revenue-based defenses of quotas rare. However, administrative practices across the country reveal an undeniable fact: law enforcement helps generate money for municipal coffers. This stark reality became clear in Nevada a few years ago, when state legislators vigorously protested the decriminalization of traffic tickets.²⁶⁰ They argued that such an action would lead to an annual loss of \$33 million in the counties of Washoe and Reno.²⁶¹

The profitability of law enforcement also helps explain why cities get nervous when police officers engage in purposeful work slow downs. Public safety is an issue, but so is money. “Cops not writing summonses is usually very effective” and garners immediate attention “because it affects the city finances greatly.”²⁶² Perhaps the most obscene version of policing for profit was the well-documented debacle in Ferguson, Missouri, where the federal government found that revenue, rather than public safety needs, shaped the city’s racially discriminatory policing.²⁶³ Defenders of revenue-based policing might concede that profit-motivated arrest quotas are indefensible and instead limit their defense to quotas for traffic tickets and violations, which represent the core feature of all anti-quota statutes and pending bills.²⁶⁴

A revenue-based defense of police quotas would highlight the fact that, in many jurisdictions, revenue from traffic violations helps finance socially valuable goods. Pennsylvania imposes a two-dollar surcharge on traffic violations that goes to its Access to Justice Account, which funds civil legal services in the state.²⁶⁵ A recent California law imposes a four-dollar fee on moving violations to support emergency air medical services.²⁶⁶ In a driver-friendly state with

²⁶⁰ James DeHaven, *Do Traffic Tickets Unfairly Hurt the Poor? Nevada Lawmakers Eyeing Traffic Law Reforms*, RENO GAZETTE-J. (Dec. 21, 2017, 4:42 PM), <https://www.rgj.com/story/news/politics/2017/12/21/do-traffic-tickets-unfairly-hurt-poor-nevada-lawmakers-again-eyeing-traffic-law-reforms-despite-city/975423001>.

²⁶¹ *Id.*

²⁶² Haven Orecchio-Egresitz, *Police Have Traditionally Protested Anti-Police Rhetoric by Making Fewer Arrests. Right Now That’s Exactly What the Public Wants*, INSIDER (June 16, 2020, 1:41 PM), <https://www.insider.com/police-have-historically-protested-by-making-fewer-arrests-its-become-2020-6>.

²⁶³ See Ferguson Report, *supra* note 17.

²⁶⁴ See *infra* Appendices A & B.

²⁶⁵ 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3733.1(c)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess. Act 95).

²⁶⁶ *Governor Signs Bipartisan Bill to Extend Funding for Emergency Air Medical Services*, PR NEWswire (Oct. 8, 2019, 2:42 PM), <https://www.prnewswire.com/news->

the country's largest population, this surcharge directly helps the critical victims of automobile accidents²⁶⁷ and improves services to rural residents who need critical care in urban centers.²⁶⁸ Surcharges for traffic violations in New Jersey fund research on spinal cord repair, brain injury, and autism treatment.²⁶⁹ In Michigan during the 2017-2018 fiscal year, penal fine revenues, including fines from traffic tickets, generated approximately \$24.6 million, with \$24.2 million distributed to public libraries and \$392,800 distributed to law libraries.²⁷⁰ Notably, all of these states have quota prohibitions on the books.²⁷¹ Government benefits derived from traffic violations, defenders would argue, are not extraordinary.

With this reality of government-generated profit in mind, a defender of quotas would argue that the remaining issue is whether quotas are an ideal way to actualize the subsidies that flow out of traffic laws. This is a question of tradeoffs.

Many jurisdictions rely on these kinds of cross-subsidies because of the legislative and electoral unpopularity of raising taxes. Jeff Cumins, a political scientist and expert in state budgets, captures this problem: "Legislators can get creative in ways to find revenue. Particularly in the last decades we've been in an anti-tax orientation, and so this is one way to raise money for legislators' pet projects and programs."²⁷² Funding by traffic violations is particularly salient in rural parts of the country as well as states in the southeast, where research has shown that jurisdictions have an unusually high reliance on fees and fines.²⁷³ These localities have small property tax bases and collect fewer sales taxes than their urban counterparts because of relatively lower commerce.²⁷⁴ Thus, "[e]ven when the ethical and fiscal problems with financing government through fines are apparent,

releases/governor-signs-bipartisan-bill-to-extend-funding-for-emergency-air-medical-services-300934138.html; CAL. GOV'T CODE § 76000.10(c)(1) (West, Westlaw through ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.).

²⁶⁷ § 76000.10(e)(1).

²⁶⁸ *Governor Signs Bipartisan Bill to Extend Funding for Emergency Air Medical Services*, *supra* note 266.

²⁶⁹ Laura Herzog, *We Paid \$405M in Tickets Last Year; See Where the Money Went*, NJ.COM (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.nj.com/news/2016/05/where_your_ticket_payment_money_goes_funds_new_jer.html.

²⁷⁰ MICHIGAN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FISCAL AGENCY, FISCAL BRIEF: TRAFFIC CITATION REVENUE 5 (2019), https://www.house.mi.gov/hfa/pdf/alpha/fiscal_brief_traffic_citation_revenue.pdf.

²⁷¹ *See infra* Appendix A.

²⁷² Liz Gonzalez, *Special Report: Why Traffic Tickets in California Are So High*, FOX26 NEWS (Apr. 29, 2019), <https://kmpm.com/news/local/special-report-why-traffic-tickets-in-california-are-so-high>.

²⁷³ *See* Maciag, *supra* note 5.

²⁷⁴ *Id.*

viable alternatives remain hard to find.”²⁷⁵ Defenders of quota-based policing would contend that such regimes are just one part of a larger set of tradeoffs when policymakers are considering how to diversify money streams. They would argue that this version of policing should be openly debated and carefully considered instead of categorically rejected based on grotesque examples. Implementation and the specter of discrimination still loom, but defenders of quotas would maintain that these issues are analytically distinct and correctable.²⁷⁶

B. Counterarguments

Law enforcement, scholars of policing, critics of the police, and the media have all offered insights that quickly dispense with some of these rationales for quotas. This subsection supplements these insights with new objections. It offers a point-by-point refutation of the above-described defenses of quotas—some of which are compelling at first glance but suffer from practical and empirical problems.

1. *The Allure of Activity*

First, quota-based policing does not guard against shirking. Quotas may produce law enforcement activity, but officers who want to shirk will still find ways to cut corners even when there are quotas in place designed to keep them productive.²⁷⁷ Consider the cases of Blaine Morgan and Michael Baker, two police officers in Charleston, South Carolina. Both officers disclosed that they falsified traffic tickets in an effort “to boost their respective citations totals” and subsequently resigned.²⁷⁸ Their scam involved writing bogus traffic tickets without motorists’ knowledge.²⁷⁹ The officers had the tickets dismissed because they had no intention of following through on them in court. But, as one news article said at the time, “one of the officers apparently slipped up. He did not dismiss a ticket in time for court

²⁷⁵ Matt Ford, *The Problem with Funding Government Through Fines*, ATLANTIC (Apr. 2, 2015), <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-problem-with-funding-government-through-fines/389387>.

²⁷⁶ See *supra* note 249.

²⁷⁷ See TOM BARKER, POLICE ETHICS: CRISIS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 131 (3d ed. 2011) (“Supervisors who impose quotas . . . increase the risks that officers will cut corners or bend the laws . . . to meet the quotas”); ROGER G. DUNHAM & GEOFFREY P. ALPERT, CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING: CONTEMPORARY READINGS 207 (7th ed. 2015) (“Management practices may encourage corruption by imposing pressures for arrest quotas or make it acceptable to cut corners to effect arrests.”).

²⁷⁸ Michael Majchrowicz, *2nd Charleston Police Officer Who Falsified Traffic Tickets Resigns from Department*, POST & COURIER (Sept. 14, 2019), https://www.postandcourier.com/news/2nd-charleston-police-officer-who-falsified-traffic-tickets-resigns-from-department/article_16b6279e-a334-11e9-a925-87076f916396.html.

²⁷⁹ *Id.*

and the driver was notified.”²⁸⁰ After Officer Morgan resigned; the Charleston Police Department admitted that Morgan artificially inflated the number of tickets written in an attempt to conceal the fact that he was not actively and appropriately patrolling his area.²⁸¹ This statement casts doubts on whether quotas can mitigate shirking and highlights the perverse incentives they invite.

A similar case involving the termination of a ticket-falsifying, quota-fulfilling officer made it to the Supreme Court of Mississippi. The state fired officer Sammy William Ray for writing “ghost tickets.”²⁸² In a sworn statement, he confessed, “During the time I have been employed with the [Mississippi Department of Public Safety], I have written 20–25 tickets that may or may not be factual tickets This was done to increase my ticket activity.”²⁸³ In an interview where he was questioned about his motives, he unambiguously added, “I was just trying to play a numbers game. You know, just trying to stay out of hot water.”²⁸⁴

A massive overtime abuse scandal in Massachusetts also injects doubt into whether police quotas actually make officers more productive. The overtime scandal dated back to 1996 and involved more than twenty officers in the now-defunct Troop E of the Massachusetts State Police (MSP), which patrolled the Massachusetts Turnpike.²⁸⁵ Prosecutors claimed that officers were “expected to issue a minimum of 8–10 citations” for each shift.²⁸⁶ Inability to meet this requirement “had to be explained to supervisors and command staff,” and “[r]epeated failures to meet this quota often resulted in a trooper being blocked from receiving [such] overtime opportunities.”²⁸⁷

Because MSP received federal funding, the Department of Justice became involved and ultimately charged and convicted eight people of

²⁸⁰ Anne Emerson, *CPD Chief: Full-Scale Investigation into Unwarranted Ticket Writing*, ABC4 NEWS (July 11, 2019), <https://abcnews4.com/news/local/cpd-chief-full-scale-investigation-into-unwarranted-ticket-writing>.

²⁸¹ *Id.*

²⁸² Ray v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 172 So. 3d 182, 184 (Miss. 2015).

²⁸³ *Id.* at 186.

²⁸⁴ *Id.* at 185.

²⁸⁵ Matt Rocheleau, *State Police Overtime Scheme, Illegal Ticket Quota Was Devised by Higher-Ups 20 Years Ago, Former Trooper Says*, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 6, 2020, 8:56 PM), <https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/02/07/metro/state-police-overtime-scheme-ticket-quota-system-stretches-back-20-years-former-trooper-says>.

²⁸⁶ Scott J. Croteau, *Were Mass. State Police Troopers in OT Scandal Told to Fill Ticket Quotas? Agency Denies New Allegation in Federal Court Filing*, MASS. LIVE (Mar. 20, 2019), <https://www.masslive.com/news/2019/03/were-mass-state-police-troopers-in-ot-scandal-told-to-fill-ticket-quotas-agency-denies-new-allegation-in-federal-court-filing.html>.

²⁸⁷ *Id.*

various embezzlement-related charges.²⁸⁸ Quotas were a motivating factor in the overtime scheme. According to one of the Department of Justice's sentencing announcements, the officers "admitted that they had been paid for hours they did not work, and for overtime shifts from which they left early."²⁸⁹ The scheme was so elaborate that the federal judge directed prosecutors to revisit whether the parties should be charged with conspiracy.²⁹⁰

Elsewhere, quota-based policing has led officers to plant crack on innocent people,²⁹¹ lazily dump summonses on clearly abandoned cars,²⁹² cite fictitious drivers,²⁹³ and ticket dead people.²⁹⁴ Such malfeasance is not only in the domain of individual decisionmaking but can shape organizational culture. Police supervisors who require officers to meet quotas are also beholden to numbers in ways that encourage the aforementioned forms of misconduct.²⁹⁵ The absence of empirical scholarship on quota-based shirking, coupled with the exis-

²⁸⁸ See, e.g., U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Mass., *Former Massachusetts State Trooper Sentenced to Three Months in Prison for Overtime Fraud* (Mar. 26, 2019), <https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/former-massachusetts-state-trooper-sentenced-three-months-prison-overtime-fraud>.

²⁸⁹ Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office: District of Mass., *Two Massachusetts State Troopers Sentenced in Overtime Abuse Investigation* (June 4, 2019), <https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/two-massachusetts-state-troopers-sentenced-overtime-abuse-investigation>.

²⁹⁰ Matt Rocheleau, *Judge Orders Federal Prosecutors to Explore Whether State Police OT Scandal Was a 'Conspiracy,'* BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 30, 2020, 3:45 PM), <https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/01/30/metro/judge-wolf-orders-federal-prosecutors-explore-whether-state-police-overtime-scandal-was-conspiracy>.

²⁹¹ See Oren Yaniv, *Ex-Cop Jason Arbeen Cries for Judge, Gets Probation; Judge Gustin Reichbach Could Have Given Him 4 Years*, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 3, 2012), <https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/ex-cop-jason-arbeen-cries-judge-probation-judge-gustin-reichbach-4-years-article-1.1016083>; Press Release, Drug Policy Alliance, *Former NYPD Detective Testifies that Police Regularly Plant Drugs on Innocent People to Meet Arrest Quota* (Oct. 12, 2011), <https://www.drugpolicy.org/news/2011/10/former-nypd-detective-testifies-police-regularly-plant-drugs-innocent-people-meet-arrest>; Jim Dwyer, *The Drugs? They Came from the Police*, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2011), <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/14/nyregion/those-drugs-they-came-from-the-police.html>.

²⁹² ELIZABETH REUSS-IANNI, *TWO CULTURES OF POLICING: STREET COPS AND MANAGEMENT COPS* 112 (1983).

²⁹³ Tom Jackman, *Md. Trooper Wrote DWI Tickets to Fictitious Drivers, Pleads Guilty to Perjury*, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2020, 6:33 AM), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/crime-law/2020/08/06/md-trooper-wrote-dwi-tickets-fictitious-drivers-pleads-guilty-perjury>.

²⁹⁴ Paul Pizzuto, *Ex-NYPD Officer, Says He Ticketed Dead People to Meet Quotas*, HUFFPOST (Sept. 7, 2012, 11:17 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/paul-pizzuto-ex-nypd-officer-ticketed-dead-people-quotas_n_1864310.

²⁹⁵ See Christopher Slobogin, *Testifying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It*, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1044 n.32 (1996) ("[P]olice supervisors, driven by the same crime control and quota pressures that drive field officers, actively encourage testifying.").

tence of widespread evidence of police corruption,²⁹⁶ leads to the reasonable conclusion that these requirements do not incentivize diligent policing and instead contribute to the scourge of wrongful convictions.²⁹⁷

2. *Arbitrariness*

Arbitrariness and inattention to quality foil the expectation that quotas will enhance police productivity. It bears noting that how one measures productivity depends on how one envisions the function of police. The purpose of law enforcement is usually tied to standard conceptions of crime control, public safety, and private property protection. But many critics of the criminal justice system attribute other, less uplifting goals, to the police, including enforcement of the racial order and oversight of the poor. There is much evidence to support the latter understanding.²⁹⁸ However, this Section's analysis will proceed, for argument's sake, with the former, good-faith conception of the police.

Even assuming that police serve the socially beneficial purpose of protecting life and property, numbers will not be completely impeachable and have a role in how this division of government is evaluated. But per se quotas are blunt objects that do not neatly get at public

²⁹⁶ See IVKOVIC, *supra* note 116; Rudovsky, *supra* note 116; Russell Covey, *Police Misconduct as a Cause of Wrongful Convictions*, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1133, 1133 (2013); Carroll Seron, Joseph Pereira & Jean Kovath, *Judging Police Misconduct: "Street-Level" Versus Professional Policing*, 38 L. & SOC'Y REV. 665 (2004) (surveying New York City residents' accounts of instances where police officers engaged in prohibited behavior such as use of unnecessary force and abuse of authority).

²⁹⁷ See JESSICA S. HENRY, *SMOKE BUT NO FIRE: CONVICTING THE INNOCENT OF CRIMES THAT NEVER HAPPENED* 66 (2020) ("Quotas result in no-crime wrongful convictions because they motivate the police to arrest people for crimes that never happened and cause innocent people to plead guilty [to them] so they can go home.").

²⁹⁸ See, e.g., PAUL BUTLER, *CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN* (2017); SALLY E. HADDEN, *SLAVE PATROLS: LAW AND VIOLENCE IN VIRGINIA AND THE CAROLINAS* (2001); ALEXES HARRIS, *A POUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS PUNISHMENT FOR THE POOR* (2016); TALITHA L. LEFLOURIA, *CHAINED IN SILENCE: BLACK WOMEN AND CONVICT LABOR IN THE NEW SOUTH* (2015); ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, *PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL* (2018); ANDREA J. RITCHIE, *INVISIBLE NO MORE: POLICE VIOLENCE AGAINST BLACK WOMEN AND WOMEN OF COLOR* (2017); LOÏC WACQUANT, *PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY* (2009); NEIL WEBSDALE, *POLICING THE POOR: FROM SLAVE PLANTATION TO PUBLIC HOUSING* (2001); Bruce Western & Katherine Beckett, *How Unregulated Is the U.S. Labor Market? The Penal System as a Labor Market Institution*, 104 AM. J. SOC. (1999).

safety. Scholars and legislative supporters have noted their arbitrariness,²⁹⁹ but there is more to unearth.

The arbitrariness of police quotas is highlighted by their overinclusive and underinclusive nature. Unreasonably high quotas can extract officers' time and prevent them from addressing more serious threats that, if attended to, could lead to greater public safety benefits.³⁰⁰ When quotas are low, as supporters claim, public safety benefits are questionable.³⁰¹ A quota of two arrests every six weeks led one cop to offer the following query: "Suppose the officer makes two arrests the first two weeks? What does he do the next four?"³⁰² If the productivity rationale governs, the officer could technically coast. Ultimately, the productivity defense for quotas is rife with incoherence. It can be irresponsible to public safety by serving as a distraction from more serious criminal wrongdoing. This rationale can also be insensitive to public safety by only scratching the surface of illegality and allowing officers to satisfy a minimal threshold quota that may not correspond with actual criminal offending.

3. *Thin Evaluations*

It is undeniable that law enforcement leadership needs some method to evaluate officers, but quotas are subpar instruments for such assessments. Critics of quotas inside and outside of law enforcement have taken the laziness rationale and deployed it against supervisors, with one online commenter arguing that "[q]uotas are management's lazy attempt to make a very few lazy employees pick up the pace."³⁰³ But a simpler, less loaded critique is available: Quotas poorly capture the qualitative dimensions of policing and misguidedly

²⁹⁹ See, e.g., Bronstein, *supra* note 21, at 545; Mitch Smith, *New Law Bans Police Use of Ticket Quotas*, CHI. TRIB. (June 16, 2014), <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2014-06-16-chi-quinn-signs-into-law-bill-banning-police-ticket-quota-20140615-story.html> (noting support for Illinois's quota statute and quoting one legislator who stated, "Arbitrary quotas on the number of tickets that have to be issued by police officers undermines the public trust in the police departments' priorities . . . [b]y eliminating these quotas, we can restore that trust and ensure that police officers are free to do their job protecting the public").

³⁰⁰ David I. Dewar, *Goal Displacement*, in *ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY* 193, 196 (David Andrew Schultz & James A. Beverly eds., 2004).

³⁰¹ See *id.*

³⁰² Athelia Knight & Benjamin L. Weiser, *Street Cops*, WASH. POST (July 12, 1982), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/07/12/street-cops/68359866-8b67-4514-a6a2-3aa39b4a1b38>.

³⁰³ Stephen Cain, Comment to *Ticket Quota for Ypsilanti Police Officers Is Illegal, Arbitrator Finds*, ANN ARBOR NEWS (Feb. 5, 2010, 6:04 AM), <http://www.annarbor.com/news/ticket-quota-for-ypsilanti-police-officers-is-illegal-arbitrator-finds>.

privilege quantity. The insights of criminologist Malcolm Sparrow are helpful here. Professor Sparrow writes:

Some departments set targets for functional outputs, including enforcement activities such as arrests, stops, searches and traffic citations. This . . . should never be the default position or become normal practice. If you want quality work from a carpenter, it makes no sense to demand that he or she drill a certain number of holes or hammer a quota of nails. The essence of craftsmanship involves mastery of all the tools and the ability to select among them based on a clear understanding of the specific task in hand. Functional quotas make little sense in this context.³⁰⁴

The obsession with quantity sacrifices a long list of qualitative concerns that are relevant to policing, namely good judgment, fairness, reasonableness, and legality.³⁰⁵ Defenders of quotas may point to statutes that prohibit exclusive consideration of citations and arrests and require evaluations to be holistic. Nevertheless, the constellation of case law, settlements, officer testimony, and media accounts described in this Article suggests that, at a bare minimum, holistic evaluation of police is not a typical practice.³⁰⁶

³⁰⁴ Sparrow, *supra* note 34, at 18.

³⁰⁵ *Id.* at 18–20; *see also* Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“For the purposes of performance review, an unconstitutional stop is no less valuable to an officer’s career than a constitutional one—because the two are indistinguishable.”); Tracey L. Meares, *The Good Cop: Knowing the Difference Between Lawful or Effective Policing and Rightful Policing—And Why it Matters*, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1865, 1875–80 (2013) (describing rightful policing, which focuses on the fairness of police conduct, as opposed to the traditional emphases on lawful or efficient policing). The obsession with numbers is not unique to policing: Scholars have criticized how prosecutors, too, overemphasize convictions and their win-loss records at the expense of fair criminal justice outcomes. *See* Stephanos Bibas, *Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability*, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 992, 987 (2009) (suggesting that “prosecutors view their jobs as maximizing convictions” and, along the lines of Professor Sparrow, noting how “conviction statistics ignore other important outcomes, such as declinations, sentences, and victim satisfaction”); Rachel E. Barkow, *Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law*, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 883 (2009) (“Prosecutors may feel the need to be able to point to a record of convictions and long sentences if they want to be promoted or to land high-powered jobs outside the government.”); Angela J. Davis, *The American Prosecutor: Power, Discretion, and Misconduct*, 23 CRIM. JUST. 24, 28 (2008) (remarking that most of the prosecutors the author, a criminal procedure scholar and former director of the D.C. Public Defender Service, engaged with “seemed to focus almost exclusively on securing convictions, without consideration of whether a conviction would result in the fairest or most satisfactory result for the accused or even the victim”).

³⁰⁶ STAMPER, *supra* note 22, at 3 (“In fact, many supervisors believe that counting and recapping activity is the only way to evaluate police performance.”).

4. Tradeoffs and Revenue-Based Defenses

Finally, it should go without saying that the police should not be tasked with generating revenue. Though such a normative claim may seem obvious, it chafes against the entrepreneurial realities of American policing. “Economic sanctions,” Beth Colgan explains, “constitute the most common form of punishment in the United States.”³⁰⁷ If the profit-based defense of police quotas rests on a question of tradeoffs—that is, tickets allow localities to generate revenue when they cannot raise taxes—then the tradeoffs at least need to be named and assessed.

Fortunately, empiricists are beginning to name the costs of for-profit policing. Many of their studies focus on the disproportionate racial effects of policing for profit.³⁰⁸ But even when measured only in terms of the public-safety purpose of policing, quotas come with considerable costs. Rebecca Goldstein and her colleagues have studied how municipal reliance on fees, fines, and forfeitures, as opposed to taxes, produce “undesirable outcomes that may not have been anticipated by policymakers aiming simply to cover a revenue shortfall.”³⁰⁹ Relying on census data that collected the revenue and expenditure data of approximately 90,000 local governments, they found that reallocating police resources to money-generating activity was “associated with neglect of other important police functions, namely, the investigation of violent crimes.”³¹⁰ This revenue-based orientation ultimately “compromises their ability to perform their traditional functions.”³¹¹ According to the study, a one percent increase in the share of revenues from fees, fines, and forfeitures is associated with a 3.7 per-

³⁰⁷ Beth A. Colgan, *Beyond Graduation: Economic Sanctions and Structural Reform*, 69 DUKE L.J. 1529, 1537 (2020).

³⁰⁸ See generally, Akheil Singla, Charlotte Kirschner & Samuel B. Stone, *Race, Representation, and Revenue: Reliance on Fines and Forfeitures in City Governments*, 56 URB. AFFS. REV. 1132 (2020); Allison P. Harris, Elliott Ash & Jeffrey A. Fagan, *Fiscal Pressures and Discriminatory Policing: Evidence from Traffic Stops in Missouri*, 5 J. RACE, ETHNICITY, & POL. 450 (2020), <https://doi.org/10.1017/rep.2020.10>; Kelsey Shoub, Leah Christiani, Frank R. Baumgartner, Derek A. Epp & Kevin Roach, *Fines, Fees, Forfeitures, and Disparities: A Link between Municipal Reliance on Fines and Racial Disparities in Policing*, 0 POL’Y STUD. J. 1 (Aug. 7, 2020), <https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12412>.

³⁰⁹ Rebecca Goldstein, Michael W. Sances & Hye Young You, *Exploitative Revenues, Law Enforcement, and the Quality of Government Service*, 56 URB. AFFS. REV. 5, 24 (2018); see also Michael D. Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann, *Political Economy at Any Speed: What Determines Traffic Citations?*, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 509, 510 (2009) (finding in empirical study that “the likelihood and dollar amounts of fines [for speeding tickets] are decreasing functions of local property tax revenue” and also that “the likelihood of receiving a speeding fine is higher in towns that are in a fiscal crunch caused by a rejected increase in the property tax limit”).

³¹⁰ *Id.*

³¹¹ *Id.*

centage point decrease in the clearance rate for violent crimes.³¹² Economist Anna Harvey has similarly concluded that “fiscal incentives can distort the allocation of law enforcement effort[s]” in ways that have distributional consequences for public safety.³¹³ Notwithstanding empirical work that highlights the compromising cost of profit-based policing, there are a host of other constituent-specific problems with police quotas.

C. *Additional Objections*

It is essential to not let defenses of quotas and counterarguments to them totally consume how quotas are understood. This subsection offers a series of additional reasons why quotas constitute lousy policy. To highlight the unique possibility for building consensus on prohibiting quotas, this subsection focuses specifically on three constituents: law enforcement, the general public, and racial minorities.

1. *Law Enforcement Objections*

Police officers and police unions have been some of the most prominent opponents of quotas. Two criticisms often offered by unions stand out. The first concerns how quotas curtail the discretion of officers.³¹⁴ Patrick Lynch, head of the Police Benevolent Association, the police union for the NYPD, has been vocal on this issue. In an op-ed that was relatively dismissive of the racial dimensions of police-citizen encounters, Lynch argued that quotas were the source of New York City’s policing woes.³¹⁵ Such requirements, he complained, “risk turning officers into automatons.”³¹⁶ The Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council, which supported Illinois’s quota statute, echoes a similar sentiment on its website, stating that “[q]uotas turn police officers into tax collection machines instead of

³¹² *Id.*

³¹³ Anna Harvey, *Fiscal Incentives in Law Enforcement*, 22 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 173, 173 (2020). In his support for Illinois’s statute, Chicago State Senator Bill Cunningham relevantly noted, “Policing should not be used as a revenue enhancement strategy by municipalities. . . . Officers will no longer be distracted from their regular law enforcement duties in order to meet ticket quotas.” See *Cunningham Bill Signed into Law*, BEVERLY REV. (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.beverlyreview.net/news/community_news/article_618a47fe-aae8-11e8-9a28-872a66178e5c.html; see also Michael D. Makowsky, Thomas Stratmann & Alex Tabarrok, *To Serve and Collect: The Fiscal and Racial Determinants of Law Enforcement*, 48 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 189 (2019) (finding in empirical study “that revenue-driven law enforcement can distort police behavior and decision-making, . . . altering the quantity, type, and racial composition of arrests”).

³¹⁴ See Bronstein, *supra* note 21, at 550.

³¹⁵ Patrick J. Lynch, *The Real Fix for Stop-and-Frisk*, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 7, 2013, 4:20 AM), <https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/real-fix-stop-and-frisk-article-1.1476893>.

³¹⁶ *Id.*

professional law enforcement officers. It distracts police officers in the exercise of their day-to-day law enforcement activities.”³¹⁷

Quotas are legal in Arizona, but the Tucson Police Officers Association has advocated for a statutory prohibition. Jason Winsky, government affairs director for the union, declared, “We’re just philosophically opposed to any kind of quota It’s a morale issue for us because the officer no longer has discretion.”³¹⁸ In Washington, where quotas are also legal, retired Spokane police officer and Washington State Senator Jeff Holy sponsored a bill prohibiting the practice.³¹⁹ For Holy, “[a]n officer’s ability to make an independen[t] decision allows them to apply the level of enforcement action they believe to be appropriate for the situation. An officer being *directed* to apply enforcement action to comply with an employer policy or ticket quota reflects badly on law enforcement.”³²⁰ These discretion-based objections are organized around the belief that quotas lead officers to be ruled by numbers instead of common-sense judgment.

Curtailed discretion bleeds into the second major criticism offered by police: that quotas limit the scope of their work. This critique works in two different directions. On one end is a concern that quotas prevent officers from attending to more serious crimes. Quantitative studies of law enforcement priorities lend support to this idea.³²¹ On the other end is a concern that quotas disincentivize police from engaging in socially beneficial activity that is less penal and harder to quantify. “If I break up a fight between two boys and send them home, I don’t get credit,” an officer explained.³²² “If I help deliver a baby in an emergency, I get no credit. But I score points if I issue a seat belt summons”³²³

When quotas distract from serious crimes and preclude the ostensible services that law enforcement holds itself out as offering (officers

³¹⁷ Brenda Schory, *New Law to End Ticket Quotas; Locally, Most Local Police Agencies Say They Never Had Them Anyway*, KANE CNTY. CHRON. (July 31, 2014, 10:48 PM), <https://www.kcchronicle.com/2014/07/29/new-law-to-end-ticket-quotas-most-local-police-agencies-say-they-never-had-them-anyway/afzdt5z>.

³¹⁸ Yoohyun Jung, *Police Union Calls for Elimination of Traffic-Ticket Quota*, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Oct. 9, 2014), https://tucson.com/news/blogs/police-beat/police-union-calls-for-elimination-of-traffic-ticket-quota/article_2cde50a7-10a0-5e18-8908-7335510ce811.html.

³¹⁹ *New WA Bill Would Discourage Traffic-Ticket Quotas for Officers*, MYNORTHWEST (Feb. 17, 2020, 2:44 PM), <https://mynorthwest.com/1723060/ticket-quotas-officers-washington>.

³²⁰ *Senate Passes Holy Bill that Seeks to Discourage Traffic-Ticket Quotas for Officers*, WASH. STATE SENATE REPUB. CAUCUS (Feb. 17, 2020) (emphasis added), <https://jeffholy.src.wastateleg.org/tag/sen-jeff-holy>.

³²¹ See *supra* text accompanying notes 309–13.

³²² POLICE REFORM ORG. PROJECT, *supra* note 14, at 3.

³²³ *Id.*

pledge to protect and *serve*), the nature of police work narrows, and public safety is compromised. Of course, quotas are not diametrically opposed to public safety, but they create scenarios where the public safety objective is deprioritized. Adherence to quotas leads police officers to be more concerned about obtaining a reward or avoiding a penalty.³²⁴ Many officers are unbothered by this state of affairs and play the numbers game, but some disapprove. Their objections supply a powerful internal critique.

It is critical to understand that police unions are not typically torchbearers of criminal justice reform. In many ways, they have impeded reform.³²⁵ As organizations tasked with ensuring optimal work conditions for their members, union concerns about quotas are far from selfless. Officers who protest quotas in their individual capacities typically do so as a response to employment grievances rather than altruistic civil rights concerns. These sobering realities do not, however, mean that the police's insights on quotas are bankrupt. In fact, their complaints are consonant with scholarly observations and warrant meaningful consideration.

2. *Racial Vulnerability*

Vulnerability to violent police encounters, and the racial subjugation that has been a feature of policing, make racial minorities foreseeable critics of quotas. This opposition is well warranted. Officers have confessed to using racial minorities to fulfill their quotas and pad their statistics.

In New Jersey, one officer described quota compliance as a sport that took place in minority communities. "Guys were going out. They were competing for how many tickets each guy could get," he revealed.³²⁶ "They're saying they're going out hunting. You go to traffic court and you see the impact. 90% of the people you see there are blacks and latinos."³²⁷ The practice of "hunting" occurred in New York, too. In an affidavit in one of many cases involving police quotas, former NYPD officer Christopher LaForce said that he had decided

³²⁴ Molly Davis, *Why the Utah Legislature Banned Police Quotas*, LIBERTAS INST. (Mar. 19, 2018), <https://libertasutah.org/op-eds/why-the-utah-legislature-banned-police-quotas>.

³²⁵ See Benjamin Levin, *What's Wrong with Police Unions?*, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1333, 1340–46 (2020) (describing the critiques of police unions); Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, *Police Unions*, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 747–56 (2017) (discussing how police unions have been obstacles to criminal justice reform); Stephen Rushin, *Police Union Contracts*, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1191 (2017) (arguing that internal disciplinary procedures developed by police unions during the collective bargaining process can hinder criminal justice reform).

³²⁶ Wallace, *supra* note 44.

³²⁷ *Id.*

to retire because of the fatigue that quota-inspired racial profiling induced. “I got tired of hunting Black and Hispanic people because of arrest quotas,” he complained.³²⁸ In addition to civilians, quotas also impact minority officers. These officials, who some hold out as a solution to racist policing, are sometimes forced to comply with a practice that facilitates discrimination and jeopardizes police relations with minority communities.³²⁹ Additional empirical evidence suggests that minorities bear the brunt of the kinds of revenue-based policing that sometimes informs quota regimes.

On the federal level, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has long had formal arrest quotas that impact the undocumented population and the predominantly Latinx community that is subject to ICE raids.³³⁰ The Department of Justice’s investigation into the City of Ferguson led it to conclude that “[F]erguson’s police and municipal court practices both reflect and exacerbate existing racial bias,” and specifically recommended that the Ferguson Police Department “[p]rohibit the use of ticketing and arrest quotas, whether formal or informal.”³³¹

The vulnerability of racial minorities to being targeted by quotas can lead to unnecessary, and sometimes violent, contact with the police. Recall that South Carolina passed its quota statute in response to a police officer’s killing of Walter Scott, an unarmed Black man. The defense team argued that the encounter stemmed from the officer’s attempt to fulfill his department-mandated quota of three minor violations every shift.³³² A desire to decrease unnecessary police and citizen contact also motivated Tennessee’s recent quota

³²⁸ Joseph Goldstein & Ashley Southall, ‘I Got Tired of Hunting Black and Hispanic People,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2020), <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/06/nyregion/nyc-police-subway-racial-profiling.html>.

³²⁹ See *id.*; CRIME + PUNISHMENT, *supra* note 68; Sklansky, *supra* note 259 (discussing how the diversification of police departments affects their relationships with the communities they serve).

³³⁰ See *Diaz-Bernal v. Myers*, 758 F. Supp. 2d 106, 114 (D. Conn. 2010); Nathan Treadwell, *Fugitive Operations and the Fourth Amendment: Representing Immigrants Arrested in Warrantless Home Raids*, 89 N.C. L. REV. 507, 560–61 (2011); Michael J. O’Brien, “Widespread” Uncertainty: The Exclusionary Rule in Civil-Removal Proceedings, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1883, 1898–99 (2014).

³³¹ Ferguson Report, *supra* note 17, at 2, 91.

³³² Cynthia Roldan, *Ticket Quota Limit Proposal for Law Enforcement Heads for Senate Floor*, POST & COURIER (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.postandcourier.com/politics/ticket-quota-limit-proposal-for-law-enforcement-heads-for-senate/article_14f44c11-d0f2-57c0-91b1-69b23bd536c8.html.

statute,³³³ which levies criminal fines on law enforcement officials who impose quotas.³³⁴

A pause is necessary here, lest causal mechanisms get confused. Quotas do not cause police brutality and killings. Rogue officers and legal cultures of impunity are better explanations. But quotas can create the conditions for violent or even lethal interactions. Quotas figured prominently in an almost 200-page decision where a federal judge painstakingly described how the NYPD maintained a racist stop-and-frisk policy that flouted constitutional rules.³³⁵ That policy encouraged officers to “crush the fucking city,” and indiscriminately stop Black and Latinx people without any legal reason because they “‘can always articulate’ some basis for a stop after the fact.”³³⁶ Testimonies given to the Center for Constitutional Rights, which litigated the Floyd case, described how stops often resulted in excessive use of force by police against minorities who were slapped, thrown against walls, tasered, and brutalized.

Moreover, quotas subject racial minorities to police interactions that are often devoid of legal remedies and exacerbate their marginalization. Devon Carbado’s insights into the relationship between racial vulnerability and police misconduct are clarifying. “The more vulnerable a group is to predatory policing, the greater that group’s police contact and thus the greater the exposure to the possibility of violence.”³³⁷ Such predation “trades on and compounds the marginalization of an already marginalized group” and “facilitates police violence by increasing the frequency [of minority contact] with the police.”³³⁸

An intersectional analysis further reveals how quotas exacerbate social inequality and make marginalized groups easy targets for police misconduct. Women of color, low-income people, and members of the LGBTQ community are particularly susceptible to being targeted by quota-fulfilling police officers. Police whistleblower Adhyl Polanco explains:

[W]hen you go hunting, when you put any type of numbers on a police officer to perform, we are going to go for the most vulnerable. Of course, we’re going to go for the LGBT community, we’re

³³³ See Arnold, *supra* note 95.

³³⁴ Act of July 15, 2020, ch. 801, 2020 Tenn. Pub. Acts, <https://publications.tnsosfiles.com/acts/111/pub/pc0801.pdf>.

³³⁵ Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

³³⁶ *Id.* at 598–99.

³³⁷ Devon W. Carbado, *Predatory Policing*, 85 UMKC L. REV. 545, 561 (2017).

³³⁸ *Id.*

going to the black community, we're going to those that have no vote, that have no power.³³⁹

Quotas exacerbate social vulnerability and make marginalized groups easy targets for police misconduct. When set against the larger context of police corruption, the predatory nature of quotas demonstrates why the practice constitutes bad policy.

3. *The General Significance of Quotas*

Police quotas should concern the general population. Some people may be undisturbed or feel unaffected by the problems police quotas invite either because they occupy a demographic group that is not a posterchild for mass incarceration or because they imagine themselves as law-abiding and invulnerable to quota-based policing. Criminal law theorist Doug Husak invites skepticism of such beliefs.³⁴⁰ He observes that “[o]ffenses are so far-reaching that almost everyone has committed one or more at some time or another; the criminal law no longer distinguishes ‘us’ from ‘them.’”³⁴¹ Going a step further, Professor Husak estimates that “over 70% of living adult Americans have committed an imprisonable offense at some point in their life.”³⁴² Thus, the average person should be concerned about quotas because they likely engage in activities that come under the purview of this kind of policing.

Quotas can also lead to routine violations of constitutional rights and civil liberties. An officer who is forced to comply with a quota “will find it difficult to be sympathetic to procedural due process guidelines which stand in the way of filling his quota.”³⁴³ In addition to due process issues, quotas invite equal protection problems, implicate Fourth Amendment issues related to unconstitutional police stops, and raise First Amendment concerns involving a police officer’s ability to speak out about quotas without fear of retaliation. Constitutional problems with quotas have arisen in large, diverse metropolitan areas like New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles as well as small cities like Mount Enterprise, Texas (with a population of approximately 450

³³⁹ Sarah Wallace, *More NYPD Officers Say There’s Proof of Quota-Driven Arrests*, NBC N.Y. (Apr. 1, 2016, 8:48 PM), <https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/nypd-officers-arrest-quota-exclusive-interview-pressure-numbers>.

³⁴⁰ See DOUGLAS HUSAK, *OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW* 24 (2008).

³⁴¹ *Id.*

³⁴² *Id.*

³⁴³ Albert T. Quick, *Attitudinal Aspects of Police Compliance with Procedural Due Process*, 6 AM. J. CRIM. L. 25, 31 (1978).

people) and racially homogenous states like Utah (approximately ninety percent white).³⁴⁴

James Spadola, a former Delaware officer who has advocated for anti-quota legislation in his state, argues that “quotas transform civilians into a performance measure and potential arrest statistic, as opposed to an American with constitutional rights and protections that should be served and protected by the police.”³⁴⁵ The availability of more sanitized euphemisms (e.g., performance standards, targets, activity) and the lack of rigorous investigations into quotas keep the general public from realizing how common they are in law enforcement. In a country that is only beginning to understand the problems of over-policing, quotas are a poorly understood practice that compromise an already fragile body of constitutional law.

For conservatives and liberals who believe that the police serve a public safety function, quotas are distortive and jeopardize the legitimacy of law enforcement. These distortive features may be of particular concern to law-and-order conservatives. John Eterno, a criminologist who spent two decades as an officer and retired as a captain in the NYPD, explains how quotas pervert police goals in his book *The Crime Numbers Game: Management by Manipulation*.³⁴⁶ Eterno and his co-author Eli Silverman (also a criminologist) argue that quotas encourage police to focus on less difficult crimes “at the expense of more significant and arduous arrests.”³⁴⁷ In a society where consensual crimes like drug trafficking leave no discernible complainant, murders often go unsolved, sexual assault is underreported, and white-collar crimes go unpunished. This should be a cause of concern for fiscal conservatives, law-and-order advocates, and supporters of victims’ rights.

Deeper questions of legitimacy also abound, as quotas undermine liberal concerns about procedural justice and the rule of law. Laurie Robinson, who was responsible for developing recommendations after the Department of Justice’s Ferguson investigation, explained how quotas and numbers-policing can shape public opinion: “If citizens believe that tickets are being issued or arrests are being made for rea-

³⁴⁴ *Mount Enterprise, Texas Population 2020*, WORLD POPULATION REV., <https://worldpopulationreview.com/us-cities/mount-enterprise-tx-population> (last visited Jan. 9, 2020); *Utah Population 2020*, WORLD POPULATION REV., <https://worldpopulationreview.com/states/utah-population> (last visited Dec. 20, 2020).

³⁴⁵ James Spadola, *Delaware Should Ban Police Quotas*, DEL. ONLINE (July 28, 2017, 11:45 AM), <https://www.delawareonline.com/story/opinion/contributors/2017/07/28/delaware-should-ban-police-quotas-james-spadola/519661001>.

³⁴⁶ JOHN A. ETERNO & ELI B. SILVERMAN, *THE CRIME NUMBERS GAME: MANAGEMENT BY MANIPULATION* (2017); see also Bronstein, *supra* note 21, at 555–56.

³⁴⁷ ETERNO & SILVERMAN, *supra* note 346, at 11.

sons other than the goal of law enforcement,” she contends, “then their trust in the legitimacy of the system is really eroded.”³⁴⁸ Others have echoed this view.³⁴⁹ As liberal reformers and some conservative allies work to repair a criminal justice system riddled with imperfections, they need to address how quotas influence internal enforcement priorities and shape public conceptions of fairness.

Skeptics of incremental criminal justice reform—a group in which I find membership—may believe that reforming the practice of police quotas fails to confront the incorrigible nature of American policing. The strongest version of this critique would likely come from abolitionists who resist reformist reforms that tinker at the edges of the criminal justice system, as opposed to non-reformist reforms, which “have as their end goal the eventual dismantling of that system and are understood to be individual elements or steps in a larger strategy of structural transformation.”³⁵⁰ This is a valid concern. Eliminating police quotas cannot solve the problems of white supremacy and poverty management that are central to the criminal justice system, but there are at least three reasons why abolitionists and radicals should care about police quotas. These reasons are theoretical, tactical, and temporal.

First, addressing the problem of quotas can be an important interim step toward reducing the imprint of the penal state, which is one goal of abolitionism.³⁵¹ Enforcing quota statutes and stamping out the practice elsewhere could shift the police away from understanding civilians as “stats to be harvested” and reduce unnecessary police encounters.³⁵² Taken one step forward, addressing quotas could also turn out to be especially necessary if the previously unorthodox, but increasingly recognizable, goal of defunding the police is achieved.³⁵³ There is a strong reason to believe, based on the Camden example,

³⁴⁸ Joel Rose, *Despite Laws and Lawsuits, Quota-Based Policing Lingers*, NPR (Apr. 4, 2015, 4:47 AM), <https://www.npr.org/2015/04/04/395061810/despite-laws-and-lawsuits-quota-based-policing-lingers>.

³⁴⁹ See Smith, *supra* note 299; Jonathan Banks, *Thing Blue Lies: How Pretextual Stops Undermine Police Legitimacy*, 66 CASE W. RESV. L. REV. 931 (2016).

³⁵⁰ Marina Bell, *Abolition: A New Paradigm for Reform*, LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 14 (2000).

³⁵¹ See, e.g., *Abolition Can't Wait*, 8 TO ABOLITION, <https://www.stoabolition.com/why> (last visited Jan. 9, 2020); Dan Berger, Mariame Kaba & David Stein, *What Abolitionists Do*, JACOBIN (Aug. 24, 2017), <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/08/prison-abolition-reform-mass-incarceration>.

³⁵² *The Big Reason Tampa Police Write So Many Tickets: They're Told To*, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Dec. 16, 2015), <https://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/crime/theres-a-big-reason-tampa-police-write-so-many-tickets/2252912>.

³⁵³ See Peter Simek, *What 'Defunding' the Dallas Police Department Could Look Like*, D MAG. (June 12, 2020, 11:14 AM), <https://www.dmagazine.com/frontburner/2020/06/what-defunding-the-dallas-police-department-could-look-like>.

that quotas could become more prominent in police forces with reduced personnel.³⁵⁴

Finally, quotas speak directly to an emerging discourse about the *purpose* of police. As this Article has shown, quota-based policing applies sharp pressure to common-sense assumptions about the public safety, crime-fighting conception of law enforcement. Attacking quotas—which have demonstrable connections to financial exploitation and racial subjugation—is at least consonant with the abolitionist insistence on rethinking punishment and reimagining the state’s relationship to vulnerable communities and the general population.

IV NORMATIVE PATHS FORWARD

What is one to do with these descriptive and definitional insights? This Part offers some recommendations on how to curb police quotas. Before beginning, I want to stress two things. First, any solution to the problem of police quotas cannot be strictly legal. A gauntlet of obstacles—white supremacy,³⁵⁵ some jurisdictions’ narcotic addiction to profit-based policing,³⁵⁶ judicial hostility to the enforcement of civil rights in federal courts,³⁵⁷ and many others—are too mountainous for any set of neat positive law or policy prescriptions. Any attempt to curb quotas must be multi-pronged and multi-disciplinary.

Second, I do not try to propose *better* mechanisms for evaluating or incentivizing the police. I resist that normative move because it has already been taken up by criminologists³⁵⁸ but more importantly because strategies for better policing dangerously invert the analysis. Almost half of American states have legislatively determined that police quotas are impermissible, and a few others have pending bills. The crucial normative issues are not about substitute incentives or evaluation metrics, but instead about how existing statutory schemes can be improved and how they can be introduced to jurisdictions that have not yet recognized the imprudence of police quotas.

³⁵⁴ See *supra* text accompanying notes 177–88; Fussell, *supra* note 31; Rushin & Michalski, *supra* note 30.

³⁵⁵ See FBI, WHITE SUPREMACIST INFILTRATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 4 (2006), <https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/402521/doc-26-white-supremacist-infiltration.pdf>; Vida B. Johnson, *KKK in the PD: White Supremacist Police and What to Do About It*, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 205, 211 (2019).

³⁵⁶ See Maciag, *supra* note 5.

³⁵⁷ See *supra* note 136 and accompanying text.

³⁵⁸ See Sparrow, *supra* note 34; NAT’L INST. OF JUST., PERSPECTIVES ON RESEARCH AND EVIDENCE-BASED POLICING 15–20 (2020); Gul & O’Connell, *supra* note 13, at 51–98.

A. A Prospective Research Program

Legal scholars must scrutinize police quotas as a critical component of the criminal justice system and as a practice that interacts with other areas of law. Police quotas matter because they animate and intersect with issues that legal scholars wrestle with, wrangle over, and consider to be fundamental to ideas about quality and justice. Traditionally, legal scholars have relinquished the study of quotas to criminologists who have a different set of intellectual interests and commitments. Instead of engaging directly with quotas, legal scholars have either overlooked them, subsumed them within other categories (e.g., broken windows policing), or given no more than pat acknowledgment of their existence. This Article supplies a framework for understanding how police quotas work, how they are defended, and why they are indefensible, but these formulations are only initial steps.

The demonstrated existence of police quotas abrades core understandings of criminal law and constitutional procedure. What does it mean when criminalization is not a product of wrongdoing, but is instead spawned by police attempts to thwart employment sanctions or garner occupational rewards? On the procedural side, the existence of race-based police quotas has been verified by federal courts, police officers, and sponsors of legislative prohibitions. How can this reality be reconciled with our country's frail Equal Protection jurisprudence³⁵⁹ or with an exception-riddled Fourth Amendment³⁶⁰ that makes satisfying quotas at the expense of minorities fairly straightforward?

For civil rights scholars, litigation involving police quotas highlights the disparity between actual government practices and stingy judicial interpretations of what constitutes a custom or policy under § 1983. Civilians are not the only aggrieved subjects of quota-based policing. Most of the relevant statutes are about work conditions. Criminal justice scholars are increasingly devoting their attention to labor law and employment law, and police quotas fit neatly into such considerations.³⁶¹ Examining the issue of police quotas may provide a new entry point into thinking about live controversies in criminal justice administration and civil rights more generally.

³⁵⁹ See Russell K. Robinson, *Unequal Protection*, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 154 (2016) (discussing how “the Supreme Court has steadily diminished the vigor of the Equal Protection Clause”).

³⁶⁰ See RIC SIMMONS, *SMART SURVEILLANCE: HOW TO INTERPRET THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY* 174 (2019).

³⁶¹ See *supra* text accompanying note 324.

Quotas also showcase intragovernmental tensions that matter to local government law scholars and legislative experts. In states where they are prohibited, law enforcement leadership often imposes quotas to demonstrate productivity.³⁶² Scholars who study how governments work could provide fruitful insights on how to enforce anti-quota statutes and how to counteract pathologies that stand in the way. Tax law scholars could also help clarify the relationship between local tax policy and policing for profit—which often serves as a substitute for increased taxing.³⁶³ Police quotas are often the mechanisms for such “taxation by citation”³⁶⁴ and make critical tax law scholars relevant interlocutors.³⁶⁵

Outstanding empirical questions remain. Besides litigation outcomes and settlements, scholars and the general public do not have any empirical data on the efficacy of quota statutes. It would be helpful to know how jurisdictions with prohibitions compare to jurisdictions where quotas are permissible. Scholars should examine how prohibitions affect a jurisdiction’s incidence of police misconduct, the size of its misdemeanor docket, clearance rates, its reliance on legal financial obligations (e.g., fees and fines), and the satisfaction of its citizens. The results could help shed light on issues specific to criminal justice as well as broader questions at the intersection of law and inequality.

B. *Investigative Agendas and Public Awareness*

The media should continue to play an important role in uncovering and publicizing the existence of police quotas. As Justice Brennan correctly observed, “[c]ommentary and reporting on the criminal justice system is at the core of First Amendment values, for the operation and integrity of that system is of crucial import to citizens concerned with the administration of government.”³⁶⁶ Interestingly, Justice Brennan’s comments were in a decision that involved media reporting on a murder trial. This felony-centric, trial-oriented understanding of criminal justice does not represent the bulk of cases

³⁶² See NATAPOFF, *supra* note 298, at 59.

³⁶³ See *supra* notes 308, 312; Michael W. Sances & Hye Young You, *Who Pays for Government? Descriptive Representation and Exploitative Revenue Sources*, 79 J. POLITICS 1090 (2017).

³⁶⁴ DICK M. CARPENTER, KYLE SWEETLAND & JENNIFER McDONALD, INST. FOR JUST., *THE PRICE OF TAXATION BY CITATION* 5 (2019), <https://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Taxation-by-Citation-FINAL-USE.pdf>.

³⁶⁵ See Nancy J. Knauer, *Critical Tax Policy: A Pathway to Reform?*, 9 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 206, 254 (2014); Anthony C. Infanti, *Tax Equity*, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1196 (2008) (discussing the concept of tax equity and its applications).

³⁶⁶ *Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart*, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976).

that are currently churned through the system. Slapdash misdemeanor processing better approximates the criminal justice system.³⁶⁷ Nevertheless, Justice Brennan's observations maintain relevance. Journalism still "contribute[s] to the public's understanding of . . . the . . . criminal justice system" and can address some of its failures.³⁶⁸

The task of local news outlets and investigative journalists is to look beyond trials and examine police conduct and practices. This is not a simple task, but our current political climate is ripe for such scrutiny. First, many news outlets are increasingly reexamining their longstanding fidelity to police accounts. They are more willing to disbelieve how police describe criminal justice administration.³⁶⁹ This reconsideration is undoubtedly influenced by social protest movements and video evidence of brutality that often contradicts initial police accounts. This journalistic skepticism should apply to the longstanding insistence of police leaders that they do not administer quotas despite evidence suggesting otherwise.³⁷⁰ Second, the current legal landscape will also enable journalistic investigation into police quotas. The Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, which generally does not protect officers from retaliation if they object to quotas in their employee capacity, essentially funnels their speech into the public sphere. Many of the litigated quota cases involve officers who leaked information to the media.³⁷¹ Finally, the general public's increasing recognition of the bias and brutality of American law enforcement is creating space for a more receptive audience to journalistic accounts of police quotas.³⁷²

Local news, mainstream media, and nonprofit investigative reporters are well-situated to more robustly examine police quotas. In places like Charleston, Rhode Island, and Damascus, Arkansas, media reporting on police quotas have led to the ACLU sending letters to all

³⁶⁷ NATAPOFF, *supra* note 298 at 218 (describing the misdemeanor process, which represents the bulk of criminal justice cases, as "sloppy, inaccurate, unpredictable and disrespectful").

³⁶⁸ Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 587.

³⁶⁹ See Paul Farhi & Elahe Izadi, *Journalists Are Reexamining Their Reliance on a Longtime Source: The Police*, WASH. POST (June 30, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/media/journalists-are-reexamining-their-reliance-on-a-longtime-source-the-police/2020/06/30/303c929c-b63a-11ea-a510-55bf26485c93_story.html (discussing how some journalists are now unwilling to take the police's account of events "at face value").

³⁷⁰ See *supra* text accompanying notes 35, 240, 245.

³⁷¹ See CRIME + PUNISHMENT, *supra* note 68; Rayman, *supra* note 120; Rayman, *supra* note 121; Rayman, *supra* note 122; Tracy Oppenheimer, *Auburn Cop Fired for Resisting Quotas Gets Online Support; City Officials Deny Deny Deny*, REASON (July 26, 2013, 10:45 AM), <https://reason.com/2013/07/26/online-community-comes-to-whistle-blower>.

³⁷² See Cohn & Quealy, *supra* note 8.

police chiefs in the state reminding them of the illegality of quotas³⁷³ and the loss of the right to issue tickets,³⁷⁴ respectively. Mainstream news outlets like the socialist *Jacobin*,³⁷⁵ the moderate *New York Times*,³⁷⁶ the libertarian *Reason*,³⁷⁷ and the conservative *Washington Examiner*³⁷⁸ have all reported on police quotas and done so in unfavorable terms. The same is true for criminal justice-specific outlets such as *The Marshall Project*³⁷⁹ and *The Appeal*.³⁸⁰

All of these organizations have the infrastructure to probe how police quotas operate. They know how to gather difficult-to-obtain documents and data like evaluation reports that demonstrate the existence of quotas and testimonial evidence.³⁸¹ Drawing from these sources, the media can shape public understanding by giving coverage to officers and civilians who have persuasive evidence that they have been governed by or subject to police quotas. Since, as discussed in Part II, many allegations of police quotas do not make it to courts or get quietly settled, journalistic accounts can be crucial to encouraging policy changes or legislative reform.

Reporters can also probe the connections between quotas and other pathologies. In states that do not have prohibitions on quotas, journalists—armed with a deeper understanding of how quotas operate—could examine how this practice is tied to police misconduct, policing for profit, and racial profiling. In states that have legislated against police quotas, reporters should consider these requirements within the larger category of police corruption that has been of interest to journalists. Overall, the public has traditionally understood

³⁷³ Patrick Anderson, *RI ACLU to Police Departments: Traffic Ticket Quotas Are Illegal*, PROVIDENCE J. (Nov. 28, 2017, 4:38 PM), <https://www.providencejournal.com/news/20171128/ri-aclu-to-police-departments-traffic-ticket-quotas-are-illegal>.

³⁷⁴ Debra Hale-Shelton, *Arkansas Town's Bid to Lift Speed-Trap Sanctions Denied: Still Can't Write Tickets*, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (May 17, 2018, 4:30 AM), <https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2018/may/17/damascus-bid-denied-still-can-t-write-t>.

³⁷⁵ See Nick Tabor, *The Mayor Who Cracked Down on Baltimore*, JACOBIN (May 14, 2015), <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/05/omalley-baltimore-clinton-democratic-primary-president>.

³⁷⁶ See Goldstein et al., *supra* note 309.

³⁷⁷ See Oppenheimer, *supra* note 371.

³⁷⁸ See Editorial, *Arrests Should Be Based on Crimes, Not Quotas*, WASH. EXAMINER (June 6, 2006, 12:00 AM), <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/editorial-arrests-should-be-based-on-crimes-not-quotas>.

³⁷⁹ Ken Armstrong, *How to Fix American Policing*, MARSHALL PROJECT (July 13, 2016, 10:00 PM), <https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/07/13/how-to-fix-american-policing>.

³⁸⁰ See George Joseph, *NYPD Commander's Text Messages Show How the Quota System Persists*, APPEAL (Dec. 12, 2018), <https://theappeal.org/nypd-commanders-text-messages-show-how-the-quota-system-persists>.

³⁸¹ See DAVID CULLIER & CHARLES N. DAVIS, *THE ART OF ACCESS: STRATEGIES FOR ACQUIRING PUBLIC RECORDS* 114–26 (2011) (chronicling methods for handling evasive agency responses and noting the success of some news organizations' tactics).

the media as a government watchdog.³⁸² This oversight function is no different in the area of police quotas.

C. Statutory Reform

The remaining issues concern getting quota provisions enacted in states without them and improving existing statutes. Enacting new statutes is simultaneously straightforward and challenging. It is straightforward because bipartisan support has already helped get quota bills passed in many states and objections to police quotas have been made by interest groups across the ideological spectrum. At the same time, getting quota statutes on the books is not easy, as demonstrated by the nine states that have drafted bills but have not been able to convert them to enacted legislation; some of these bills were drafted more than a decade ago.³⁸³ Police chiefs and politicians worry that these bills will hamper their ability to evaluate officers.³⁸⁴ The research and investigative agendas mentioned above could engender more public awareness, whereas intentional partnerships could move the legislative ball forward. South Carolina, Missouri, and Tennessee—all states that recently adopted statutes—did so by considering and representing that quotas impacted a cross-section of diverse interests.³⁸⁵

The other task is to shore up existing statutes. Most anti-quota laws have appreciable shortcomings, including ambiguity about whether they apply to informal requirements, and loopholes for stops and warnings. To this end, the Appendix includes the skeleton of a model statute addressing some of these shortcomings and collating the best features of existing legislation.³⁸⁶ It is far from comprehensive since this Article cannot supply answers to critical questions about future implementation. But, it is a starting point for statutory amendments as well as consideration of new anti-quota laws.

The model statute also proposes an additional provision that is not found in existing quota statutes and requires explanation: Pension forfeiture should be a consequence of violating the statute. This may

³⁸² See JAMES L. AUCOIN, *THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM* 12 (2005).

³⁸³ See *infra* Appendix B.

³⁸⁴ See, e.g., N.J. STATE ASS'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, *LEGISLATIVE POSITION PAPER: OPPOSITION TO S1105 / A2126* (2016), <https://www.njsacop.org/Files/NJSACOP%20Position%20Paper%20-%20Opposition%20to%20S1105%20A2126.pdf> (opposing amendments to state anti-quota law).

³⁸⁵ See *supra* Section I.B.

³⁸⁶ See *infra* Appendix C.

sound like an extraordinary ramification.³⁸⁷ But many states already have laws that either revoke, reduce, or suspend the pensions of public employees who have been convicted of a felony³⁸⁸ or any crime related to their public employment.³⁸⁹ West Virginia's pension forfeiture law is arguably the most liberal, simply stating that "honorable service is a condition to receiving any pension, annuity, disability payment or any other benefit under a retirement plan."³⁹⁰ The efficacy of quota statutes is still an open empirical question, but it is clear from the litigation discussed in Part II that police continue to implement police quotas even in states that prohibit them. Where judicial avenues for redress are limited, pension forfeiture can be a potential deterrent. The measure has been proposed by police abolitionists,³⁹¹ and economists have tentatively found that states with stronger pension forfeiture laws experience lower rates of police misconduct.³⁹² Adding a pension forfeiture provision could add teeth to existing statutes and help stamp out stubborn police quotas.

³⁸⁷ James Jacobs and his colleagues have analyzed arguments for and against pension forfeiture and conclude that imprisonment and fines would be better sanctions. This suggestion might be subject to concerns about "progressive punitivism" that uses incarceration to advance social justice goals. Jacobs and his colleagues do suggest a model for pension revocation that would be less harsh than some states' schemes. See James B. Jacobs, Coleen Friel & Edward O'Callaghan, *Pension Forfeiture: A Problematic Sanction for Public Corruption*, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 57, 89–91 (1997); Hadar Aviram, *Progressive Punitivism: Notes on the Use of Punitive Social Control to Advance Social Justice Ends*, 68 BUFF. L. REV. 199, 201–02 (2020).

³⁸⁸ See, e.g., 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-156 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-651); VA. CODE ANN. § 51.1-124.13 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.192 (West, Westlaw through File 60 of 133d Gen. Assemb. 2019-2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 135-18.10 (West, Westlaw through S.L. 2020-97 of 2020 Reg. Sess.).

³⁸⁹ MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 32, § 15(4) (West, Westlaw through ch. 226 of 2020 2d Ann. Sess.) ("In no event shall any member after final conviction of a criminal offense involving violation of the laws applicable to his office or position, be entitled to receive a retirement allowance."); GA. CODE ANN. § 47-1-21(b) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis. Sess.) ("If a public employee commits a public employment related crime . . . in the capacity of a public employee and is convicted for the commission of such crime, such employee's membership in any public retirement system shall terminate on the date of final conviction and such employee shall not at any time thereafter be eligible for membership in any public retirement system."); see also ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 37.10.310 (West, Westlaw through ch. 32 of 2020 2d Reg. Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 17062 (West, Westlaw through 2019 2d Reg. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:1-3.1(b)(17) (West, Westlaw through L.2020, c.127 & J.R. No.2); 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1313(a) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess. Act 95); 36 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 36-10.1-3 (West, Westlaw through ch. 79 of 2020 2d Reg. Sess.).

³⁹⁰ W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-10A-1 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.).

³⁹¹ See *Reformist Reforms vs. Abolitionist Steps in Policing*, CRITICAL RESISTANCE, https://www.criticalresistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/CR_NoCops_reform_vs_abolition_REV2020.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2020).

³⁹² See D. Bruce Johnsen & Adam David Marcus, *Pension Forfeiture and Police Misconduct*, 14 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 1, 30 (2017).

CONCLUSION

Although police quotas have escaped serious in-depth scrutiny, a diverse cross-section of the public rejects their use and believes that criminal sanctions should not be tied to law enforcement statistics or incentives. This Article provides descriptive insights into how police quotas work and why they are a pressing criminal justice issue. Moving forward, interim and long-term strategies must confront the reality that, across the country, quotas are a basic feature of policing.

APPENDIX A. STATE STATUTES

Statutory Prohibitions on Police Quotas		
State	Statute Title	Statute Overview
Arkansas	ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-6-302 (West, Westlaw through 2020 1st Extraordinary Sess. and 2020 Fiscal Sess.)	No state or local agency employing law enforcement officers engaged in the enforcement of any motor vehicle traffic laws of this state or any local ordinance governing motor vehicle traffic may establish any policy requiring any law enforcement officer to meet an arrest quota
California	CAL. VEH. CODE § 41602 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.)	No state or local agency . . . may establish any policy requiring any peace officer or parking enforcement employees to meet an arrest quota.
Connecticut	CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-282d (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.) Imposition of traffic ticket quotas prohibited	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No municipal police department may impose any quota with respect to the issuance of . . . summonses for motor vehicle violations upon any policeman in such department. • “Quota” means a specified number of . . . summonses for motor vehicle violations to be issued within a specified period of time. • Nothing in this section shall prohibit such department from using data concerning the issuance of . . . summonses in the evaluation of an individual’s work performance provided such data is not the exclusive means of evaluating such performance.
Florida	FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.640 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 184 of 2020 2d Reg. Sess.)	8(b): A traffic enforcement agency may not establish a traffic citation quota.
Illinois	20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2610/24 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-651) State Police quotas prohibited	The Department may not require a Department of State Police officer to issue a specific number of citations within a designated period of time.
	65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1-12 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-651) Quotas prohibited	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A municipality may not require a police officer to issue a specific number of citations within a designated period of time. This prohibition shall not affect the conditions of any federal or State grants or funds awarded to the municipality and used to fund traffic enforcement programs. • A municipality may not, for purposes of evaluating a police officer’s job performance, compare the number of citations issued by the police officer to the number of citations issued by any other police officer who has similar job duties. • Nothing in this Section shall prohibit a municipality from evaluating a police officer based on the police officer’s points of contact.

<p>Louisiana</p>	<p>LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:2401.1 (West, Westlaw through 2020 2d Extraordinary Sess.) Prohibition against quotas</p>	<p>No municipality or any police department . . . shall establish or maintain, formally or informally, a plan to evaluate, promote, compensate, or discipline a law enforcement officer on the basis of the officer making a predetermined or specified number of any type or combination of types of arrests or require or suggest to a law enforcement officer, that the law enforcement officer is required or expected to make a predetermined or specified number of any type or combination of types of arrests within a specified period.</p>
<p>Maryland</p>	<p>MD. CODE ANN. PUB. SAFETY § 3-504 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.)</p>	<p>(a) In this section, “quota” means the mandating of a finite number of arrests made or citations issued that a law enforcement officer must meet in a specified time period. (b) A law enforcement agency may not: (1) establish a formal or informal quota for the law enforcement agency or law enforcement officers of the agency; or (2) use the number of arrests made or citations issued by a law enforcement officer as the sole or primary criterion for promotion, demotion, dismissal, or transfer of the officer. (c) This section does not preclude a law enforcement agency from: (1) using quantitative data for arrests, citations, and other law enforcement activities as management tools or in evaluating performance; (2) collecting, analyzing, and applying information concerning the number of arrests and citations in order to ensure that a particular law enforcement officer or group of law enforcement officers does not violate an applicable legal obligation; or (3) assessing the proportion of the arrests made and citations issued by a law enforcement officer or group of law enforcement officers.</p>
<p>Michigan</p>	<p>MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.750 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2020, No. 256 of 2020 Reg. Sess.)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A police officer shall not be required to issue a predetermined or specified number of citations for violations of this act or of local ordinances substantially corresponding to provisions of this act, including parking or standing violations. • A police officer’s performance evaluation system shall not require a predetermined or specified number of citations to be issued.
<p>Minnesota</p>	<p>MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.985 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.)</p>	<p>A law enforcement agency may not order, mandate, require, or suggest to a peace officer a quota for the issuance of traffic citations, including administrative citations authorized under section 169.999, on a daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, or yearly basis.</p>
<p>Missouri</p>	<p>MO. ANN. STAT. § 304.125 (West, Westlaw through 2020 2d Reg. Sess.)</p>	<p>No political subdivision or law enforcement agency shall have a policy requiring or encouraging an employee to issue a certain number of citations for traffic violations on a daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, yearly, or other quota basis. This section shall not apply to the issuance of warning citations.</p>

<p>Nebraska</p>	<p>NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-235 (West, Westlaw through end of 2020 2d Reg. Sess.)</p>	<p>A state agency or political subdivision shall not directly require a law enforcement officer employed by the state agency or political subdivision to issue a certain number or percentage of traffic citations, police citations, memoranda of traffic violations, memoranda of faulty equipment, or any other type of citation on any periodic basis.</p>
<p>New Jersey</p>	<p>N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-181.2 (West, Westlaw through L.2020, c.136 and J.R. No. 2)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A State, county or municipal police department . . . shall not establish any quota for arrests or citations. • The department or force shall not use the number of arrests or citations issued by a law enforcement officer as the sole criterion for promotion, demotion, dismissal, or the earning of any benefit provided by the department or force.
<p>New York</p>	<p>N.Y. LAB. LAW § 215-a (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2019, ch. 758 and L.2020, chs. 1 to 387) Discrimination against employees for failure to meet certain ticket quotas</p>	<p>No employer or his or her duly authorized agent shall transfer or in any other manner penalize or threaten . . . based in whole or in part on such employee’s failure to meet a quota</p>
<p>North Carolina</p>	<p>N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-187.3 (West, Westlaw through S.L. 2020-97 of 2020 Reg. Sess.) Quotas prohibited</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Secretary of Public Safety shall not make or permit to be made any order, rule, or regulation requiring the issuance of any minimum number of traffic citations, or ticket quotas • Pay and promotions of members of the Highway Patrol shall be based on their overall job performance and not on the basis of the volume of citations issued or arrests made.
<p>Pennsylvania</p>	<p>71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2001 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess. Act 95)</p>	<p>No political subdivision or agency of the Commonwealth shall have the power or authority to order, mandate, require or in any other manner, directly or indirectly, suggest to any police officer . . . that said police officer . . . shall issue a certain number of traffic citations, tickets or any other type of citation on any daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly or yearly basis.</p>
<p>Rhode Island</p>	<p>31 R.I. GEN. LAWS 31-27-25 (West, Westlaw through ch. 79 of 2020 2d Reg. Sess.) Ticket quotas prohibited</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No state or municipal agency engaged in the enforcement of any motor vehicle traffic or parking laws of this state, or any local ordinance governing motor vehicle traffic or parking, may establish or maintain any policy, formally or informally, requiring any officer to meet a quota. • “Quota” means any requirement regarding the number of arrests or investigative stops made, or summonses or citations issued, by an officer regarding motor vehicle traffic or parking violations. • Nothing contained herein shall preclude a local or municipal agency from using data concerning arrests or investigative stops made, or summonses or citations issued, and their disposition in the evaluation of an officer’s work performance, provided such data is not the exclusive means of evaluating such performance.

<p>South Carolina</p>	<p>S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1-245 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Sess.)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A law enforcement agency, department, or division may not require a law enforcement officer employed by the agency, department, or division to issue a specific amount or meet a quota for the number of citations he issues during a designated period of time. • An employee of a law enforcement agency, department, or division who files a report with an appropriate authority alleging a violation of the provisions contained in this section is protected by the provisions contained in Chapter 27, Title 8. (D) As contained in this section: (1) “law enforcement agency, department, or division” includes, but is not limited to, municipal police departments, sheriff departments, the Highway Patrol, SLED, and other agencies that enforce state and local laws; (2) “quota” means a fixed or predetermined amount; (3) “points of contact” means a law enforcement officer’s interaction with citizens and businesses within their jurisdictions and the law enforcement officer’s involvement in community-oriented initiatives. • Nothing in this section shall prohibit a law enforcement agency, department, or division from evaluating an officer’s performance based on the officer’s points of contact.
<p>Tennessee</p>	<p>TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-16-516 (West, Westlaw through end of 2020 2d Extraordinary Sess.) Traffic offense citation quotas — Performance standards</p> <p>Replaced by Act of July 15, 2020, ch. 801, 2020 Tenn. Pub Acts, https://publications.tnsosfiles.com/acts/111/pub/pc0801.pdf. See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304 (West, Westlaw through end of 2020 2d Extraordinary Sess.) (Whistleblower Act)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A public official or employee shall not establish or maintain, formally or informally, a plan to evaluate, promote, compensate, or discipline a law enforcement officer solely by the issuance of a predetermined or specified number of any type or combination of types of traffic citations. • A public official or public employee shall not require or suggest to a law enforcement officer that the law enforcement officer is required or expected to issue a predetermined or specified number of any type or combination of types of traffic citations within a specified period. • Nothing in this section shall prohibit a municipal corporation, a political subdivision or any agency of this state, from establishing performance standards for law enforcement officers that include issuance of traffic citations, but do not require issuance of a predetermined or specified number or any type or combination of types of citations as the sole means of meeting such performance standards.

<p>Texas</p>	<p>TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 720.002 (West, Westlaw through end of 2019 Reg. Sess.) Prohibition on Traffic-Offense Quotas</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A political subdivision or an agency of this state may not establish or maintain, formally or informally, a plan to evaluate, promote, compensate, or discipline a peace officer according to the officer’s issuance of a predetermined or specified number of any type or combination of types of traffic citations • A political subdivision or an agency of this state may not require or suggest to a peace officer, a justice of the peace, or a judge of a county court, statutory county court, municipal court, or municipal court of record . . . that the peace officer is required or expected to issue a predetermined or specified number of any type or combination of types of traffic citations within a specified period.
<p>Utah</p>	<p>UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-27 (West, Westlaw through 2020 6th Spec. Sess.) Quotas for arrest, citation prohibited</p>	<p>A political subdivision or law enforcement agency employing a peace officer may not require or direct that a peace officer meet a law enforcement quota. Subsection (2) does not prohibit a political subdivision or law enforcement agency from including a peace officer’s engagement with the community or enforcement activity as part of an overall determination of the peace officer’s performance.</p>
<p>Wisconsin</p>	<p>WIS. STAT. ANN. § 349.025 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 186) Quotas relating to the enforcement of traffic regulations prohibited</p>	<p>No state agency or political subdivision of this state may require a law enforcement officer to issue a specific number of citations, complaints or warning notices during any specified time period for violations of traffic regulations.</p>

APPENDIX B. STATE BILLS

State Bills on the Prohibition of Police Quotas		
State	Bill Title	Bill Overview
Arizona	H.R. 2410, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2015)	<p>Prohibits municipalities, police departments, boards of supervisors, sheriffs and DPS from:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • implementing or establishing a traffic complaint quota for peace officers (officers) employed by a police department, sheriff’s department or DPS; • basing the determination of an officer’s rank or classification on the number of traffic complaints the officer issues; or • consider[ing] the number of traffic complaints an officer issues as a factor when determining the officer’s rank or classification.
Colorado	S. 84, 67th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2010)	<p>16-2.5-311. Arrest Quotas.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An employing agency may not establish any policy requiring any peace officer to meet an arrest quota. • An employing agency may not use the number of arrests or citations issued by a peace officer as the sole criteria for promotion, demotion, reprimand
District of Columbia	Sense of the Council in Support of Enhanced Metro Transit Police Department Oversight Resolution of 2020, 67 D.C. Reg. 14611 (Dec. 1, 2020)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Finding that “some MTPD officers had created and were participating in a ‘game’ in which officers were rewarded for making arrests and issuing citations.” • Establishing an independent review body to address officer complaints.
Georgia	H.R. 738, 2009 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009) 2009 Bill Text GA H.B. 738	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No local governing authority, law enforcement unit, or peace officer shall by influence or demand require that peace officers employed by a law enforcement unit meet quotas for arrests or the issuance of citations or otherwise increase or maintain the number of arrests or citations for the purpose of providing or increasing revenue. • No local governing authority shall withhold or decrease or threaten, suggest, or imply that such local governing authority will withhold or decrease any funding, revenues, or the operation budget for a law enforcement unit that fails to meet quotas for arrests or the issuance of citations or otherwise fails to increase or maintain the number of arrests or citations for the purpose of maintaining or increasing revenue.

<p>Nevada</p>	<p>S. 390, 1999 Leg., 70th Sess. (Nev. 1999)</p>	<p>[A] state or local law enforcement agency in this state shall not:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • establish or carry out a policy that requires or encourages, either directly or indirectly, a police officer employed by the law enforcement agency to meet a quota for issuing citations or making arrests. • consider the number of citations issued or arrests made by police officers employed by the law enforcement agency when determining the needs of the agency with respect to equipment, funding or staffing.
<p>Virginia</p>	<p>H.R. 1376, 2015 Sess. (Va. 2015)</p>	<p>A sheriff shall not . . .</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • establish a formal or informal quota that requires a deputy to make a specific number of arrests or issue a specific number of summonses within a designated period of time. • use the number of arrests made or summonses issued by a deputy as the sole criterion for evaluating a deputy’s job performance.
<p>Washington</p>	<p>S.R. 6316, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020)</p>	<p>The number of citations issued by a law enforcement officer for traffic infractions, or the amount of penalties assessed from the issuance of such citations, may not be considered in any performance review, evaluation, rating, assessment, salary, promotion, or assignment of the law enforcement officer.</p>
<p>West Virginia</p>	<p>1992 Bill Tracking W. Va. H.R. 4037 Prohibiting the use of ticket writing quotas by the Department of Public Safety H.B. 2984 (W. Va. 2000) Prohibiting arrest quotas</p>	<p>Any state or local agency . . .</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • May not establish policy or expectations requiring any officer to meet an arrest quota or use the number of arrests or citations issued by an officer as the criterion for promotion, demotion, dismissal or the earning of any benefit provided by the agency. • May not use the number of arrests or citations issued by their officers as the criterion for funding, staffing or equipment needs.

APPENDIX C. MODEL STATUTE

No political subdivision or law enforcement agency employing a law enforcement officer shall require or suggest, directly or indirectly, that a law enforcement officer should follow a quota.

“Quota” means a specified average, percentage, or number of warnings, stops, citations, or arrests to be issued on any daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly or yearly basis.

No political subdivision or law enforcement agency employing a law enforcement officer shall use the number of warnings, stops, citations, or arrests issued by a law enforcement officer as the sole or primary criterion for an officer’s demotion, penalization, transfer, termination, constructive dismissal, promotion, or earning of any benefit.

Any officer penalized for failing to adhere to a quota system shall be fully compensated and shall be provided an avenue of legal remedy beyond the unit’s internal complaint system.

A violation of this section is a Class B misdemeanor, subject to pension forfeiture only.

A court of this State shall enter an order of pension forfeiture pursuant to this section immediately upon a finding of guilt by the trier of fact or a plea of guilty entered in any court of this State unless the court, for good cause shown, orders a stay of the pension forfeiture pending a hearing on the merits at the time of sentencing.

Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude the authority of the board of trustees of any State or locally-administered pension fund or retirement system created under the laws of this State from ordering the forfeiture of all or part of the earned service credit or pension or retirement benefit of any member of the fund or system for misconduct occurring during the member’s public service.

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ATTACHMENT 2.
**Arrest Quotas Update Memorandum from Charles
Clarke, February 19, 2024 to the City of Berkeley
Police Accountability Board and Director of Police
Accountability**

Arrest Quotas Update

Memorandum from Charles Clarke, February 19, 2024
To the City of Berkeley Police Accountability Board
and Director of Police Accountability

My earlier *Arrest Quotas* memorandum¹ reported absence of quantitative evidence for the operation of an alleged arrest quota among the members of the Berkeley Police Department (BPD) Bike Unit (formerly known as the DTF, Downtown Task Force). The presence of *qualitative* evidence, mainly intra-Bike Unit/DTF text messages, prompted my recommendation that this Board and the Director continue their investigation of the alleged arrest quota.

One issue of potential interest to this Board that I identified in my earlier memorandum concerned arrest *quality*, not just quantity:²

4. The arrest *quantities* reported in this memorandum are separate from their *quality*, most notably their adequacy for prosecution by the Alameda County District Attorney (ACDA). This Board should seek from ACDA the prosecutorial outcomes for the cases brought by Bike Unit arrests and for the Department as a whole. In particular, charges that ACDA deems *legally insufficient* (possibly indicating inadequate police work) should be distinguished from charges dropped for other reasons such as the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The consultation of an outside source as to arrest quality would benefit the Board's understanding of BPD arrest activity.

Berkeley Copwatch has recently issued a report on the alleged arrest quotas.³ Part of Copwatch's effort included publication of a dataset recording Alameda County District Attorney (ACDA) decisions whether to charge BPD arrestees.⁴ This update memorandum addresses arrest quality using the data provided by Berkeley Copwatch. **I find the vast majority of dismissed charges may have been more due to pandemic-caused change in ACDA charging practice, than to policing deficiencies.**

¹ *Arrest Quotas*: Memorandum from Charles Clarke to the City of Berkeley Police Accountability Board and Director of Police Accountability, August 18, 2023

https://drive.google.com/file/d/14oJZkx43301MOxsLYO7oqA_pi3AAxlsi/view

² *Arrest Quotas*, supra n. 1, pp. 15-16

³ *Purging The Poor: Arrest Quotas, Racist Texts and the Role of City Leadership in the 'Textgate' Scandal*, Berkeley Copwatch, January 16, 2024 (accessed February 18, 2024)

https://www.berkeleycopwatch.org/files/ugd/9faa72_175f75bda71646b983857d0a0e352434.pdf

⁴ Filename combined-arrests-built20230421.xlsx (accessed February 18, 2024)

<https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/148YRpAp2cOvcUjnIqfgS3TYaY0xcHEIO/edit#gid=1464294616>

What Are The Data?

ACDA's case management system, DALITE, tracks all phases of a case's prosecutorial lifecycle from intake of an arrestee through electronic filing of charges with the Alameda County Superior Court (ACSC)'s Odyssey criminal case management system.⁵ On occasion a case's path is more complicated than basic filing through Odyssey, in which case DALITE records the variance with a *disposition* ("T") code.

The disposition codes are elaborated in a decade-old guide sheet⁶ that mentions Odyssey's predecessor system, CORPUS (replaced in 2016). Despite its age the guide sheet seems to document current disposition codes, a sample of which is in Table 1.

Table 1. Sample of Alameda County District Attorney Disposition Codes

Disposition Code	Illustrative Subcodes
T1 – Lack of Corpus	Conduct lawful; Insufficient proof of value
T2 – Lack of Sufficient Evidence	Insufficient corroboration; Insufficient evidence to connect suspect; Insufficient quantity of drugs
T3 – Admissibility Factors	Questionable execution (search warrant); Questionable probable cause for arrest/officer not present; Questionable search and seizure problem
T4 – Victim Factors	Victim credibility issues; Victim uncooperative
T5 – Witness Factors	Necessary witness credibility issues
T6 – Other Cases and/or Counts	Declined in favor of other counts/case
T7 – Interest of Justice	Defendant provided immunity; Exonerating evidence/information revealed; Nature of offense/relationship of parties
T8 – Other	Referred to State Attorney General
T9 – Prosecutor Prefiling Deferral	DA Corrective Intervention Program

Source: *T Series for Refusals*, ACDA, via Berkeley Copwatch. See Exhibit 1.

The Copwatch dataset includes an ACDA disposition code for about four-fifths of BPD arrests in calendar years 2018-2022. Copwatch interprets the remaining one-fifth of recorded arrests lacking a disposition code as having not been dropped by the District Attorney.⁷ I concur with this interpretation.

⁵ Alameda County Information Technology Department, *Projects: District Attorney's Case Management System DALITE*, <https://itd.acgov.org/projects/> (accessed February 18, 2024)

⁶ ACDA, *T Series for Refusals: 02/03/2014*, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Rd8Cy9hsal-Tj1Wh5Eaj5CDz_dYIKvUi/view (accessed February 18, 2024) Attached as Exhibit 1.

⁷ *Purging the Poor*, supra n. 3, p. 13

The T Codes. From the perspective of constitutional policing the most troubling reasons for a DA to decline to prosecute an arrestee would be codes **T1** (lack of corpus, meaning lack of legally valid grounds for arrest); **T2** (insufficient evidence of arrestee culpability); and **T3** (evidence admissibility problems). Copwatch has (properly) flagged these codes for scrutiny, given the possibility of unconstitutional police work.

Three other T codes pertain to non-police actors whose actions bear less directly on arrest quality: **T4** (victim factors), **T5** (witness factors), and **T6** (prosecutorial decision to charge an arrestee in a different case or with different counts than those arrested for). Copwatch has (properly) not flagged these codes.

However, Copwatch has also flagged **T7**, a very broad “interest of justice” category encompassing grounds in which (with one exception) the police seem to play no role. The phrase seems to draw upon, for example, the California statute that confers discretion upon a court to dismiss a criminal prosecution, either on its own motion or at the prosecutor’s request, “in furtherance of justice.”⁸ “Interest of justice” seems to be a term of legal art (with a fuzzy meaning to outsiders like myself), so I will henceforth preserve the quotation marks around the phrase “interest of justice.”

The one T7 subcode that *does* directly implicate police is subcode T7-K, “Police request no prosecution.” California statute allows such a request, for example, in connection with citations for misdemeanors.⁹ Unfortunately the T7 subcodes are not reported in the Copwatch dataset, so a more specific basis for the DA’s declining to prosecute a T7-coded arrest is not known.

In my view, unless contrary evidence becomes known, prosecutions dropped due to code T7 should be viewed as the *District Attorney’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion*, not as “unnecessary” arrests by BPD (as Copwatch would have it).¹⁰ **On this view, the disposition codes of greatest concern to the people and police of Berkeley should be T1, T2, and T3, not T7.**

⁸ California Penal Code § 1385(a), *Dismissal of the Action for Want of Prosecution or Otherwise* https://leginfo.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=PEN§ionNum=1385.

⁹ California Penal Code § 853.6(j)(3), *Citations for Misdemeanors* (“If...the arresting officer determines that, *in the interest of justice*, the citation or notice should be dismissed, the arresting agency may recommend, in writing, to the magistrate that the charges be dismissed. The recommendation shall cite the reasons for the recommendation and shall be filed with the court.”) (italics added) https://leginfo.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=PEN§ionNum=853.6.

¹⁰ *Purging the Poor*, supra n. 3, p. 13

The COVID-19 Pandemic and the “Interest of Justice.” This more benign view of the T7 disposition code is grounded in recent history. There is reason to suspect that in early 2020 the ACDA made its charging standards more lenient due to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. An April 2020 ACDA press release announced:¹¹

The DA’s Office is only filing cases that involve serious or violent felony crimes. In fact, our average week’s filings since the Shelter in Place Order was given are down nearly 70% from an average week’s filing of new cases a year ago. The Court is only open two days a week (Tuesday and Friday) to arraign defendants on new cases. [italics added]

Reduced court availability due to Alameda County’s COVID-19 Shelter In Place Order¹² clearly figured in ACDA’s limiting its charging to only serious or violent felonies. ACDA did not issue a press release announcing when its pre-pandemic charging standard had been restored, but the Superior Court did announce its gradual reopening over the next two years. Specifically, all courthouses reopened on June 15, 2021,¹³ and courtrooms reopened to the public on April 25, 2022.¹⁴ This latter reopening preceded by 10 months the official termination of California’s COVID-19 state of emergency on February 28, 2023,¹⁵ but court availability would likely not have constrained ACDA beyond April 2022.

I use the courts’ state of reopening as a (very imperfect) proxy for the *timing* of pandemic-related prosecutorial changes. This proxy’s main virtue is that courts’ reopening is observable and bears some correlation with ACDA’s changes. Its main imperfection is the risk of erroneously inferring the District Attorney’s *substantive* legal

¹¹ Office of the Alameda County District Attorney, “DA O’Malley Makes Statement on Release of Individuals from Santa Rita Jail,” April 9, 2020, <https://web.archive.org/web/20200628234909/https://www.alcoda.org/newsroom/2020/apr/statement-on-release-from-santa-rita-jail> (accessed February 18, 2024) Attached as Exhibit 2.

¹² Order of the [Alameda] County Health Officer to Shelter in Place, March 16, 2020 (accessed February 18, 2024) <https://www.acgov.org/documents/Final-Order-to-Shelter-In-Place.pdf> Attached as Exhibit 3.

¹³ Alameda County Superior Court press release, June 14, 2021 (accessed February 18, 2024) <https://www.alameda.courts.ca.gov/system/files/june-14-2021-press-release-re-further-reopening.pdf> Attached as Exhibit 4.

¹⁴ Alameda County Superior Court press release, April 14, 2022, (accessed February 18, 2024) https://www.alameda.courts.ca.gov/system/files/april-14-2022-press-release-re-reopening-courtrooms-and-expanded-office-hours-final_1.pdf Attached as Exhibit 5.

¹⁵ Executive Department, State of California, *A Proclamation by the Governor of the State of California Terminating State of Emergency*, February 28, 2023 (accessed February 18, 2024) <https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/COVID-SOE-Termination-Proclamation-2.28.23.pdf?emrc=1db54f> Attached as Exhibit 6.

decisionmaking from the Superior Court's *scheduling* availability. Therefore I use this proxy solely to demarcate when ACDA likely modified its charging practices in some degree due to the pandemic, but I do not measure that degree.

The Main Hypothesis. Following the reasoning of the previous paragraph my main hypothesis is that the District Attorney dismissed more arrests “in the interest of justice” due to the pandemic between March 17, 2020 (the onset of Shelter In Place) and April 25, 2022 (when public access to courtrooms resumed). **Within this 25-month period I expect more frequent dropping of less serious charges “in the interest of justice” – that is, more frequent appearance of code T7 during the pandemic than before or after it.**

The phased court reopening dates suggest distinguishing the “early” pandemic (after March 2020 but before the June 2021 courthouse reopenings) from the “late” pandemic (after June 2021 but before the April 2022 courtroom reopenings). These phases of the pandemic are associated with increased COVID-19 vaccination rates in Alameda County, which I also expect to be associated with resumption of normal (pre-pandemic) ACDA charging practice. As it happened Alameda County (2020 population: 1.68 million¹⁶) had administered 1.03 million full vaccination series by June 15, 2021 (61% of the population, up from zero in March 2020) and 1.37 million full vaccination series by April 25, 2022 (82% of population).¹⁷ Leniency due to the pandemic would likely have lost explanatory power by the latter date.

A more sophisticated econometric approach to analyze the ACDA “regime change” in charging decisions due to COVID-19 would be *switching regression*, a well-studied technique that would take more time to implement than the one afternoon I spent to write this memorandum.¹⁸ With this direction for future research in mind, the results I report in this memorandum should be viewed as suggestive – perhaps even strongly suggestive – but not conclusive.

¹⁶ United States Census Bureau, *Alameda County, California, Populations and People* (accessed February 18, 2024) [https://data.census.gov/profile/Alameda County, California?g=050XX00US06001#populations-and-people](https://data.census.gov/profile/Alameda%20County,%20California?g=050XX00US06001#populations-and-people)

¹⁷ California Department of Public Health, Statewide COVID-19 Vaccines Administered By County (accessed February 18, 2024) <https://data.ca.gov/dataset/covid-19-vaccine-progress-dashboard-data/resource/317f8cd8-7225-4b7e-99d1-6ea441043a51>


¹⁸ For more on switching regression, see Lung-Fei Lee and Robert H. Porter, “Switching Regression Models with Imperfect Sample Separation Information – With an Application on Cartel Stability,” *Econometrica* 52:2 (March 1984), pp. 391-418, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1911495>

What Do The Data Say?

The Copwatch dataset contains a slightly different sample of arrests than the one I reported in my August 2023 memorandum. Copwatch has observations on 10,159 BPD arrests across calendar years 2018-2022 whereas my August dataset observed 10,330 arrests over the same period. For this memorandum I analyze the Copwatch sample without investigating this discrepancy further.

It turns out that the Bike Unit had *zero* arrests dropped due to T1 (invalid detention) and T3 (admissibility problem) in the 2018-2022 sample period. The rest of BPD (other than the Bike Unit) had 0.2% of arrests dropped due to T1 and 0.07% due to T3. In view of the paucity of these events I choose to focus on the relative prevalence of codes T2 and T7, which Copwatch has lumped together (unjustifiably, in my view) in their figure below.¹⁹


Figure 1. Copwatch's Summary of the Data



A more informative approach would distinguish T2 (insufficient evidence, which raises the possibility of a policing problem) from T7 (“interest of justice,” which doesn’t) to display their relative prevalence, as in Figure 2 below.

¹⁹ *Purging the Poor*, supra n. 3, p. 13

Figure 2. Distinguishing 'Interest of Justice' from 'Insufficient Evidence'



Source: Author's tabulation of ACDA data via Copwatch

In Figure 2 the left column (colored more vividly) within each year's cluster displays the fraction of Bike Unit arrests dropped by the District Attorney; the right column (colored more mutedly) is the same fraction for the rest of BPD. Each orange bar refers to prosecutions dropped due to insufficient evidence (code T2); each blue bar to prosecutions dropped "in the interest of justice" (code T7).

The most remarkable feature of Figure 2 is the twin spikes of Bike Unit arrests dropped in the "interest of justice" in 2020 (31% of arrests!) and 2022, particularly when compared to the much lower levels exhibited by the rest of the Police Department. This feature seems to be the confluence of (1) the Bike Unit's community-policing orientation that focused on lesser offenses before they became serious²⁰ and (2) the District Attorney's pandemic-related shift in focus predominately (or exclusively) toward serious or violent felonies.

Mixed support for my main hypothesis comes from the time pattern of prosecutions dropped "in the interest of justice" during the pandemic (both early and late) compared to before the pandemic – the pandemic exhibited more frequent "interest of justice" dismissals, as hypothesized. However, the post-pandemic rate of dismissals did not return to the pre-pandemic rate and, in the case of BPD (excluding

²⁰ *Arrest Quotas*, supra n. 1, esp. pp. 4-5 ("The Downtown Task Force/Bike Unit Has Met A City Policing Priority") and pp. 9-12 ("Did the Bike Unit Charge Different Violations From the Rest of BPD?")

the Bike Unit), actually increased substantially (from 12.8% to 15.2%). Table 2 summarizes these patterns.

Table 2. Prosecutions Dropped As % Of Arrests, by Pandemic Phase

Disposition Code	Unit	Pre-Pandemic	Early Pandemic	Late Pandemic	Post-Pandemic
Insufficient Evidence T2	Bike Unit	3.5%	3.9%	3.0%	3.0%
	Rest of BPD	4.5%	5.4%	7.7%	10.4%
"Interest of Justice" T7	Bike Unit	16.7%	20.6%	24.7%	22.9%
	Rest of BPD	8.9%	7.9%	12.8%	15.2%

Notes Pre-Pandemic=01/01/2018 to 03/16/2020 Early Pandemic=03/17/2020 to 06/14/2021
Late Pandemic=06/15/2021 to 04/24/2022 Post-Pandemic=04/25/2022 to 12/31/2022

The 2021 "trough" between the twin spikes of Figure 2 is not explicable from the recent history already discussed, thereby illustrating a limitation of using calendar dates of pandemic phases to proxy for ACDA charging policy.

A second remarkable feature of Figure 2 is the much lower incidence of Bike Unit arrests dropped due to insufficient evidence (about 3-4%) compared to the rest of BPD (rising to 10.4% in the post-pandemic period). Although the focus of this memorandum (and its prequel) is the Bike Unit, the higher and increasing proportion of rest-of-BPD arrests dropped for insufficient evidence would be worth explaining, which I cannot do with the time and data now available. Part of the explanation would be greater detail about the circumstances under which ACDA records a T2 code, as well as the Police Department explaining what (if anything) it does in response to ACDA's dropping a prosecution due to insufficient evidence (T2), as well as the association of T2 codes with various statutory violations (charges).

A third remarkable feature of Figure 2 circles back to the reason for its creation: the preponderance of prosecutions dropped "in the interest of justice" relative to those dropped due to insufficient evidence, particularly for the Bike Unit but also (to lesser degree) for the rest of BPD. This feature reinforces the need for greater detail about the circumstances under which ACDA issues a T7 code (starting with the relevant subcode) so as to better understand the operation of the Alameda County criminal justice system and BPD's role within it.

From this cursory analysis of the data obtained thus far, to label any of BPD's arrests as "unnecessary" (as Copwatch does) would be as recklessly premature as declaring them flawless. Two additional analyses support this caution: The first asks

about variation across officers of the Bike Unit (and potentially the rest of BPD). The second asks about variation of prosecutions dropped across the arrestees’ races.

Bike Unit and BPD Performance. Table 3 presents the prosecutions dropped due to T2 and T7 for the individual Bike Unit officers, their performance as a whole (which is just the average across officers, weighted by each officer’s arrest count), and the performance of the rest of BPD as a whole. Table 3 echoes the earlier analysis that found (1) a much higher proportion of Bike Unit arrests dropped “in the interest of justice” relative to the rest of BPD (nearly double, 20.1% vs. 10.4%), and (2) a much lower proportion (a bit more than one-half, 3.4% vs. 6.2%) of Bike Unit arrests dropped for insufficient evidence, relative to the rest of BPD.

Table 3. Prosecutions Dropped as % of Arrests, DTF/Bike Unit vs. BPD, 2018-2022

Disposition Code	Kacalek	Breaux	Michalczyk	Pickett	Schikore	Seaton	Shedoudy	Stern	DTF/ Bike Unit	Rest of BPD
Insufficient Evidence T2	0%	3%	2%	8%	5%	4%	4%	3%	3.4%	6.2%
“Interest of Justice” T7	10%	18%	26%	12%	23%	17%	17%	31%	20.1%	10.4%

A more thorough analysis than presented here would investigate how consistently ACDA dropped the same offenses across different arresting officers, particularly across the four calendar subdivisions of Table 2. As a polar example, if all arrests for a statutory violation were dismissed during the pandemic but prosecuted before and after the pandemic, then the pandemic-era dismissals should not be ascribed to reduced arrest quality but rather to more lenient ACDA charging policy. Another polar example could posit that if all arrests by exactly one officer were dismissed, but prosecuted for all the other officers, then the quality of that officer’s arrests would warrant additional scrutiny.

The variation across individual officers on display in Table 3 represents some combination of the quality of an officer’s arrests and the ACDA’s policy toward the offenses alleged against an arrestee (which could vary across pandemic phases). Explaining that variation would be a worthy direction for future research.

Race. Table 4 below presents the prosecutions dropped due to T2 and T7 according to the race of the arrestee. To simplify presentation and to avoid diluting non-white groups, I have consolidated arrestees of more than one race/ethnicity with one of the main race/ethnicity groups to which they belong. Thus, *Hispanic* includes Hispanic/White and Hispanic/Other; *Black* includes Black/Hispanic and Black/Other.

Table 4. Prosecutions Dropped as % of Arrests, By Race, DTF/Bike Unit vs. BPD, 2018-2022

Race	Bike Unit		Rest of BPD		All BPD	
	T2%	T7%	T2%	T7%	T2%	T7%
Black	1.5%	8.6%	2.9%	4.7%	2.7%	5.2%
White	1.5%	9.4%	1.6%	3.6%	1.6%	4.3%
Hispanic	0.3%	1.5%	1.2%	1.3%	1.0%	1.3%
Asian	0.0%	0.4%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%
Other	0.1%	0.3%	0.3%	0.6%	0.3%	0.6%
Total	3.4%	20.1%	6.2%	10.4%	5.8%	11.6%

Notes T2=Insufficient Evidence, T7="Interest of Justice"

Black includes 'Black,' 'Black/Hispanic,' and 'Black/Other'

Hispanic includes 'Hispanic,' 'Hispanic/White,' and 'Hispanic/Other'

Asian includes 'Asian' and 'Asian/Other'

Other includes 'Other' and 'White/Other'

Over the entire 2018-2022 sample period the officers of the Bike Unit had prosecutions dropped due to insufficient evidence (code T2) at an equal rate for Black and white arrestees (1.5%), whereas the rest of BPD had a noticeably higher rate for Black arrestees (2.9%) than white arrestees (1.6%). Keeping in mind that insufficient evidence is a possible indicator of inadequate policing, this disparity (as well as the higher rest-of-BPD insufficient-evidence rates) warrants further examination.

The Bike Unit's arrests dropped "in the interest of justice" (code T7) were more heavily weighted toward white arrestees (9.4%) than Black arrestees (8.6%). The proportionately fewer arrests by the rest of BPD dropped "in the interest of justice" were weighted more toward Black arrestees (4.7%) than white arrestees (3.6%).

As I noted in my August memorandum, the Center for Policing Equity has explained such disparities as due to *community factors* (e.g. racially disparate crime rates) and *policing factors* (e.g. officer discretion),²¹ now with the added consideration of pandemic-caused change to ACDA charging practice toward certain crimes that could have affected observed outcomes according to race.

²¹ *Arrest Quotas*, supra n. 1, p. 13

A more sophisticated analysis would study the variation of disposition codes (T2, T7) across races, during various pandemic phases, taking into account the crime types that had given rise to arrest. As with the earlier discussion of Table 3, explaining the variation in Table 4 would be a worthy direction for further research.

Issues of Potential Interest to the Police Accountability Board

The main finding of this memorandum is the preponderance of BPD, especially Bike Unit, arrests whose prosecution was dropped “in the interest of justice,” especially compared to the relative few dropped for lack of sufficient evidence. See Figure 2.

The many Bike Unit arrests dropped “in the interest of justice” seem related to a pandemic-era change in ACDA charging standards. Offenses for which the Bike Unit would likely make arrests would not (and did not) rise to the District Attorney’s pandemic-era standard of “serious or violent felony crimes.”

I suggest several investigative directions following this analysis:

1. Direct inquiry to the Alameda County District Attorney office about the meaning of the various T codes, particularly T7; the meaning of “in the interest of justice” as it pertains to the dropping of a criminal charge; and whether T7 can be equated with “the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”
2. Request to ACDA for data about the *subcodes* that more specifically identify the basis for declining prosecution.
3. Direct inquiry to the ACDA about the pandemic-related change to the office’s charging practice.
4. Request to ACDA of other measures of arrest quality that might exist from the prosecutorial perspective.
5. Elicitation from BPD of its usage, if any, of prosecutorial decisions to evaluate officer performance, especially usage of codes T1, T2, and T3.
6. More detailed analysis of prosecutions dropped due to Insufficient Evidence (code T2), including patterns associated with specific officers, specific offenses, arrestee race, and (for the rest of BPD) its growth over time.

Conclusions

1. A large fraction of Bike Unit arrests has not been prosecuted by the District Attorney “in the interest of justice,” especially during the COVID-19 pandemic.

2. The interruption of Superior Court availability during the pandemic may have led the District Attorney to decline to prosecute “in the interest of justice,” so these dismissals do not immediately indicate a problem with policing (e.g. “unnecessary” arrests).
3. The fraction of Bike Unit arrests dropped due to insufficient evidence is much smaller than those dropped “in the interest of justice,” and proportionately smaller than the rest of BPD.
4. The rest of BPD has had a larger, and growing, fraction of arrests declined prosecution due to insufficient evidence.

I recommend that the Police Accountability Board continue its investigation to ascertain more completely the quality of BPD arrests from the viewpoint of the Alameda County District Attorney. This independent view of BPD performance would be, in my opinion, a valuable perspective for this Board to have.

Exhibit 1 – Alameda County District Attorney Disposition Codes, 02/03/2014

Exhibit 2 – Alameda County District Attorney Press Release, April 9, 2020

Exhibit 3 – Alameda County Health Officer, Shelter In Place Order, March 16, 2020

Exhibit 4 – Alameda County Superior Court Press Release, June 14, 2021

Exhibit 5 – Alameda County Superior Court Press Release, April 14, 2022

Exhibit 6 – Governor of State of California Proclamation Terminating State of Emergency, February 28, 2023

Erratum to August 18, 2023, Memorandum

Footnote 28 (p. 10) misidentified the statute governing possession of drug paraphernalia and of methamphetamine. Those are governed by the *California Health and Safety Code*, specifically the Uniform Controlled Substances Act.

https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayexpandedbranch.xhtml?tocCode=HSC&division=10.&title=&part=&chapter=&article=&nodetreepath=12

The footnote should have read:

²⁸ Cal. H&S.C. §§ 11364(A), 11377(A), P.C. § 647(F)

EXHIBIT 1

T Series for Refusals: 02/03/2014

T1 - LACK OF CORPUS		T7 – INTEREST OF JUSTICE	
A	Conduct lawful	A	Civil remedy appropriate
B	Insufficient proof of value	B	Defendant provided immunity
C	No jurisdiction	C	Exonerating evidence/information revealed
D	Statute of limitations	D	Interest of Justice - Defendant
T2 LACK OF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE		E	Interest of Justice - Other
A	Aid/Abet evidence insufficient	F	Made restitution
B	Analysis report negative	G	Nature of offense/relationship of parties
C	Insufficient corroboration	H	No sentence advantage
D	Insufficient evidence to connect suspect	I	Other agency handling (e.g., CPS, Traffic)
E	Insufficient quantity of drugs	J	Plea to other jurisdiction
F	Refusal/failure to locate/disclose informant	K	Police request no prosecution
		T8 OTHER (INDICATE REASON IN REMARKS)	
T3 ADMISSIBILITY FACTORS		A	Other jurisdictional consideration
A	Questionable consent	B	Refer to law enforcement administration
B	Questionable execution (search warrant)	C	Referred to State Attorney General
C	Questionable ID admissibility	T9 – PROSECUTOR PREFILING DEFERRAL	
D	Questionable PC for arrest/officer not present	A	District Attorney Corrective Intervention Program
E	Questionable search and seizure problem	U2 – REFERRED TO NON-CALIF. JURIS	
F	Questionable statement by defendant	A	Referred to military authority
T4 – VICTIM FACTORS		B	Referred to another jurisdiction
A	Other victim considerations	C	Referred to U.S. Attorney General
B	Victim credibility issues	U3 – REFERRED TO PROBATION (CORPUS Entry only)	
C	Victim requests no prosecutions	U4 – REFERRED TO PAROLE (DALITE Entry only)	
D	Victim unable to qualify	V1A– SENT BACK FI (indicate one DALITE only)	
E	Victim unavailable	1	Inadequate ID
F	Victim uncooperative	2	Insufficient proof of intent
T5 - WITNESS FACTORS		3	Check Alibi
A	Necessary witness credibility issues	4	Inadequate search evidence
B	Necessary witness not available	5	Need corroboration
C	Other witness considerations	6	Insufficient proof of value
D	Witness privilege	7	Physical evidence - Chain
T6 – OTHER CASES AND/OR COUNTS		8	Physical evidence – Need expert
A	Declined in favor of other counts/case	9	Need statement
B	Def. plead/found guilty of other charges/case	10	Police Investigation requested (see notes)
C	Other charges filed in different county	11	Lab results pending
		12	CALICO

EXHIBIT 2

[Meet District Attorney Nancy E. O'Malley](#)

Office of the Alameda County District Attorney

Nancy E. O'Malley, District Attorney

HOME ABOUT THE MEET NEWSROOM VICTIM-WITNESS COMMUNITY OUTREACH CONSUMER, ENVIRONMENTAL
OFFICE YOUR DA SERVICES & YOUTH PROGRAMS & WORKER PROTECTION
RESOURCES & PUBLICATIONS

- Press Releases
- In the News
- Events
- Felony Verdicts
- Misdemeanor Verdicts
- Videos
- Newsletter
- Past Events
- Archives**

DA O'Malley Makes Statement on Release of Individuals from Santa Rita Jail

Since the COVID-19 crisis began, this office has worked together with all justice partners to take dramatic steps to reduce the number of individuals detained in custody at Santa Rita Jail. The District Attorney has been working diligently for weeks with the public defender, defense attorneys and the justice partners to systematically release individuals who do not pose a risk of harm to the community or to a victim of crime. We have met at least twice a week, if not more, and remain in constant contact with staff at the Public Defender's Office.

Ultimately, regardless of the actions of the DA or defense, it is the Judge who makes the final decision whether someone will be released.

"The District Attorney's Office is doing everything we can, and should do to address this pandemic. However, we also have the obligation to protect the community from serious and violent offenders," says DA O'Malley "we cannot and will not agree to everyone being released from Santa Rita Jail, as we must also protect the safety of the public. I will also note that it is the constitutional obligation of the District Attorney, which we accept freely, to notify victims of crime if there is a change in circumstances, such as early release. We do all we possibly can to ensure that every victim of a charged crime understands the changes being made and why."

- 2020**
- January
- February
- March
- April**
- May
- June
- 2019
- 2018
- 2017
- 2016
- 2015

2014 “This Office takes very seriously the duty to balance a defendant’s
2013 rights with public safety. It is very disappointing that the Public
2012 Defender has chosen this time of crisis to grandstand and to make
2011 politically divisive and disingenuous statements when what the
2010 circumstances demand of all public officials is unity and collaboration.”

2009 Efforts to minimize the jail population are being made on multiple
fronts:

Press Contact

The DA’s Office is only filing cases that involve serious or violent felony crimes. In fact, our average week’s filings since the Shelter in Place Order was given are down nearly 70% from an average week’s filing of new cases a year ago. The Court is only open two days a week (Tuesday and Friday) to arraign defendants on new cases. Last Friday, we filed three (3) new serious felony crimes. All other crimes presented to us we filed and set dates 60 days out so the defendants could be released from custody.

Efforts also encompass the setting of bail and the negotiation of sentences, which we are doing with an eye on minimizing the jail population. On April 2, 2020 by agreement with Presiding Judge Tara Desautels of the Alameda County Superior Court, all requests for “release on one’s own recognizance” for individuals with pending criminal matters, and all requests for “early release” for individuals who were already serving jail sentences issued by Alameda County Superior Court Judges, would receive “judicial review” by a designated judge before releases would be made. Since that time, Supervising Deputy District Attorneys have worked with the defense bar and agreed with defense requests for “O.R” releases and early sentence releases on appropriate cases, always balancing public safety in this time of “Shelter in Place”.

The DA’s Office is also agreeing to early release of people who are serving a previously imposed sentence.

On March 19, 2020 the Alameda County District Attorney’s Office agreed to the early release of 247 individuals already sentenced by the Alameda County Superior Court with scheduled release dates all the way up to April 30, 2020. By doing so, office effectively agreed to take off up to 80 days of an individual’s previous court ordered sentence.

On March 20 and March 27, 2020 the office further agreed to the early release of another 9 individuals deemed by Santa Rita Jail as having “vulnerable health conditions”. The office is reviewing a list of people

containing individuals whose sentence would end by the end of May. While the release of “Medically Fragile” individuals is also taking place. Due to HIPAA, the DA cannot know which individuals in the jail are of vulnerable health or compromised immune system. However, without giving any information, on our request ACSO provided a list of individuals who may fall in that category. We agreed to most of those people. However, we did not agree to everyone on the list being released. For example, we did not agree with the release of a woman who repeatedly tortured her 5 year old child.

As of today, April 9, 2020, with the latest information from Santa Rita Jail, the jail population of individuals that are serving out their court ordered sentences is currently at 115 – less than half the number of individuals who have already been released by District Attorney agreement these past three weeks.

Regardless of whether or not a defense attorney makes a request, the District Attorney’s Office continues to look at individuals with less than 60 days left on their sentence and are making recommendations to the reviewing judge that we do not oppose early release in appropriate cases.

The District Attorney has set up a system whereby any defense attorney can contact one of four attorneys in the DA’s Office to ask us to look at a specific case for release, and we are doing that every day. The court has assigned two judges to whom we take cases for consideration of early release.

Review of the cases is vital for public safety; cannot jeopardize the safety of victims or the community by abandoning this duty. We must take the necessary care and precaution to ensure the health of those incarcerated and the staff working at the jail without sacrificing the security of victims or well-being of the county. To do otherwise would be irresponsible.

This office has and will continue to work with all justice partners, including the Superior Court, the Alameda County Sheriff, the Probation Department, the defense bar and the Public Defender’s Office to make effective and smart decisions.

Posted on Apr 9, 2020

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Oakland, CA 94612

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EXHIBIT 3

**ORDER OF THE HEALTH OFFICER
OF THE COUNTY OF ALAMEDA DIRECTING
ALL INDIVIDUALS LIVING IN THE COUNTY TO SHELTER AT THEIR
PLACE OF RESIDENCE EXCEPT THAT THEY MAY LEAVE TO
PROVIDE OR RECEIVE CERTAIN ESSENTIAL SERVICES OR
ENGAGE IN CERTAIN ESSENTIAL ACTIVITIES AND WORK FOR
ESSENTIAL BUSINESSES AND GOVERNMENTAL SERVICES;
EXEMPTING INDIVIDUALS EXPERIENCING HOMELESSNESS FROM
THE SHELTER IN PLACE ORDER BUT URGING THEM TO FIND
SHELTER AND GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO PROVIDE IT;
DIRECTING ALL BUSINESSES AND GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES TO
CEASE NON-ESSENTIAL OPERATIONS AT PHYSICAL LOCATIONS IN
THE COUNTY; PROHIBITING ALL NON-ESSENTIAL GATHERINGS
OF ANY NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS; AND ORDERING CESSATION OF
ALL NON-ESSENTIAL TRAVEL**

DATE OF ORDER: MARCH 16, 2020

Please read this Order carefully. Violation of or failure to comply with this Order is a misdemeanor punishable by fine, imprisonment, or both. (California Health and Safety Code § 120295, *et seq.*)

UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE SECTIONS 101040, 101085, AND 120175, THE HEALTH OFFICER OF THE COUNTY OF ALAMEDA (“HEALTH OFFICER”) ORDERS:

1. The intent of this Order is to ensure that the maximum number of people self-isolate in their places of residence to the maximum extent feasible, while enabling essential services to continue, to slow the spread of COVID-19 to the maximum extent possible. When people need to leave their places of residence, whether to obtain or perform vital services, or to otherwise facilitate authorized activities necessary for continuity of social and commercial life, they should at all times reasonably possible comply with Social Distancing Requirements as defined in Section 10 below. All provisions of this Order should be interpreted to effectuate this intent. Failure to comply with any of the provisions of this Order constitutes an imminent threat to public health.
2. All individuals currently living within the County of Alameda (the “County”) are ordered to shelter at their place of residence. To the extent individuals are using shared or outdoor spaces, they must at all times as reasonably possible maintain social distancing of at least six feet from any other person when they are outside their residence. All persons may leave their residences only for Essential Activities, Essential Governmental Functions, or to operate Essential Businesses, all as defined in Section 10. Individuals

Order of the County Health Officer
to Shelter in Place

experiencing homelessness are exempt from this Section, but are strongly urged to obtain shelter, and governmental and other entities are strongly urged to make such shelter available as soon as possible and to the maximum extent practicable (and to utilize Social Distancing Requirements in their operation).

3. All businesses with a facility in the County, except Essential Businesses as defined below in Section 10, are required to cease all activities at facilities located within the County except Minimum Basic Operations, as defined in Section 10. For clarity, businesses may also continue operations consisting exclusively of employees or contractors performing activities at their own residences (i.e., working from home). All Essential Businesses are strongly encouraged to remain open. To the greatest extent feasible, Essential Businesses shall comply with Social Distancing Requirements as defined in Section 10 below, including, but not limited to, when any customers are standing in line.
4. All public and private gatherings of any number of people occurring outside a household or living unit are prohibited, except for the limited purposes as expressly permitted in Section 10. Nothing in this Order prohibits the gathering of members of a household or living unit.
5. All travel, including, but not limited to, travel on foot, bicycle, scooter, motorcycle, automobile, or public transit, except Essential Travel and Essential Activities as defined below in Section 10, is prohibited. People must use public transit only for purposes of performing Essential Activities or to travel to and from work to operate Essential Businesses or maintain Essential Governmental Functions. People riding on public transit must comply with Social Distancing Requirements as defined in Section 10 below, to the greatest extent feasible. This Order allows travel into or out of the County to perform Essential Activities, operate Essential Businesses, or maintain Essential Governmental Functions.
6. This Order is issued based on evidence of increasing occurrence of COVID-19 within the County and throughout the Bay Area, scientific evidence and best practices regarding the most effective approaches to slow the transmission of communicable diseases generally and COVID-19 specifically, and evidence that the age, condition, and health of a significant portion of the population of the County places it at risk for serious health complications, including death, from COVID-19. Due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 virus in the general public, which is now a pandemic according to the World Health Organization, there is a public health emergency throughout the County. Making the problem worse, some individuals who contract the COVID-19 virus have no symptoms or have mild symptoms, which means they may not be aware they carry the virus. Because even people without symptoms can transmit the disease, and because evidence shows the disease is easily spread, gatherings can result in preventable transmission of the virus. The scientific evidence shows that at this stage of the emergency, it is essential to slow virus transmission as much as possible to protect the most vulnerable and to prevent the health care system from being overwhelmed. One proven way to slow the transmission is to limit interactions among people to the greatest extent practicable. By

reducing the spread of the COVID-19 virus, this Order helps preserve critical and limited healthcare capacity in the County.

7. This Order also is issued in light of the existence of 15 cases of COVID-19 in the County, as well as at least 258 confirmed cases and at least three deaths in the seven Bay Area jurisdictions jointly issuing this Order, as of 5 p.m. on March 15, 2020, including a significant and increasing number of suspected cases of community transmission and likely further significant increases in transmission. Widespread testing for COVID-19 is not yet available but is expected to increase in the coming days. This Order is necessary to slow the rate of spread and the Health Officer will re-evaluate it as further data becomes available.
8. This Order is issued in accordance with, and incorporates by reference, the March 4, 2020 Proclamation of a State of Emergency issued by Governor Gavin Newsom, the Declarations of Local Health Emergency issued by the Health Officer on March 1 and 5, the March 10, 2020 Resolution of the Board of Supervisors of the County of Alameda Ratifying the Declarations of Local Health Emergency, and Governor Newsom's March 12, 2020 Executive Order N-25-20.
9. This Order comes after the release of substantial guidance from the County Health Officer, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the California Department of Public Health, and other public health officials throughout the United States and around the world, including a variety of prior orders to combat the spread and harms of COVID-19. The Health Officer will continue to assess the quickly evolving situation and may modify or extend this Order, or issue additional Orders, related to COVID-19.
10. Definitions and Exemptions.
 - a. For purposes of this Order, individuals may leave their residence only to perform any of the following "Essential Activities." But people at high risk of severe illness from COVID-19 and people who are sick are urged to stay in their residence to the extent possible except as necessary to seek medical care.
 - i. To engage in activities or perform tasks essential to their health and safety, or to the health and safety of their family or household members (including, but not limited to, pets), such as, by way of example only and without limitation, obtaining medical supplies or medication, visiting a health care professional, or obtaining supplies they need to work from home.
 - ii. To obtain necessary services or supplies for themselves and their family or household members, or to deliver those services or supplies to others, such as, by way of example only and without limitation, canned food, dry goods, fresh fruits and vegetables, pet supply, fresh meats, fish, and poultry, and any other household consumer products, and products necessary to maintain the safety, sanitation, and essential operation of residences.

Order of the County Health Officer
to Shelter in Place

- iii. To engage in outdoor activity, provided the individuals comply with Social Distancing Requirements as defined in this Section, such as, by way of example and without limitation, walking, hiking, or running.
 - iv. To perform work providing essential products and services at an Essential Business or to otherwise carry out activities specifically permitted in this Order, including Minimum Basic Operations.
 - v. To care for a family member or pet in another household.
- b. For purposes of this Order, individuals may leave their residence to work for or obtain services at any “Healthcare Operations” including hospitals, clinics, dentists, pharmacies, pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, other healthcare facilities, healthcare suppliers, home healthcare services providers, mental health providers, or any related and/or ancillary healthcare services. “Healthcare Operations” also includes veterinary care and all healthcare services provided to animals. This exemption shall be construed broadly to avoid any impacts to the delivery of healthcare, broadly defined. “Healthcare Operations” does not include fitness and exercise gyms and similar facilities.
- c. For purposes of this Order, individuals may leave their residence to provide any services or perform any work necessary to the operations and maintenance of “Essential Infrastructure,” including, but not limited to, public works construction, construction of housing (in particular affordable housing or housing for individuals experiencing homelessness), airport operations, water, sewer, gas, electrical, oil refining, roads and highways, public transportation, solid waste collection and removal, internet, and telecommunications systems (including the provision of essential global, national, and local infrastructure for computing services, business infrastructure, communications, and web-based services), provided that they carry out those services or that work in compliance with Social Distancing Requirements as defined this Section, to the extent possible.
- d. For purposes of this Order, all first responders, emergency management personnel, emergency dispatchers, court personnel, and law enforcement personnel, and others who need to perform essential services are categorically exempt from this Order. Further, nothing in this Order shall prohibit any individual from performing or accessing “Essential Governmental Functions,” as determined by the governmental entity performing those functions. Each governmental entity shall identify and designate appropriate employees or contractors to continue providing and carrying out any Essential Governmental Functions. All Essential Governmental Functions shall be performed in compliance with Social Distancing Requirements as defined in this Section, to the extent possible.
- e. For the purposes of this Order, covered businesses include any for-profit, non-profit, or educational entities, regardless of the nature of the service, the function they perform, or its corporate or entity structure.

- f. For the purposes of this Order, “Essential Businesses” means:
- i. Healthcare Operations and Essential Infrastructure;
 - ii. Grocery stores, certified farmers’ markets, farm and produce stands, supermarkets, food banks, convenience stores, and other establishments engaged in the retail sale of canned food, dry goods, fresh fruits and vegetables, pet supply, fresh meats, fish, and poultry, and any other household consumer products (such as cleaning and personal care products). This includes stores that sell groceries and also sell other non-grocery products, and products necessary to maintaining the safety, sanitation, and essential operation of residences;
 - iii. Food cultivation, including farming, livestock, and fishing;
 - iv. Businesses that provide food, shelter, and social services, and other necessities of life for economically disadvantaged or otherwise needy individuals;
 - v. Newspapers, television, radio, and other media services;
 - vi. Gas stations and auto-supply, auto-repair, and related facilities;
 - vii. Banks and related financial institutions;
 - viii. Hardware stores;
 - ix. Plumbers, electricians, exterminators, and other service providers who provide services that are necessary to maintaining the safety, sanitation, and essential operation of residences, Essential Activities, and Essential Businesses;
 - x. Businesses providing mailing and shipping services, including post office boxes;
 - xi. Educational institutions—including public and private K-12 schools, colleges, and universities—for purposes of facilitating distance learning or performing essential functions, provided that social distancing of six-feet per person is maintained to the greatest extent possible;
 - xii. Laundromats, drycleaners, and laundry service providers;
 - xiii. Restaurants and other facilities that prepare and serve food, but only for delivery or carry out. Schools and other entities that typically provide free food services to students or members of the public may continue to do so under this Order on the condition that the food is provided to students or members of the public on a pick-up and take-away basis only. Schools and other entities that provide food services under this exemption shall not permit the food to be eaten at the site where it is provided, or at any other gathering site;
 - xiv. Businesses that supply products needed for people to work from home;
 - xv. Businesses that supply other essential businesses with the support or supplies necessary to operate;
 - xvi. Businesses that ship or deliver groceries, food, goods or services directly to residences;

- xvii. Airlines, taxis, and other private transportation providers providing transportation services necessary for Essential Activities and other purposes expressly authorized in this Order;
 - xviii. Home-based care for seniors, adults, or children;
 - xix. Residential facilities and shelters for seniors, adults, and children;
 - xx. Professional services, such as legal or accounting services, when necessary to assist in compliance with legally mandated activities;
 - xxi. Childcare facilities providing services that enable employees exempted in this Order to work as permitted. To the extent possible, childcare facilities must operate under the following mandatory conditions:
 - 1. Childcare must be carried out in stable groups of 12 or fewer (“stable” means that the same 12 or fewer children are in the same group each day).
 - 2. Children shall not change from one group to another.
 - 3. If more than one group of children is cared for at one facility, each group shall be in a separate room. Groups shall not mix with each other.
 - 4. Childcare providers shall remain solely with one group of children.
- g. For the purposes of this Order, “Minimum Basic Operations” include the following, provided that employees comply with Social Distancing Requirements as defined this Section, to the extent possible, while carrying out such operations:
- i. The minimum necessary activities to maintain the value of the business’s inventory, ensure security, process payroll and employee benefits, or for related functions.
 - ii. The minimum necessary activities to facilitate employees of the business being able to continue to work remotely from their residences.
- h. For the purposes of this Order, “Essential Travel” includes travel for any of the following purposes. Individuals engaged in any Essential Travel must comply with all Social Distancing Requirements as defined in this Section below.
- i. Any travel related to the provision of or access to Essential Activities, Essential Governmental Functions, Essential Businesses, or Minimum Basic Operations.
 - ii. Travel to care for elderly, minors, dependents, persons with disabilities, or other vulnerable persons.
 - iii. Travel to or from educational institutions for purposes of receiving materials for distance learning, for receiving meals, and any other related services.
 - iv. Travel to return to a place of residence from outside the jurisdiction.
 - v. Travel required by law enforcement or court order.
 - vi. Travel required for non-residents to return to their place of residence outside the County. Individuals are strongly encouraged to verify that their transportation out of the County remains available and functional prior to commencing such travel.

- i. For purposes of this Order, residences include hotels, motels, shared rental units and similar facilities.
 - j. For purposes of this Order, “Social Distancing Requirements” includes maintaining at least six-foot social distancing from other individuals, washing hands with soap and water for at least twenty seconds as frequently as possible or using hand sanitizer, covering coughs or sneezes (into the sleeve or elbow, not hands), regularly cleaning high-touch surfaces, and not shaking hands.
11. Pursuant to Government Code sections 26602 and 41601 and Health and Safety Code section 101029, the Health Officer requests that the Sheriff and all chiefs of police in the County ensure compliance with and enforce this Order. The violation of any provision of this Order constitutes an imminent threat to public health.
12. This Order shall become effective at 12:01 a.m. on March 17, 2020 and will continue to be in effect until 11:59 p.m. on April 7, 2020, or until it is extended, rescinded, superseded, or amended in writing by the Health Officer.
13. Copies of this Order shall promptly be: (1) made available at the County Administration Building at 1225 Oak Street, Oakland, California 94612; (2) posted on the County Public Health Department’s website (acphd.org); and (3) provided to any member of the public requesting a copy of this Order.
14. If any provision of this Order to the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held to be invalid, the remainder of the Order, including the application of such part or provision to other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected and shall continue in full force and effect. To this end, the provisions of this Order are severable.

IT IS SO ORDERED:



Erica Pan, MD, MPH, FAAP

Dr. Erica Pan
Interim Health Officer of the County of Alameda

Dated: March 16, 2020

Order of the County Health Officer
to Shelter in Place

EXHIBIT 4

Superior Court of California
COUNTY OF ALAMEDA



Tara M. Desautels, Presiding Judge
Charles Smiley, Assistant Presiding Judge

Chad Finke, Executive Officer

René C. Davidson Courthouse
1225 Fallon Street
Oakland, California 94612

 @AlamedaSuperior

www.alameda.courts.ca.gov

**For more information about this news
release, please contact:**

Executive Office
pcomments@alameda.courts.ca.gov
510-891-6012

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Monday, June 14, 2021

OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA: Superior Court of Alameda County announces the physical reopening of all courthouses and restoration of additional in-person services beginning June 15, 2021.

Consistent with Governor Newsom's "[Beyond the Blueprint](#)" plan, the Superior Court of Alameda County (Court) announced today that it will reopen all courthouses to the public and restore additional in-person services beginning June 15, 2021.

On March 17, 2020, the start of the COVID-19 pandemic and related shelter-in-place orders required the Court to close its courthouses to the public. Since that date, Court services have been provided almost exclusively through remote access. However, in recent months, improving COVID-19 conditions in Alameda County have enabled the Court to gradually restore in-person services.

On June 8, 2021, for the first time since the establishment of the tier system, Alameda County moved to the "[Yellow Tier](#)," easing some COVID restrictions. On Friday, June 11, the California Department of Public Health (CDPH) issued an [order](#) that, among other things, mandated [new face covering requirements](#) effective June 15. In addition, the tier system will be eliminated. As an employer, however, the Court is required to comply with regulations issued by Cal/OSHA. Thus, all who enter court facilities will be required to wear a face covering at all times and maintain social distancing until such time as the current regulations are modified by Cal/OSHA or through executive action.

Just as court operations have consistently followed public health guidance, on June 15, with the greatly improved health conditions in Alameda County and throughout the State, the Court will continue and significantly expand its in-person reopening efforts.

Specifically, starting on June 15, 2021, the following clerk's offices will physically re-open to the public for in-person services from 8:30 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., Monday through Friday (with the exception of Friday, June 25):

- Rene C. Davidson Courthouse (RCD), 1225 Fallon Street, Oakland (Criminal).
- Wiley W. Manuel Courthouse, 661 Washington Street, Oakland (Criminal and Traffic).
- East County Hall of Justice, 5151 Gleason Drive, Dublin (Criminal and Traffic).

- Fremont Hall of Justice, 39439 Paseo Padre Parkway, Fremont (Criminal, Traffic).
- Juvenile Justice Center, 2500 Fairmont Drive, San Leandro (Juvenile).

Telephone services will continue to be offered during those business hours, and drop boxes will be available at each of the above locations from 3:00 to 4:00 p.m. every day.

Then, starting June 21, the following services will be offered at the Berkeley Courthouse (Probate), RCD (Civil and Appeals), George E. McDonald Hall of Justice (Records) and Hayward Hall of Justice (Civil, Family), with the exception of Friday, June 25:

- In-person clerk's office hours: 8:30 a.m. – 2:30 p.m.
- Drop box hours: 2:30 p.m. – 4:00 p.m.
- Telephone hours: 10:00 a.m. – 2:00 p.m.

The Court asks all who visit court facilities not to enter if they have been diagnosed with COVID within the last 10 days, if they live or have had "close contact" with a COVID-positive person within the last 14 days, or if they have any symptoms of COVID. Litigants and members of the public can continue to access the Court's services remotely, as explained on the Court's dedicated [COVID-19 web page](#).

The Court looks forward to continuing to expand its in-person court offerings while also maintaining remote access to our Court to the extent permitted by public health and safety guidelines and other applicable authorities. Please continue to check our [website](#) and follow [@AlamedaSuperior](#) on Twitter for the most current information.

EXHIBIT 5

Superior Court of California
COUNTY OF ALAMEDA



Charles A. Smiley III, Presiding Judge
Thomas Nixon, Assistant Presiding Judge
Chad Finke, Executive Officer

René C. Davidson Courthouse
1225 Fallon Street
Oakland, California 94612
 @AlamedaSuperior
www.alameda.courts.ca.gov

**For more information about this news
release, please contact:**

Executive Office
pcomments@alameda.courts.ca.gov
510-891-6012

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Thursday, April 14, 2022

OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA: Superior Court of Alameda County announces reopening of courtrooms to the public and extension of clerk office hours.

The Superior Court of Alameda County (Court) announced today that, effective April 25, 2022, it will begin reopening courtrooms to the public. For the duration of the COVID pandemic, the public has been unable to observe court proceedings in person, although access has been available through [live audio streaming](#). While the live streaming option will remain, the public also will now be able to be physically present in the courtroom for proceedings that are open to the public generally.

The process of reopening courtrooms will occur on a rolling basis, driven by resource availability. The Court will maintain an up-to-date list of which courtrooms are open to the public on its dedicated [COVID-19 web page](#). Please note that courtrooms will only be open during times when court is in session. In some courthouses, lists of the daily proceedings are printed and posted, and litigants, attorneys, and members of the public may also check the appropriate case management system online to determine the date, time, and location of hearings:

- [Odyssey](#) (Criminal)
- [TCMS](#) (Traffic)
- [eCourt](#) (Civil/Small Claims)
- [DomainWeb](#) (Family/Probate)

The Court continues to require face coverings in all courthouses at all times under [General Directive 2022-03A](#). And while the Court does not currently have any social distancing mandate, it requests that courtroom spectators attempt to maintain a safe distance from each other, including leaving empty seats if possible. Judicial officers will have the authority to limit the number of persons in a courtroom if necessary for the health and safety of the public or Court personnel.

In addition, beginning April 25, Civil, Family, Probate, Records, and Appeals clerk office will once again open at 8:30 a.m. for in-person and telephone services, and will close at 2:00 p.m. Criminal clerk's offices will continue to open at 8:30 a.m. and close at 3:00 p.m., while Traffic clerk office will open at 8:00 a.m. and close at 3:00 p.m. Drop boxes will be available from when each office closes until 4:00 p.m. every day.

[Civil e-filing](#) will still be available 24 hours per day, 7 days a week, along with [Criminal and Juvenile e-filing](#). [Fax filing](#) also remains available for Family and Probate filings.

The Court's Self-Help Center will remain closed for in-person service at this time, although assistance is still available by [telephone and LiveChat](#). The Court is planning to resume in-person Self-Help services by appointment only within the coming weeks.

For additional information related to the Court's COVID response, please see our dedicated [COVID-19 page](#), and please follow [@AlamedaSuperior](#) on Twitter for immediate updates.

EXHIBIT 6

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
STATE OF CALIFORNIA


A PROCLAMATION
BY THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
TERMINATING STATE OF EMERGENCY

I, **GAVIN NEWSOM**, Governor of the State of California, having found pursuant to Government Code section 8629 that the conditions of extreme peril to the safety of persons and property declared in the State of Emergency proclamation listed below no longer exist, therefore proclaim that the State of Emergency proclaimed on the following date and in the following jurisdiction no longer exists, effective at 11:59 p.m. on February 28, 2023. Accordingly, any Executive Orders related to the terminated State of Emergency will also no longer be in effect as of 11:59 p.m. on February 28, 2023.

PROCLAMATION		
Emergency	Date Proclaimed	Jurisdiction
COVID-19	March 4, 2020	Statewide

I FURTHER DIRECT that as soon as hereafter possible, this Proclamation be filed in the Office of the Secretary of State and that widespread publicity and notice be given of this Proclamation.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Great Seal of the State of California to be affixed this 28th day of February 2023.



GAVIN NEWSOM
Governor of California

ATTEST:

SHIRLEY WEBER, PH.D.
Secretary of State



Berkeley Police Department Memorandum



From: Chief Jen Louis

Date: 2/18/2025

To: Berkeley City Council Public Safety Policy Committee

Subject: Berkeley Police Department Response to the Police Accountability Board's 2024 Fair and Impartial Policing Implementation Report

On February 23, 2021, City Council approved recommendations submitted by then-Mayor Arreguin's Fair and Impartial Policing taskforce. Since that decision, the department began reporting quarterly to Council, offering detailed updates as recommendations advanced from initial planning to completion. Today, we provide substantial, near real-time data on our FIP efforts through the Transparency Hub and deliver a comprehensive account in our annual report. The Department is proud to have fully implemented the fourteens recommendations assigned by Council. Our commitment to transparent, fair, and impartial public safety remains unwavering.

This correspondence serves as a formal response to the Public Safety Policy Committee regarding the PAB's 2024 FIP Implementation Report. Please note that we submitted a direct response to both the Director of Police Accountability (DPA) and PAB when we first received the report in April 2024. We appreciate the opportunity to clarify our progress and address specific recommendations as we continue our work to ensure that policing in Berkeley remains fair, equitable, and effective.

Below is a detailed response organized by the categories of recommendations:

Recommendations to the Berkeley Police Department

Three-Prong Approach to Traffic Safety

PAB Recommendation:

- Adopt a definition of low-level traffic infractions consistent with SB 50.
- Specify the mode of the party at fault within the Primary Collision Factors prong.
- Define which unsafe driving calls merit a police response based on the fact that 13% of community calls result in a citation or arrest.
- Provide more concrete guidelines for the Community Caretaking prong, rooted in local data about severe collisions—or eliminate it if it remains too vague.
- Include data in future updates showing whether this approach reduces low-level stops and narrows racial disparities.

BPD Response:

Since implementing our Three-Pronged Traffic Enforcement model, we have decreased equipment violation stops by 21% between 2022 and 2023 and reduced disparities in all discretionary vehicle stops. Notably, the percentage of discretionary equipment violation stops involving Black individuals has declined from 29.49% in 2021 to 20.93% in 2023. While we remain open to future adjustments, we believe that our data-driven approach merits continued evaluation over time as we collect further evidence on its impact.



Berkeley Police Department Memorandum



Evidence-Based Definition for Stops of Criminal Suspects

PAB Recommendation:

- Establish an evidence-based definition for stops of criminal suspects and explain how precision-based policing, feedback loops, and accountability measures support this goal.

BPD Response:

Our department has long maintained that stops occur only when there is reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed—a standard that is essential to protecting constitutional rights and maintaining public trust. We utilize precision-based policing by directing resources to high-need areas identified via crime trend analysis, coupled with robust feedback loops and regular reviews. This continuous, evidence-driven process ensures that our stops of criminal suspects, as well as traffic stops under our three-prong approach, adhere to the highest legal and ethical standards.

Enhanced Implicit Bias Training

PAB Recommendation:

- Ensure that BPD personnel receive intensive annual training dedicated to implicit bias.

BPD Response:

BPD continues to exceed the Council's directives through our comprehensive "KIND" training program, which integrates principles of Constitutional, Humane, Impartial, Neighborhood and Community Oriented, and DEI-Centered responses into all facets of officer training—from tactics and de-escalation to communication. Our policies also mandate strict accountability for any biased conduct. We remain committed to fostering a work environment that minimizes bias and upholds public trust.

Early Intervention System (EIS)

PAB Recommendation:

- Focus EIS audits on officers with notable racial disparity indicators, assign a PAB observer, and ensure transparent audit findings.

BPD Response:

BPD is actively collaborating with both the PAB and the Berkeley Police Association on the procurement and implementation of a state-of-the-art Early Intervention System developed by Benchmark Analytics. In February 2025, the department finalized a contract with Benchmark and began implementation. The system will continuously monitor 91 officer/incident variables—including incident context, sequence of events, behavioral patterns, and peer comparisons—to provide a nuanced assessment of officer performance. We look forward to refining our practices in consultation with PAB experts as this system is integrated.



Berkeley Police Department Memorandum



Written Consent Searches

PAB Recommendation:

- Include in future FIP updates the number of consent searches and their effects on racial disparities.

BPD Response:

This recommendation has been fulfilled. Our current reporting on the Transparency Hub's dashboards and open data portal as well as in our Annual Report includes data on consent searches. Academic standards favor yield rate ratios as a more appropriate measure for evaluating biased decision-making. Accordingly, we do not plan to expand our reporting on this item further.

Warrantless Searches of People on Supervised Release

PAB Recommendation:

- Report on changes in search and arrest rates for individuals on supervised release under Policy 311.6, including any racial disparities.

BPD Response:

This recommendation is already fulfilled. Data on parole/probation searches is tracked and publicly available as part of our RIPA stop data that we publish and update daily on the Transparency Hub. No additional reporting is planned on this matter.

Profiling by Proxy

PAB Recommendation:

- Provide details on dispatcher guidance regarding profiling by proxy and evidence that these protocols have curtailed racial bias in responses.

BPD Response:

Our existing protocols as documented in the Communications Center Operations Manual and Policies 401 and 1105.5 address profiling by proxy. Given that it is generally impossible to discern the race of a 911 caller in most scenarios, the overall departmental training efforts related to implicit bias and other KIND training, we do not anticipate expanding training or protocols on this topic.

Business Cards

PAB Recommendation:

- Ensure that business cards are distributed as mandated by the Council directive.

BPD Response:

This recommendation has been fulfilled. Business cards containing information on how to submit a complaint and other relevant resources are in active circulation.



Berkeley Police Department Memorandum



[RAHEEM.org](https://raheem.org)

PAB Recommendation:

- Make resources on police-civilian encounters publicly available on the department's website, directly the public to a platform such as RAHEEM.org.

BPD Response:

The Department completed this recommendation early in the implementation process, providing a direct link on our City of Berkeley webpage [Make a Commendation or Complaint | City of Berkeley](#) to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) page [Know Your Rights | Stopped by Police | ACLU](#)

The decision was intentional, to link to an organization that is internationally recognized, that has been in existence since the 1920's, and is made up of "more than 1.1 million members, 500 staff attorneys, thousands of volunteer attorneys, and offices throughout the nation, the ACLU of today continues to fight government abuse and to vigorously defend individual freedoms including speech and religion, a woman's right to choose, the right to due process, citizens' rights to privacy and much more."

While we appreciate the continued suggestion of RAHEEM.org, that organization has been discredited as a fraudulent site (as noted in a number of New York Times articles, with the first appearing on August 25, 2024, as well as a November 2025 Washington Post article on the DC attorney general's office lawsuit for fraud).

Information on submitting complaints is printed on our business cards and is also prominently posted on the city's website at multiple locations.

Additional Considerations

We would like to reiterate that BPD has fulfilled all 14 FIP recommendations that were assigned to the department. These reforms have involved significant policy changes, resulting in fewer stops, balanced search yields, and ongoing updates on our Transparency Hub. Although the PAB report restates several recommendations, we note that many proposed measures—such as additional data collection (e.g., the race of 911 callers) and direct oversight of training—exceed the PAB's stated Charter direction or rely on data that is not feasibly collectible.

Our reforms rest on robust data collection and continuous evaluation and ensure that our practices maintain the highest legal and ethical standards. Our training needs are continuously driven by legal mandates, timely legal updates, data analysis, audits, and early intervention efforts. These mechanisms ensure that we are providing training exactly where it is needed. Currently, our assessments show that our existing training adequately addresses these standards and no additional training measures regarding stay-away orders are warranted at this time. For instance, nearly every officer has completed a 40-hour Crisis Intervention Training course, and our Annual Report already provides evidence-based metrics on implicit bias and racial disparities.

Furthermore, while the report acknowledges external factors driving racial disparities, it continues to hold BPD fully accountable for outcomes influenced by broader social issues. We believe a collaborative approach that recognizes both department-level initiatives (such as our new Early Intervention System and rigorous evidence-based analyses of officer behavior) and the larger social context is necessary to achieve lasting change.



Berkeley Police Department Memorandum



Conclusion

The Berkeley Police Department remains fully committed to fair and impartial policing. We value our ongoing collaboration with the Police Accountability Board and the Public Safety Policy Committee. Our reforms—ranging from the Three-Pronged Traffic Enforcement model to comprehensive KIND training and the upcoming Early Intervention System—demonstrate our dedication to continuous improvement and community trust.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide this follow-up response. We look forward to continued dialogue and collaboration to ensure that Berkeley's policing reflects our shared commitment to justice and equity.

Cc:

Paul Buddenhagen, City Manager

Hansel Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability

Josh Cayetano, Police Accountability Board Chair

Mark Numainville, City Clerk



ACTION CALENDAR

February 11, 2025

To: Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council

From: Police Accountability Board

Submitted by: Hansel A. Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability

Subject: Police Accountability Board Report: Fair and Impartial Policing Implementation

RECOMMENDATION

Approve the following recommendations and instruct the Berkeley Police Department (BPD) and Police Accountability Board (PAB) to proceed with their implementation:

Recommendations to the Berkeley Police Department

1. Three-prong approach.
 - a. Definition of Low-Level Traffic Infractions: A definition consistent with SB 50 should be adopted.
 - b. Primary Collision Factors: This prong should specify the mode of the party at fault.
 - c. Community Reports: Under the category of "a variety of unsafe driving incidents," policies should be put in place that specify which calls for service will result in law enforcement action. That specification should be derived from an analysis of the 13% of calls from community members that resulted in a citation or arrest, as per the City Auditor's July 2021 report.
 - d. Community Caretaking: This prong needs more specificity, and its components should be based on Berkeley data rather than national statistics, as is done for Prong 1 (Primary Collision Factors). Specifically, the analysis should examine which other factors (non-PCFs) are highly associated with severe and fatal collisions in Berkeley. The open-ended quality of this prong may contribute to more non-safety-related stops than is called for in the Council directive. If more specificity is not possible or feasible, this prong should be eliminated.
 - e. Reporting: Future BPD updates on FIP implementation should include statistical information enabling an analysis of the impact of the three-prong approach on reducing or eliminating stops for low-level offenses—a primary

- focus of the Council directive—in a manner that supports an overall assessment and an understanding of the approach's impact on reducing racial disparities in traffic stops.
2. Evidence-based definition for stops of criminal suspects:
 - a. Establish an evidence-based definition for stops of criminal suspects.
 - b. Explain how precision-based policing, feedback loops, and accountability measures referenced in BPD FIP implementation updates relate to this recommendation and addresses the directive to establish an evidence-based definition for stopping criminal suspects.
 3. Enhanced implicit bias training: Per the Council's directive, ensure that BPD personnel receive intensive annual training dedicated to implicit bias.
 4. EIS: Pending the deployment of a new Early Intervention and Risk Management system, EIS audits should be focused on officers who are outliers on the variables stipulated in the Department's EIS, with a particular focus on racial disparities in stops, arrests, and searches. A designated PAB Member should serve as an observer in this process, as has been informally agreed to. Future audit reports should include the scope of what was reviewed and a clear statement of findings within the confines of officer confidentiality.
 5. Written consent searches: Future reporting to the council should include the number of consent searches conducted per reporting period and their effect on racial disparities in searches, compared to consent search numbers before implementation.
 6. Warrantless searches of people on supervised release: Future FIP updates should identify the impact of the new BPD Policy 311.6 on the numbers of searches and arrests of people on probation and parole and the racial disparities in them.
 7. Profiling by proxy: Future BPD updates should specify what instructions dispatchers are given on profiling by proxy, and any impact the instruction and corresponding Communications Manual amendments have had on racial disparities in departmental response to calls for service.
 8. Business cards: Ensure that business cards are distributed as mandated by the Council directive.
 9. Make resources on police-civilian encounters publicly available, such as through RAHEEM.org.

Recommendations to the Police Accountability Board

1. Scenario-based training: The 2021 Council specifically referred to the PAB oversight of the implementation of a scenario-based training component in the existing officer training required by the California Penal Code. This topic will be agendaized for discussion at a future PAB meeting, including the appropriateness of, and ability of the PAB to oversee departmental training.
2. Crisis Intervention Team (CIT): The 2021 Council item refers to the PAB accelerating CIT activity. This will be discussed in future PAB meetings.

Recommendations to the Berkeley City Council

1. Establish metrics to assess the success of implementing FIP directives. Currently, the BPD appears to be focused entirely on policy, and on tests of bias, as evidenced in its recently published Annual Report. The PAB has focused instead on outcomes, addressing the key question of whether racial disparities have decreased in any of the areas subject to FIP directives.
2. Eliminate reporting requirements for recommendations that the PAB ascertains have been fully implemented.
3. Require BPD to report biannually on:
 - a. Traffic stops by each prong of their 3-prong framework and by race within each prong.
 - b. Stop, search, and arrest data by probation/parole status and race.
 - c. Calls for service by the race of the reporter and reportee.

SUMMARY

This report formally assesses the Berkeley Police Department's (BPD) progress in implementing the Fair and Impartial Policing (FIP) directives adopted by the Berkeley City Council in February 2021. The Mayor's Working Group developed these directives on Fair and Impartial Policing following two years of consultations with experts and BPD representatives. The directives were established in response to findings in the 2018 Center for Policing Equity (CPE) report, which identified significant racial disparities in BPD's stops, arrests, and searches, particularly affecting Black and Latino/a individuals.

The report includes an analysis of BPD's efforts to implement the FIP policies, focusing on whether these efforts have successfully reduced racial disparities in policing practices. It acknowledges the BPD's progress in certain areas, such as a slight reduction in racial disparities in vehicle stops. Still, it highlights concern regarding the increase in disparities in pedestrian stops and the ongoing pronounced disparities in arrests and searches.

The PAB initially submitted this report to the City Council for presentation at the October 15, 2024 Regular Meeting. During the PAB meeting on September 25, 2024, the PAB voted to request the withdrawal of the item¹, a request that was granted by the Agenda and Rules Committee on September 30, 2024.² Notable findings of this report include, but are not limited to:

¹ The motion carried with 6 ayes in favor, 0 noes, and 2 PAB members absent. Police Accountability Board Regular Meeting Minutes for September 25, 2024: [link]

² Berkeley City Council Agenda and Rules Committee Special Meeting Minutes for September 30, 2024: <https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/legislative-body-meeting-minutes/09-30%20Minutes%20-%20Agenda%20Committee.pdf>

- The BPD has completed the implementation of some FIP Council directives, establishing implementation programs for others, and appears not to have begun implementing some directives.
- Racial disparities in vehicle stops by the BPD have decreased slightly since the CPE report but remain high.
- Racial disparities in pedestrian stops have substantially increased.
- Racial disparities in arrests and searches remain pronounced.
- Consent searches have decreased, but racial disparities in consent searches remain high.
- The percentage of stops for equipment and other non-safety-related infractions declined from 24.8% of all traffic stops in 2022 to 19% in 2023.
- A full Early Intervention and Risk Management System is in the very early stages.
- Enhanced implicit bias training has not yet begun.

Recommendations include, but are not limited to:

- The BPD's quarterly reports on the implementation of FIP should focus on policy modifications and outcomes, specifically whether and how those policy reforms have impacted racial disparities.
- The three-pronged approach to traffic enforcement should be reviewed and further oriented towards reducing low-level, non-safety-related stops.
- As per the Council's FIP directive, annual enhanced implicit bias training should be institutionalized.
- A full Early Intervention and Risk Management System should be adopted as soon as possible. In the meantime, random audits of officers should be replaced with targeted audits of "outliers."
- Full accountability must be ensured for officers whose speech or behavior demonstrates racial animus or other bias and "damages the mission" of the Berkeley Police Department.

FISCAL IMPACTS OF RECOMMENDATION

Implementing the PAB's recommendations will incur costs related to staff time, technology requirements, and maintenance of such technology.

CURRENT SITUATION AND ITS EFFECTS

On February 23, 2021, the Berkeley City Council unanimously approved a set of policy recommendations submitted by the Mayor's Working Group on Fair and Impartial Policing (FIP). As part of this decision, the Police Review Commission (PRC) and its successor, the Police Accountability Board (PAB), were tasked with monitoring and evaluating the Berkeley Police Department's (BPD) implementation of FIP directives. These directives require the BPD to provide quarterly updates to the City Council on the progress of their implementation. To comply with the Council Directive, the Police Accountability Board established a subcommittee on August 4, 2021, to monitor the progress of these reports.

BACKGROUND

The purpose of the PAB is to promote public trust through independent, objective civilian oversight of the Berkeley Police Department, provide community participation in setting and reviewing Police Department policies, practices, and procedures, and offer a means for prompt, impartial, and fair investigations of complaints brought by members of the public against sworn employees of the Berkeley Police Department.

ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY AND CLIMATE IMPACTS

There are no identifiable environmental effects or opportunities associated with this report.

RATIONALE FOR RECOMMENDATION

The PAB presents these recommendations to the BPD, the PAB, and the City Council, aiming to enhance the progress made in implementing the FIP recommendations, ensure that all directives are fully addressed, and set the expectation that future BPD updates include an analysis of racial disparity outcomes.

CONTACT PERSON

Hansel A. Aguilar, Director of Police Accountability,

Office of the Director of Police Accountability (510) 981-4950

Attachments:

1: Police Accountability Board Report: Fair and Impartial Policing Implementation



2024

Police Accountability Board Report: Fair and Impartial Policing Implementation



Approved* by the Police Accountability Board on
April 24, 2024

*(6 Aye Votes and 1 Nay Vote)

Meeting Link:

<https://tinyurl.com/PAB-FIP-Report-Approval>

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Introduction

On February 23, 2021, the Berkeley City Council (City Council or Council) unanimously passed the package of policy recommendations that the Mayor's Working Group on Fair and Impartial Policing (FIP) forwarded to City Council after two years of meetings with experts and Berkeley Police Department (BPD) representatives (See Attachments 1 and 2). As part of that package, the Police Review Commission (PRC) and its successor the Police Accountability Board (PAB) were assigned responsibility for "monitoring and assessing" BPD implementation of the FIP directives. The directives included a requirement for quarterly updates from the BPD to City Council on implementation progress. A chart summarizing the BPD updates from June 2021 to October 2023 is provided in Attachment 3.

The goal of the Mayor's Fair and Impartial Working Group was to discuss ways to address racial disparities in BPD stops, arrests, and searches, as presented to the Berkeley community in the 2018 Center for Policing Equity (CPE) report¹ commissioned by the Council. That report found that, given the city's population demographics, Black motorists were 6.5 times more likely to be stopped by Berkeley police than White motorists and that Black pedestrians were 4.5 times more likely to be stopped than White pedestrians.

The PAB recognizes the ongoing efforts taken by the BPD to implement the Fair and Impartial Policing mandates, as represented in the quarterly updates from Chief Louis. This PAB report, submitted pursuant to the PAB's directive to monitor FIP implementation, is an independent assessment of progress to date. The focus of this assessment is not only on BPD changes in written policy, but also on whether progress has been made in reducing racial disparities in BPD stops, arrests, and searches.

¹ Center for Policing Equity. *The Science of Justice: Berkeley Police Department, National Justice Database City Report*. May 2018. <https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Berkeley-CPE-Report-May-2018.pdf>

Before proceeding, it is important to note that a finding of racial disparities does not, by that fact alone, indicate racial bias among individual police officers or the institution. Disparity is not synonymous with bias or discrimination. A measurement of racial disparity simply indicates an inequality or disproportion among or between various races on a particular variable (such as police stops), whatever the source of that inequality. Bias, on the other hand, can be defined as individual or institutional prejudice against a particular group, which may lead to disparities. This report focuses on racial disparities, as did the Mayor's Working Group on Fair and Impartial Policing and City Council's directives. Several factors may account for such disparities. These factors include, but are not limited to, socio-economic inequalities associated with race; cultural factors; institutional decision making; and, finally, individual officer bias. These factors may act independently of each other or in interaction with each other, amplifying their potential impact. It is not our goal to untangle the complex web of factors responsible for those disparities, nor is it within the scope of our work--or our ability, given data and resource limitations--to do so. Instead, the goal is to establish policies and practices that have the potential to reduce disparities and curtail the impact of any potential bias.

Key findings include, but are not limited to:

- The BPD has completed implementation of some FIP Council directives, is in the process of establishing implementation programs for other FIP directives, and appears not to have begun implementation of others.
- Racial disparities in vehicle stops by the BPD have decreased slightly since the CPE report, but remain high
- Racial disparities in pedestrian stops have substantially increased
- Racial disparities in arrests and searches continue to be pronounced
- The number of consent searches has decreased, but racial disparities in consent searches remain high

- The percentage of stops for equipment and other non-safety related infractions declined from 24.8% of all traffic stops in 2022 to 19% in 2023
- A full Early Intervention and Risk Management System is in very early stages
- Enhanced implicit bias training has not begun

Recommendations include, but are not limited to:

- The BPD quarterly reports on implementation of FIP should focus not only on policy modifications, but on outcomes, specifically the issue of whether and how those policy reforms have impacted racial disparities
- The three-pronged approach to traffic enforcement should be reviewed and further oriented towards reducing low-level, non-safety related stops
- Annual enhanced implicit bias training should be institutionalized, as per the Council's FIP directive
- A full Early Intervention and Risk Management System should be adopted as soon as possible. In the meantime, random audits of officers should be replaced by targeted audits of "outliers"
- Full accountability must be ensured for officers whose speech or behavior demonstrates racial animus or other bias and "damage[s] the mission... of the Berkeley Police Department"

Our report begins with recent statistics on stops, arrests, and searches. As we will see, a pattern of racial disparities remains since the CPE issued its report in 2018. While the racial disparity in vehicle stops has fallen slightly, racial disparities in pedestrian stops has increased substantially. The fact of racial disparities is not an abstract or academic issue. Racial disparities in policing have a serious impact on the lives of many Black and Latino/a people.

The report then includes a discussion of the status of BPD's implementation efforts, as well as questions that emerge from Chief Louis's quarterly updates². We conclude with recommendations for the BPD, the PAB, and the Council, with the goal of more effectively addressing racial disparities.

Related to the issue of the meaning of disparities, the BPD presented their Annual Report to City Council on March 12, 2024. As part of that report, they included "tests for bias" in traffic stops, searches, and use of force. We have examined the analyses presented in that report and note several fundamental challenges to their conclusion that BPD traffic stops, searches, and use of force are "race-neutral." See Appendix 1 for a brief discussion of the PAB's concerns with the BPD analysis.


Fair and Impartial Policing Statistical Profile

The BPD data that were derived from the Department's Transparency Hub and analyzed by the ODPA and the PAB reveal little progress in reducing racial disparities in stops since the CPE report was released in 2018. That report showed that for the period 2012-2016, Black motorists were 6.5 times more likely to be stopped than White motorists based on Berkeley demographics, and Black pedestrians in 2015-2016 were 4.5 more likely to be stopped than White pedestrians.

² In addition to direction to the Berkeley Police Department to implement reforms, the February 2021 City Council action included referral of some FIP recommendations to the public safety reimagining process, and others to be "taken up by the PAB". This report does not address recommendations that were referred to the reimagining process. The report substantively addresses one of the three recommendations referred to the PAB (annual implicit bias training).

Berkeley Police Department statistics show that from April 1, 2021 to October 31, 2023³, of the 13,620 stops of bicyclists, motorists and pedestrians, 45.73% were White individuals, 44.77% were Black individuals, and 20.81% were Latino/a individuals.⁴ Based on Berkeley population figures⁵, Black motorists were 5.8 times more likely to be stopped by Berkeley police than White motorists. The racial disparity has worsened for pedestrian stops, with Black pedestrians now 8.3 times more likely to be stopped than White pedestrians.⁶

Figure 1 Likelihood of stops for Black/African Americans Compared to White Individuals



³ The April 1, 2021 date was chosen in consideration of the fact that the FIP directives were issued by Council on February 23, 2021. The end date of October 31, 2023 was used because we initiated this analysis in December 2023 and used the data then available. October 3, 2023 was the date of the last full quarterly update from the BPD. Unless otherwise noted, the data in this report covers the period from April 1, 2021 to October 31, 2023.

⁴ Occasionally, small differences will appear in the data presented here and those in the BPD Transparency Hub. These differences, which are minor and do not affect the percentages or ratios reported, are due to periodic data updates or modifications made in the BPD Transparency Hub. All the analyses reported are derived from data in our “Data Notebook” which is available in Appendix 2.

⁵ Population data sources from U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey (ACS) 1-Year Estimates Data Profiles, Table DP05 (2022):

https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDP5Y2022.DP05?g=040XX00US06_160XX00US0606000&tid=ACSDP5Y2022.DP05

⁶ In order to calculate the greater likelihood of Black motorists or pedestrians being stopped than White individuals, we divided the number of stops of each race/ethnicity by their numbers in the Berkeley population.


Looking at overall stop data for Berkeley residents only, a significant racial disparity persists. Black people residing in Berkeley were 6.55 times as likely to be stopped as their White counterparts. The Table below shows the absolute number of bicycle, pedestrian and vehicle stops, by race, for residents and non-residents of Berkeley.

Table 1 Number of Stops of Non-Berkeley Residents vs. Berkeley Residents by Race/Ethnicity.

Race/Ethnicity	Stops of Non-Berkeley Residents, 2021-2023	Stops of Berkeley Residents, 2021-2023
Black	1615	2814
Hispanic/Latino(a)	1212	955
White	1626	3112
Other	1109	1177
Total	5562	8058

With respect to arrests, of 2,202 arrests in this period, Black people were 50.47 percent of the total, White people 34.45 percent, and Latino/as 15.08 percent. This means that, based on population figures, Black people were 10.4 times as likely to be arrested as White people in Berkeley, and Latinos were twice as likely. Looking at these data a different way, Black people were 6.47 times more likely to be arrested than their population would suggest, White people were .62 times less likely, and Latino/as 1.25 times more likely to arrested.

Figure 2 Percent of Arrest by Race/Ethnicity (April 1, 2021 to October 31, 2023)



The Table below shows the absolute number of arrests by race.


Table 2 Number of Arrest by Race/Ethnicity for Reporting Period.

Race/Ethnicity	Number of Arrests
Black	1021
Hispanic/Latino(a)	305
White	697
Other	179
Grand Total	2202

With regard to searches, of the 2,421 searches conducted by the BPD during the period of April 1, 2021 to October 31, 2023, Black individuals were 46.55 percent of the total, White individuals were 31.47 percent, and Latino/as were 13.26 percent. This indicates that Black individuals were 10.5 times more likely to be searched compared to White individuals, while Latino individuals were 1.9

times more likely.⁷ Alternatively, Black individuals were 5.97 times more likely to be searched than expected based on their population representation, White individuals were 0.57 times less likely, and Latino/as were 1.10 times more likely.

Figure 3 Percent of Searches by Race/Ethnicity (April 1, 2021 - October 31, 2023)



Policy and Practices Directive and Reforms

Reducing stops for low-level infractions and focusing on safety in traffic stops.

The FIP recommendation regarding traffic stops was to “prioritize safety in traffic stops” and “discontinue stops for minor offenses.” The FIP Working Group saw this as a way to reduce racial disparities and eliminate pretextual traffic stops. The motion approved by the City Council was to “Implement a new evidence-based traffic enforcement model that emphasizes safety as the primary reason for traffic stops, rather than merely addressing minor offenses.” Neither the Mayor’s Working Group nor the Council provided a clear definition of “minor

⁷ Similar to our calculations for stops and arrests, to determine the greater likelihood of Black and Latino/a individuals than White individuals to be searched, we divided the number of searches of Black, Latino/a and White individuals by their respective numbers in the population.

offenses.” The PAB recommends that the BPD adopt the definition utilized in Senate Bill 50, as outlined in the footnote below.⁸

The BPD is using a 3-pronged approach to traffic safety (“Primary Collision Factors”; “Community Reports”; and “Community Caretaking”) to fulfill the Council directive (See Attachment 4 for BPD Special Order 1106.2). Quarterly BPD updates report that implementation of this recommendation is complete.

The first prong of BPD’s three-pronged approach, known as “Primary Collision Factors” or PCF, is generally excellent and data-driven at the local level. This prong consists of factors that commonly lead to fatal or severe collisions in Berkeley, including unsafe speed, disregarding pedestrian right-of-way at crosswalks, failure to yield for turns, red light violations, and stop sign violations.

One important update to this prong would be to specify not only the violation but also the mode of the party at fault (e.g., stop sign violations by drivers are a common cause of fatal and severe collisions in Berkeley, but stop sign violations by bicyclists are not, and the PCF categories should reflect this). It is expected that most, if not all, stops should occur in response to these well-documented safety issues, following the Council’s directive.

⁸ In 2023, a Bill was introduced in the California Legislature, SB50 (“An Act to Amend Sections 21 and 21100 of, and add Section 2804.5, to the Vehicle Code”), that stipulated that “notwithstanding any other law, a peace officer shall not stop or detain the operator of a motor vehicle or bicycle for a low-level infraction...”. The Bill, which was tabled after a third reading and may be re-submitted this year, defined a “low-level infraction” as “a violation related to the registration of a vehicle or vehicle equipment,” as specified; “a violation related to the positioning or number of license plates when the rear license plate is clearly displayed...”; “a violation related to vehicle lighting equipment not illuminating, if the violation is limited to a single brake light, headlight, rear license plate, or running light or a single bulb in a larger light of the same,” as specified; “a violation related to vehicle bumper equipment,” as specified; “a violation related to bicycle equipment or operation,” as specified.

The second prong (“Community Reports”) consists of “responding to calls from community members” and includes such things as “possible DUI driver (i.e., car reportedly swerving)”; “driver fallen asleep at red light”; “a variety of unsafe driving incidents”; “crime with get-away vehicle description.” While some of these community calls no doubt require an immediate response, the category is broad and opens the door to potential profiling by proxy. At a minimum, under the category of “a variety of unsafe driving incidents,” policies should be put in place that specify which calls for service will result in law enforcement action.

The City Auditor’s data analysis⁹ shows that only 13% of calls from community members resulted in a citation or arrest, compared to 42% of officer-initiated stops. To effectively reduce the potential for profiling by proxy, analysis of this 13% should be conducted to determine what types of community calls are most likely to yield a law enforcement response crucial to public safety. The PAB recommends that this prong then be substantially reformulated based on the data analysis of which types of calls for service result in enforcement actions and which are more likely to open the door to profiling by proxy.

The third prong, “Community Caretaking,” is the least specific and consists of three examples: “seatbelt violations”; “distracted driving (hands-free law)”; and “DUI”. As described by the BPD, these are not primary collision factors according to the California Highway Patrol because they are not the proximate cause of a collision. Because this prong is open-ended and consists only of several examples, it allows for maximum discretion with no real parameters.

The PAB recommends more specificity in this prong and that its components be based on Berkeley data rather than national statistics, as BPD did for Prong 1 (Primary Collision Factors, or PCFs). Specifically, the analysis should

⁹ Data Analysis of the City of Berkeley’s Police Response, 07/02/2021
<https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/Data-Analysis-Berkeley-Police-Response.pdf>

examine which other factors (non-PCFs) are highly associated with severe and fatal collisions in Berkeley. The open-ended quality of this prong may contribute to more non-safety related stops than is called for in the Council directive. If more specificity is not possible or feasible, this prong should be eliminated.

In addition to further clarification and specification of factors and policies related to prongs two and three, future BPD updates to Council should include statistical information enabling an analysis of the impact of the three-prong approach on reducing or eliminating stops for low-level offenses in a manner that supports an overall assessment, as well as an understanding of the impact of the approach on reducing racial disparities.

The PAB analysis of vehicle stops reveals that little progress has been made on reducing racial disparities. Given this finding, careful scrutiny of the three-pronged approach needs to be undertaken, with future BPD updates analyzing disparity outcomes and focusing on their reduction, as appropriate.

Our analysis of BPD raw data on traffic stops¹⁰ in 2022 (when the three-pronged approach was established) and the first three quarters of 2023 reveals that the number of traffic violation stops increased from 2883 in 2022 to 3297 in the first three quarters of 2023. The percentage of stops for equipment and other such low-level infractions declined from 24.8% in 2022 to 19% in 2023. While the percentage of low-level stops thus declined, their numbers are still relatively high

¹⁰ For this calculation, we included all vehicle stops for 2022 and for the first three quarters of 2023. The BPD data include the primary reason for each stop. From these raw data we were able to count all stops for low-level equipment violations or other non-safety related violations, for example misplaced registration tags, failure to dim beams, faulty window installation, etc. The BPD data included a few categories—such as those relating to improper parking, trespassing, bicycle helmet infractions, littering, and vehicle theft—that were not appropriate to include in these counts of traffic violations. We excluded those few categories (n=79 for 2022; n=70 for 2023) from our calculations.

despite the three-pronged approach and the directive that such stops be minimized.

Table 3 Percentage of Stops for Equipment Violations and Other Low-Level Infractions

Year	Traffic Stops	% of Stops for Equipment violations and other low-level infractions
2022	2883	24.8%
2023	3297	19%

Clear, evidence-based definition of stops of criminal suspects.

The FIP Working Group recommended “us[ing] a clear, evidence-based definition for stops of criminal suspects.” This was not meant to be primarily about traffic stops but all stops of criminal suspects, including motorists, cyclists and pedestrians. Following this recommendation, Council directed the BPD to amend policies “reaffirming and clarifying that the Berkeley Police Department will use a clear, evidence-based definition for stops of criminal suspects.” The Department’s quarterly updates state that the BPD “is establishing a precision based policing model that considers data and public safety. This model aims to reduce the number of stops that studies have shown had minimal impact on public safety.”

The PAB appreciates the BPD June 2023 and October 2023 update statement that “ensuring that we implement approaches that identify and work to reduce racial disparities will be a cornerstone to our evidence-based approaches.” However, without more specifics about the department’s “precision-based policing model” and “a feedback loop with information flowing both ways”, it is difficult to assess whether these additions have the potential to reduce racial disparities. More specificity in this context is particularly critical as the data presented in this report indicate that racial disparities remain high.

The BPD June and October 2023 updates also state that this “feedback loop ... creates an accountability measure.” Does this mean there is

accountability for racial disparities? If so, what does it consist of? The next BPD update should include greater specificity regarding precision-based policing, feedback loops, and accountability measures. Further, and significantly, none of the BPD updates have included a definition of what constitutes legitimate stops for criminal suspects, evidence-based or otherwise. Although the BPD indicated that this recommendation was implemented as of September 2022, a definition is still outstanding.

Only use race and ethnicity as determining factors together with other clear criteria.

BPD updates indicate that this recommendation has been completed because formal policies, state law, and the Constitution prohibit using race as the defining factor in making stops, arrests, and searches. The PAB is concerned that the BPD suggests no change is needed; the question is not whether BPD policies or state or federal law allow the use of race as a defining factor—clearly, they do not. The question is how to prevent discretionary actions in the field from inadvertently introducing race as the determining factor. Most important, how are race and ethnicity used as determining factors “together with other clear criteria”? Future updates should include more specificity on this important question of how race and ethnicity may be used with other factors. Examples may be useful here.

Enhanced Implicit Bias Training

The FIP directives passed by Council “require enhanced annual implicit bias training for police.” The BPD updates state that there has been “ongoing training in topics such as implicit bias, racial profiling...”. The PAB has been informed by the BPD that “The topic of bias is covered as a subtopic throughout various trainings” such as de-escalation and tactical communication. This likely falls short of the enhanced annual implicit bias training that was called for in the Council directive. Full compliance with the Council directive requires that the BPD install

annual intense implicit bias training, not the less intensive approach to implicit bias as a subtopic to other materials as currently practiced.

Early Intervention System (EIS)¹¹

An effective EIS was a central component of the FIP recommendations, and the focus—as with the FIP program as a whole-- was on racial disparities. As the Working Group stated in its presentation to Council in February 2021, an effective Early Intervention System would “involve identifying officer outliers in stops, searches, and use of force and their outcomes and examining the reasons for racial disparities.” Racial disparities take a back seat in the BPD quarterly updates, including in its description of an amended EIS program. Beyond this important omission, BPD updates have been inconsistent across quarterly reports with regard to how this directive has been implemented (See Attachment 3). After relatively minor tweaking, the BPD reported that the EIS directive had been completed.

Additionally, recent updates report that periodic audits of several randomly chosen officers have been added to the EIS process. While audits of a few randomly chosen officers may occasionally be useful, the intent of the FIP was to focus on “outliers”, a neutral term of art that refers to officers whose performance on certain indicators is outside the BPD average. As the focus of the FIP was on racial disparities, in the case of EIS it is important to focus on those units or officers for whom stops are disproportionately numerous and/or racial disparities most pronounced. The allegations of racism, disdain for the unhoused, and implicit

¹¹ The PAB acknowledges the Council's allocation of funding for designing and implementing a comprehensive Early Intervention and Risk Management System (EIRMS). However, the \$100,000 appropriation for the evaluation, design *and* implementation of an EIRMS is unlikely to be sufficient. Therefore, the budget for the EIRMS should be augmented to support not only its design but its near-term implementation.

arrest quotas in the Downtown Bike Force have drawn attention to the importance of such a directed focus when doing EIS audits.

In April 2023, City Council referred \$100,000 to the June 2023 budget to hire a consultant for the design and help with implementing a new Early Intervention and Risk Management System. It will take some time before that project is complete. In the interim, EIS audits should be focused on officers who are outliers on the variables stipulated in the Department's EIS, with a particular focus on racial disparities in stops, arrests, and searches. In addition, a designated PAB Member should serve as an EIS observer. With regard to the latter, the PAB is pleased that observation by a PAB Member has recently been agreed to by the Chief.


Written consent search forms

The PAB is pleased that this has been implemented (Policy 311.3). An understanding of the implementation process and its effect would be improved by the inclusion of data in the quarterly BPD reports. Dr. Frank Baumgartner and his team (2018) found that in North Carolina, consent searches declined by 75% in cities that required written permission.

PAB analysis of BPD data reveals that the number of consent searches decreased from 188 in 2021, to 123 in 2022, and 69 through the first three quarters of 2023. While the number of consent searches has gone down since the introduction of written consent forms, racial disparities in these discretionary searches remain high. In 2021, 44% of consent searches were of Black individuals, 32% were of White individuals, and 16% were of Latinos. Two years later, the respective percentages were 43%, 30%, and 19%. In other words, while the absolute number of people of color undergoing consent searches has decreased with the

implementation of written consent forms, the racial disparities in these discretionary searches have not.¹²

Figure 4 Consent Searches by Race/Ethnicity



Warrantless searches of people on supervised release status

BPD Policy 311.6, as adopted with agreement between the PRC and the BPD and incorporated into the FIP directives, limited warrantless searches of people on supervised release status unless there was reasonable suspicion that they had committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime. This policy was modified by City Council on July 26, 2022, to make a distinction between people on supervised release for violent crimes (who would be subject

¹² These racial disparities in consent searches are roughly comparable to the disparities in all searches. As we saw above, for the period 2021 through the first three quarters of 2023, there were 2507 searches, with 47% of these searches Black people, 32% White people and 13% Latinos.

Source: https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2023-04-11_Item_25_Referral_100%2C000_to_the_June%2C_2023.pdf

to warrantless searches) as opposed to non-violent crimes (for whom reasonable suspicion would be required for a search).

The Department under Chief Greenwood had considered the violent/non-violent distinction a challenging one to make in practice and recommended the “reasonable suspicion” standard for all searches of people on supervised release. Have officers found it difficult to implement the “violent”/“non-violent” distinction as Chief Greenwood had suggested? What is the impact of this policy revision on numbers of, and racial disparities in, arrests and searches of people on probation and parole? Future BPD updates should continue to address what, if any, impact this 2022 change in policy has had on racial disparities.

Since introduction of the 311.6 policy change in 2020, BPD data no longer included “probation or parole search” as a category. This made sense since those searches were no longer permissible (absent reasonable suspicion). However, since the modification in 2022, probation and parole searches (and other supervised release searches) were allowed if the individual was on probation or parole for a violent offense. Therefore, BPD data should once again include these searches in their data.

Profiling by proxy

According to Chief Louis’s June 2023 update, the Communications Manual “has been amended to address handling cases involving profiling by proxy.” Further, dispatchers “are instructed to be cognizant and screen for profiling by proxy calls.” More specifics need to be provided. Exactly what does the “instruction” consist of? What has the effect been on racial disparities in departmental response to calls for service? As detailed in the City Auditor’s report cited above, law-enforcement actions are lower in stops initiated by the public than in officer-initiated stops. This suggests that more targeted dispatcher instructions and call-screening for profiling by proxy may be necessary.

Resources on police-civilian encounters.

The PAB is pleased that the business card directive has been fulfilled. That provision was to ensure that business cards with information on how to commend police officers or file misconduct complaints were distributed upon each officer/civilian encounter. However, the body-worn camera footage that the PAB has received in conjunction with individual misconduct complaints does not seem to show any distribution of business cards as directed by Council.

Fire racist officers identified through social media and other media screens

BPD Policy 1029 (“Employee Speech, Expression, and Social Networking”) stipulates that employees of the BPD whose speech or expression “tends to compromise or damage the mission, function, or reputation...of the Berkeley Police Department” will be held accountable. Two issues arise here: 1) The FIP recommendation included media scans to ensure consistency with this policy, yet this proactive approach does not seem to have been implemented; 2) The FIP recommendation was that “racist officers identified through social media...” shall be fired. The current Policy 1029 is not specific and requires only “accountability”. Thus, it is not clear if this FIP directive has been implemented. One way to move forward on this directive would be to be more specific on what exactly “accountability” means in this context and what preliminary steps would be taken prior to an officer’s termination.

Require regular analysis of BPD stop, search, and use of force data

As noted in the BPD quarterly reports, a Transparency Hub was developed that provides raw data through an Open Data Portal. While this allows members of the public who have the time and ability to analyze the data, the BPD’s Data Analyst should provide more detailed analysis of these data with a focus on racial disparities, as we have done in this report.

Make resources on police-civilian encounters publicly available such as through RAHEEM.org

This Council directive is mentioned in the BPD quarterly updates, but no information is provided regarding its implementation status.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Racial disparities in stops, arrest, and searches remain high, and there is little public accountability for the overall results of the FIP effort due to a lack of statistical reporting or outcome analysis in BPD quarterly updates. While some policy changes have been implemented by the BPD, modification of these changes is needed in some areas. Other FIP recommendations have not been implemented.

The PAB offers the following recommendations for action by BPD, the PAB, and City Council with the goals of improving upon steps that have already been taken, ensuring that no directives remain unfulfilled, and establishing an expectation for future BPD updates to include analysis of racial disparity outcomes.

Recommendations to the Berkeley Police Department

1. Three-prong approach.
 - a. Definition of Low-Level Traffic Infractions: A definition consistent with SB 50 should be adopted.
 - b. Primary Collision Factors: This prong should specify the mode of the party at fault.
 - c. Community Reports: Under the category of "a variety of unsafe driving incidents," policies should be put in place that specify which calls for service will result in law enforcement action. That specification should be derived from an analysis of the 13% of calls from community members that resulted in a citation or arrest, as per the City Auditor's July 2021 report.

- d. Community Caretaking: More specificity is needed in this prong, and its components should be based on Berkeley data rather than national statistics, as is done for Prong 1 (Primary Collision Factors). Specifically, the analysis should examine which other factors (non-PCFs) are highly associated with severe and fatal collisions in Berkeley. The open-ended quality of this prong may contribute to more non-safety related stops than is called for in the Council directive. If more specificity is not possible or feasible, this prong should be eliminated.
 - e. Reporting: Future BPD updates on FIP implementation should include statistical information enabling an analysis of the impact of the three-prong approach on reducing or eliminating stops for low-level offenses—a primary focus of the Council directive—in a manner that supports an overall assessment as well as an understanding of the impact of the approach on reducing racial disparities in traffic stops.
2. Evidence-based definition for stops of criminal suspects.
 - a. Establish an evidence-based definition for stops of criminal suspects.
 - b. Explain how the precision-based policing, feedback loops, and accountability measures, referenced in BPD FIP implementation updates in relation to this recommendation, address the directive to establish an evidence-based definition for stops of criminal suspects.
 3. Enhanced implicit bias training: Ensure that intensive annual training dedicated to the topic of implicit bias is delivered to BPD personnel per the Council's directive.
 4. EIS: Pending the deployment of a new Early Intervention and Risk Management system, EIS audits should be focused on officers who are outliers on the variables stipulated in the Department's EIS, with a particular focus on racial disparities in stops, arrests, and searches. A designated PAB Member should serve as an observer in this process, as has been informally

agreed to. Future audit reports should include the scope of what was reviewed and a clear statement of findings, within the confines of officer confidentiality.

5. Written consent searches: Future reporting to council should include the number of consent searches conducted per reporting period and their effect on racial disparities in searches, with a comparison to consent search numbers before implementation.
6. Warrantless searches of people on supervised release: Future FIP updates should identify the impact of the new BPD Policy 311.6 on the numbers of, and racial disparities in, searches and arrests of people on probation and parole.
7. Profiling by proxy: Future BPD updates should specify what instruction dispatchers are given on the topic of profiling by proxy, as well as any impact the instruction and corresponding Communications Manual amendments have had on racial disparities in departmental response to calls for service.
8. Business cards: Ensure that business cards are distributed as mandated by the Council directive.
9. Make resources on police-civilian encounters publicly available, such as through RAHEEM.org.

Recommendations to the Police Accountability Board

1. Scenario-based training: The 2021 Council specifically referred to the PAB oversight of the implementation of a scenario-based training component in the existing officer training required by the California Penal Code. This topic will be agendaized for discussion at a future PAB meeting, including the appropriateness of, and ability of, the PAB to oversee departmental training.

2. Crisis Intervention Team (CIT): The 2021 Council item refers to the PAB the acceleration of CIT activity. This will be taken up for discussion in future PAB meetings.

Recommendations to the Berkeley City Council

1. Establish metrics to assess the success of the implementation of FIP directives. Currently the BPD appears to be focused entirely on policy, and on tests of bias, as evidenced in its recently published Annual Report. The PAB has focused instead on outcomes, addressing the key question of whether racial disparities have decreased in any of the areas subject to FIP directives.
2. Eliminate reporting requirements for recommendations that the PAB ascertains have been fully implemented.
3. Require BPD to report biannually on:
 - a. Traffic stops by each prong of their 3-prong framework and by race within each prong.
 - b. Stop, search, and arrest data by probation/parole status and race.
 - c. Calls for service by the race of the reporter and reportee.

Ensure that employees of the BPD whose speech or behavior is inconsistent with fair and impartial policing be held accountable.

Appendix

Appendix 1. Berkeley Police Department 2024 Annual Report “Tests for Bias”

The PAB has several concerns about the adequacy of the three tests conducted for stops and searches (use of force is not part of the FIP focus): “At-fault collision demographics”; “yield rate analysis”; and, the “veil of darkness”.

1. The at-fault collision test is the most problematic of these analyses. This BPD test purports to compare the parties at fault in collisions, by race, to the rate of police stops by race. Because they find that the proportion of stops for each race is approximately the same as the proportion of each race at fault in collisions, they conclude that police stops are “race-neutral”. In other words, while not citing disparity statistics, the BPD implies that the racial disparity in stops is the result of Black motorists’ more dangerous driving.

There are numerous problems with that analysis, including the following:

- In the interest of focusing on “discretionary stops,” which as they note are most likely to involve potential bias, the BPD only includes in their analysis stops that were officer-initiated. Curiously, however, it omits the most discretionary stops of all—those based on equipment violations, registration or license plate infractions and other such low-level offenses that make up 19% of all vehicle stops.
 - The “at-fault collision” side of this equation is also problematic. Only those collisions for which the police were called to the scene or were nearby when the accident happened, and/or for which a written police report was filed, are included in the analysis. Personal experience suggests that many if not most collisions are not reported to the police.
2. The BPD’s yield rate analysis cites the 2024 RIPA Annual Report that shows there were no statistically significant differences in rates of discovery of contraband in searches of Black people and White people in Berkeley. This is an important RIPA finding. It must be qualified, however, by the RIPA Board’s advice on interpreting the finding. As the RIPA Board notes, when search rates are higher and discovery

rates lower for Black people than for white people, it can be concluded that racial bias was involved in the searches. However, “[w]hen these statistics do not move in opposite directions, it is more difficult to determine whether disparate treatment is present.” (RIPA 2024 Annual Report; Appendix B.3, p. 46).

3. The veil of darkness test is an industry-wide standard for testing racial bias. It assumes that if racial bias exists in vehicle stops, people of color would be more likely to be stopped during the day than at night when it is presumably less possible to discern motorists’ race. The BPD analysis compares vehicle stops at the “inter-twilight” period around 6:30 pm during daylight savings time (when it is light) and standard time (when it is dark). The BPD finding is that the stop rates by race are comparable in the light and in the dark, and that “this is what we would expect to see if those stops were being made based on race-neutral factors.” This is quite different from the finding of Stanford researchers who analyzed 95 million traffic stops across the United States using the veil of darkness test and found statistically significant racial disparities¹³. The BPD finding for Berkeley is a positive one, but we need more details here. It is possible that stops occurring in the inter-twilight period in Berkeley in one year would not be sufficient in number to draw statistically valid inferences. Finally, while the veil of darkness is an industry-standard, several cautions must be applied. As numerous scientists have explained, and the BPD report acknowledges, both street lighting and car profiling may skew results.

In sum, we cannot confidently conclude from these BPD tests for bias that it is not a factor in racial disparities in BPD vehicle stops and searches. More rigorous studies would be required to untangle the web of socio-economic, cultural, institutional, and individual factors—and their interactions—that produce these racial disparities.

¹³ <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-020-0858-1>

Appendix 2. PAB Data Workbook

To access a copy of the Data Workbook, please use the following link:

https://berkeleyca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/PAB%20Data%20Workbook_2024%20FIP%20Implementation%20Report%20.xlsx

Attachment List

1. [Mayor's Working Group on Fair and Impartial Policing. Proposal to City Council. February 23, 2021.](#)
2. [Working Group Recommendations Passed by Council. February 23, 2021](#)
3. Summary of BPD Quarterly Updates on Fair and Impartial Policing Implementation
4. [BPD Three-Pronged Approach to Traffic Enforcement](#)
5. Berkeley Police Department Memorandum Titled: "PD Response to PAB FIP Implementation Report"

Attachment 1: Mayor's Working Group on Fair and Impartial Policing. Proposal to City Council. February 23, 2021

The Mayor's Working Group on Fair and Impartial Policing Policy Proposals

Developing and implementing reforms that will effectively reduce existing racial disparities requires changes at several levels. The following recommendations include setting new policy, updating institutional structures, and mandating individual accountability. Their implementation and ongoing effectiveness require supportive leadership, transparency and police accountability.

Executive Summary. Mayor's Working Group on Fair and Impartial Policing (hereafter, "the working group") focused on reducing racial disparities in stops and searches and improving community relationships damaged by the racially disparate practices in stops and searches.

This report advances the following recommendations for BPD practices:

- Focus on public safety and eliminate stops for low-level offenses not directly impacting public safety.
- Use race and ethnicity as determining factors in stops only when paired with clear, evidence-based criteria.
- Institute annual implicit bias training and scenario-based training for California Penal Code 13519.4, prohibiting racial or identity profiling.
- Establish a truly effective Early Intervention System and risk management process to ensure department accountability and identify officers who are outliers in stops, searches, dispositions, and outcomes.
- Limit warrantless searches of individuals on supervised release status such as Post Release Community Supervision (PRCS), probation, or parole.
- Require written consent for consent searches.
- Include evaluations of cultural competence in hiring and promotion, and fire officers who have expressed racist attitudes and/or are identified as members of racist groups.

The report also advances these recommendations for the Berkeley City Council and/or the City of Berkeley:

- Hire a consultant to create a plan for monitoring and reporting on the implementation of these recommendations.
- Ensure the creation of a Specialized Care Unit with crisis-response field workers, as included in the recent contract for a community-process to establish an SCU.
- Ensure a robust community engagement process, including annual surveys and community forums
- Require quarterly analysis of stop, search, and use of force data by City Auditor and/or the PRC.
- Adopt and carry out the compliance and accountability system outlined in this document.

Proposed Actions

Table 1 provides a proposed action for each recommendation in the body and appendices of this draft report.

Action	Recommendations
Direct the City Manager to implement key recommendations, with at minimum, quarterly progress reports to the PAB and/or the Working Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus traffic stops on safety • Use a clear, evidence-based definition for stops of criminal suspects • Use race and ethnicity as determining factors in stops only when paired with clear, evidence-based criteria • Eliminate stops for low-level offenses • Implement an Early Intervention System (EIS) and a risk-management structure • Immediately release stop, arrest, calls for service and use of force data from 2012 to present to the Working Group • Limit warrantless searches of individuals on supervised release status such as Post Release Community Supervision (PRCS), probation, or parole • Require written consent for all consent searches • Address Profiling by Proxy (PAB Policy Development, Dispatcher Training) • Fire racist police officers identified through social media and other media screens • Address Profiling by Proxy (Council develop & pass CAREN policy) • Require regular analysis of BPD stop, search, and use of force data • Make resources on police-civilian encounters more publicly available such as RAHEEM.org • Adopt Compliance and Accountability Mechanisms <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Hire consultant to develop implementation plan • For any individual detained, BPD officers shall provide a business card with info on a website similar to RAHEEM and info on complain process with PAB
Refer to be included in the process to reimagine public safety	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The City should create a formalized feedback system to gauge community response to ongoing reforms and ensure this constructive input system is institutionalized and includes a basic report card and quarterly neighborhood check-ins • Conduct a baseline community survey.
Refer to the Police Accountability Board	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Include a scenario-based training component in the existing officer training required by California Penal Code 13519.4 • Require enhanced annual implicit bias training for police • Accelerate Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) activity
Follow-up with PAB and/or Fair and Impartial Working Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluate the impact of these proposals on racial disparities in stops and searches, using regular updates to stop and search data • Conduct a regular community survey and annual community forums on Police and Public Safety
Recommendations already underway	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fund and implement a specialized care unit for mental health crises • Conduct a Capacity Study of police calls and responses and use of officer time outside of case work
Outstanding - No Action Recommended	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Include community member participation and feedback in the hiring process • Include the following for Performance Appraisal Reports

Reducing Disparities in Vehicle, Pedestrian, and Bicycle Stops & Searches:

1. Focus traffic stops on safety

According to Dr. Frank Baumgartner's 2018 book, *Suspect Citizens*, "Safety stops are those aimed at enforcing the rules of the road to decrease the likelihood of an accident" (pg. 191). The types of stops falling into this traffic safety category may include:

- Excessive speeding¹
- Running a stop sign or stop light
- Unsafe movement
- Driving while intoxicated

2. Use a clear, evidence-based definition for stops of criminal suspects

Dr. Baumgartner's analysis² reveals that "investigatory stops" (stops that use a minor infraction as a pretext for investigating rather than to prevent or reduce dangerous behavior pgs. 53-55) allow for the most officer discretion and open the possibility of implicit bias or "reliance on cultural heuristics" (pg. 191). Based on analyses of more than 9 million stops, Baumgartner's team found that 47% were investigatory and that they added substantially to the racial disparity statistics. Thus, investigatory stops and stops of criminal suspects shall be restricted to those made because the person and/or vehicle fits a description in relation to a specific crime.³⁴

Since the Oakland Police Department (OPD) has implemented evidence-based methods, the number of African American civilians stopped by the OPD has declined. Since Oakland Police Department has implemented evidence-based methods, the number of African American civilians stopped has declined from 19,185 in 2017 to 7,346 in 2019, a drop of 62% and a stop disparity rate reduction of almost 60%,⁵ with no corresponding increase in crime (Captain Chris Bolton presentation, 7/15/2020).

3. Use race and ethnicity as relevant factors when determining law enforcement action only when provided as part of a description of a crime and suspect that is credible and relevant to the locality and timeframe of the crime and only in combination with other specific descriptive and physical characteristics.^{6,7}

Specific descriptive and physical characteristics may include, for example: the gender, age, height, weight, clothing, tattoos and piercings of the suspect, the make and model of the car, and the time and location of the crime. Simple race and ethnicity alone are not

¹ <https://www.idrivesafely.com/dmv/california/laws/traffic-tickets-and-violations/>, <https://www.martenslawfirm.com/blog/2015/november/what-is-excessive-speeding/>

² *Suspect Citizens*, pp. 190-192

³ Eberhardt, J. L. (2016). *Strategies for change: Research initiatives and recommendations to improve police-community relations in Oakland, Calif.* Stanford University

⁴ This definition was created by Dr. Jennifer Eberhardt in collaboration with the Oakland Police Department.

⁵ This is the percentage of African American stops within all discretionary non-intel led stops made by Police Area 2 officers fell from 76% in September 2017 to 31% in September 2018

⁶ Southern Poverty Law Center, 10 Best Practices for Writing Policies Against Racial Profiling

⁷ CA Penal Code

satisfactory as bases for reasonable suspicion under the law, and amount to racial profiling.

4. Eliminate stops for low-level offenses

According to the presentation to the Working Group by Captain Bolton of the OPD, Oakland significantly reduced stops for these low-level, non-public safety related offenses, resulting in a reduction in the number of African Americans being stopped and a reduced stop-disparity rate, with no effect on crime rates (homicides and injury shootings went down during the same period). There is often overlap between “investigatory stops” and “stops for low-level offenses,” as the latter may be used as a pretext for investigation. The types of stops falling into these categories may include:

- Equipment violations
- Not wearing a seat belt
- Improper use of high beams
- Violating a regulation (e.g. expired license tags)
- Stop purposes recorded as “other”

5. Implement an Early Intervention System (EIS) and a risk-management structure

These measures to ensure individual accountability have operated successfully in Oakland and many other localities for some time. They involve identifying officer outliers in stops, searches, and use of force and their outcomes and examining the reasons for racial disparities. Existing software programs to assist BPD in implementing an EIS could be utilized or BPD can build its own system.

These programs operate to identify officers who are a danger either to themselves or to the public. They are referred to as “risk management” systems because they help limit the financial liability of the City and hence its taxpayers. They may address a broad range of concerns, but in this document, we only consider their use with regard to racial disparities. Elements of this process include the following steps:

- a. Evaluate and assess stop incidents for legality and enforcement yield.
- b. Analyze data to determine whether racial disparities are generalized across the force or are concentrated in a smaller subset of outlier officers or squads/groups of officers. To the extent that the problem is generalized across the department, supervisors as well as line officers should be re-trained and monitored, and department recruitment, training, and structure should be reviewed. In addition, department policy should be examined for their impacts.
- c. Where disparities are concentrated in an individual or a group of officers, with no race-neutral legitimate evidence for this behavior in specific cases, initiate an investigation to determine the cause for the disparity. Evaluate whether there are identifiable causes contributing to racially disparate stop rates and high or low rates of resulting enforcement actions exhibited by outlying officers. Determine and address any trends and patterns among officers with disparate stop rates. In the risk management process, the responsible personnel in the chain of

command reviews and discusses the available information about the subject officer and the officer's current behavior.

- d. Absent a satisfactory explanation for racially disparate behavior, monitor the officer.. Options for the supervisor in these cases include reviewing additional body-worn camera footage, supervisor ride-alongs, and other forms of monitoring. Further escalation to intervention, if necessary, may include a higher form of supervision, with even closer oversight. If performance fails to improve, command should consider other options including breaking up departmental units, transfer of officers to other responsibilities, etc. The goal of this process is to achieve trust and better community relations between the department as a whole and all the people in Berkeley. Formal discipline is always a last resort unless there are violations of Department General Orders, in which case this becomes an IAB matter.
- e. Identify officers who may have problems affecting their ability to make appropriate judgments, and monitor and reduce time pressures, stress and fatigue on officers.
- f. An outside observer from the PRC shall sit in on the risk management and/or EIS program. Reports from these meetings, or other accurate statistical summary, can be given to the commission without identifying any officers' names.
- g. Report the results of this data analysis quarterly.

6. Immediately release the following data to the Working Group:

- a. All data given to the Center for Policing Equity (CPE) - This data includes:
 - i. Calls for Service (January 1, 2012 - December 2016)
 - ii. Use of Force Data (January 1, 2012 - December 31, 2016)
 - iii. Crime Report Data (January 1, 2012 - December 31, 2016)
- b. STOP DATA - this data shall include information on "call type," similar to the data used by the Center for Policing Equity. The timeframe would be January 1, 2012 to present.
- c. USE OF FORCE DATA - This data was used in the analysis presented in the CPE report. Along with the CPE data, it would be helpful to have more recent Use of Force data. The timeframe would be January 1, 2012 to present.
- d. DEIDENTIFIED STOP & ARREST DATA - To determine if there are any problematic patterns among certain officers, or perhaps pairs of officers, data that we can be attached to anonymized individuals. The timeframe for this data would be January 1, 2012 to present.
- e. ADDITIONAL ARREST DATA - Currently, the Open Data Portal posts arrest data from January 1, 2015. The timeframe for this data would be January 1, 2012 to present day.
- f. ADDITIONAL CALLS FOR SERVICE - Currently, Calls for Service data are posted for the last 180 days. The timeframe for this data would be January 1, 2012 to present.

7. Limit warrantless searches of individuals on supervised release status, including probation, Post Release Community Supervision (PRCS), and parole, absent evidence of imminent danger

California is one of a handful of states that allow high-discretion, suspicionless searches of probationers and parolees. The following was passed by the Police Review Commission on 9/23/2020 and the Working Group endorses this approach:

“In accordance with California law, individuals on probation, parole, Post Release Community Supervision, or other supervised release status may be subject to warrantless search as a condition of their probation. Officers shall only conduct probation or parole searches to further a legitimate law enforcement purpose. Searches shall not be conducted in an arbitrary, capricious, or harassing fashion. However, under Berkeley policy, officers shall not detain and search a person on probation or parole solely because the officer is aware of that person’s probation or parole status.

The decision to detain a person and conduct a probation or parole search, or otherwise enforce probation or parole conditions, should be made, at a minimum, in connection with articulable facts that create a reasonable suspicion that a person may have committed a crime, be committing a crime, or be about to commit a crime.”

8. Require written consent for all consent searches

Baumgartner (pp. 195-209) and his team found that in cities requiring written consent to perform a consent search, these searches declined by 75%. Since people of color are disproportionately the subjects of these searches, it makes sense that a significant reduction would lead to fewer consent searches for people of color.

Examining three cities in North Carolina, Baumgartner found that in cities where there was resistance by leadership to the new written-consent policy, there was a substitution effect, such that as consent searches went down, probable cause searches went up. However, the substitution effect seemed to be directly correlated with leadership priorities. The chapter concludes, “We showed that a combination of leadership directives and simple initiatives can alter the relationship a department can have with their community” (pg. 213). *This speaks to the need for clear buy-in from BPD leadership.* The Working Group recommends that the BPD adopt the written consent form used in North Carolina, a copy of which can be found [here](#).

9. For any individual detained, BPD officers shall provide a business card with the following information on the back

- a) A website similar to RAHEEM that collects information on police-civilian encounters.⁸
- b) Contact information for filing a complaint with the PRC or its successor, the Police Accountability Board.

⁸ <https://www.raheem.ai/en/>

10. Address Profiling by Proxy⁹

Police should not be dispatched to calls that are motivated by caller bias or malintent, e.g., a claim that someone is suspicious with no corroborating reason.¹⁰ These types of calls harm police-community relationships and undermine the authority of the police. To protect against profiling by proxy the police department shall:

- a. work with PRC and other appropriate agencies to formulate a policy that defines and remedies profiling by proxy.
- b. enhance Dispatcher training to evaluate calls and add implicit bias training for 911 Dispatch.

An article on profiling by proxy by the Vera Institute of Justice recommends including 911 Dispatch in implicit bias training as a method for reducing issues with profiling by proxy. Anti-bias training will also help Dispatchers become aware of their own biases. For example, when they receive calls about behavior the complainant may dislike but is not illegal—e.g., “too many” black teenagers in the public park.¹¹

Hiring & Evaluation

The successful hiring and evaluation of police officers is an important part of creating a healthy and high-functioning police department. The types of people the department hires, and the effective evaluation of police officers are important in determining police department culture. Researchers on policing have repeatedly found that organizational culture is the single most important determinant of officer behavior.¹² Human Resource Management research supports including the evaluation for cultural competency as important in improving agencies. The key components for a high degree of cultural competency are: awareness, attitude, knowledge, skills.

11. Fire racist police officers identified through social media and other media screens

A third-party agency, hired by the City of Berkeley, or agency outside the police department should screen police officers and potential new hires’ social media accounts for racist or violent comments, affiliations to racist groups whether public or private, including private groups expressing racist or violent rhetoric.

- a. BPD shall immediately fire all identified officers who have engaged in racist or violent actions or commentary online.
- b. A social media screen of officer online conduct shall be done annually.

⁹ Profiling by proxy may occur “when an individual calls the police and makes false or ill-informed claims of misconduct about persons they dislike or are biased against—e.g., ethnic and religious minorities, youth, homeless people” (retrieved from The Vera Institute of Justice).

¹⁰ Captain Bolton of the Oakland Police Department made improvements on profiling by proxy using an approach that educated citizens on focusing on criminal behavior instead of suspicion when calling police.

¹¹ “Avoiding ‘profiling by proxy,’” Vera Institute of Justice, March 13, 2015, <https://www.vera.org/blog/police-perspectives/avoiding-profiling-by-proxy>

¹² [Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct](#)

Recommendations for Council

Community Engagement and Feedback - When the City of Berkeley pledged to consider reducing funding for the police department by 50%, it also committed itself to shifting to new and alternative methods of community safety. To effectively understand and implement new and alternative safety practices and services, the City of Berkeley must look to its residents for ongoing insight and feedback. The City must collect and utilize regular community feedback to inform the city on community investment priorities including police department policies and practices and future direction. To that end:

12. Address Profiling by Proxy¹³

To protect against profiling by proxy City Council should:

- a. Introduce profiling by proxy legislation similar to [CAREN Act](#) in SF, which would hold residents accountable for using police in a biased manner.
- b. Issue a quarterly review of data from 911 Dispatch, for the PRC or City Auditor to help understand the extent of calls from community members presenting ‘biased’ suspicions.”

13. Require regular analysis of BPD stop, search, and use of force data

The City Auditor and/or PRC shall update the [analysis](#) of BPD data completed by the [Center for Policing Equity](#) and the PRC and publish the results on the BPD website every quarter. This report shall include stop, search, and use of force analysis. —

Ensuring Timely and Effective Implementation:

Since the fall of 2017, the police department has received 37 separate policy or legislative directives to address the racially disparate treatment of City of Berkeley residents. Those directives are the result of extensive and on-going racial disparities in police department stops, searches, and use of force. As of the drafting of this report, at least 30 of those directives remain outstanding with ***no plan*** for implementation.

We respectfully recognize that the role of the Mayor’s Working Group on Fair and Impartial Policing is to advise the Berkeley City Council and staff. We recognize that we are not in a position to make final decisions; rather, our role is to offer advice and recommendations to the Council. The Mayor’s Working Group is committed to ensuring that the policy recommendations outlined in this proposal are not added to the long list of unaccomplished directives. Therefore, we have included an accountability system with our policy proposal. This accountability system

¹³ When an individual calls the police and makes false or ill-informed claims of misconduct about persons they dislike or are biased against—e.g., ethnic and religious minorities, youth, homeless people; retrieved from The Vera Institute of Justice

will ensure that the changes necessary to establish fair and impartial policing and rebuild public trust occur.

Compliance and Accountability Mechanisms:

- A. Working in partnership with the Mayor's Working Group on Fair and Impartial Policing and within six months from approval of the proposal (extended for good cause), the City Manager hires an experienced consultant to help draft an implementation plan that includes a timeline to monitor, assess, and report on the implementation of the items outlined in the working group's policy proposal.
 - i. If a consultant is not hired within six months from approval of the proposal, the Council should move to item "E" below.
 - ii. If a consultant is not hired within six months (extended for good cause), the working group should remain formally organized by the Mayor until a consultant is hired and a plan is approved.
- B. The Working Group, Police Chief, and the consultant will create an implementation plan that includes a timeline to monitor, assess, and report on the implementation of the items outlined in the Working Group's policy proposal. Long-term monitoring and assessments will be the responsibility of the police oversight body (the PRC or its successor the Police Accountability Board).
- C. The implementation plan will be presented to the Berkeley City Council for approval. Once the plan is approved by the City Council, the consultant's work is finished. Long-term monitoring and assessment will be the responsibility of the police oversight body (the PRC or its successor the Police Accountability Board).
- D. The City Manager and the Berkeley Police Chief should do everything within their power to implement the items outlined in the plan and timeline set forth and approved by City Council.
- E. The City Council should set the implementation of this plan as a priority in the annual evaluation of the city manager.
- F. If the City Manager does not ensure that the Police Department implements the plan in accordance with the timeline, the City Manager should be held accountable.
 - i. In the event of a new Berkeley Police Department Chief: the Mayor's Working Group, on Fair and Impartial Policing, the new Police Chief and the City Manager shall meet and agree upon an updated timeline to monitor, assess, and report on the implementation of the items outlined in the plan approved by City Council.
 - ii. In the event of a new City Manager: the Working Group, the Berkeley Police Chief, and the new City Manager shall meet and agree upon an updated timeline to monitor, assess, and report on the implementation of the items outlined in the plan approved by City Council.

If these recommendations are adopted and implemented promptly, we expect that the disparate stop data can show significant improvement in the near future. We expect the City Manager and the Police Chief to implement these programs with enthusiasm and dedication, as they reflect the constitutional imperative of equal protection under the law.

Appendix A: Additional Recommendations

The following recommendations are also supported by the working group, which suggests referring them to the reimagining process and/or follow-up with the Police Accountability Board and the Fair and Impartial working group. See table 1 for recommended actions.

14. Include a scenario-based training component in the existing officer training required by California Penal Code 13519.4

- a. The training must include specific, relevant examples of prohibited actions and how to conduct law enforcement activities in an unbiased manner.¹⁴
- b. MILO and VIRTRA are two such scenario-based training programs¹⁵
- c. An independent observer shall review the training and report back to the PRC or its successor on the quality of the training.

15. Require enhanced annual implicit bias training for police

There is scant scientific evidence that implicit bias training works to change implicit biases over the long-term. However, agency-wide, enhanced, and well-executed training that occurs on a regular basis could have a positive effect on the cultural environment of the police department and on expectations for behavior. Regular, required implicit bias training provides an expression of institutional support for fairness, which is important in improving relationships across groups¹⁶and improving agency culture.

- a. Officers should receive intensive anti-racism and implicit bias training as part of their core instruction in the first 90 days of employment, and an annual 'refresher' course.
- b. An independent observer shall attend the training and report back to the PRC on the quality of the training.

16. Accelerate Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) activity

- a) Require 40 hours of CIT training in the first year of employment.
- b) Collect data on CIT calls to allow BPD to make informed decisions about staffing and deployment so that a CIT officer is available for all shifts in all districts to respond to every CIT call.
- c) Develop a CIT reporting system so that each deployment of a CIT officer is well documented. CIT officers should submit narrative reports of their interactions with persons in crisis so the appropriateness of the response can be evaluated in an after-action analysis.
- d) Implement an assessment program to evaluate the efficacy of the CIT program as a whole and the performance of individual CIT officers. A portion of a CIT officer's performance review should address skill and effectiveness in CIT situations.

¹⁴ CA Penal Code

¹⁵ MILO in an Oakland setting

¹⁶ Allport, G. W., Clark, K., & Pettigrew, T. (1954). The nature of prejudice.

17. The City of Berkeley should conduct annual community forums on Police and Public Safety:

- a. Identifying community-based leaders and impacted individuals for control of the envisioning process.
- b. Placing the process under the Office of the Mayor, not the City Manager. Upon establishment of the Police Accountability Board, place the process under the auspices of the Police Accountability Board.
- c. Including the creation of community-based measures of safety as part of the first round of the envisioning process.¹⁷
- d. Once community-based measures of safety are created, including these measures in the annual community survey (see item 17) and publishing the data as per item 17b.

18. The City of Berkeley should conduct an annual community survey.

Sample surveys include the [Milwaukee survey](#) and the [Dallas survey](#).

- a. Data collected should be shared publicly via the City of Berkeley website or an online community dashboard.

19. The City should create a formalized feedback system to gauge community response to ongoing reforms and ensure this constructive input system is institutionalized and includes:

- a. A basic "Report Card," in collaboration with the PRC or its successor the Police Accountability Board, based on community feedback for each reform. This will enable the Department to take the 'community's temperature' on how the implementation of the reforms are being perceived by the public.
- b. Quarterly neighborhood 'check ins' for relationship building .

20. Conduct a Capacity Study

- a. Release data including but not limited to 911 dispatch calls, BPD stops and interventions, written reports, and body-worn camera footage to the City Auditor and/or PRC for analysis.¹⁸
- b. Conduct an audit on officer down time to determine the percentage of police time spent outside of responding to calls for service and how police officers spend this time. Share this information with the City Auditor and/or PRC for analysis for use in the capacity study.
- c. Conduct an audit of police overtime to determine the factors that contribute to the use of overtime .

¹⁷ This process should follow or be modeled after the [Everyday Peace Indicators](#) process

¹⁸ This study could be time-limited and would not have to be a comprehensive analysis of internal data; a random sample done correctly would suffice to determine how best to restructure the response to a variety of problematic situations.

- d. Identify what percentage of calls for service require a unique police response and what percentage of calls could be better served by an alternative response with the goal to focus police response on issues that can best be responded to by police officers.
- e. These data can also assist in identifying calls suspected of profiling by proxy.

21. Fund and implement a specialized care unit for mental health crises

Fully fund and implement the specialized care unit as swiftly as possible in order to remove mental health and homeless encounters from the responsibility of BPD. Research has found that individuals with mental illness are at a higher risk of police stops, use of force,¹⁹ and a fatal police encounter.²⁰ These disparities increase for Black and Latinx individuals. Specialized mental health crisis units are a safer option for those experiencing a mental health crisis than a police response and a more cost-effective use of public resources.²¹ The Council's July 14, 2020 decision to create a Specialized Care Unit will better serve people in Berkeley experiencing a mental health crisis. The Working Group supports transitioning away from police as first responders to 911 calls related to mental health and towards trained, unarmed mental health first responders.

The Berkeley Community Safety Coalition in collaboration with Councilmember Bartlett are developing a proposal related to a pilot program transitioning away from sworn police as first responders to professional mental health first responders. The Working Group supports this effort.

22. Make resources on police-civilian encounters more publicly available, including:

- a. A website similar to RAHEEM that collects information on police-civilian encounters.²²
- b. Contact information for filing a complaint with the PRC or its successor.

23. Evaluate the impact of these proposals on racial disparities in stops and searches, using regular updates to stop and search data

¹⁹ [Mental Illness, Police Use of Force, and Citizen Injury](#)

²⁰ [Deaths of people with mental illness during interactions with law enforcement](#)

²¹ [CAHOOTS Media Guide, 2020](#)

²² <https://www.raheem.ai/en/>

Attachment 2: Working Group Recommendations Passed by Council. February 23, 2021

**ANNOTATED AGENDA
SPECIAL MEETING OF THE
BERKELEY CITY COUNCIL**

Tuesday, February 23, 2021

4:00 P.M.

JESSE ARREGUIN, MAYOR

Councilmembers:

DISTRICT 1 – RASHI KESARWANI
DISTRICT 2 – TERRY TAPLIN
DISTRICT 3 – BEN BARTLETT
DISTRICT 4 – KATE HARRISON

DISTRICT 5 – SOPHIE HAHN
DISTRICT 6 – SUSAN WENGRAF
DISTRICT 7 – RIGEL ROBINSON
DISTRICT 8 – LORI DROSTE

PUBLIC ADVISORY: THIS MEETING WILL BE CONDUCTED EXCLUSIVELY THROUGH VIDEOCONFERENCE AND TELECONFERENCE

Pursuant to Section 3 of Executive Order N-29-20, issued by Governor Newsom on March 17, 2020, this meeting of the City Council will be conducted exclusively through teleconference and Zoom videoconference. Please be advised that pursuant to the Executive Order and the Shelter-in-Place Order, and to ensure the health and safety of the public by limiting human contact that could spread the COVID-19 virus, there will not be a physical meeting location available.

Live audio is available on KPFB Radio 89.3. Live captioned broadcasts of Council Meetings are available on Cable B-TV (Channel 33) and via internet accessible video stream at <http://www.cityofberkeley.info/CalendarEventWebcastMain.aspx>.

To access the meeting remotely: Join from a PC, Mac, iPad, iPhone, or Android device: Please use this URL <https://us02web.zoom.us/j/81676274736>. If you do not wish for your name to appear on the screen, then use the drop down menu and click on "rename" to rename yourself to be anonymous. To request to speak, use the "raise hand" icon by rolling over the bottom of the screen.

*To join by phone: Dial **1-669-900-9128** or **1-877-853-5257 (Toll Free)** and enter Meeting ID: **816 7627 4736**. If you wish to comment during the public comment portion of the agenda, Press *9 and wait to be recognized by the Chair.*

To submit an e-mail comment during the meeting to be read aloud during public comment, email clerk@cityofberkeley.info with the Subject Line in this format: "PUBLIC COMMENT ITEM ##." Please observe a 150 word limit. Time limits on public comments will apply. Written comments will be entered into the public record.

Please be mindful that the teleconference will be recorded as any Council meeting is recorded, and all other rules of procedure and decorum will apply for Council meetings conducted by teleconference or videoconference.

This meeting will be conducted in accordance with the Brown Act, Government Code Section 54953. Any member of the public may attend this meeting. Questions regarding this matter may be addressed to Mark Numainville, City Clerk, (510) 981-6900. The City Council may take action related to any subject listed on the Agenda. Meetings will adjourn at 11:00 p.m. - any items outstanding at that time will be carried over to a date/time to be specified.

Preliminary Matters

Roll Call: 4:06 p.m.

Present: Taplin, Bartlett, Harrison, Hahn, Wengraf, Robinson, Droste, Arreguin

Absent: Kesarwani

Councilmember Kesarwani present at 4:13 p.m.

Action: M/S/C (Arreguin/Wengraf) to adopt a special rule for this meeting to limit public comment to one minute per speaker, with the option to yield time up to a total of four minutes.

Vote: Ayes – Taplin, Bartlett, Harrison, Hahn, Wengraf, Robinson, Droste, Arreguin; Noes – None; Abstain – None; Absent - Kesarwani

Action Calendar – New Business

1. **Report and Recommendations From Mayor’s Fair and Impartial Policing Working Group**
From: Mayor Arreguin (Author), Councilmember Harrison (Author)
Recommendation:
 1. Accept and acknowledge the report from the Fair and Impartial Working Group (Attachment 1).
 2. Direct the City Manager to implement the following recommendations summarized below and detailed in full in Attachment 1, with at minimum, quarterly progress updates to the Police Accountability Board (PAB) and/or the Working Group.
 - Focus traffic stops on safety
 - Use a clear, evidence-based definition for stops of criminal suspects
 - Use race and ethnicity as determining factors in stops only when paired with clear, evidence-based criteria
 - Eliminate stops for low-level offenses
 - Implement an Early Intervention System (EIS) and a risk-management structure
 - Immediately release stop, arrest, calls for service and use of force data from 2012 to present to the Working Group
 - Limit warrantless searches of individuals on supervised release status such as Post Release Community Supervision (PRCS), probation, or parole
 - Require written consent for all consent searches
 - Address Profiling by Proxy (PAB Policy Development, Dispatcher Training)
 - Fire racist police officers identified through social media and other media screens
 - Address Profiling by Proxy (Council develop & pass CAREN policy)
 - Require regular analysis of BPD stop, search, and use of force data
 - Make resources on police-civilian encounters more publicly available such as RAHEEM.org
 - Adopt Compliance and Accountability Mechanisms; -Hire consultant to develop implementation plan
 - For any individual detained, BPD officers shall provide a business card with info on a website similar to RAHEEM and info on complaint process with PAB
 3. Refer the following recommendations summarized below and detailed in full in Attachment 1 to be included in the process to reimagine public safety:

Action Calendar – New Business

-Create a formalized feedback system to gauge community response to ongoing reforms and ensure this constructive input system is institutionalized with the Police Review Commission or its successor and includes a basic report card and quarterly neighborhood check-ins

-Conduct a baseline community survey

4. Refer the following recommendations summarized below and detailed in full in Attachment 1 to the Police Review Commission, to be taken up by the Police Accountability Board when it is established

-Include a scenario-based training component in the existing officer training required by California Penal Code 13519.4

-Require enhanced annual implicit bias training for police

-Accelerate Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) activity

5. Acknowledge and reaffirm the following recommendations summarized below and detailed in full in Attachment 1 that are already underway:

-Fund and implement a specialized care unit for mental health crises

-Conduct a Capacity Study of police calls and responses and use of officer time outside of case work

6. Refer \$50,000 to the FY 2022 budget process for a consultant to develop an implementation plan as described in Attachment 1 and other minor costs the Department may confer

Financial Implications: See report

Contact: Jesse Arreguin, Mayor, (510) 981-7100

Action: 40 speakers. M/S/C (Arreguin/Harrison) to:

1. Accept and acknowledge the report from the Mayor's Fair and Impartial Policing Working Group;
2. Acknowledge and appreciate the work already completed or underway by the City Manager's Office and Police Department to implement policing reforms including:
 - Adoption and implementation of Policy 401, Fair and Impartial Policing
 - Public reporting of stop data on the BPD Open Data Portal
 - Initiation of the Center for Policing Equity study
 - Implementation of the Body Worn Camera Program
 - Early adoption of Racial and Identity Profiling Act (RIPA) data collection and reporting
 - Updates to the Use of Force Policy, Policy 300
 - Development and passage of Measure II to create a new Police Accountability Board
 - Launching of the Public Safety Reimagining process
3. Refer to the City Manager to implement the following recommendations summarized below, with quarterly progress updates to the City Council and Police Review Commission/Police Accountability Board (when established):

Implement a new evidence-based Traffic Enforcement Model

 - Focusing the basis for traffic stops on safety and not low-level offenses;
 - Reaffirming and clarifying that the Berkeley Police Department will use a clear, evidence-based definition for stops of criminal suspects;
 - Reaffirming and clarifying that the Berkeley Police Department will use race and ethnicity as determining factors in stops only when paired with clear, evidence-based criteria
 - Minimize or de-emphasize as a lowest priority stops for low-level offenses.

Action Calendar – New Business

Implement Procedural Justice Reforms

- Refer amendments to existing BPD policy and the creation of an Early Intervention System (EIS) related to traffic, bike and pedestrian stops;
- Adopt a policy to require written consent for all vehicle and residence searches and update the consent search form in alignment with best practice and community feedback;
- Limit warrantless searches of individuals on supervised release status such as Post Release Community Supervision (PRCS), probation, or parole;
- Address Profiling by Proxy (PAB Policy Development, Dispatcher Training);
- Fire racist police officers identified through social media and other media screens;
- Require regular analysis of BPD stop, search, and use of force data;
- Make resources on police-civilian encounters publicly available such as through RAHEEM.org;
- For any individual detained, BPD officers shall provide a business card with info on the commendation and complaint process with PAB and Berkeley Police Department.

Request that the City Manager report back at a Council Work Session in three months with budget estimates for implementation (to be considered along with the FY 22 budget process), information on legal and operational considerations, and a short-term action plan of recommendations which can be implemented without the hiring of a consultant, and those that will require the assistance of a consultant and additional resources.

Compliance and Accountability Mechanisms

- The City Manager will create an implementation plan with the assistance of a consultant that includes a timeline to monitor, assess, and report on the implementation of the items outlined in the Working Group's policy proposal. Long-term monitoring and assessments will be the responsibility of the police oversight body (the PRC or its successor the Police Accountability Board).
 - The implementation plan will be presented to the Berkeley City Council for approval. Once the plan is approved by the City Council, the consultant's work is finished. Long-term monitoring and assessment will be the responsibility of the police oversight body (the PRC or its successor the Police Accountability Board).
4. Refer the following recommendations summarized below to the Reimagine Public Safety process:
 - Create a formalized feedback system to gauge community response to ongoing reforms and ensure this constructive input system is institutionalized with the Police Review Commission or its successor and includes a basic report card and quarterly neighborhood check-ins
 - Conduct a baseline community survey.
 5. Refer the following training recommendations summarized below to the Police Review Commission, to be taken up by the Police Accountability Board when it is established, and consider the resources required to implement this expanded training:
 - Include a scenario-based training component in the existing officer training required by California Penal Code 13519.4
 - Require enhanced annual implicit bias training for police
 - Accelerate Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) activity

Action Calendar – New Business

- Refer to the PRC/PAB to consider a departmental policy on requiring written consent for person searches and report back in 6 months.
- 6. Acknowledge and reaffirm the following recommendations summarized below and detailed in full in Attachment 1 that are already underway and have been completed:
 - BPD released stop, arrest, calls for service and use of force data from 2012 to present to the Working Group;
 - Fund and implement a specialized care unit for mental health crises;
 - Conduct a Capacity Study of police calls and responses and use of officer time outside of case work.
- 7. Refer \$50,000 to the FY 2022 budget process for a consultant to assist the City Manager/Police Department in the implementation of these recommendations and other minor costs the Department may confer; and also refer to the FY 2022 budget process a line item for police training for the new evidence-based stop program (costs to be determined by BPD).

Vote: All Ayes.

Adjournment

Action: M/S/C (Robinson/Taplin) to adjourn the meeting.

Vote: All Ayes.

Adjourned at 7:07 p.m.

Communications

- None

Supplemental Communications and Reports 1

- None

Supplemental Communications and Reports 2

Item #1: Report and Recommendations From Mayor's Fair and Impartial Policing Working Group

1. Elizabeth Ferguson

Supplemental Communications and Reports 3

Item #1: Report and Recommendations From Mayor's Fair and Impartial Policing Working Group

2. Material, submitted by Mayor Arreguin
3. Presentation, submitted by the Police Department
4. Janice Schroeder
5. Thomas Luce
6. Ben Gerhardstein, on behalf of Walk Bike Berkeley
7. Diana Bohn
8. Sivan Orr
9. Ali Lafferty

Attachment 3: Summary of BPD Quarterly Updates on Fair and Impartial Policing Implementation

Summary of Berkeley Police Department Quarterly Reports: Fair & Impartial Policing Recommendation Implementation Updates per BPD

FIP Recommendation	June 2021	Oct 2021	Feb 2022	June 2022	September 2022	March 2023	June 2023	October 2023
Implement a new evidence-based traffic enforcement model: minimize or de-emphasize as a lowest priority stops for low-level offenses	A working group (wg) has been established consisting of employees working in every division of BPD and a representative of the BPA leadership. The wg is tasked with identifying what low-level offenses are applicable while balancing the necessity of traffic safety and the Berkely Vision Zero initiative. The wg will present recommended policy language as well as analysis of risk or unintended outcomes no later than Fall 2021.	Officers have been directed to focus less attention on equipment violations and are expected to make investigative stops related to criminal intelligence information. The wg has been working to identify traffic offenses that most impact public safety.	Officers have been provided data regarding primary collision factors and have been directed to enforce those violations. The wg created a three-prong approach that focuses on primary collision factors, community member reports, and community caretaking. Implementation in progress. Training has commenced.	Implementation complete ¹ . Officers have been provided data regarding primary collision factors and have been directed to enforce those violations. BPD has implemented and conducted departmental training on the three-prong approach.	Implementation complete. Training on the three-pronged approach has concluded. The Department will continue to review data on traffic offenses that affect community safety.	Same as previous	In addition, this has been formalized as a departmental directive in a Special Order on traffic enforcement.	Same as previous
Use a clear, evidence-based definition for stops	BPD is establishing a precision based policing model that considers	BPD continues to develop and deploy data-	BPD is establishing a precision-based policing model	BPD is establishing a precision-based policing model	Implementation complete. BPD is establishing a precision-based	Same as previous	Same as previous	Same as previous

¹ Reflects BDP-reported status update.

Summary of Berkeley Police Department Quarterly Reports: Fair & Impartial Policing Recommendation Implementation Updates per BPD

<p>of criminal suspects</p>	<p>data and public safety. Data driven tools that enable close to real-time dashboard tracking of calls for service have been provided to Community Service Bureau and Patrol Watch Commandeers. The goal is to have data-driven approaches to violence prevention programs in real time crime and call analysis for patrol deployment strategies.</p>	<p>driven tools to enhance precision-based policing model. Interviewing for two data analysts and continuing to build data dashboard.</p>	<p>that considers data and public safety. Data driven tools that enable real-time dashboard tracking (close to real time) have been provided to Patrol Watch Commanders. Exploring feasibility of a system that employs a feedback loop to provide information back to the Community Services Bureau to support accountability. Filled one of two data analyst positions.</p>	<p>that considers data and public safety. Data driven tools that enable real-time dashboard tracking (close to real time) have been provided to Patrol Watch Commanders. Exploring feasibility of a system that employs a feedback loop.</p>	<p>policing model that considers data and public safety. Data driven tools that enable real-time dashboard tracking (close to real time) have been provided to Patrol Watch Commanders. During this reporting period feedback loop implemented. System provides tracking of calls for service with the goal of call analysis for patrol deployment strategies and allows officers in the field to communicate to the Community Service Bureau.</p>			
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Summary of Berkeley Police Department Quarterly Reports: Fair & Impartial Policing Recommendation Implementation Updates per BPD

<p>Use race and ethnicity as determining factors in stops only when paired with clear, evidence-based criteria</p>	<p>Implementation complete. Existing law prohibits racial profiling. Policy 401 (Fair and Impartial) explicitly states that officers shall not consider race, ethnicity, national origin, gender....in establishing reasonable suspicion or probable cause...the above policies were reviewed in light of taskforce recommendations and found to affirm and clarify officer responsibility in stops.</p>	<p>Same as previous</p>	<p>Same as previous</p>	<p>Same as previous</p>	<p>Same as previous</p>	<p>Same as previous</p>	<p>Same as previous</p>	<p>Same as previous</p>
<p>Implement an Early Intervention System (EIS) and a risk-management structure</p>	<p>Working on amendments to EWS to include data around traffic, bike, and pedestrian stops.</p>	<p>Amendments are being made to specifically identify additional activity that should be considered when applying the EWS policy. Language</p>	<p>Implementation complete. Updated policy finalized reflecting amendments to include monitoring of stop data for</p>	<p>Implementation complete. Random quarterly audits of officers' stop data, complaints, and use of force, and other</p>	<p>Implementation complete. The City Council referred \$100,000 to the June 2023 Budget Process to enter into a contract to</p>	<p>Same as previous</p>	<p>Same as previous</p>	<p>Same as previous</p>

Summary of Berkeley Police Department Quarterly Reports: Fair & Impartial Policing
 Recommendation Implementation Updates per BPD

<p>BPD to provide regular analysis of stop, search, and use of force data</p>		<p>BPD is in the process of expanding the call for service dataset to include all call types and eliminate 180-day time range. BPD has started working with a vendor to update the public facing open data.</p>	<p>added to include data around traffic, bicycle and pedestrian stops. The new policy is being reviewed by the police union.</p>	<p>individual officers. The Audits and Inspections Sergeant will also conduct separate and random quarterly audits of officer's stop data, complaints, and use of force incidents and other factors and will share these audits with the PAB.</p>	<p>factors, the results of which will be reported to the Chief of Police.</p>	<p>design and assist with implementing a comprehensive Early Intervention and Risk Management System.</p>	<p>Same as previous</p>
			<p>In the process of eliminating the 180-day time range that currently exists. In the process of expanding the call for service data set. Expected completion is summer 2022.</p>	<p>Implementation complete. Open Data Portal and Transparency Hub effectuate this recommendation.</p>	<p>Implementation complete. The department will regularly analyze stop, search, and use of force data.</p>	<p>Same as previous</p>	<p>Same as previous</p>

Summary of Berkeley Police Department Quarterly Reports: Fair & Impartial Policing
 Recommendation Implementation Updates per BPD

Require written consent for all consent searches	Policy to require written consent for all vehicle and residence searching using updated form near completion.	Revised consent form has been created. Implementation in progress. New search and seizure policy being reviewed by union.	Implementation complete.	Same as previous	Same as previous	Same as previous	Same as previous
Limit warrantless searches of individuals on supervised release status such as PRCS, probation, or parole, absent reasonable suspicion		Implementation complete. Policy 311 updated to limit searches on individuals who are on supervised release, absent reasonable suspicion.	Implementation complete. However, in July 2022, City Council approved a revised Policy 311 to allow for searches of those on supervised release for violent crimes.	Same as previous	Same as previous	Same as previous	Same as previous
Address profiling by proxy		Implementation complete. Comms Center Operation Manual amended to address.	Same as previous	Same as previous	Same as previous	Same as previous	Same as previous
Fire racist police officers identified through social media and other media screens	The FIP taskforce identified additional methods for	Implementation complete. Existing policy implements this recommendation	Same as previous	Same as previous	Same as previous	Same as previous	Same as previous

Summary of Berkeley Police Department Quarterly Reports: Fair & Impartial Policing
 Recommendation Implementation Updates per BPD


			<p>One data analyst will be tasked with ongoing analysis of police calls and responses.</p>	<p>process via the Council's direction on Reimagining public safety</p>		<p>ations were provided to the BPD and findings were referred to the Reimagine Public Safety Task Force. BPD has implemented the recommendations and an assessment of overall staffing levels as well as patrol beat specific analysis will be conducted as part of the sworn staffing assessment.</p>	<p>Citygate is expected in the near future.</p>	<p>of August.</p>
<p>Fund and implement a specialized care unit</p>	<p>XX (PAB has not tracked implementation status of this effort)</p>	<p>XX</p>	<p>XX</p>	<p>XX</p>	<p>XX</p>	<p>XX</p>	<p>XX</p>	<p>XX</p>
<p>Create a formalized feedback system to</p>			<p>Implementation in progress. Baseline survey</p>	<p>Initial implementation complete. BPD</p>	<p>Same as previous</p>	<p>Same as previous</p>	<p>Initial implementation complete. To</p>	<p>Same as previous</p>





Appendix 3

Summary of Berkeley Police Department Quarterly Reports: Fair & Impartial Policing
 Recommendation Implementation Updates per BPD

<p>gauge community response to ongoing reforms and ensure this constructive input system is institutionalized with the police review commission or its successor and includes a basic report card and quarterly neighborhood check-ins; conduct a baseline community survey.</p>			<p>completed as part of Reimagining Public Safety Taskforce process.</p>	<p>will be seeking ongoing community input and feedback via the Transparency Hub</p>			<p>support feedback systems, the BPD will be seeking ongoing community input and feedback around reform efforts via the Transparency Hub.</p>	
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Attachment 4: BPD Three-Pronged Approach to Traffic Enforcement


Police Transparency

Stop Data
Calls for Service
Use of Force
Crime Data
Community Engagement
Current Trends
Traffic Safety
Open Data Portal

Our Three-Prong Approach to Traffic Safety


The BPD has reprioritized traffic safety efforts around a three-prong approach that focuses on primary collision factors (PCF), community concerns submitted to the BPD, and our role as community caretakers. Community caretaking functions consider safety violations that aren't always noted as the primary collision factor but can be a significant contributing factor in serious collisions. The BPD collects a range of data related to traffic safety to include calls for service, collision data, and qualitative survey data. The analyses are then used to guide enforcement, education, and prevention strategies.

Prong # 1 - Primary Collision Factors (Berkeley specific data)


Vehicle code violations resulting in severe and fatal collisions in Berkeley.

- Unsafe speed
- Pedestrian right-of-way at crosswalks
- Failure to yield for turns
- Red light violations
- Stop sign violations

For additional information on the city's Vision Zero efforts please check out their page on the right!



Use the Dashboard below to explore Berkeley collision data.



Vision Zero

Berkeley's Vision Zero strategy aims to eliminate all traffic fatalities and severe injuries while increasing saf...


Explore

Prong # 2 – Community Reports


Responding to calls from community members.

- Possible DUI driver (car reportedly swerving)
- Driver that's fallen asleep at a red light
- A variety of unsafe driving incidents occurring
- CRIME involving vehicle
 - Hit and Run
 - Crime with get-away vehicle description

To submit a traffic safety concern, please fill out the form on the right!



Use the Dashboard below to explore traffic-related Calls for Service (orange lines) and community concerns (orange flag).



Submit a Traffic Concern

Let the Berkeley Police Department Traffic Bureau know about your traffic safety concern in the community


Take Survey

Prong #3 – Community Caretaking


Examples of violations that are safety concerns but not necessarily PCFs

- Distracted Driving (hands free law)
- DUI Investigation
- Seatbelt Violations

For additional information on our traffic stop data, please visit our Stop Data page on the right!



Use the Dashboard below to explore our traffic enforcement efforts (blue lines) in relation to calls/concerns/collisions.




Stop Data

An ArcGIS Hub page used by Law Enforcement agencies to help illustrate to the general public the enforcement.

Explore

Attachment 5: Berkeley Police Department Memorandum Titled: "PD Response to PAB FIP Implementation Report"



Berkeley Police Department Memorandum



From: Chief Jennifer Louis

Date: 4/15/2024

To: The Police Accountability Board and the Office of the Director of Police Accountability

Subject: PD Response to PAB FIP Implementation Report


We sincerely thank you for sharing the draft of your Fair and Impartial Policing Implementation Report and for being open to accepting our comments and feedback. The Berkeley Police Department commends the Police Accountability Board for your analysis and efforts to enhance policing standards in our community. Your work plays a vital role in promoting fairness, equity, and impartiality in policing.

BPD is fully committed to collaborating with the PAB as we share the goals of ensuring justice and safety for every community member. We value your partnership as we implement effective reforms and strive for continuous improvement.

Regarding the specific recommendations:

- BPD appreciates the guidance to focus on outcomes, not just policies. We commit to including measures of our impact on racial disparities, such as steps taken to mitigate officer bias, in our quarterly FIP reports. While acknowledging external factors, we will emphasize areas where BPD can drive meaningful change.
- Since implementing our Three-Pronged Traffic Enforcement model, we've decreased equipment violation stops by 21% from 2022-2023 and reduced disparities in all discretionary vehicle stops. The data shows that the percentage of all discretionary equipment violation stops involving Black individuals has decreased from 29.49% in 2021 to 20.93% in 2023, indicating progress in addressing the overrepresentation of Black people in these stops. We are open to further adjustments but believe our current approach needs more time to demonstrate its full impact.
- BPD will continue to exceed the Council's directives for implicit bias training through our comprehensive KIND program, which embeds these principles into trainings on tactics, de-escalation, and communication. This holistic approach reinforces recognizing and mitigating bias across all aspects of our work.
- BPD is actively collaborating with the PAB and the Berkeley Police Association to enhance and refine our Early Intervention System. We are working to ensure our approach reflects best practices and balances the goals of fairness and effectiveness in identifying areas for improvement. The system's design will be informed by comprehensive analysis and guidance from these subject matter experts.
- Our policies mandate strict accountability for any biased conduct by officers. BPD is fully committed to enforcing these standards to maintain the highest levels of integrity and public trust.

Regarding the collision analysis, we want to clarify that it aims to provide a relevant baseline of the demographics of Berkeley drivers, especially those driving dangerously, to enable a fair assessment of officers' decision-making. The data reflects operational realities, not an attribution of driving behaviors



Berkeley Police Department Memorandum



to any racial group. We acknowledge the omission of equipment violations and commit to expanding our analysis to examine these stops in future reports.


We suggest the FIP subcommittee develop a theory of change linking each recommendation to specific factors contributing to disparities (e.g., socioeconomic inequities, institutional practices, individual bias). This will allow us to better assess if reforms are addressing the intended aspects of the disparities.

We also recommend clarifying that the disparity figures compare stop demographics to city demographics, not necessarily differential treatment for identical behaviors, to accurately capture the complex factors shaping police interactions beyond just department policies.

Regarding implementation progress, BPD has engaged on every recommendation, completing all but one. The outstanding recommendation, 'Conduct a capacity study of police calls and responses and use of officer time outside of case work,' is expected to be completed by June, pending the results of an upcoming report from Citygate Associates. Our 2023 annual report reflects this progress and commitment. Beyond the completion of the final recommendation, the department will continue efforts related to fair and impartial policing and will continue to assess and review the efficacy of our efforts.

In conclusion, the Berkeley Police Department reaffirms our unwavering dedication to fair and impartial policing. We deeply value the PAB's crucial role in achieving our shared goals and welcome your continued feedback. BPD is committed to learning, improving, and engaging in open dialogue as we work together to promote equity and justice.

Thank you again for the opportunity to provide input. We look forward to our continued partnership to ensure Berkeley's policing lives up to our city's values.




No Material
Available for
this Item

There is no material for this item.

City Clerk Department
2180 Milvia Street
Berkeley, CA 94704
(510) 981-6900

The City of Berkeley Public Safety Policy Committee Webpage:

<https://berkeleyca.gov/your-government/city-council/council-committees/policy-committee-public-safety>



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